Can literature make it possible to represent histories that are otherwise ineffable? Making use of the Deleuzian concept of “the powers of the false,” Doro Wiese offers readings of three novels that deal with the Shoah, with colonialism, and with racialized identities. She argues that Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything Is Illuminated, Richard Flanagan’s Gould’s Book of Fish, and Richard Powers’s The Time of Our Singing are novels in which a space for unvoiced, silent, or silenced difference is created. (...) Seen through the lens of Deleuze and his collaborators’ philosophy, literature is a means for mediating knowledge and affects about historical events. Going beyond any simple dichotomy between true and untrue accounts of what “really” happened in the past, literature’s powers of the false incite readers to long for a narrative space in which painful or shameful stories can be included. (shrink)

Can literature make it possible to represent histories that are otherwise ineffable? Making use of the Deleuzian concept of “the powers of the false,” Doro Wiese offers readings of three novels that deal with the Shoah, with colonialism, and with racialized identities. She argues that Jonathan Safran Foer’s _Everything Is Illuminated_, Richard Flanagan’s _Gould’s Book of Fish_, and Richard Powers’s _The Time of Our Singing _are novels in which a space for unvoiced, silent, or silenced difference is created. (...) Seen through the lens of Deleuze and his collaborators’ philosophy, literature is a means for mediating knowledge and affects about historical events. Going beyond any simple dichotomy between true and untrue accounts of what “really” happened in the past, literature’s powers of the false incite readers to long for a narrative space in which painful or shameful stories can be included. (shrink)

Some authors argue that phenomenal unity can be grounded in the attentional structure of consciousness, which endows conscious states with at least a foreground and a background. Accordingly, the phenomenal character of part of a conscious state comprises a content aspect and a structural aspect. This view presents the concern that such a structure does not bring about phenomenal unity, but phenomenal segregation, since the background is separated from the foreground. I argue that attention can still lead to a form (...) of phenomenal unity that connects the foreground with the background. Experiencing oneself as controlling the focus of attention can, at least occasionally, bring about an experienced connection between the attentional foreground and the attentional background of a conscious experience. (shrink)

This paper sketches an account that explains the elusive subjective quality of 'enduring substantiality' of the phenomenal self. It integrates a recent predictive processing account of the self by Chris Letheby and Philip Gerrans with key ideas of Michael Graziano's attention schema theory of consciousness. Similarly to the attention schema theory, the present account posits an internal model of ongoing attentional processing that supports attentional control. In terms of predictive processing, it is a dynamic model of precision estimates that represents (...) the salience of features, objects, and internal and external processes. The apparent substantiality of the self is then explained by a structural feature of this salience model: it binds different dimensions of salience by representations of higher-order dimensions of salience. The result of this salience binding is a phenomenally transparent 'salience object', which is represented as a cause of widespread changes in precision estimates, and results in a form of epistemic self-control. Phenomenologically, this goes along with the experience of the self as an attentional agent, and in this way creates the origin of our consciously experienced first-person perspective: I attend, I am. (shrink)

Definition of the problem The research and regulatory levels for data-intensive research in medicine are divergent. This results in a heterogeneous global field of regulating institutions with regionally unequal regulations, both in terms of the depth and restrictiveness of regulations. Despite or precisely because of the lack of globally binding regulation, nonbinding or only partially binding normative guidelines can also serve as orientation. But how should such normative regulation be designed in view of data-intensive research in medicine and what should (...) it be based on? Arguments The question of how concrete and in detail such research should be regulated can only be answered on a case-by-case basis for specific situations and institutions. Whether new norms or weightings of norms should be introduced, or whether the norms and their weightings should remain in place, can only be answered with reference to strong normative arguments. So far, there is a lack of compelling arguments in favour of new standards in view of data-intensive medical research. However, it is always necessary to translate norms, whether new or old, and apply them to a new method or technology. As in the past, both established and transparently communicated standards and an independent judgement on the application of these standards are therefore required. Conclusion In view of their particular suitability for this task, ethics committees should continue to be required and qualified as a procedural authority in the approval of data-intensive research in medicine; as an independent institution, they should make a judgement appropriate to the individual case on the basis of existing norms and standards. However, the changing practices of data-intensive research projects can also be reflected in new demands on research ethics committees, which should be addressed with reforms of their operating mode. (shrink)

