The article is devoted to the analysis of the anthropological views of Cyril of Turov on the relationship of spiritual and bodily principles in human nature. In connection with this goal, a review of general anthropological ideas about human nature, presented in Eastern Christian patristic thought, is undertaken in order to identify possible continuity in the works of the ancient Russian author. The tradition of anthropological dualism characteristic of Byzantine patristic thought is shown. A detailed reflection of the (...) relationship between the spiritual and the carnal in human nature is considered on the material of such early works by Cyril of Turov as “A word about the monasticism”, “The Legend of the Chernorizsky rank”, and later – “The Parable of the Soul and Body”, “The Word about the Relaxed”. As a result of the research, the author of the article concludes that, firstly, physicality in the anthropology of the ancient Russian author acts as a necessary outer shell for the soul, a form that is not sinful in isolation from spiritual movements, but acts as a receptacle of vice in connection with the free will of a person who has decided to live his life in satisfying earthly temptations and animals needs. Secondly, sin is an exclusively spiritual burden and spiritual responsibility. And, finally, thirdly, according to Cyril of Turov, soul and body are not opposed within a human being, but act as necessary, equally significant parts of the indivisible, undifferentiated integrity of the perfect creation of the Lord – man. (shrink)

The monograph under review, written as a doctorate in 1999 and later revised and supplemented, offers a searching analysis of the form and function of rhetoric in the Pascal-Pentecost cycle of the 12th century homilist Cyril of Turov, together with an examination of the Byzantine sources. Lunde scrutinizes eight festal homilies for the period from Palm Sunday to the Sunday before Pentecost, using the edition by Igor' Erëmin [TODL 11–13,15 (1955–1958), reprinted as Literaturnoe nasledie Kirilla Turovskogo: Archeologičeskij obzor (...) I izdanie tekstov in 1989]. All Slavonic fragments are accompanied by English translations, predominantly drawn from Simon Franklin's Sermon and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus' [1991, reviewed by Francis Thomson in Slavica Gandensia 19], with minor alterations (e.g. p. 266, note 11) and critical remarks (e.g. p. 180, note 37). The study is positioned along the line that marks a shift in focus from philological and historical commentary towards the literary analysis of Cyril's sermons. Lunde's approach is clearly indebted to various developments in modern literary criticism, from structural linguistics to discourse analysis and communication theory. Questions of dating, attribution, and textual criticism are consciously left aside. (shrink)

Prevod sledi edini obstoječi kritični izdaji, ki sta jo objavila W.K. Reischl in J. Rupp, Cyrilli Hierosolymorum archiepiscopi opera quae supersunt omnia, 2 zv. (München 1848, 1860). Cirilove kateheze bodo letos izšle pri založbi Logos.

Brentano is perhaps most famously renowned for his re-deployment of Scholastic terminology of ‘intentional act’ and ‘intentional object’ in the elaboration of his novel science of ‘descriptive psychology’ in the mid-1870s and 1880s. In this re-deployment, however, Brentano adapted the original Scholastic meanings of both of these terms. Thus Brentano advanced not one but two descriptive-psychological theses of intentionality.1 These theses, however, are often not properly distinguished, and consequently they are more often confused. Nevertheless, once the two theses are distinguished, (...) Brentano’s basic descriptive-psychological tenet of the intentionality of consciousness is more readily understandable on its own terms. Whether Brentano’s descriptive-psychological tenet is entirely acceptable philosophically, or not, of course, is another matter but this presupposes understanding in a straightforward sense what Brentano’s doctrine is. In this article, I will be concerned mainly with Brentano’s re-introduction of ‘what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object’ in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874),2 even though it is Brentano’s (second) thesis on ‘intentional act’, one that he developed after his 1874 publication, that is more generally well known and examined. While acknowledging that many versions of ‘Brentano’s thesis’, as it is usually (and loosely) referred to by commentators today, have been re-worked in modern philosophy of mind, this article focuses attention on some of the main points of convergence and deviance between the original Scholastic concept and Brentano’s ‘new’ concept of intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. (shrink)

