This chapter focuses on a widely held package of views, according to which: (i) assertions are governed by some alethic or epistemic norm, (ii) such a norm is intimately connected to assertion, in the sense that it individuates or characterizes the speech act, and (iii) this sense of intimate connection can be explained with the help of an analogy between language use and games. It is argued that this package of views must be rejected. More specifically, by considering some different (...) ways of spelling out the analogy mentioned in (iii), it is shown that at least that part of the package must be abandoned: even if some alethic or epistemic norm is intimately connected to assertion, that relationship is not mirrored by the relationship between norms and the games they govern. (shrink)

This chapter considers whether ordinary instances of racist hate speech can be authoritative, thereby constituting the subordination of people of color. It is often said that ordinary speakers cannot subordinate because they lack authority. Here it is argued that there are more ways in which speakers can come to have authority than have been generally recognized. In part, this is because authority has been taken to be too closely tied to social position. This chapter presents a series of examples which (...) show that speaker authority needn’t derive from social position at all. Moreover, these examples also show that a speaker can come to have authority even when they lack it prior to speaking. After distinguishing these different ways in which speakers can come to have authority, it is argued that there is ample reason to think that even producers of ordinary instances of racist hate speech can sometimes have authority in these ways. (shrink)

Analyzing a sample of 13,917 US firm–years from 1991 to 2006, we find that more innovative firms demonstrate high corporate social responsibility performance subsequent to a successful innovation. These high-CSR innovative firms enjoy significantly higher valuation post-innovation. These findings imply that firms with demonstrated potential growth opportunities, as evident from the number of registered patents and their citations, benefit by strategically investing more in CSR activities; that is, CSR investment entails ‘doing well by [strategically] doing good.’.

Pornography deserves special protections, it is often said, because it qualifies as speech. Therefore, no matter what we think of its content, we must afford it the protections that we extend to most speech, but don’t extend to other actions.1 In response, Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton have argued that the case is not so simple: one of the harms of pornography, they claim, is that it silences women’s speech, thereby preventing women from deriving from speech the very benefits that (...) warranted the special protections in the first place.2 At first glance, it is hard to see how to make sense of this response. If the claim is that pornography prevents women from actually uttering words, then it just seems false; on the other hand, if that isn’t the claim, then it isn’t clear how anyone can be said to be silenced. Faced with such worries, many have been inclined to dismiss these claims about silencing as confused. (shrink)

This volume draws on a range of approaches in order to explore the problem and determine what ought to be done about allegedly harmful speech.Most liberal societies are deeply committed to a principle of free speech. At the same time, however, there is evidence that some kinds of speech are harmful in ways that are detrimental to important liberal values, such as social equality. Might a genuine commitment to free speech require that we legally permit speech even when it is (...) harmful, and even when doing so is in conflict with our commitment to values like equality? Even if such speech is to be legally permitted, does our commitment to free speech allow us to provide material and institutional support to those who would contest such harmful speech? And finally, and perhaps most importantly, which kinds of speech are harmful in ways that merit response, either in the form of legal regulation or in some other form? This collection explores these and related questions. Drawing on expertise in philosophy, sociology, political science, feminist theory, and legal theory, the contributors to this book investigate these themes and questions. By exploring various categories of speech (including pornography, hate speech, Holocaust denial literature, 'Whites Only' signs), and attending to the precise functioning of speech, the essays contained here shed light on these questions by clarifying the relationship between speech and harm. Understanding how speech functions can help us work out which kinds of speech are harmful, what those harms are, and how the speech in question brings them about. All of these issues are crucially important when it comes to deciding what ought to be done about allegedly harmful speech. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the phenomenon that has been labeled 'silencing' in some of the recent philosophical literature. A speaker who is silenced in this sense is unable to make herself understood, even though her audience hears every word she utters. For instance, consider a woman who says “No”, intending to refuse sex. Her audience fails to recognize her intention to refuse, because he thinks that women tend to be insincere, and to not say what they really mean, especially (...) in sexual situations. This speaker’s utterance then goes astray in the manner that constitutes silencing in my sense. Regarding this phenomenon, philosophers such as Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby have argued, first, that women are particularly liable to be thus affected, i.e., silenced; second, that, as a result of this silencing, they are systematically disadvantaged; and third, that pornography is responsible for this silencing. Here, I focus on the third of these claims, explaining what it might mean for silencing to be systematic. (shrink)