Lambert Wiesing's The Philosophy of Perception challenges current theories of perception. Instead of attempting to understand how a subject perceives the world, Wiesing starts by taking perception to be real. He then asks what this reality means for a subject. In his original approach, the question of how human perception is possible is displaced by questions about what perception obliges us to be and do. He argues that perception requires us to be embodied, to be visible, and to continually participate (...) in the public and physical world we perceive. Only in looking at images, he proposes, can we achieve something like a break in participation, a temporary respite from this, one of perception's relentless demands. Wiesing's methods chart a markedly new path in contemporary perception theory. In addition to identifying common ground among diverse philosophical positions, he identifies how his own, phenomenological approach differs from those of many other philosophers, past and present. As part of the argument, he provides a succinct but comprehensive survey of the philosophy of images His original critical exposition presents scholars of phenomenology, perception and aesthetics with a new, important understanding of the old phenomenon, the human being in the world. (shrink)

A weak version of the life-mind continuity thesis entails that every living system also has a basic mind (with a non-representational form of intentionality). The strong version entails that the same concepts that are sufficient to explain basic minds (with non-representational states) are also central to understanding non-basic minds (with representational states). We argue that recent work on the free energy principle supports the following claims with respect to the life-mind continuity thesis: (i) there is a strong continuity between life (...) and mind; (ii) all living systems can be described as if they had representational states; (iii) the ’as-if representationality’ entailed by the free energy principle is central to understanding both basic forms of intentionality and intentionality in non-basic minds. In addition to this, we argue that the free energy principle also renders realism about computation and representation compatible with a strong life-mind continuity thesis (although the free energy principle does not entail computational and representational realism). In particular, we show how representationality proper can be grounded in ’as-if representationality’. (shrink)

The goal of this short chapter, aimed at philosophers, is to provide an overview and brief explanation of some central concepts involved in predictive processing (PP). Even those who consider themselves experts on the topic may find it helpful to see how the central terms are used in this collection. To keep things simple, we will first informally define a set of features important to predictive processing, supplemented by some short explanations and an alphabetic glossary. -/- The features described here (...) are not shared in all PP accounts. Some may not be necessary for an individual model; others may be contested. Indeed, not even all authors of this collection will accept all of them. To make this transparent, we have encouraged contributors to indicate briefly which of the features are necessary to support the arguments they provide, and which (if any) are incompatible with their account. For the sake of clarity, we provide the complete list here, very roughly ordered by how central we take them to be for “Vanilla PP” (i.e., a formulation of predictive processing that will probably be accepted by most researchers working on this topic). More detailed explanations will be given below. Note that these features do not specify individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of “predictive processing”. All we currently have is a semantic cluster, with perhaps some overlapping sets of jointly sufficient criteria. The framework is still developing, and it is difficult, maybe impossible, to provide theory-neutral explanations of all PP ideas without already introducing strong background assumptions. (shrink)

The article presents the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court from 26 February 2020 on assisted suicide. The statements regarding human dignity, human rights and the relationship between citizens and the state are examined. Furthermore, the consequences resulting from this interpretation of human dignity for states that are pluralistic and based on human rights will be laid out. The court’s judgment limits the power of parliaments and poses a challenge to many laws in states that see themselves as pluralistic, (...) human rights-based states. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

Does the assumption of a weak form of computational functionalism, according to which the right form of neural computation is sufficient for consciousness, entail that a digital computational simulation of such neural computations is conscious? Or must this computational simulation be implemented in the right way, in order to replicate consciousness? From the perspective of Karl Friston’s free energy principle, self-organising systems (such as living organisms) share a set of properties that could be realised in artificial systems, but are not (...) instantiated by computers with a classical (von Neumann) architecture. I argue that at least one of these properties, viz. a certain kind of causal flow, can be used to draw a distinction between systems that merely simulate, and those that actually replicate consciousness. (shrink)

Now available in English for the first time, The Visibility of the Image explores the development of an influential aesthetic tradition through the work of six figures. Analysing their contribution to the progress of formal aesthetics, from its origins in Germany in the 1880s to semiotic interpretations in America a century later, the six chapters cover: Robert Zimmermann (1824-1898), the first to separate aesthetics and metaphysics and approach aesthetics along the lines of formal logic, providing a purely syntactic way of (...) using signs, regardless of objective content; Alois Riegl (1858-1905), who went on to further develop aesthetics on the model of formal logic, creating a theory of style in response to Zimmermann's call for an aesthetics oriented toward formal logic; Heinrich Wölfflin (1864-1945), who represents a step toward an understanding of consciousness by using pictures as cognitive tools; Konrad Fiedler (1841-1895), the Saxon philosopher who considered the possibility that some kinds of images are made and viewed not for what they show, but for their visibility's sake alone; Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), responsible for taking up the connections between the problems of reducing the range of potential meanings and contexts of a given image down to just the picture surface; Charles William Morris (1901-1979), who set out to establish whether a picture with no objective reference, such as an abstract painting, still counts as a sign, and if so, in what sense. Bringing these thinkers together and interlinking their ideas, Lambert Wiesing presents an engaging history of formal aesthetics, while reconstructing the philosophical foundations for the appearance of new image forms in the 20th century, including the video-clip, abstract collage, digital simulation and virtual reality. Using this original approach, The Visibility of the Image introduces the rise of modern image theory and provides a valuable account of our engagement with pictures in the 21st century. (shrink)