Rawls’s political turn is the result of his struggle with the problem of stability in his theory of justice. Rawls’s late solution uses the concept of public reason. It requires that the members of the well-ordered society should abide by a political conception of justice for shared public reasons, thus fostering an overlapping consensus. This solution has been criticized by post-Rawlsian scholars endorsing a Diversity-Convergence account of the stability problem. I complement Rawls’s model of public reason by arguing that the (...) stability problem can be solved if members of the well-ordered society are community-based reasoners. This leads to a Wittgensteinian reinterpretation of the concept of public reason. This solution is only partial, however. At the bottom, stability without a minimal form of consensus is unlikely. (shrink)

Cyril Smith shows that Marx developed a far richer and liberatory vision of humanity and the alternative to capital than that which has characterized his followers, and he makes a powerful argument that it is essential to return to Marx's original body of thought in order to reconstitute a viable critique of existing capitalist society.

This paper evaluates how Amartya Sen’s critique of revealed preference theory stands against the latter’s contemporary, ‘neo-Samuelsonian’ version. Neo- Samuelsonians have argued that Sen’s arguments against RPT are innocuous, in particular once it is acknowledged that RPT does not assume away the existence of motivations or other latent psychological or cognitive processes. Sen’s claims that preferences and choices need to be distinguished and that external factors need to be taken into account to analyze the act of choice then appear to (...) be irrelevant. However, while it is true that contemporary revealed preference theory partially evades Sen’s critique, I show that the latter is still relevant outside the restricted areas of consumer choice and market dynamics. In particular, Sen’s views regarding the importance of incomplete preferences and the multiplicity of levels of agency can hardly be integrated into the framework of CRPT. This is a significant limit, given the imperialistic claims of some of the proponents of the latter. (shrink)

Our present models and theories of African history and prehistory are profoundly influenced by the physical anthropologists’ perceptions of human reality in present-day Africa. Professor P. V. Tobias has suggested that the present-day people of Africa, excluding the recent arrivals from Europe and Asia, descended from a common proto-Negriform stock which gave birth first to the so-called “Khoisan” (I am using here the terminology of my source, not the historically justified Khoe and San, meaning the Hottentots and the Bushmen) and (...) later to the Negro genetic type. Of greater importance to archaeologists, who deal mainly with the so-called pre-history, is the fact that, genetically speaking, the difference between the “Khoisan” and the Negroids is smaller than the difference between these two African racial types and all other non-African types. This realisation tends to have one consequence: the pre-historic and even historic developments are generally perceived as explainable from within Africa, without any need for external clues or explanations. Archaeological finds are thus taken for evidence of a basically internal evolution and the finds of foreign glass beads, though very frequent and spread all over Africa, are seen as belonging to the same category as Persian, Chinese, or Arab ceramics and are explained as indication of a coastal trade. (shrink)

I wish to correlate Bernard Lonergan’s functional specialty Communications with Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of novelistic discourse with the goal of teasing out how the Bakhtinian notion of discourse furthers on-going reflection on inculturation. Theology as a highly differentiated and specialized reflection on religion bears fruit in the final stage (Communications) of theological reflection. This fruit – inculturation – can be explained using different constructs. This paper privileges the Bakhtinian construct in that it addresses “the life and behavior of discourse in (...) a contradictory and multi-languaged world” in ways that Lonergan’s differentiated and specialized reflection on theology accounts for multiplicity of cultural traditions in an ever-changing world church. (shrink)

Economic theories of team reasoning build on the assumption that agents can sometimes behave according to beliefs or preferences attributed to a group or a team. In this paper, I propose a different framework to introduce collective intentionality into game theory. I build on John Searle’s account, which makes collective intentionality constitutive of institutional facts. I show that as soon as one accepts that institutions are required to solve indetermination problems in a game, it is necessary to assume a form (...) of collective intentionality that comes from what I call a common understanding of the situation among the players. This common understanding embodies the epistemic requirements for an institution to be a correlated equilibrium in a game. As a consequence, I question recent claims made by some economists according to which game-theoretic accounts of institutions do not need to assume collective intentionality. (shrink)

