«De ahora en adelante una empresa podrá elegir entre el mecenazgo y el patrocinio, del mismo modo que puede hacerlo entre campañas de relaciones públicas y publicidad. Es una mera cuestión de estrategia. Creo que, para una empresa, el mecenazgo constituye un mejor medio de comunicación que el patrocinio ya que, al estar relacionado con la cultura por el valor semántico de su propio nombre, resulta más intelectual y cualitativo» (Alain-Dominique Perrin, Cartier International, «Art and Business», pág. 208).

Dans la lignée de la thèse pionnière (1988) de Dominique Godineau sur les Citoyennes tricoteuses : les femmes du peuple à Paris pendant la Révolution française (Perrin, 2004), Pauline Moszkowski-Ouargli nous propose, à partir de son mémoire (M2) qui a obtenu le prix 2013 de l’Association Mnémosyne, de déplacer notre regard des citoyennes parisiennes vers les citoyennes provinciales. L’originalité de son étude consiste à interroger conjointement, sources à l’appui, le processus d’inclusion/exc...

Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...) and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We'll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it's true. We will show how Explanationism offers a better account of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better account of knowledge. (shrink)

Is an appropriate causal connection to the past experience it represents a necessary condition for a mental state to qualify as an episodic memory? For some years this issue has been the subject of an intense debate between the causalist theory of episodic memory (CTM) and the simulationist theory of episodic memory (STM). This paper aims at exploring the prospects for an embodied approach to episodic memory and assessing the potential case for causalism that could be founded on it. In (...) a critical section, it argues that the empirical data to which STM appeals are both incomplete and inconclusive, and on closer examination even provide support for a proceduralist version of CTM. In a constructive section, it elaborates on the notion of a necessary causal connection in terms of particular procedural patterns acquired at encoding and operative at retrieval, grounding this move on recent empirical data about eye movements in mnemonic mental imagery. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest among philosophers of memory in the questions of how to characterize and to account for the temporal phenomenology of episodic memory. One prominent suggestion has been that episodic memory involves a feeling of pastness, the elaboration of which has given rise to two main approaches. On the intentionalist approach, the feeling of pastness is explained in terms of what episodic memory represents. In particular, Fernández has argued that it can be explained (...) in terms of memory representing itself as being caused by a past perceptual experience. On the metacognitive approach, which we have recently developed in, the feeling of pastness results from the monitoring and interpretation of the processing features of episodic remembering. In this paper, we show that the metacognitive approach should be preferred over the intentionalist approach. We argue that intentionalism, and Fernández’ causal self-referential view in particular, ultimately fail as accounts of the feeling of pastness. The difficulties faced by intentionalism allows us to single out three constraints that any satisfactory account of the temporal phenomenology of episodic remembering needs to meet. We conclude by arguing that the metacognitive view satisfies those constraints in a neat way, and as such, that it should be preferred over intentionalism. (shrink)

This paper tackles the issue of the diversity of déjà experiences. According to the standard view in the neuropsychological literature, they should all be defined by means of a psychological criterion, by which they are experiences triggered by a perceived item and consist of a conscious clash between a first-order feeling of familiarity about the item and a second-order evaluation that assesses the first-order feeling as erroneous. This paper dismisses the standard view and contends there are two types of déjà (...) experiences, labeled déjà vu and déjà vécu respectively. But it also takes issue with the rare proponents of a distinct déjà vécu type. Contrary to their achievement view, it argues that recollection is not involved in déjà vécu experiences as an actual mental state or a component thereof. In our ability view, déjà vécu involves the feeling that one could recollect past occurrences of a currently lived episode of experience. (shrink)

Around sixty years ago, Martin and Deutscher (1966) published a paper about the conditions under which an occurring mental state qualifies as episodically remembering. Recent philosophy of memory has developed this ontological interrogation in depth. But while it has significantly contributed to the ontological characterisation of episodic memory, it has also left aside an important part of it. Our memories not only occur, they also reoccur: we re-remember. This raises the ontological issue of their identity over time, along with the (...) related issue of their individuation. In the present paper, I explore this as yet uncharted territory of the ontology of episodic memories. I show first that the notion of re-remembering refers to a genuine mnemic phenomenon, and as such requires a theoretical account. I then proceed to design candidate accounts of said phenomenon, two of which, I claim, are particularly promising. (shrink)