Die Studien zur Philosophie des Bildes verfolgen eine doppelte Absicht: Sie bemühen sich einerseits um einen Überblick über die grundlegenden Positionen innerhalb der gegenwärtigen Bildwissenschaft und versuchen andererseits stets einen systematischen Hauptgedanken zu verteidigen: Bilder präsentieren; nur Bilder ermöglichen die artifizielle Präsenz von ausschließlich sichtbaren Dingen, die den Gesetzen der Physik enthoben sind. Vor dem Hintergrund dieses Bildbegriffs wird die Verwendung von Bildern als Zeichen aus einer phänomenologischen Sicht beschrieben, Platons Mimesis-Begriff anhand seiner kanonischen Bildvorstellungen rekonstruiert und die besondere Bedeutung (...) extremer Bildtypen - wie die virtuelle Realität, Benutzeroberflächen oder die Abstrakte Fotografie - für die philosophische Arbeit am Bildbegriff vorgeführt. (shrink)

Resumo: A máxima de Píndaro “torna-te o que tu és” representou por muito tempo o mote da formação humana, pautada historicamente por diversos humanismos, até ser ressignificada em um perspectiva pós-humanista por Nietzsche, que a retoma no subtítulo de sua obra autobiográfica Ecce Homo. Coube a Foucault, no entanto, apresentar uma versão transformada da velha máxima. “Tornarmo-nos o que nunca fomos” é a reivindicação de um cuidado de si liberto dos pressupostos metafísicos e ideológicos dos muitos humanismos que almejam impor (...) tipos humanos universais. O objetivo deste artigo é recuperar as linhas gerais desse movimento histórico-filosófico em dois momentos: primeiro, na transformação do sentido originário da máxima de Píndaro no uso que Nietzsche faz dela; depois, na crítica ao humanismo que segue com Heidegger e desemboca em Foucault. Argumenta-se que a versão foucaultiana da máxima de Píndaro, “torna-te o que nunca fostes”, pode ser assumida como um lema da formação pós-humanista. Palavras-chave: Formação; Humanismo; Pós-humanismo; Nietzsche; Foucault “To become what we have never been”: Foucault’s post-humanist version of the traditional motto of human formation Abstract: Pindar’s maxim “become what you are” represented for a long time the motto of human formation, historically guided by different humanisms, until it was re-signified in a post-humanist perspective by Nietzsche, who takes it up in the subtitle of his autobiographical work Ecce Homo. It was up to Foucault, however, to present a transformed version of the old maxim. “We have become what we have never been” is the demand for self-care freed from the metaphysical and ideological assumptions of the many humanisms that aim to impose universal human types. The aim of this article is to recover the general guidelines of this historical-philosophical movement in two moments: first, in the transformation of the original meaning of Pindar’s maxim in the use that Nietzsche makes of it; then, in the critique of humanism that follows with Heidegger and ends in Foucault. It is argued that the Foucauldian version of Pindar’s maxim, “become what you have never been”, may be assumed as a motto of post-humanist education. Key-words: Formation; Humanism; Post-humanism; Nietzsche; Foucault “Convertirse en algo que nunca se ha sido”: la versión poshumanista de Foucault para el mote tradicional de la formación humana Resumen: La máxima de Píndaro “conviértete en lo que tú eres” representó desde hace mucho tiempo el mote de la formación humana, pautada históricamente por diversos humanismos, hasta ser resignificada en una perspectiva poshumanista por Nietzche, que retoma en el subtítulo de su obra autobiográfica Ecce Homo. Sin embargo, cupo a Foucault presentar una versión transformada desde la vieja máxima. “Convertirse en algo que nunca se ha sido” es el reclamo de un cuidado de uno mismo liberto de los supuestos metafísicos e ideológicos de los muchos humanismos que desean imponer tipos humanos universales. El objetivo de este estudio es recuperar las líneas generales de ese movimiento histórico-filosófico en dos momentos: primero, en el cambio del sentido originario de la máxima de Píndaro en el uso que Nietzche hizo de ella; enseguida, en la crítica al humanismo que sigue con Heidegger y termina en Foucault. Se argumenta que la versión foucaultiana de la máxima de Píndaro, “Conviértete en lo que nunca has sido”, puede ser asumida como lema de la formación poshumanista. Palabras-clave: Formación; Humanismo; Poshumanismo; Nietzche; Foucault Data de registro: 22/08/2022 Data de aceite: 13/12/2022. (shrink)