We argue against the knowledge rule of assertion, and in favour of integrating the account of assertion more tightly with our best theories of evidence and action. We think that the knowledge rule has an incredible consequence when it comes to practical deliberation, that it can be right for a person to do something that she can't properly assert she can do. We develop some vignettes that show how this is possible, and how odd this consequence is. We then argue (...) that these vignettes point towards alternate rules that tie assertion to sufficient evidence-responsiveness or to proper action. These rules have many of the virtues that are commonly claimed for the knowledge rule, but lack the knowledge rule's problematic consequences when it comes to assertions about what to do. (shrink)

A feminist theory of content allows us to appreciate the nuanced role that historical and socio-cultural forces play in shaping the content of many of our terms. In this chapter, Maitra first shows how the classic articulation of externalism in literature is ineffective for feminist purposes. She then identifies two important ingredients that a feminist theory of content requires, namely, accounts of how the social and physical world shape content and what is required to transform that content. The final (...) part of her argument develops the first approximation of a feminist theory of content drawing from Ruth Millikan’s “consumer” account of meaning and mental representation. Using as an example José Jorge Mendoza’s analysis of how the history of U. S. immigration and citizenship law has shaped the term ‘whiteness,’ this chapter argues that feminist theorizing and activism stand to benefit from the possibility of a feminist theory of mental content that makes explicit how the contents of many terms with social and political import are determined and held stable. (shrink)

The properties of antisymmetry and linearity are easily seen to be sufficient for a recursively enumerable binary relation to be recursively isomorphic to a recursive relation. Removing either condition allows for the existence of a structure where no recursive isomorph exists, and natural examples of such structures are surveyed.

India is a large country with 29 states as constituents in its federal structure. The large and growing population imposes great pressure on available natural resources. Disputes arising out of contested river water entitlements between states are common and often intractable. Laws conceived for settling such disputes were created for a particular socio-political environment characterized by strong Centre and relatively non-assertive states. The paper argues that this political configuration has changed dramatically and in turn has reduced the efficacy of the (...) existing statutory mechanisms. A new paradigm for dispute resolution is required. The existing institutional mechanism and its political environment are examined and the structural changes identified. A set of reforms in the dispute resolution mechanism is proposed, which would reduce the friction between the statutory mechanism and its operational environment. (shrink)

Many liberal societies are deeply committed to freedom of speech. This commitment is so entrenched that when it seems to come into conflict with other commitments (e.g., gender equality), it is often argued that the commitment to speech must trump the other commitments. In this paper, we argue that a proper understanding of our commitment to free speech requires being clear about what should count as speech for these purposes. On the approach we defend, should get a special, technical sense, (...) different from its ordinary sense. We offer a partial characterization of this technical sense. Finally, we argue that if certain theorists (e.g., MacKinnon) are right about what (some) pornography does, then it should fall outside the scope of the free-speech principle. If so, then contrary to first appearances, pornography may not be a case in which our commitments to freedom and gender equality come into conflict. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Nellie Wieland argues that silencing in the sense put forward by Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby has the unpalatable consequence of diminishing a rapist's responsibility for the rape. We argue both that Wieland misidentifies Langton and Hornsby's conception of silencing, and that neither Langton and Hornsby's actual conception, nor the one that Wieland attributes to them, in fact generates this consequence.