A common view about the phenomenology of episodic remembering has it that when we remember a perceptual experience, we can relive or re-experience many of its features, but not its characteristic presence. In this paper, we challenge this common view. We first say that presence in perception divides into temporal and locative presence, with locative having two sides, an objective and a subjective one. While we agree with the common view that temporal and objective locative presence cannot be relived in (...) remembering, we argue that subjective locative presence – the feeling of being immersed in a certain scene – can be so. Our argument for this claim starts by determining independently the underpinning mechanisms of subjective locative presence in quasi-perceptual imagination. These mechanisms are self-projection, imaginative pretence, and attentional focus. We then proceed to establish that they have been found to underpin conscious states of episodic remembering too. We conclude that episodic remembering can bring us to relive the subjective locative presence characteristic of a perceptual experience, and that the common view is mistaken. Our view – ‘mnemonic immersivism’ – has important consequences regarding the relationships between memory and imagination and the phenomenology of episodic remembering. (shrink)

Judgments based on episodic memory are often thought to be immune to errors of misidentification (IEM). Yet there is a certain category of episodic memories, viz. observer memories, that seems to threaten IEM. In the resulting debate, some say that observer memories are a threat to the IEM enjoyed by episodic memory (Michaelian, 2021); others say that they pose no such threat (Fernández, 2021; Lin, 2020). In this paper, we argue for a middle way. First, we frame the debate, claiming (...) that the existing literature lacks a satisfying definition both of observer memories and of the precise issue of errors of identification in such memories. Then, we contribute to the debate by challenging an anti-separatist view about the relation between phenomenal and intentional features of observer memories that looms behind this debate. On this view, if the rememberer's self is a phenomenal feature of the memory, by implication it is also built into the intentional content. We reject this view and offer a moderate separatist account. Distinguishing between empirically-grounded species of observer memories, we say that the phenomenal self sometimes is, and sometimes is not built into the intentional content of the memory, and this results in different implications for IEM. (shrink)

Showing a very early interest in Descartes, after having first considered him as a Christian thinker in the perspective of a deconstruction of religious life, Heidegger soon regards him as the major obstacle to the phenomenological analyses he wants to develop, as part of the first ontological search he gave himself: that of a hermeneutics of facticity. Therefore, the latter immediately takes in his work the shape of a hermeneutics of the I think, therefore I am, its author being blamed (...) for having entirely ignored the sense of being in the I am, focused as he is on the thinking ego, the ins and outs of which he develops. But the criticism also applying to Husserl, it is by laying the blame on his master, that Heidegger intends to radicalize the project of his own master, hence the necessity to throw light on the origin and the foundations of what we can call the Cartesian question in Heidegger. (shrink)

La pensee de Ludwig Wittgenstein est animee, tout au long des annees 1930 et 1940, par une meditation de la question du temps. C'est un de ses aspects les plus mal connus. Ce livre vise a restituer cette meditation dans sa force et sa singularite, afin d'etablir la contribution qu'elle apporte a la tradition qui s'est consacree a cette question majeure de la philosophie. Il montre d'abord comment la tentation d'accorder un privilege au present constitue un element essentiel du projet (...) phenomenologique wittgensteinien de 1929, avant d'explorer le travail critique auquel Wittgenstein soumet ce projet au cours des deux decennies suivantes, et qui le conduit a situer dans un certain rapport a notre langage l'origine de notre facon de penser la temporalite. Une analyse originale du langage ordinaire permet ainsi de reevaluer les theories classiques du temps que proposent la phenomenologie, la philosophie de la psychologie et la philosophie du langage. (shrink)

L’auteur, dans cet article, analyse la façon dont elle crée une fiction philosophique pour le jeune public et comment la théâtralité en surgit. Fondée sur un axe spatio-temporel lié à l’esthétique et à la poétique des philosophes choisis, apparaissent les personnages conceptuels ou ceux de l’Idiot questionneur. Le dialogue est ensuite analysé comme vecteur de la philosophie, à la fois dans sa discursivité et ses structures stylistiques. Enfin, l’auteur conclut à la nécessité de voir le texte théâtral comme un matériau (...) textuel susceptible de générer des pratiques philosophiques en ateliers. (shrink)

