«De ahora en adelante una empresa podrá elegir entre el mecenazgo y el patrocinio, del mismo modo que puede hacerlo entre campañas de relaciones públicas y publicidad. Es una mera cuestión de estrategia. Creo que, para una empresa, el mecenazgo constituye un mejor medio de comunicación que el patrocinio ya que, al estar relacionado con la cultura por el valor semántico de su propio nombre, resulta más intelectual y cualitativo» (Alain-Dominique Perrin, Cartier International, «Art and Business», pág. 208).

Dans la lignée de la thèse pionnière (1988) de Dominique Godineau sur les Citoyennes tricoteuses : les femmes du peuple à Paris pendant la Révolution française (Perrin, 2004), Pauline Moszkowski-Ouargli nous propose, à partir de son mémoire (M2) qui a obtenu le prix 2013 de l’Association Mnémosyne, de déplacer notre regard des citoyennes parisiennes vers les citoyennes provinciales. L’originalité de son étude consiste à interroger conjointement, sources à l’appui, le processus d’inclusion/exc...

Is an appropriate causal connection to the past experience it represents a necessary condition for a mental state to qualify as an episodic memory? For some years this issue has been the subject of an intense debate between the causalist theory of episodic memory (CTM) and the simulationist theory of episodic memory (STM). This paper aims at exploring the prospects for an embodied approach to episodic memory and assessing the potential case for causalism that could be founded on it. In (...) a critical section, it argues that the empirical data to which STM appeals are both incomplete and inconclusive, and on closer examination even provide support for a proceduralist version of CTM. In a constructive section, it elaborates on the notion of a necessary causal connection in terms of particular procedural patterns acquired at encoding and operative at retrieval, grounding this move on recent empirical data about eye movements in mnemonic mental imagery. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest among philosophers of memory in the questions of how to characterize and to account for the temporal phenomenology of episodic memory. One prominent suggestion has been that episodic memory involves a feeling of pastness, the elaboration of which has given rise to two main approaches. On the intentionalist approach, the feeling of pastness is explained in terms of what episodic memory represents. In particular, Fernández has argued that it can be explained (...) in terms of memory representing itself as being caused by a past perceptual experience. On the metacognitive approach, which we have recently developed in, the feeling of pastness results from the monitoring and interpretation of the processing features of episodic remembering. In this paper, we show that the metacognitive approach should be preferred over the intentionalist approach. We argue that intentionalism, and Fernández’ causal self-referential view in particular, ultimately fail as accounts of the feeling of pastness. The difficulties faced by intentionalism allows us to single out three constraints that any satisfactory account of the temporal phenomenology of episodic remembering needs to meet. We conclude by arguing that the metacognitive view satisfies those constraints in a neat way, and as such, that it should be preferred over intentionalism. (shrink)

Although episodic memory is a widely studied form of memory both in philosophy and psychology, it still raises many burning questions regarding its definition and even its acceptance. Over the last two decades, cross-disciplinary discussions between these two fields have increased as they tackle shared concerns, such as the phenomenology of recollection, and therefore allow for fruitful interaction. This editorial introduction aims to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date presentation of the main existing conceptions and issues on the topic. After delineating (...) Tulving’s chief theoretical import and multifaceted legacy, it goes on to chart the different attempts to capture the episodicity feature of memory according to three categories: a first approach aims to show the cognitive abilities required for a subject to episodically remember; the second defines episodicity as a stage-specific feature; the last explains episodicity in terms of the epistemological properties of episodic memory. This state of the art thereby sets the stage for the contributions of the present volume, which will be introduced in conclusion. (shrink)

This paper tackles the issue of the diversity of déjà experiences. According to the standard view in the neuropsychological literature, they should all be defined by means of a psychological criterion, by which they are experiences triggered by a perceived item and consist of a conscious clash between a first-order feeling of familiarity about the item and a second-order evaluation that assesses the first-order feeling as erroneous. This paper dismisses the standard view and contends there are two types of déjà (...) experiences, labeled déjà vu and déjà vécu respectively. But it also takes issue with the rare proponents of a distinct déjà vécu type. Contrary to their achievement view, it argues that recollection is not involved in déjà vécu experiences as an actual mental state or a component thereof. In our ability view, déjà vécu involves the feeling that one could recollect past occurrences of a currently lived episode of experience. (shrink)