O artigo trata, na perspectiva da filosofia heideggeriana, dos fundamentos ontológicos da socialização, da individuação e da singularização, cuja pertinência para o campo educacional é realçada por meio de uma aproximação do conceito alemão de formação (Bildung). O objetivo é mostrar que o modo como Heidegger aborda a questão do indivíduo e da sociedade, do si mesmo próprio e do si mesmo impessoal, em termos de autenticidade e inautenticidade, o inscreve no debate tradicional acerca da formação, enquanto autocultivo de si. (...) Nessa linha, o cuidado, indicado como essência do ser-aí, é interpretado como o termo heideggeriano para formação. (shrink)

The foundation of phenomenological image theories is the view that image perception leads to a perception sui generis . In order to grasp this peculiarity of image perception, two ways have traditionally been considered: either through a description of the particular object of image perception or through a description of the unique origin of image perception. This article explores a third way within the phenomenology of the image by trying to determine the uniqueness of image perception through its peculiar, necessary (...) effects on the observer of the image. The thesis is: The observer of an image does not become an image object in the image. It is only in the case of image perception that there is relief through a gap in participation. It is the perception of something without the demand, as the perceiving person, of being physically involved in what is perceived. (shrink)

Philosophische Mythen und Modelle. Unzufriedenheit auf höchstem Niveau ; Der Mythenvorwurf in der Philosophie ; Modellierende Philosophie : eine contradictio in adjecto ; Der Mythos des Gegebenen ; Vom Mythos desGegebenen zum Mythos des Mittelbaren ; Interpretationismus und Wahrnehmungsphilosophie ; Transzendentaler Interpretationismus ; Die Verbindung des Mythos des Gegebenen mit dem Mythos des Mittelbaren : Repräsentationalismus ; Das Paradigma des Zugangs -- Phänomenologie : die Philosophie ohne Modell. Phänomenale Gewißheit ; Vom cartesischen Cartesianismus zum phänomenologischen Cartesianimus ; Intentionalität : das (...) fundamentum inconcussum relationalis ; Zu den Sachen und zurück zur Sprache ; Phänomenologische Protreptik ; Eidetische Variation -- Das Mich der Wahrnehmung. Von den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit zu den Folgen der Wirklichkeit ; Vom Primat des Wahrnehmenden zum Primat der Wahrnehmung ; Vom Ich zum Mich der Wahrnehmung ; Die Zumutung dauernder Anwesenheit ; Die Beschreibung der Anwesenheitszumutung : der Gehalt der Wahrnehmung ; Die Qualität der Wahrenmung und der Auffassungssinn ; Sich sicher sein, daß etwas der Fall ist : Wissen und Gewißheit ; Die unmögliche Epoché ; Vom Eindruck zum Ausdruck zur Teilhabe ; Transzendentale Ästhetik und die Unterstellung von Anschauungsformen ; Die Leiblichkeit des Wahrnehmenden : eine folge der Wahrnehmung ; Die Kontinuität des Wahrgenommenen ; Das Wahrgenommene und die Ursache der Wahrnehmung ; Die Zumutung der Öffentlichkeit ; Die Identität des Mich -- Die Partizipationspause. Pause versus Unterbrechung ; Die drei Paradigmen der Bildwahrnehmungstheorie ; Das besondre Objekt der Bildwahrnehmung ; Die besonderen Folgen der Bildwahrnehmung ; Zum Zuschauen gezwungen ; Die optische Entindividualisierung des Mich ; Zur Teilnahme entschieden. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Die Forschungs- und Regulierungsebene bei datenintensiver Forschung in der Medizin liegen auseinander. Ein heterogenes Feld aus regulierenden Institutionen mit regional ungleichen Regelungen, sowohl hinsichtlich der Dichte als auch der Restriktivität von Regelungen, steht einer globalen Entwicklung der Technologien entgegen. Trotz oder gerade wegen mangelnder global-gültiger Regulierungen können auch unverbindliche oder nur bedingt verbindliche normative Vorgaben der Orientierung dienen. Doch wie soll eine solche normative Regulierung angesichts datenintensiver Forschung in der Medizin ausgestaltet werden und woran soll sie sich orientieren? Die (...) Frage, wie konkret und detailliert man eine solche Forschung regulieren sollte, lässt sich nur im Einzelfall für bestimmte Situationen und Institutionen beantworten. Ob dabei neue Normen oder Gewichtungen von Normen vorgenommen werden sollen, oder ob die Normen und deren Gewichtung weiterhin bestehen bleiben sollen, lässt sich nur mit Verweis auf starke normative Argumente beantworten. An zwingenden Argumenten für neue Normen angesichts der datenintensiven medizinischen Forschung mangelt es bisher. Dennoch ist eine Umsetzungsarbeit von Normen, egal ob neue oder alte, und deren Anwendung auf eine neue Methode oder Technologie allemal zu erbringen. Es bedarf daher – wie schon bisher – beider: sowohl etablierter und transparent kommunizierter Normen als auch des unabhängigen Urteils zur Anwendung dieser Normen. Angesichts der besonderen Eignung für diese Aufgabe sollten auch weiterhin Ethik-Kommissionen als prozedurale Instanz bei der Bewilligung von datenintensiver Forschung in der Medizin gefordert und befähigt werden, die als unabhängige Institution ein Urteil im Einzelfall anhand vorgegebener Normen fällen. Nichtsdestotrotz können sich die veränderten Praktiken datenintensiver Forschungsprojekte auch in neuen Anforderungen an Ethik-Kommissionen niederschlagen, denen mit Reformen der Arbeitsweise begegnet werden sollte. (shrink)