Condemned to exist beyond his essence, since he is only what he does and can always become what he is not or not to be what he is any more, man is, for Sartre, condemned to freedom without condition which constitutes, not his nature, but his condition. Free of anything apart from not being free, since he chooses neither to be, nor the necessity to choose the being that he must make himself be, man, however, is always already determined by (...) his condition: thrown in to a world where he acknowledges his own condition. Far from calling into question the integrity of his autonomy of choice, this ontological conditioning is for the Being-itself the ground on which the need for his engagement appears and, therefore also the plenitude of his freedom. As tragic as that which one considers controlled by fate, for Sartre, the human condition thus means being condemned to freedom. (shrink)

On Barzykowski and Moulin's continuum hypothesis, déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) share their underpinning neurocognitive processes. A discontinuity issue for them is that familiarity and episodic recollection exhibit different neurocognitive signatures. This issue can be overcome, I say, provided the authors are ready to distinguish a déjà vécu/episodic IAM continuity and a déjà vu/semantic IAM continuity.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reading Plato's Dialogues to Enhance Learning and Inquiry: Exploring Socrates' Use of Protreptic for Student Engagement by Mason MarshallWilliam PerrinMARSHALL, Mason. Reading Plato's Dialogues to Enhance Learning and Inquiry: Exploring Socrates' Use of Protreptic for Student Engagement. New York: Routledge, 2021. 223 pp. Cloth, $136.00; paper, $39.16One doesn't need to search to find criticism of contemporary democratic citizens. We are told we are an ignorant, dogmatic, and generally (...) vicious bunch. These traits, it's natural to think, make trouble for our democracy. One solution, Mason Marshall argues, is to read Plato to reform our vicious tendencies. This might be surprising, considering Plato is sometimes portrayed as a great enemy of democracy. But Marshall doesn't propose to read Plato to find out what Plato thought, or to mine his dialogues for promising arguments. Rather, Marshall proposes to read Plato to develop a theory of philosophical protreptic. "Protreptic," as used by Marshall, means to turn someone toward a new end. And thus, philosophical protreptic is turning someone "so that they want truth more than anything else." The idea, then, is to use Plato to protrepticize students, in order to cultivate democracy-required character traits in students.There are, broadly speaking, two parts to the book. Marshall, in one part, sketches two ways of carrying out his project, a top-down approach (chapter 1) and a bottom-up approach (chapter 2), before putting the project in action to illustrate its value (chapter 5). In the second part of the book, Marshall defends his project from the charge that it's an illegitimate approach to Plato scholarship (chapter 3) and from the charge that his approach would not be sufficiently valuable (chapter 4). Surprisingly, given the stated aim of the book, chapters 3 and 4 take up the bulk of the pages. I offer an explanation of this striking feature below. But first, I follow Marshall's structure in summarizing the two parts.Marshall begins with the top-down approach. The reader would suppose that above all else Socrates aims to foster self-examination in his interlocutors, before imagining various strategies Socrates could have pursued to satisfy this end. The reader evaluates the various imagined strategies, not for whether they are the ones Socrates uses in the text but for how well they would achieve the end. For example, one might think that Socrates, in order to protrepticize Euthyphro, must convince Euthyphro that he needs to be able to cogently answer philosophical questions, if only so that he does not look foolish when facing them. The reader would then sketch thought experiments varying along the axis of harshness—how abrasive Socrates' humiliation of Euthyphro must be—before evaluating which scenario would most likely lead to self-examination.The bottom-up approach proceeds in the opposite order: One starts by wondering what the intermediate ends motivating Socrates' actual behavior in the dialogues could be. For example, one would ask why Socrates muddies the waters in offering convoluted definitions of piety in the Euthyphro (11e7–12d4). It could be that Socrates wants to make Euthyphro look silly, that Socrates wants to overwhelm him, or that Socrates wants Euthyphro to agree to a view Socrates is anxious to refute. It could be all three. But the idea is to identify the strategies that make the [End Page 353] most sense of the supposition that Socrates aims, above all else, to foster self-examination, before evaluating them for their likelihood of turning someone to self-examination.Marshall, in the second part of the book, defends his approach from the objection that, since his project isn't aiming to articulate the content of Plato's mental states, or mining for arguments, he is co-opting Plato illegitimately. The basic defense is that we would have to know much more about Plato's intentions than we do for the charge to stick. In short, given that we are largely unable to articulate the assumptions we have regarding what goods an interpretation of a text will win us, we will be unable to arbitrate between radically different, yet internally coherent, interpretations of Plato.It is initially puzzling why Marshall spends... (shrink)