The highly contagious 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak has not only impacted health systems, economies, and governments, it has also rapidly grown into a global health crisis, which is now threatening the lives of millions of people globally. While, on one hand, medical institutions are critically attempting to find a cure, on the other hand, governments have introduced striking measures and policies to curtail the rapid spread of the disease. Although COVID-19 has achieved pandemic status and is predominantly viewed (...) as a biomedical issue, it is argued that it should also be treated as a psychological crisis. This paper also reviews the literature to examine and comment on the detrimental effects of isolation, which has been enforced as one of the primary preventative measures to manage the spread of COVID-19. This paper further outlines key recommendations that should be addressed across different levels to buffer against the known adverse effects of isolation, which is especially relevant for the current COVID-19 situation, where a large proportion of the global population is isolated, confined, and/or quarantined. (shrink)

Chandra Mohanty, in introducing the phrase “feminism without borders,” acknowledges that she is influenced by the image of “doctors without borders” and wants to highlight the multiplicity of voices and viewpoints within the feminist coalition. So the question of agency assumes primary significance here. But answering the question of agency becomes harder once we try to accommodate this multiplicity. Take, for example, the practice of veiling among certain Muslim women. As many third-world feminists have pointed out, although veiling can't simply (...) be perceived as an expression of women's oppression, it can't be perceived as an expression of “free agency” either since what is required for true feminist agency is women's ability to “formulate choices” and not simply to make choices. In this paper I argue that this ability includes two related abilities: first, to develop a perspective of self that acknowledges and accepts its own grounding in its given intersectionalities; second, to realize that its interdependencies and interconnectivities enable a sense of continuity and solidarity that works collaboratively toward consensus without sacrificing or stifling all differences. My main argument is that feminist self-consciousness informed by Buddhist mindfulness gives us opportunities to articulate clearly and to cultivate both of these abilities. (shrink)

The term “Anthropocene” is frequently used to refer to the present planetary epoch, characterized by a geological signature of human activities, which have led to global ecological crises. This paper probes at what it means to be human on earth now, using healing as a concept to orient humanity in relation to other species, and particularly medicinal plants. Donna Haraway’s concept of the “Chthulucene” is used as an alternate lens to the Anthropocene, which highlights the inextricable linkages between humans and (...) other-than-human species. Healing can be viewed as a type of embodied orientation or engagement with the world, which has the potential to reach across boundaries of the skin, blur distinctions between self and other, and allow for both transpersonal and trans-species reconciliation. I focus my attention on Indigenous Shipibo healing rituals, and Shipibo concepts of healing that integrate humans within the ecosystem, and traverse species boundaries through communication with and embodiment of plant spirits. These healing rituals offer ways of coming into being within an ecology of selves—both internal and external, human and non-human—through listening and lending voice. I explore the potential for healing and ritual to work as a form of porous resistance through the internal blurring of binaries and hierarchical structures. (shrink)

"This collection is the first book to focus on the emerging field of study called feminist philosophy of mind. Each of the twenty chapters of Feminist Philosophy of Mind employs theories and methodologies from feminist philosophy to offer fresh insights and perspectives into issues raised in the contemporary literature in philosophy of mind and/or uses those from the philosophy of mind to advance feminist theory. The book delineates the content and aims of the field and demonstrates the fecundity of its (...) approach, which is centered on the collective consideration of three questions: What is the mind? Whose mind is the model for the theory? To whom is mind attributed? Topics considered with this lens include mental content, artificial intelligence, the first-person perspective, personal identity, other minds, mental attribution, mental illness, perception, memory, attention, desire, trauma, agency, empathy, grief, love, gender, race, sexual orientation, materialism, panpsychism, and enactivism. In addition to engaging analytic and feminist philosophical traditions, essays draw from resources in phenomenology, philosophy of race, decolonial studies, disability studies, embodied cognition theory, comparative philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology"--. (shrink)