The article critically responds to "A Planetary Health Pledge for Health Professionals in the Anthropocene" which was published by Wabnitz et al. in The Lancet in November 2020. It focuses on the different roles and responsibilities of a physician. The pledge is criticised because it neglects the different roles, gives no answers in case of conflicting goals, and contains numerous inconsistencies. The relationship between the Planetary Health Pledge and the Declaration of Geneva is examined. It is argued that the Planetary (...) Health Pledge should have supplemented the Declaration of Geneva instead of changing it. (shrink)

Are there logically possible types of conscious experience that are nomologically impossible, given independently justified assumptions about the neural underpinnings of consciousness in human beings? In one sense, this is trivial: just consider the fact that the types of perceptual experiences we can have are limited by our sensory organs. But there may be non-trivial types of conscious experience that are impossible. For instance, if there is a basic type of self-consciousness, corresponding to a phenomenal property that is nomologically necessary (...) for consciousness, then experiences lacking this phenomenal property will be impossible. More generally, it may be that there are causal dependencies between the neural mechanisms that are required to instantiate distinct phenomenal properties. If this is the case, instantiating one of these phenomenal properties without certain others may be impossible, which means there are non-trivial cases of nomologically impossible types of conscious experience. This paper clarifies this hypothesis, outlines a general methodology for its investigation, and relates it to research on radical disruptions of self-consciousness. (shrink)

Vilém Flusser not only defines his theoretical work as phenomenology, he considers the act of photography itself a phenomenological act. For this reason this contribution seeks to answer the question how much Flusser’s conception of phenomenology owes to Edmund Husserl and in what ways he has transformed Husserl’s own philosophical tenets. The main idea of this essay is that Flusser has reduced Husserl’s phenomenology to the concept of phenomenography. Nowhere in Flusser, in fact, can we trace any mention of Husserl’s (...) idea of phenomenology as an aprioristic science of essentials. On the basis of this reduced understanding of phenomenology as a cultural science, however, Flusser discovers a remarkable structural affinity between philosophy and photography. (shrink)

This article presents the new German law on advance directives from 1 September 2009. The history of the parliamentary process of this law is described, the present regulations are explained, their relevance for medical practice discussed and shortcomings are identified. Finally, the new law is compared with other regulations in the international context. Previously established legal practice in Germany has now become largely confirmed by the new law: An advanced directive must be respected in any decision concerning medical treatment, regardless (...) of the stage of the illness. It can be informally revoked at any time, even with limited decision-making capacity. Nobody may be obliged to issue a directive in any way. Advance directives do not need notarisation or routine updating after certain time intervals. Provided that the patient, who is no longer mentally competent, has issued a lasting power of attorney, or provided that the patient has been appointed a healthcare proxy by the courts, this authorised surrogate must assert the patient's will. The role of the guardianship court is clarified: it only needs to be involved in cases of disagreement as to the patient's will. The new German law thus combines more legal certainty with a liberal emphasis on patient autonomy and flexible, adaptable regulations. (shrink)