"Join up, they said! It’s a man’s life, they said!"Cartesian Lineage and Tradition in Being and Nothingness While Descartes is literally present in 27 of 722 pages that Being and Nothingness counts, Hegel appears in 43, Husserl in 46 and Heidegger in 47 of them. Without asserting, and thus without infirming the obvious influence of these three German thinkers on it, one year after his essay of phenomenological ontology, it is nevertheless the filiation and the manner of only the French (...) philosopher that Sartre claims in front of Pierre Lorquet. So, which relative and which model is Descartes for him? And what relationship does Sartre exactly maintain with him? Following the track of the latter in the 1943 treatise, I want to ensure that “the individual of existentialism is Descartes’s true heir”. (shrink)

Motif déterminant de l’analytique existentiale, le On — das Man — n’est jamais interrogé pour lui-même par les commentateurs de Heidegger ; il fait pourtant de leur part l’objet d’interprétations non seulement très contrastées, mais encore fort éloignées de ce que le penseur allemand semblait avoir envisagé en menant son analyse. D’où la nécessité d’en faire le sujet central d’une réflexion qui, en contrepoint des lectures historique­ment situées et scientifiquement orientées, entend éclairer l’être qui est le sien en le ramenant (...) à son statut d’existential d’un Dasein dont il constitue, toujours et d’emblée, l’ombre portée. (shrink)

resumo Este artigo parte da constatação de que a análise jamesiana da consciência do tempo constituiu uma fonte comum fundamental das meditações husserlianas e wittgensteinianas relativas ao tempo, o specious present engendrando tanto o ursprüngliche Zeitfeld de Husserl quanto o fliehende Gegenwart do Wittgenstein de 1929. Em seguida, examino a possibilidade de apreender a articulação entre as concepções do tempo de Husserl e de Wittgenstein no nível de suas respectivas apropriações da análise de James. Respondendo de modo afirmativo, sustento de (...) início que essas apropriações se cruzam na crítica do presentismo jamesiano e da idéia segundo a qual a lembrança é uma imagem-cópia presente. Sustento, em seguida, que o anti-psicologismo dá lugar, no entanto, a desenvolvimentos muito diferentes em Husserl e em Wittgenstein. Aquele, com efeito, visa purificar o "núcleo fenomenológico" contido na análise jamesiana de seus resíduos psicológicos para revelar o que ele nos ensina acerca dos modos de aparecer temporais essenciais. De modo inteiramente diferente, Wittgenstein irá pôr em questão a própria imagem do fluxo do presente de consciência, ao descrever a genealogia dessa imagem a partir de erros acerca da linguagem ordinária. O resultado desse artigo é duplo: de um lado, se a análise jamesiana é realmente uma fonte comum às reflexões husserliana e wittgensteiniana acerca do tempo, no final das contas ela dá lugar a apropriações quase opostas; de outro, o debate James-Husserl-Wittgenstein permite confrontar as abordagens psicológica, fenomenológica e gramatical do tempo, e, desse modo, em particular, especificar esta última. palavras-chave James – Husserl – Wittgenstein – tempo - fenomenologia. (shrink)

For some fifteen years in his chemistry lectures in Edinburgh, Joseph Black taught that phlogiston possesses absolute levity. It was not an aberration on Black's part: he justified the notion on experimental grounds. Moreover, the existence of a nongravitating substance capable of entering the composition of bodies raised intriguing possibilities for uniting physical and chemical phenomena. The doctrine became something of a tradition in Edinburgh, but was subject to growing criticism, particulary with the growth of pneumatic chemistry. By the early (...) 1780s, Black found the hypothesis was no longer tenable and quietly dropped it, leaving a void in the explanation of weight relations in combustion which his students were quick to fill with Lavoisier's oxygen theory. (shrink)

We have never been so indebted. However, we have never felt less in debt. This paradox of our time deserves some clarifications. While watching critically at the debt, which, through philosophy and not economy, tends to enlighten the reality of today’s crisis by the structural crisis touching its concept, that is what we try to do. We base our explorations on philosophy as well as literature. Indeed the great thinkers tend to get indebted towards each other without reflecting on their (...) debt. Presenting the essence of the debt first leads us to assert that the debt is not the consequence of a gift anymore than the duty would be a consequence of the debt. Stating the meaning of it more precisely makes us report the mundane debts on the humane debt, that which we have to pay and that which we may honor. (shrink)