Book reviewed in this articles.From Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought. by Julian Bourg.After the Deluge: New Perspectives on the Intellectual and Cultural History of Postwar France. Edited by Julian Bourg.The One and the Many: Reading Isaiah Berlin. Edited by George Crowder and Henry Hardy.The Task ofCriticism: Essays onPhilosophy, History, and Community. Edited by Joseph P. Fell, Vincent Colapietro, and Michael J. McGandy.Blackness and Modernity: the Colour ofHumanity and the Quest For Freedom. by Cecil Foster.The Meaning ofIdeology: (...) Cross‐Disciplinary Perspectives. Edited by Michael Freeden.What is Military History? by Stephen Morillo with Michael F. Pavkovic.Reading Orientalism: Said and the Unsaid. by Daniel Martin Varisco. (shrink)

Disagreements about the morality of markets, and about self-interested behavior within markets, run deep. They arise from perspectives within economics and political philosophy that appear to have nothing in common. In this book, Daniel Finn provides a framework for understanding these conflicting points of view. Recounting the arguments for and against markets and self-interest, he argues that every economy must address four fundamental problems: allocation, distribution, scale, and the quality of relations. In addition, every perspective on the morality of (...) markets addresses explicitly or implicitly the economic, political, and cultural contexts of markets, or what Finn terms 'the moral ecology of markets'. His book enables a dialogue among the various participants in the debate over justice in markets. In this process, Finn engages with major figures in political philosophy, including John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Michael Walzer, as well as in economics, notably Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and James Buchannan. (shrink)

The process of constructing a social reality where “difference” becomes a social asset rather than a monster that threatens peace and progress must commence with a phenomenological understanding of social interactions within and among human societies. In my opinion, Hegel, more than any other thinker, has constructed a phenomenological framework that adequately captures and represents the nature of group interactions within human societies. This paper explores the Hegelian phenomenon of social identity, and, especially, characterizes the interactions between and among various (...) social identities. It is a modest effort to contribute theoretically to the available discourse on the management of “difference” in multi-ethnic societies. (shrink)

In this dissertation I advance a Jaspersian account of the formation and possession of irrational attitudes. This account stands in opposition to two competing views – externalism and internalism with respect to rational and irrational attitudes. According to externalism, a subject’s attitudes are irrational when they fail to satisfy standards or criteria independent of the subject, such as laws of logic, methods for evidence acquisition, and rules of decision theory. According to internalism, a subject’s attitudes are irrational when they are (...) not supported by reasons selected by the subject. In this dissertation, I take Donald Davidson’s theory of rational and irrational attitudes to be a case of externalism and John Searle’s theory of rational and irrational attitudes to be a case of internalism. While articulating and identifying the merits of externalism and internalism with respect to rational or irrational attitudes, I argue that each account ends up in difficulties: Davidson’s externalism cannot account for the experience of freedom, an individual’s subjectivity, and is unable to avoid an infinite regress of rules; Searle’s internalism struggles to avoid solipsism and an infinite regress of reasons. Karl Jaspers’ account of rational and irrational attitude formation, I argue, avoids the pitfalls of Davidson’s and Searle’s views while preserving the merits of each. On Jaspers’ account, a subject possesses rational attitudes insofar as that subject holds those attitudes to be always open to revision while, at the same time, using those attitudes to bring unity to all manner of phenomena and other attitudes. Irrationality, by contrast, occurs, on the Jaspersian view, when a subject holds onto attitudes with complete and absolute resolution and interprets all else according to these attitudes. Having defined a Jaspersian account of rational and irrational attitudes, I show how it accounts for the irrationality of delusional beliefs and the irrationality of certain worldviews. On Jaspers’ view, I argue, delusions and worldviews are irrational insofar as they are held with absolute conviction, are unamenable to modification, and are used to understand all available evidence, views, and opinions. (shrink)

In Karl Jaspers' Theory of Irrationality, Daniel Adsett explains how a Jaspersian view of irrationality makes better sense of the irrationality of delusions and worldviews than competing views, offering a novel contribution to contemporary debates about the character of reason.