We argue for a perspective on bilingual heritage speakers as native speakers of both their languages and present results from a large-scale, cross-linguistic study that took such a perspective and approached bilinguals and monolinguals on equal grounds. We targeted comparable language use in bilingual and monolingual speakers, crucially covering broader repertoires than just formal language. A main database was the open-access RUEG corpus, which covers comparable informal vs. formal and spoken vs. written productions by adolescent and adult bilinguals with heritage-Greek, (...) -Russian, and -Turkish in Germany and the United States and with heritage-German in the United States, and matching data from monolinguals in Germany, the United States, Greece, Russia, and Turkey. Our main results lie in three areas. We found non-canonical patterns not only in bilingual, but also in monolingual speakers, including patterns that have so far been considered absent from native grammars, in domains of morphology, syntax, intonation, and pragmatics. We found a degree of lexical and morphosyntactic inter-speaker variability in monolinguals that was sometimes higher than that of bilinguals, further challenging the model of the streamlined native speaker. In majority language use, non-canonical patterns were dominant in spoken and/or informal registers, and this was true for monolinguals and bilinguals. In some cases, bilingual speakers were leading quantitatively. In heritage settings where the language was not part of formal schooling, we found tendencies of register leveling, presumably due to the fact that speakers had limited access to formal registers of the heritage language. Our findings thus indicate possible quantitative differences and different register distributions rather than distinct grammatical patterns in bilingual and monolingual speakers. This supports the integration of heritage speakers into the native-speaker continuum. Approaching heritage speakers from this perspective helps us to better understand the empirical data and can shed light on language variation and change in native grammars. Furthermore, our findings for monolinguals lead us to reconsider the state-of-the art on majority languages, given recurring evidence for non-canonical patterns that deviate from what has been assumed in the literature so far, and might have been attributed to bilingualism had we not included informal and spoken registers in monolinguals and bilinguals alike. (shrink)

The Hippocratic Oath and the Declaration of Geneva of the World Medical Association are compared in terms of content and origin. Their relevance for current medical practice is investigated. The status which is ascribed to these documents will be shown and the status which they can reasonably claim to have will be explored. Arguments in favor of the Hippocratic Oath that rely on historical stability or historical origin are being examined. It is demonstrated that they get caught up in paradoxes. (...) Should doctors swear the Hippocratic Oath or the Declaration of Geneva? The Hippocratic Oath is a remarkable historic document, which contains important elements still relevant for medical ethics today. Its interpretation as a timeless, still valid medical code is unfounded. The historical arguments, that should justify its validity, are untenable. The Declaration of Geneva, and not the Hippocratic Oath, can legitimately claim to come close to representing the most important principles of professional medical conduct in today’s globalised world. (shrink)

An interdisciplinary account of phenomenal unity, investigating how experiential wholes can be characterized and how such characterizations can be analyzed computationally. How can we account for phenomenal unity? That is, how can we characterize and explain our experience of objects and groups of objects, bodily experiences, successions of events, and the attentional structure of consciousness as wholes? In this book, Wanja Wiese develops an interdisciplinary account of phenomenal unity, investigating how experiential wholes can be characterized and how such characterization (...) can be analyzed conceptually as well as computationally. Wiese first addresses how the unity of consciousness can be characterized phenomenologically, discussing what it is like to experience wholes and what is the experiential contribution of phenomenal unity. Considering the associated conceptual and empirical issues, he draws connections to phenomenological accounts and research on Gestalt theory. The results show how the attentional structure of experience, the experience of temporal flow, and different types of experiential wholes contribute to our sense of phenomenal unity. Moreover, characterizing phenomenal unity in terms of the existence of a single global phenomenal state is neither necessary nor sufficient to adequately address the problem of phenomenal unity. Wiese then suggests that the concepts and ideas of predictive processing can be used to analyze phenomenal unity computationally. The result is both a conceptual framework and an interdisciplinary account: the regularity account of phenomenal unity. According to this account, experienced wholes correspond to a hierarchy of connecting regularities. The brain tracks these regularities by hierarchical prediction error minimization, which approximates hierarchical Bayesian inference. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Artikel untersucht die Frage, ob es sinnvoll ist, Doping im Sport unter ärztlicher Kontrolle freizugeben. Dazu werden die Auswirkungen einer Freigabe untersucht, die stets nur eine begrenzte Freigabe wäre, allein wegen der Risiken. Die unangenehmen Begleiterscheinungen der Dopingkontrollen würden nicht entfallen. Die Auswirkungen einer Freigabe von Doping im Wettkampfsport wären entweder unsinnig oder aber mit Nachteilen behaftet. Es ist nicht notwendig, die Frage zu klären, was die „Idee des Sportes“ ausmacht und ob sie verändert werden darf. Allein unter praktischen (...) Aspekten zeigt sich, dass dem Sport mit einer Freigabe des Dopings keine Vorteile, aber viele Nachteile erwachsen. (shrink)