Around sixty years ago, Martin and Deutscher (1966) published a paper about the conditions under which an occurring mental state qualifies as episodically remembering. Recent philosophy of memory has developed this ontological interrogation in depth. But while it has significantly contributed to the ontological characterisation of episodic memory, it has also left aside an important part of it. Our memories not only occur, they also reoccur: we re-remember. This raises the ontological issue of their identity over time, along with the (...) related issue of their individuation. In the present paper, I explore this as yet uncharted territory of the ontology of episodic memories. I show first that the notion of re-remembering refers to a genuine mnemic phenomenon, and as such requires a theoretical account. I then proceed to design candidate accounts of said phenomenon, two of which, I claim, are particularly promising. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a psychologically-informed philosophical account of the phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, in favour of the view that the phenomenology of remembering—autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness, as we will refer to it here—is an epistemic feeling, but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have (...) so far been proposed. Building on insights from the psychological literature, we argue that a form of feeling-based metacognition is involved in episodic remembering and develop an integrated metacognitive feeling-based view that addresses several key aspects of the feeling of pastness, namely, its status as a feeling, its content, and its relationship to the first-order memories the phenomenology of which it provides. (shrink)

A common view about the phenomenology of episodic remembering has it that when we remember a perceptual experience, we can relive or re-experience many of its features, but not its characteristic presence. In this paper, we challenge this common view. We first say that presence in perception divides into temporal and locative presence, with locative having two sides, an objective and a subjective one. While we agree with the common view that temporal and objective locative presence cannot be relived in (...) remembering, we argue that subjective locative presence – the feeling of being immersed in a certain scene – can be so. Our argument for this claim starts by determining independently the underpinning mechanisms of subjective locative presence in quasi-perceptual imagination. These mechanisms are self-projection, imaginative pretence, and attentional focus. We then proceed to establish that they have been found to underpin conscious states of episodic remembering too. We conclude that episodic remembering can bring us to relive the subjective locative presence characteristic of a perceptual experience, and that the common view is mistaken. Our view – ‘mnemonic immersivism’ – has important consequences regarding the relationships between memory and imagination and the phenomenology of episodic remembering. (shrink)

Judgments based on episodic memory are often thought to be immune to errors of misidentification (IEM). Yet there is a certain category of episodic memories, viz. observer memories, that seems to threaten IEM. In the resulting debate, some say that observer memories are a threat to the IEM enjoyed by episodic memory (Michaelian, 2021); others say that they pose no such threat (Fernández, 2021; Lin, 2020). In this paper, we argue for a middle way. First, we frame the debate, claiming (...) that the existing literature lacks a satisfying definition both of observer memories and of the precise issue of errors of identification in such memories. Then, we contribute to the debate by challenging an anti-separatist view about the relation between phenomenal and intentional features of observer memories that looms behind this debate. On this view, if the rememberer's self is a phenomenal feature of the memory, by implication it is also built into the intentional content. We reject this view and offer a moderate separatist account. Distinguishing between empirically-grounded species of observer memories, we say that the phenomenal self sometimes is, and sometimes is not built into the intentional content of the memory, and this results in different implications for IEM. (shrink)

Showing a very early interest in Descartes, after having first considered him as a Christian thinker in the perspective of a deconstruction of religious life, Heidegger soon regards him as the major obstacle to the phenomenological analyses he wants to develop, as part of the first ontological search he gave himself: that of a hermeneutics of facticity. Therefore, the latter immediately takes in his work the shape of a hermeneutics of the I think, therefore I am, its author being blamed (...) for having entirely ignored the sense of being in the I am, focused as he is on the thinking ego, the ins and outs of which he develops. But the criticism also applying to Husserl, it is by laying the blame on his master, that Heidegger intends to radicalize the project of his own master, hence the necessity to throw light on the origin and the foundations of what we can call the Cartesian question in Heidegger. (shrink)

La pensee de Ludwig Wittgenstein est animee, tout au long des annees 1930 et 1940, par une meditation de la question du temps. C'est un de ses aspects les plus mal connus. Ce livre vise a restituer cette meditation dans sa force et sa singularite, afin d'etablir la contribution qu'elle apporte a la tradition qui s'est consacree a cette question majeure de la philosophie. Il montre d'abord comment la tentation d'accorder un privilege au present constitue un element essentiel du projet (...) phenomenologique wittgensteinien de 1929, avant d'explorer le travail critique auquel Wittgenstein soumet ce projet au cours des deux decennies suivantes, et qui le conduit a situer dans un certain rapport a notre langage l'origine de notre facon de penser la temporalite. Une analyse originale du langage ordinaire permet ainsi de reevaluer les theories classiques du temps que proposent la phenomenologie, la philosophie de la psychologie et la philosophie du langage. (shrink)

« Je dirai quelque jour vos naissances latentes »Rimbaud, « Voyelles » « À présent l’inflexion éternelle des moments et l’infini des mathématiques me chassent par ce monde »Rimbaud, Illuminations, « Guerre » I. Difficultés d’une eidétique de l’historicité Toute réflexion phénoménologique sur la structure et les modalités essentielles de l’historicité se heurte à une difficulté essentielle : comment atteindre l’invariant eidétique de toute historicité en général, quels qu’en soient le domaine...