My dissertation is a systematic defense of the moral relevance of alternative possibilities. As such, it constitutes an attack on semi-compatibilism. ;To begin, then, I defend alternative possibilities against three related but independent lines of criticism. The most prominent of these is Harry Frankfurt's now famous counterexample strategy in which cases are constructed that purport to show that a person can, in fact, be responsible even when he cannot do otherwise. Another line of criticism is John Fischer's "flicker of freedom" (...) argument, which builds on Frankfurt-type argumentation by challenging the "robustness" of alternative possibilities. Finally, some recent critics of alternative possibilities have developed "reasons-responsiveness" accounts of moral responsibility that seem further to invalidate the importance of the power to do otherwise. By extending traditional concerns and developing new objections, I argue that room remains for the possible relevance of an alternative possibilities condition on moral responsibility. ;I try to make a positive case for the plausibility of relevance by offering reasons to think that the ability to do otherwise plays an important role in our moral life. Alternatives are important, I argue, because giving up a "freedom to do otherwise" condition would put us in an epistemic bind with respect to our responsibility. That is, the kind of confidence we ordinarily have in our own moral responsibility would be unjustified if it turned out that we do not have alternatives. A second consideration in favor of the relevance of alternatives is distinctively moral. I explore and exploit the relationship between the ability to do otherwise and the putatively Kantian idea that "ought" implies "can," concluding that the semi-compatibilist must either reject both alternative possibilities and the Kantian thesis, or accept that people would not be blameworthy for their moral failures under determinism. Neither option is attractive. ;I conclude, then, that there is good reason to believe that alternative possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility and that semi-compatibilism should be rejected. Our intuitions about the importance of being able to do otherwise can still factor into the traditional arguments to the conclusion that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism. (shrink)

Much of contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by the intersection of three topics: physicalism, the conceivability argument, and the necessary a posteriori. I will be concerned here to describe the consensus view of these topics; to explain why I think this account is mistaken; and to briefly sketch an alternative.

A pergunta pelo sentido do ser será aqui orientada para a afirmação do postulado de uma condição essencialmente precária do mortal, a partir da qual ele deverá ser radicalmente situado em seu horizonte histórico-metafísico fundamentalmente através do seu comprometimento existencial com uma abertura abissal do fenômeno de mundo que excede sua capacidade de apreensão.

We propose the use of variable declarations in natural deduction. A variable declaration is a line in a derivation that introduces a new variable into the derivation. Semantically, it can be regarded as declaring that the variable denotes an element of the universe of discourse. Undeclared variables, in contrast, do not denote anything, and may not occur free in any formula in the derivation. Although most natural deduction systems in use today do not have variable declarations, the idea can be (...) traced back to one of the first papers on natural deduction. We show how the use of variable declarations in natural deduction leads to a formal system that has a number of desirable features: It is simple, easy to use and understand, and corresponds closely to ordinary informal reasoning. Soundness and completeness of the system are easily proven. Furthermore, the system clarifies the role of the existential instantiation rule in natural deduction. (shrink)

Pour certains philosophes pluralistes politiques, accepter la thèse de pluralisme des valeurs entraîne le rejet de l’autonomie libérale en faveur d’une forme de libéralisme fondée sur l’idéal de la tolérance. Cette idée est fausse. D’abord le pluralisme des valeurs partage avec le relativisme la difficulté inhérente à toute tentative de tirer une conclusion normative d’une thèse descriptive. Chercher à soutenir l’argument en comblant les prémisses manquantes montre que le pluralisme des valeurs est plus naturellement lié au libéralisme autonomiste qu’à un (...) libéralisme fondé sur la tolérance. C’est parce que les individus doivent posséder une capacité de choix autonome pour que le pluralisme puisse les concerner. (shrink)

The issue of climate change has become an ethical and political controversy of the first magnitude. This is a very eloquent case of what might be called “complex justice”, both by the difficulty of assessing the causes and impacts, and the fact that in the controversies that come into play there are different conceptions of justice and due to the complexity and the number of institutions involved in its governance, markets and states, public sector and private sector, science and politics.