What constitutes our number concept? What makes it possible for us to employ numbers the way we do; which mental faculties contribute to our grasp of numbers? What do we share with other species, and what is specific to humans? How does our language faculty come into the picture? This 2003 book addresses these questions and discusses the relationship between numerical thinking and the human language faculty, providing psychological, linguistic and philosophical perspectives on number, its evolution and its development in (...) children. Heike Wiese argues that language as a human faculty plays a crucial role in the emergence of systematic numerical thinking. She characterises number sequences as powerful and highly flexible mental tools that are unique to humans and shows that it is language that enables us to go beyond the perception of numerosity and to develop such mental tools. (shrink)

Paweł Gładziejewski has recently argued that the framework of predictive processing postulates genuine representations. His focus is on establishing that certain structures posited by PP actually play a representational role. The goal of this paper is to promote this discussion by exploring the contents of representations posited by PP. Gładziejewski already points out that structural theories of representational content can successfully be applied to PP. Here, I propose to make the treatment slightly more rigorous by invoking Francis Egan’s distinction between (...) mathematical and cognitive contents. Applying this distinction to representational contents in PP, I first show that cognitive contents in PP are determined by mathematical contents, at least in the sense that computational descriptions in PP put constraints on ascriptions of cognitive contents. After that, I explore to what extent these constraints are specific. I argue that the general mathematical contents posited by PP do not constrain ascriptions of cognitive content in a specific way. However, there are at least three aspects of PP that constrain ascriptions of cognitive contents in more specific ways: formal PP models posit specific mathematical contents that define more specific constraints; PP entails claims about how computational mechanisms underpin cognitive phenomena ; the processing hierarchy posited by PP goes along with more specific constraints. (shrink)

Robots are increasingly envisaged as our future cohabitants. However, while considerable progress has been made in recent years in terms of their technological realization, the ability of robots to inter-act with humans in an intuitive and social way is still quite limited. An important challenge for social robotics is to determine how to design robots that can perceive the user’s needs, feelings, and intentions, and adapt to users over a broad range of cognitive abilities. It is conceivable that if robots (...) were able to adequately demonstrate this, humans would eventually accept them as social companions. We argue that the best way to achieve this is using a systematic experimental approach based on behavioral and physiological neuroscience methods such as motion/eye tracking, electroencephalography (EEG), or functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) embedded in interactive human-robot paradigms. This approach requires understanding how humans interact with each other, how they perform tasks together and how they develop feelings of social connection over time, and using these insights to formulate design principles that make social robots attuned to the workings of the human brain. In this review, we put forward the argument that the likelihood of artificial agents being perceived as social companions can be increased by designing them in a way that they are perceived as intentional agents that activate areas in the human brain involved in social-cognitive processing. We first review literature related to social-cognitive mechanisms involved in human-human interactions, and high-light the importance of perceiving others as intentional agents to activate these brain areas. We then discuss how attribution of intentionality can positively affect human-robot interaction by (a) fostering feelings of social connection, empathy and prosociality, and by (b) enhancing performance on joint human-robot tasks. Lastly, we describe circumstances under which attribution of intentionality to robot agents might be disadvantageous, and discuss challenges associated with designing social robots that are inspired by neuroscientific principles. (shrink)

Should models of consciousness be detailed _mechanistic_ models of particular types of systems, or should they be _minimal_ models that abstract away from the underlying mechanistic details and provide generalisations? Detailed mechanistic models may afford a complete and precise account of consciousness in human beings and other, physiologically similar mammals. But they do not provide a good model of consciousness in other animals, such as non-vertebrates, let alone artificial systems. Minimal models can be applicable to a wide range of different (...) conscious systems. But do they provide genuine explanations that are autonomous from explanations by detailed mechanistic models? This paper provides a taxonomy of minimal models and measures of consciousness, clarifies their relation to detailed mechanistic models, and highlights benefits of different minimalist approaches to consciousness. (shrink)