L’auteur, dans cet article, analyse la façon dont elle crée une fiction philosophique pour le jeune public et comment la théâtralité en surgit. Fondée sur un axe spatio-temporel lié à l’esthétique et à la poétique des philosophes choisis, apparaissent les personnages conceptuels ou ceux de l’Idiot questionneur. Le dialogue est ensuite analysé comme vecteur de la philosophie, à la fois dans sa discursivité et ses structures stylistiques. Enfin, l’auteur conclut à la nécessité de voir le texte théâtral comme un matériau (...) textuel susceptible de générer des pratiques philosophiques en ateliers. (shrink)

Comme l'a écrit Jean Claude Passeron, quand la sociologie française s'attaque à la notion de populaire, «la morale s'en mêle»: le populaire conduit aux deux dérives symétriques et opposées du populisme et du légitimisme. Cette formulation du débat sur le populaire apparaît être spécifique à la France, et en partie due au fait que les échanges avec les sociologies de la culture anglo-saxonne sont restés faibles. À partir de quelques publications-clés dans chacune des traditions, cet article examine les divergences entre (...) les travaux en sociologie de la culture française, l'école anglaise des Cultural Studies, et les recherches américaines inspirées par l'interactionnisme. Il propose aussi de relier le parcours des recherches en sociologie des médias en France à travers cette histoire plus générale du sous-traitement de la catégorie du populaire dans la sociologie de la culture hexagonale.As Jean Claude Fasseron wrote, when French sociology tackles the concept of popular, "morals interferes himself: the popular one led to the two symmetrical and opposed drifts populism and legitimism. This formulation of the debate on the popular one appears being specific to France, and partly due to the fact that the exchanges with sociologies of the Anglo-Saxon culture remained weak. From some key publications in each tradition, this article examines the divergences between work in sociology of the French culture, the English school of Cultural Studies, and the American researches inspired by interactionnism. It also proposes to connect the map of research in sociology of media in France through this more general history of the under-processing of the category of popular in sociology of the hexagonal culture. (shrink)

Condemned to exist beyond his essence, since he is only what he does and can always become what he is not or not to be what he is any more, man is, for Sartre, condemned to freedom without condition which constitutes, not his nature, but his condition. Free of anything apart from not being free, since he chooses neither to be, nor the necessity to choose the being that he must make himself be, man, however, is always already determined by (...) his condition: thrown in to a world where he acknowledges his own condition. Far from calling into question the integrity of his autonomy of choice, this ontological conditioning is for the Being-itself the ground on which the need for his engagement appears and, therefore also the plenitude of his freedom. As tragic as that which one considers controlled by fate, for Sartre, the human condition thus means being condemned to freedom. (shrink)

There is no direct, constant relationship between the anthropological and cultural aspects of modernity. Anthropologically modern peoples display a certain heterogeneity that is not unconnected with earlier peoples, and the culture produced by modern humans, which is also heterogeneous, is differentiated diachronically and according to territory. Though paleogenetic research seems to point us to a single, African source for modern peoples, who had replaced the pre-sapiens populations in Eurasia, this view is not completely proven or accepted. On the other hand, (...) paleo-genetic research has contributed to our relinquishing the hypothesis of a multiregional ‘total continuity’ of local pre-modern populations in the Old World. Indeed the theory of a partial replacement, by a migration ‘out of Africa’, appears to be getting increasingly plausible. This article deals with the problems of the origins of modern man from the points of view of anthropological, paleogenetic, paleoenvironmental and cultural approaches. (shrink)