If we understand modernity as the construction of a distinction –i.e. subjectivity vs. objectivity– postmodernity can be considered the abolition of that distinction, after the experience of its apories. In this paper the interest points towards a non disjunctive direction, towards a kind of thought that may embrace both ambigüity and the relative indiscernibility of the opposites.

El artículo busca profundizar en las elaboraciones de Freud respecto de la agresividad y la inconvertibilidad de la violencia, con el objeto de indagar en los posibles aportes que la perspectiva psicoanalítica puede realizar frente a los problemas sociopolíticos contemporáneos. Este trabajo se detiene en las problemáticas referidas a la naturalización de las identidades, la radicalización de las retóricas comunitarias y los escenarios de exclusión. Sostiene, en este sentido, la importancia de los procesos sublimatorios en el trabajo de diferimiento frente (...) al empuje pulsional. (shrink)

This note argues for the presence of an allusion to Ennius “Annales” 1 Sk. (Musae, quae pedibus magnum pulsatis Olympum) at Appendix Vergiliana “Dirae” 48 (undae, quae uestris pulsatis litora lymphis). This has ramifications not only for the interpretation of the poem, but also for the dating of the “Dirae”, and for the question as to whether Enn. Ann. 1 Sk. is in fact the first line of Ennius’ epic poem.

Este artículo analiza la discusión entre Taylor y Rorty sobre los resultados de la superación de la epistemología. Primeramente, este artículo resume la crítica de Taylor a Rorty. En segundo lugar, considera la respuesta rortyana a Taylor y sus propios argumentos contra el realismo de Taylor. Los desacuerdos principales entre Rorty y Taylor son los siguientes: 1) Rorty dice que el pragmatismo supera la epistemología, mientras que Taylor dice que el realismo no-comprometido es el que supera la tradición epistemológica popular; (...) 2) ellos están en desacuerdo sobre cómo entender cierto vocabulario: Taylor afirma que siempre es posible conocer qué vocabulario describe mejor al mundo, pero Rorty parece sostener que los vocabularios son inconmensurables; 3) Taylor piensa a la verdad como una relación de correspondencia con el mundo; Rorty, sin embargo, rechaza esta concepción. En tercer lugar, se hace aquí una evaluación de los argumentos ofrecidos por cada lado, especialmente la sección que argumenta contra la concepción rortyana de los juegos del lenguaje y sus consecuencias no-realistas. Finalmente, se sugiere una reconsideración de la dicotomía realismo-pragmatismo. (shrink)

This paper investigates the evaluation of ritual frame indicating expressions (RFIEs) in two groups of L2 learners: British English learners of Chinese and Mainland Chinese learners of English. RFIEs are expressions by means of which speakers confirm their awareness of rights and obligations in a particular standard situation. Previous research in applied linguistics has largely ignored the production and evaluation of such forms, despite the fact that they are pragmatically-loaded and, as such, are very important for the development of the (...) (meta)pragmatic competence of L2 learners. In our study, we have conducted an experiment in which we exposed our learners to both authentic and constructed uses of RFIEs. The evaluation of their (meta)pragmatic competence has revealed notable linguacultural differences between the two groups of L2 learners. (shrink)

Je défends la classification carnapienne des disciplines sémiotiques en montrant qu'elle permet de caractériser adéquatement la nature de la pragmatique. J'indique, en particulier, comment une notion de système pragmatique pourrait être développée par analogie avec celles de système syntaxique et de système sémantique.I defend Carnap's classification of semiotic disciplines by showing that it leads to an adequate characterization of the nature of pragmatics. In particular, I indicate how a notion of pregmatic system could be constructed on the analogy with those (...) of syntactic system and semantic system. (shrink)