According to active inference, action is enabled by a top-down modulation of sensory signals. Computational models of this mechanism complement ideomotor theories of action representation. Such theories postulate common neural representations for action and perception, without specifying how action is enabled by such representations. In active inference, motor commands are replaced by proprioceptive predictions. In order to initiate action through such predictions, sensory prediction errors have to be attenuated. This paper argues that such top-down modulation involves systematic misrepresentations. More specifically, (...) the paper first argues for the following conditional claim. If active inference provides an accurate computational description of how action is enabled in the brain, then action is enabled by systematic misrepresentations. Furthermore, it is argued that an inference to the best explanation provides reason for believing the antecedent is true: Firstly, active inference provides a crucial extension to ideomotor theories. Secondly, active inference explains otherwise puzzling phenomena related to sensory attenuation, e.g. in force-matching or self-tickling paradigms. Taken together, these reasons support the claim that action is indeed enabled by systematic misrepresentations. The claim casts doubt on the assumption that representations are systematically beneficial to the extent that they are true: if the argument in this paper is sound, systematically beneficial misrepresentations may lie at the heart of our neural architecture. (shrink)

Der Beitrag untersucht die ethischen Konflikte, die einer Regelung der Arbeitszeit von Ärzten zugrunde liegen. Als oberstes ethisches Prinzip ist die Vermeidung von Schäden zu beachten, die durch Überarbeitung der Ärzte sowie durch übermäßige Aufteilung der Arbeit entstehen. Zudem sind andere ethische Prinzipien zu berücksichtigen, insbesondere die Schadensvermeidung und Nutzenmehrung für zukünftige Patienten sowie für die Ärzte. Der Beitrag begründet Präferenzen bei konfligierenden ethischen Prinzipien und untersucht überdies die strukturellen Schwierigkeiten, die unvermeidlich bei der Regelung einer komplexen Tätigkeit, wie der (...) ärztlichen, anfallen. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Definition of the problem: The regulation of residents' work hours involves several ethical conflicts which need to be systematically analysed and evaluated. Arguments and conclusion: The most important ethical principle when regulating work hours is to avoid the harm resulting from the over‐work of physicians and from an excessive division of labour. Additionally, other ethical principles have to be taken into account, in particular the principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence for future patients and for physicians. The article presents arguments (...) for balancing the relevant ethical principles and analyses the structural difficulties that occur unavoidably in any regulation of the complex activities of physicians. (shrink)

In reference to historical developments, this article introduces the topic of this special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, that is, the relationship(s) between theory and practice. The authors emphasize the need for scientific research in this neglected area for the sake of both clinical practice and medical education.

Personalized medicine plays an important role in the development of current medicine. Among the numerous statements regarding the future of personalized medicine, some can be found that accord medicine a new scientific status. Medicine will be transformed from an art to a science due to personalized medicine. This prognosis is supported by references to models of historical developments. The article examines what is meant by this prognosis, what consequences it entails, and how feasible it is. It refers to the long (...) tradition of epistemological thinking in medicine and the use of historical models for the development of medicine. The possible answers to the question “art or science” are systematized with respect to the core question about the relationship between knowledge and action. The prediction for medicine to develop from an ‘empirical healing art’ to a ‘rational, molecular science’ is nonsensical from an epistemological point of view. The historical models employed to substantiate the development of personalized medicine are questionable. (shrink)

This chapter explores to what extent some core ideas of predictive processing can be applied to the phenomenology of time consciousness. The focus is on the experienced continuity of consciously perceived, temporally extended phenomena (such as enduring processes and successions of events). The main claim is that the hierarchy of representations posited by hierarchical predictive processing models can contribute to a deepened understanding of the continuity of consciousness. Computationally, such models show that sequences of events can be represented as states (...) of a hierarchy of dynamical systems. Phenomenologically, they suggest a more fine-grained analysis of the perceptual contents of the specious present, in terms of a hierarchy of temporal wholes. Visual perception of static scenes not only contains perceived objects and regions but also spatial gist; similarly, auditory perception of temporal sequences, such as melodies, involves not only perceiving individual notes but also slightly more abstract features (temporal gist), which have longer temporal durations (e.g., emotional character or rhythm). Further investigations into these elusive contents of conscious perception may be facilitated by findings regarding its neural underpinnings. Predictive processing models suggest that sensorimotor areas may influence these contents. (shrink)