On Barzykowski and Moulin's continuum hypothesis, déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) share their underpinning neurocognitive processes. A discontinuity issue for them is that familiarity and episodic recollection exhibit different neurocognitive signatures. This issue can be overcome, I say, provided the authors are ready to distinguish a déjà vécu/episodic IAM continuity and a déjà vu/semantic IAM continuity.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reading Plato's Dialogues to Enhance Learning and Inquiry: Exploring Socrates' Use of Protreptic for Student Engagement by Mason MarshallWilliam PerrinMARSHALL, Mason. Reading Plato's Dialogues to Enhance Learning and Inquiry: Exploring Socrates' Use of Protreptic for Student Engagement. New York: Routledge, 2021. 223 pp. Cloth, $136.00; paper, $39.16One doesn't need to search to find criticism of contemporary democratic citizens. We are told we are an ignorant, dogmatic, and generally (...) vicious bunch. These traits, it's natural to think, make trouble for our democracy. One solution, Mason Marshall argues, is to read Plato to reform our vicious tendencies. This might be surprising, considering Plato is sometimes portrayed as a great enemy of democracy. But Marshall doesn't propose to read Plato to find out what Plato thought, or to mine his dialogues for promising arguments. Rather, Marshall proposes to read Plato to develop a theory of philosophical protreptic. "Protreptic," as used by Marshall, means to turn someone toward a new end. And thus, philosophical protreptic is turning someone "so that they want truth more than anything else." The idea, then, is to use Plato to protrepticize students, in order to cultivate democracy-required character traits in students.There are, broadly speaking, two parts to the book. Marshall, in one part, sketches two ways of carrying out his project, a top-down approach (chapter 1) and a bottom-up approach (chapter 2), before putting the project in action to illustrate its value (chapter 5). In the second part of the book, Marshall defends his project from the charge that it's an illegitimate approach to Plato scholarship (chapter 3) and from the charge that his approach would not be sufficiently valuable (chapter 4). Surprisingly, given the stated aim of the book, chapters 3 and 4 take up the bulk of the pages. I offer an explanation of this striking feature below. But first, I follow Marshall's structure in summarizing the two parts.Marshall begins with the top-down approach. The reader would suppose that above all else Socrates aims to foster self-examination in his interlocutors, before imagining various strategies Socrates could have pursued to satisfy this end. The reader evaluates the various imagined strategies, not for whether they are the ones Socrates uses in the text but for how well they would achieve the end. For example, one might think that Socrates, in order to protrepticize Euthyphro, must convince Euthyphro that he needs to be able to cogently answer philosophical questions, if only so that he does not look foolish when facing them. The reader would then sketch thought experiments varying along the axis of harshness—how abrasive Socrates' humiliation of Euthyphro must be—before evaluating which scenario would most likely lead to self-examination.The bottom-up approach proceeds in the opposite order: One starts by wondering what the intermediate ends motivating Socrates' actual behavior in the dialogues could be. For example, one would ask why Socrates muddies the waters in offering convoluted definitions of piety in the Euthyphro (11e7–12d4). It could be that Socrates wants to make Euthyphro look silly, that Socrates wants to overwhelm him, or that Socrates wants Euthyphro to agree to a view Socrates is anxious to refute. It could be all three. But the idea is to identify the strategies that make the [End Page 353] most sense of the supposition that Socrates aims, above all else, to foster self-examination, before evaluating them for their likelihood of turning someone to self-examination.Marshall, in the second part of the book, defends his approach from the objection that, since his project isn't aiming to articulate the content of Plato's mental states, or mining for arguments, he is co-opting Plato illegitimately. The basic defense is that we would have to know much more about Plato's intentions than we do for the charge to stick. In short, given that we are largely unable to articulate the assumptions we have regarding what goods an interpretation of a text will win us, we will be unable to arbitrate between radically different, yet internally coherent, interpretations of Plato.It is initially puzzling why Marshall spends... (shrink)

Detroit is frequently viewed as a city where hope has been lost, government is totally dysfunctional, and the infrastructure is beyond repair. For far too many people around the world, the Motor City is perceived as a city whose greatness is in distant memory. Detroit Resurgent, while not ignoring the problems facing the city, explores Detroit in a new way that reveals a culturally rich, very alive, and undeniably present side of the city. Through photographic portraits, interviews, essays, and poetry, (...) it demonstrates the vitality and humanity of Detroit’s people, providing a powerful counternarrative to the vision of Detroit as a Rust Belt wasteland. Giving voice to people with hopes for a brighter future and aspirations to create a new city out of the old required recording their own words and engaging a portrait photographer grounded in humanism whose approach is based upon the traditions of social documentary photography. Detroit Resurgent explores the city through the voices of those working in a multitude of ways to reshape it into a twenty-first-century urban space, through the auto industry, urban agriculture and food production, entrepreneurial action and small business, visual and performing arts, activism, and visionary leadership. (shrink)