The folklore studies scholar, such as Dorson (1976, Folklore and fakelore: Essays toward the discipline of folk studies, Harvard: Harvard University Press), was emphatic about the distinction between folklore and ‘fake lore’, one being authentic and the other as invented by the popular industry; however, he paradoxically maintained interest in the contemporariness of folklore. This was a paradox since the contemporariness of folklore is largely, and usually, due to intersections of folk with popular and political. Nevertheless, the emphasis on contemporariness (...) was a harbinger of discussion on the potential dynamics of folklore, and everything buried therein, including value orientation. This essay is guided by the observations emerging from folklore studies, socio-cultural anthropology and performance studies in order to get into a specific case of Bihu, a folk performance inclusive of songs, dance, attires and instruments inter alia in Assam, in the northeast of India. The curious case of Bihu in flux divulges dynamics of value orientation and intersections of identity politics, in the wake of the contemporariness of folklore. (shrink)

In Down Girl, Kate Manne sets out to reclaim the word ‘misogyny’. To do this, she takes on the naïve conception, according to which misogyny is the hatred of women – universally or at least generally speaking – simply because they are women. Manne argues that this conception has many drawbacks, chief among them its tendency to “deprive women of a suitable name for a potentially potent problem facing them”. Her aim, then, is to develop an alternate conception of misogyny (...) that names this problem, and in so doing, provides a more effective tool for understanding this aspect of gender-based oppression. In this commentary, I focus on two themes. First, I look in more detail at Manne’s critique of the naïve conception. I find that critique entirely persuasive. However, I argue that Manne’s preferred conception of misogyny ends up being very broad, in at least three respects. This breadth, I worry, is incompatible with generating predictions about the phenomenon. I’ll also consider some responses to this worry, but argue that these too have a cost. Some mis-classify clear cases, while others risk re-raising some difficulties for the naïve conception. Second, I consider Manne’s rejection of humanism. In this part, I argue that her substantive account of patriarchy, and the resulting conception of misogyny, is more closely related to humanism than she allows. I also emphasize differences between distinct versions of humanism, and argue that some may be able to counter some of Manne’s main criticisms of this family of views. This part of the discussion seeks to press Manne on precisely how much of humanism she ultimately wishes to reject. (shrink)

Contributed articles chiefly on the life and work of Govinda Chandra Dev, philosopher from Bangladesh; festscrift volume of lectures; includes articles on Bengali culture.

This paper begins with the idea that there are sometimes gaps in our shared linguistic/ conceptual resources that make it difficult for us to understand our own social experiences, and to make them intelligible to others. In this paper, I focus on three cases of this sort, some of which are drawn from the literature on hermeneutical injustice. I offer a diagnosis of what the gaps in these cases consist in, and what it takes to fill them. I argue that (...) these gaps are filled in, at least initially, by labels of a particular kind. Specifically, these are labels that allow us to see the experiences in question as novel instances of phenomena with which we are already normatively familiar. Further, I also show that these labels bring with them important downsides: they introduce distortions into our understandings of these experiences. Using a pair of case studies (‘statutory rape,’ ‘sexual harassment’), I illustrate these distortions. (shrink)

The only part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (hereafter, ‘the ACA’) struck down in National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) et al. v. Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. was a provision expanding Medicaid. We will argue that this was a mistake; the provision should not have been struck down. We’ll do this by identifying a test that C.J. Roberts used to justify his view that this provision was unconstitutional. We’ll defend that test against (...) some objections raised by J. Ginsburg. We’ll then go on to argue that, properly applied, that test establishes the constitutionality of the Medicaid provision. (shrink)

In recent work, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore have argued that neither Radical nor Moderate Contextualism can explain how we regularly succeed in communicating with each other. In this chapter, I argue that their preferred view (Pluralistic Minimalism) encounters the same difficulty with respect to explaining communication. Further, I offer a characterization (different from the one offered by Cappelen and Lepore) of what is at issue between the Moderate and the Radical Contextualist. This way of drawing the distinction between the (...) two Contextualist camps has the advantage of being stable, in the sense that it is immune to Cappelen and Lepore’s “collapse” arguments. I then sketch a version of Contextualism that is Moderate in my sense. I show that this version has the resources to explain how communication is successful across a wide range of contexts. (shrink)

Phenomenology, as I understand it, by G. C. Deb.--Phenomenology: education and evaluation, by Kazi A. Kadir.--Phenomenology, by B. H. Siddiqi.--Phenomenology in perspective, by James L. Kinder.