How do people adapt to technology? This study examines one mechanism people may be using to personalize technology—talking to machines. Communicating to machines is similar to other forms of personalization and can be explained using attribution theory. Characteristics of machines (such as relationship to emotions, predictability, and familiarity) may affect people's willingness to communicate. A survey study that examined people's communication to machines showed that people do communicate to some machines, and hypotheses about the characteristics of machines were supported. A (...) second survey study examined the differences between communicating with cars and computers, comparing issues such as frequency, emotionality, and the perceived gender of the machines. Overall, these studies show some of the ways people are adapting to their increasingly computerized, technological environment. (shrink)

One recent trend in Western philosophical ethics has been a push toward ethical naturalism, and with it, psychological realism.1 One part of such psychological realism involves the attempt to recast the ethical project in light of our recent acceptance that the sources of human behavior are complex and multifarious, that we are not, as it were, autonomous rational agents who can comply with our moral norms simply by choosing to do so. This keener empirical understanding of the sources of human (...) behavior leads ethicists of a psychologically realist bent to see the project of developing empirically sound methods of ethical cultivation as an important part of the ethical project.2This trend in Western ethics has... (shrink)

Theological study and teaching at Oxford prior to the First World War have been characterized as unambitious and lacking in critical rigour. In contrast to the constructive theological endeavours of biblical scholars at Cambridge or the bold revisionism of F.D. Maurice at King's College London, Oxford's theological teaching and research are perceived through the lens of E.B. Pusey and his High Church colleagues. Prior to the First World War, however, circumstances and personalities coincided to produce a radical set of proposals (...) from the Board of the Faculty of Theology under the leadership of Henry Scott Holland, Regius Professor of Divinity from 1910 until his death in 1918. Had Oxford's graduate legislative assembly, Convocation, not comprehensively rejected the reforms approved by the resident MAs, Oxford's Faculty might have been transformed into an influential centre of comparative religion. In this article, the prevailing accounts of Oxonian ‘narrowness’ are challenged through an account of this seminal moment in the history of the Faculty. Using correspondence from the Bodleian Library Special Collections, minutes and reports from the Oxford University Archives, pamphlet material and national, ecclesiastical, and University journals, the article seeks to identify the reasoning behind the proposed reforms and the significance of that reasoning for the history of modern theology in England. In so doing, it is suggested that the standard characterization of theological life at Oxford in the ‘long nineteenth century’ merits revision and further clarification. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: I offer a refutation of the standard argument according to which we have no doxastic obligation because we do not have the kind of voluntary control over our beliefs required for having obligations. I then propose an interpretation of the distinction between epistemic and practical reasons for belief which can be generalised to other attitudes such as intention, and seems to imply that mental acts such as judgements and decisions never count as intentional actions, and that these two sorts (...) of reasons are incommensurable. (shrink)

I clarify in what sense one might want to claim that thought or language are public. I distinguish among four forms that each of these claims might take, and two general ways of establishing them that might be contemplated. The first infers the public character of thought from the public character of language, and the second infers the latter from the former. I show that neither of these stategies seems to be able to dispense with the claim that thought and (...) language are interdependent, and that the second strategy raises more difficulties than the first. I then examine the reasoning by which Davidson means to establish that thought depends on language. I claim that this reasoning is not conclusive, and that it can be adapted in such a way as to establish a version of the thesis that thought is public which does not presuppose that language is public, and a version of the thesis that language is public which does not imply that thought depends on language. I conclude with the suggestion that despite appearances to the contrary Davidson's doctrine is defensible only if it implies at least the conceivability of intentional systems that would lack language altogether. (shrink)

In a recent article (2011), Steglich-Petersen claims to be able to provide a teleological account of the nature of epistemic reasons which (i) avoids the standard objections to this kind of approach and (ii) is compatible with the evidentialist claim that epistemic reasons always trump non-epistemic reasons (assuming there are such reasons). I argue that his proposal is unable to do justice to the idea that epistemic reasons are constituted by the evidence, and more generally, that it is incoherent to (...) hold at once that epistemic reasons are instrumental, that believing the true and not believing the false is what has epistemic value and that epistemic reasons are evidential in nature. (shrink)