According to Hanne Andersen, "an analysis of goes beyond research ethics and includes important epistemological aspects" (p.1). Her purpose is to point at a new area for philosophy of science in practice, which she does by highlighting different epistemological issues about malpractices and showing how documenting them in a precise way is beneficial to their solution. She articulates in particular two questions, namely the issue of the identification of bad practices and malpractices, and the ways of preventing the latter from (...) happening. I shall discuss how Andersen contributes to these issues, and make additional suggestions. Before going further, I first want to clarify a few points. (shrink)

In the 5th century, Cyril of Alexandria wrote a large apologetic work, as a response to Julian the Apostate’s anti-Christian work Against the Galileans. Aside from the obvious divide of one being a Christian and one a pagan, Cyril's religious views were very different from Julian's. Julian's arguments against the Christian doctrine do not greatly differ from those used in the second century by Celsus and by Porphyry in the third, and he regarded the relations between Neoplatonic criticism (...) of Christian Word. As a pagan, Julian had adopted the Platonic and Neoplatonic conception of the one God. Cyril doesn’t stack up against the Platonic one. Cyril’s goal in responding to Julian is, therefore, to help the skeptical reader to find the real faith. Cyril invokes precisely the evidence of Platonist philosophers in favor of the Trinitarian doctrine. Cyril shows, unlike Julian, that the Greek philosophers accept the three principal hypostases and using the term triad, they agree with Christian teaching. So, ancient philosophers as Porphyry supported that the substance of the divinity has proceeded towards three hypostases. Cyril doesn’t only confront Julian’s view against Christian, but he also confirms something that Justin the Martyr supported centuries ago about the “spermatic logos.” In this paper, we will examine this two works, “Against the Galileans” of Julian and “Against Julian” of Cyril, not only from their theological opinions but as arguments using the “common images” (εἰκότα), the possible logical arguments, in supporting the positions of Julian and Cyril in a legal struggle. (shrink)

The theme of “presence” holds an ambivalent place in Gerald O'Collins’ Christology. On the one hand the theme is O'Collins’ “most creative contribution to contemporary Christology” and on the other hand the notion itself is a difficult and stubborn concept that can be best understood in an evolutionary way. This deeper analysis of “presence,” which is not offered by O'Collins, occupies a center stage in Bernard Lonergan's Christology. This essay mediates O'Collins’ account of “presence” with Lonergan's evolutionary understanding of the (...) term—a scientific theological account Lonergan worked out in dialogue with phenomenology and the sciences. The paper argues that such a mediation is necessitated by the fact that the meaning of “presence” is key to understanding the Chalcedonian definition of the union of the two natures of Christ, an important Christian dogmatic teaching that both O'Collins and Lonergan consider sacrosanct, and that a clarification of this meaning advances not only Christian understanding of Christ's presence in history, but also Christ's presence in non-Christian religions. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF MODERN SCIENCE By the same Author ESSAYS IN COMMON-SENSE PHILOSOPHY Second Impression Published by the Oxford University Press MATTER, ...

Introduction.--Plato.--Plato's theory of ideas; St. Thomas Aquinas.--Rationalism: Descartes and Leibniz.--Idealism. I. Berkeley.--Idealism. II. Kant and Hegel.--The philosophy of change.--Modern realism.--Ethical philosophies.

The aim of this article is to argue that Marcel’s idea of freedom as participation in being is what constitutes authentic freedom and existence. A “pessimistic” existentialist, Sartre conceives of authentic freedom and existence or life as making free choices and committing oneself to one’s chosen mode of life and taking responsibility for it. However, this stand of absolute freedom of choice, irrespective of the morality and nature of one’ actions with regard to human essence and ontological status as finite (...) and potential being in need of plenitude, could lead to the loss of sense of being and the proliferation of evil in a society. This is because one might freely choose to indulge in an act that negates the essence of humanity and engenders self-destruction as well as the destruction of others, since, for the “pessimistic” existentialist, one only has to be committed to it and accept its accompanying responsibility to qualify as authentic freedom and existence. I will argue that Marcel’s conception of freedom as participation in being leads to an individual’s awareness of their ontological status as a finite being and that their finitude imposes a limitation on their hold on being and generates some self-trepidation that they might lose their sense of being, and consequently propels them to engage in those acts that are consistent and compatible with their essence and are geared towards self-realisation. I will conclude that genuine freedom and authentic life lie in participation in being. (shrink)

(1982). ’What is the Good?’: a comparison of young people's responses to two unfinished sentences about values. Educational Studies: Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 113-121.