The paper explores the dynamics of the phenomenon of Development Induced Displacement and the theoretical, legal, and policy level issues which have impeded the fluent process of implementation of development projects in India. Modern India has found itself embroiled in this tussle between the development plans of the State at the macro level and their undesirable consequences for the specific project affected people. Though the exigencies of time and the logic of the liberalization policy demand the continuous articulation of development (...) projects, it is equally imperative to transcend the disempowering effects of displacement on its people. Despite recent initiatives by the government, concrete policy statements and laws governing the issues of compensation and resettlement are found wanting. The paper argues that there is an urgent need for the state to reach a necessary balance between its efforts to augur development and to make it sustainable, just, and equitous. The problems encountered in the allocation of compensation and resettlement in such projects form the focus of the article. The experiences of dam-induced displacement at the Sardar Sarovar Project in the Narmada River Valley Project in Gujarat in India are highlighted to serve as illustrations. (shrink)

The "incompatibility charge" argues that externalism fails to explain "self-knowledge" or the privileged knowledge that we ordinarily take ourselves to enjoy in relation to at least some of our own mental states. This dissertation attempts to provide an externalist reply to this charge. First, I suggest that the "compatibility debate" needs to be reoriented. This is because the mere internality or externality of determining factors cannot by itself explain how one can know the content determined by those factors. Thus the (...) task of explaining self-knowledge is one of explaining how we come to make these claims and where do they derive their privileged status from. Further, a story about the underlying epistemology of these claims has to be told not only by the externalists but also by the internalists. ;Chapter One introduces a distinction between two ways of understanding the epistemic privilege, namely, between "privilege in access", that consists of the way in which these claims are made and validated, and "privilege in authority", that consists of their infallibility. I argue that the epistemology underlying the phenomenon of self-knowledge can be best understood in terms of the privilege in access. ;Chapter Two turns to the incompatibility charge. I argue that the exchanges of arguments that have been taken place between the incompatibilists and the compatibilists in the literature rely on the implicit presupposition that a concept must always have an univocal and unambiguous referent and this fact should be discoverable a priori. I argue that a thorough going externalist should reject this questionable presupposition. ;Chapter Three criticizes the internalist argument that the internalists' job in accounting for self-knowledge is different from the externlaists' job. I conclude by noting that the internalist accounts have as much, if not more, difficulty in accounting for self-knowledge. ;Chapter Four suggests an externalist account of self-knowledge from the perspective of Sellars. The uniqueness of the Sellarsian account lies in the fact that it offers an interesting way of understanding the privilege of self-knowledge claims according to which though these claims enjoy non-inferential privilege, they are nonetheless defeasible and also justifiable from an independent source. (shrink)

Vrinda Dalmiya's Caring to Know is an exciting, impressive, and above all important work on caring in ethics and epistemology. Its central focus is to articulate what Dalmiya calls "care-knowing"—which proposes care as a basic intellectual virtue. In developing its dual aspects—caring as a process and caring as a disposition—Dalmiya offers a systematic argument that defends the viability and efficacy of care-knowing. The early chapters set the stage by offering a "thumbnail" account of the main moves in the literature on (...) care ethics and virtue epistemology. All the building blocks are then assembled to develop the central concept of the book, namely the virtue of "relational humility," a... (shrink)