First published in Great Britain in 1948, this book examines the definition of goodness as being distinct from the question of What things are good? Although less immediately and obviously practical, Dr. Ewing argues that the former question is more fundamental since it raises the issue of whether ethics is explicable wholly in terms of something else, for example, human psychology. Ewing states in his preface that the definition of goodness needs to be confirmed before one decides on the place (...) value is to occupy in our conception of reality or on the ultimate characteristics which make one action right and another wrong. This book discusses these issues. (shrink)

This paper pursues a naturalist endeavor in social ontology by arguing that the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account of institutions can help to advance the debate over the nature of social kinds. This account of institutions emerges from a growing number of works in economics that use game theory to study the role and the functioning of institutions in human societies. I intend to show how recent developments in the economic analysis of rules and institutions can help solve issues that are generally considered (...) constitutive of any ontological inquiry. I argue that the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account of institutions can contribute to advancing the debate on an issue of particular importance, regarding the specific form of dependence characterizing the relation between institutions and individuals’ attitudes about them. I tackle this issue by taking Francesco Guala's claims about the nature of institutions made in his book “Understanding Institutions” as a point of departure. In particular, I reject Guala’s functionalism about institutions. On the basis of the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account, I claim that it is futile to search for constitutive features of general institutions (money, property rights, family…) and that the best we can have is a knowledge of what are the rules within a specific institution, which the agents consider to be essential in their institutional practice. (shrink)

This paper analyses Heidegger’s controversial advancement of Husserl’s idea of philosophy and phenomenological research towards ‘the Being-Question’ and its relation to ‘Dasein’. It concentrates on Heidegger’s elision of Dilthey and Husserl’s different concepts of ‘Descriptive Psychology’ in his 1925 Summer Semester lecture-course, with Husserl’s concept losing out in the competition, as background to the formulation of ‘the Being-Question’ in Being and Time (1927). It argues that Heidegger establishes his own position within phenomenology on the basis of a partial appropriation of (...) Dilthey’s hermeneutical manner of thinking, an appropriation that was later radically called into question by Levinas on Diltheyean-hermeneutical-philosophical grounds. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Philosophy of Modernism (in Its Connection With Music) The prerequisite to immortality in the world of art is the capacity to create something new, or, in other words, the capacity to invent a style. Indeed, let any one but survey the past history of music, poetry and painting, and he will notice that each great name stands for a literary or musical invention: so that to talk of Keats or Shelley, Beethoven or Wagner, is not to talk (...) of men only, but also of very distinct styles of art. And this capacity to create something new proceeds from a certain divine discontent - divine, because it stimulates evolution, is mild and pleasant, yet just sufficient to prevent the man who possesses it from sinking into that unprogressive lassitude so often associated with a good glass of port wine, a widow's cruse of tobacco, and a rather soporific fireside. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the relationship between paradigms of explication and the practice of conceptual engineering. It defends three interrelated claims: First, the predominant functionalist attitude in the present debate on conceptual engineering is due to its roots in Carnapian explication, which identifies the explicandum with a precursor concept. Second, alternative metaphysical paradigms of explication locate the explicandum in a part of a concept-independent reality (‘field explication‘, as I will call it). Third, field explication may be a better paradigm (...) than Carnapian functionalism for certain instances of socio-political conceptual engineering. In these instances, we adjust our concepts to more adequately capture differences in our concept-independent (felt) reality. To demonstrate this, I will contrast the metaphysical to the functionalist paradigm concerning the example of Heimat. [in German]. (shrink)