What is remarkably unique of the popular cinema in the region of South Asia? How does it lead beyond the vexed notions of the contemporary milieu, namely, hybrid local? How does it transcend the idea of nationally restricted local too? Looking through eclectic motley of popular cinema in the region, this article seeks to unravel such questions with reflexive propositions. It paves the way to comprehend cinematic identity of the region with the adjective of ‘melodrama’, as perceived through the local (...) sociocultural component. It is with the sweep of melodrama, arguably, that cinema of South Asia transcends the notions attached with the category of ‘local’. In this backdrop, this article moots a probing question: What is local in the regional cinemas? Does local mean merely a vexed category in contemporary context of transnational flow? Or there is more to the category of local, beyond the existing formulations? With these questions, this article seeks to participate in the available discourse showing the regional cinema underpinned by the essentially dynamic nature and scope of the local. (shrink)

This essay discusses Rae Langton’s recent collection of essays, Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification. After introducing some of the major themes of the collection, I raise questions about two of the central concepts in the book. The first question has to do with Langton’s notion of subordination. I ask why she takes pornography to be a subordinating speech act, rather than a subordinating practice, and argue that the latter view has several advantages. The remaining questions have to (...) do with Langton’s notion of objectification. Looking first at the moral dimension of objectification, I raise some concerns about Langton’s strategy for distinguishing instances of objectification from non-instances. Then, turning to Langton’s discussion of the epistemic dimension of objectification, I ask under what circumstances certain belief-forming mechanisms, such as desire-driven projection, are objectifying, on her view. (shrink)

This paper explores the role of Buddhist mindfulness in developing a feminist conception of self-consciousness. I will open with a discussion of the role and function of self-consciousness within feminist consciousness. Although largely unrecognized in the literature, feminist self-consciousness is an essential component of feminist consciousness and, as such, the political activity of feminist consciousness-raising is dependent on the development of a distinctively feminist self-consciousness. Mindfulness is understood in terms of certain meditative practices to attain an altered consciousness that provides (...) a better awareness of one’s bare subjectivity. In Buddhism successful mindfulness results in a cessation of suffering and pain and finally of the self itself as ordinarily understood (anatman). I will argue that similar meditative practices can play a role in articulating feminist self-consciousness. Techniques used to cultivate mindfulness can help us articulate and attain a feminist self-consciousness that takes into account the particular situations, contexts, and positions of individual women and does not homogenize them in one group in an essentialist fashion. What makes the comparative relevance of Buddhist thinking on self-consciousness to feminism interesting is their shared suspicion of essentialism and shared interest in finding ways to liberation. One of the central points of this paper is that meditative practices associated with attaining mindfulness could provide a perspective to attain self-consciousness in many feminist contexts. -/- At first glance, this comparative engagement may seem far-fetched and at best forced. One might argue that while the Buddhist engagement with liberation is motivated by an other-worldly concern, feminist conception of liberation is fundamentally this-worldly. Even with this difference, however, it seems worthwhile to explore how understanding mindfulness and its associated meditative practices can illuminate our understanding of feminist self-consciousness. Especially if meditative practices are understood not as a means to withdraw from the world but to engage with it with a better understanding of reality, then that kind of self-knowledge can certainly be useful to understanding and raising feminist consciousness. (shrink)

In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz writes, 'Our perceptions are always true, it is our judgments that come from ourselves that deceive us' (section 14). Leroy Loemker in his 'Leibniz's Doctrine of Ideas' criticizes this account of error. His main worry can be presented in the form of the following syllogistic argument, which he derives from Leibniz's doctrine of ideas: (a) There cannot be a false perception; (b) All judgments are perceptions; and therefore (c) There cannot be a false judgment. (...) However, in this paper I argue that Leibniz can distinguish between a perception and a judgment in their semantic aspect. The sense in which a perception turns out to be false (or true) for Leibniz is different from the sense in which a judgment turns out to be false (or true). This is because, while a perception, understood in Leibniz's terms, lacks truth-conditions, a judgment, in being representational, has such conditions. Thus while a perception remains true always, a judgment can be false. Pointing to the equivocal use of 'false' in (a) and (c) above, I conclude that (c) does not follow from (a) and (b). (shrink)