The Italian Twin Registry (ITR) has been carrying out several genetic-epidemiological studies. Collection and storage of biological material from study participants has recently increased in the light of biobanking development. Within this scenario, we aimed at investigating understanding, awareness and attitude towards blood/DNA donation of research participants. About these quite unknown dimensions more knowledge is needed from ethical and social perspectives.

This article analyzes Italian research and experimentation on the economic potential of certain plant species in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, also providing insight into beekeeping and honey production. It focuses on continuity of method and progress across regimes and on the invisibility of many of the actors involved in the development of agricultural science and food research. Specifically, “continuity” refers to the continuation of certain threads of Old-Regime experimentation by the scientific apparatus put in place during the (...) Napoleonic era. These threads were reworked and strengthened with the new means available to Frenchified Europe. The concept of “invisibility” derives from an expression by Steven Shapin and refers to actors who contributed to the development of agricultural science while remaining in the shadows. These include various types of technicians and members of rural society who supported the scientific work of scholars without receiving overt recognition. Continuity and invisibility were therefore two fundamental components both in the epistemological development of agricultural science and in the improvement of food research. The article analyzes case studies mainly from northern Italy – or rather, the various geopolitical entities existing in this geographical region – during the late Old Regime and the Napoleonic era, comparing them with examples from all over Europe. (shrink)

Motor representations live a kind of double life. Although paradigmatically involved in performing actions, they also occur when merely observing others act and sometimes influence thoughts about the goals of observed actions. Further, these influences are content-respecting: what you think about an action sometimes depends in part on how that action is represented motorically in you. The existence of such content-respecting influences is puzzling. After all, motor representations do not feature alongside beliefs or intentions in reasoning about action; indeed, thoughts (...) are inferentially isolated from motor representations. So how could motor representations have content-respecting influences on thoughts? Our aim is to solve this puzzle. In so doing, we shall provide the basis for an account of how experience links the motoric with thought. Such an account matters for understanding how humans think about action: in some cases, we have reasons for thoughts about actions that we would not have if we were unable to represent those actions motorically. (shrink)

Being part of the life of institutions requires a considerable amount of conceptual knowledge. In institutional settings, we must learn the relevant concepts to act meaningfully, and these concepts are internal in a peculiar way, namely, they are strictly relative to the rules of a given institution because they are constituted by those rules. However, institutions do not come out of nothing: They are inscribed in a social setting and this setting determines, at least in a broad sense, what is (...) the nature of the institution. Our social life therefore creates more or less defined contexts for meaningful institutional activities, and these contexts in their own turn involve concepts. In this paper, I address this question by distinguishing between three kinds of concepts relevant for an institution and trying to identify the different relations that these concepts have with constitutive rules. I then proceed to explain how this distinction can improve our understanding of practical reasoning in institutional context. (shrink)

Central to the still-nascent normative literature on counterspeech is the widespread belief that citizens should engage discursively with haters and the effects of hate speech. It is also increasingly clear that discursive engagement with intolerant members of society should be understood as a continuous and extended series of different and connected actions. Much less has been said about the ways that attempts in persuasion and direct responses to hate speech relate to one another and about when specific counterspeech actions should (...) happen. This essay advances a more expansive and refined account of counterspeech, which is understood as a combination of continuous discursive engagement with intolerant members of society and acts of distancing from haters (shaming, correcting falsehoods, “Not in my name” campaigns, protests, and forms of discursive exit). After reconsidering discursive agency distribution (that is, who is an active participant, how, and when) around public hate speech, I show that continuous discursive engagement with intolerant members of society should be interrupted by visible acts of distancing when haters make hateful representative claims. (shrink)

Despite the impressive body of evidence supporting the existence of a mirror neuron (MN) system for action, the original claim regarding its crucial role in action understanding remains controversial. Emma Borg has recently launched a sharp attack on this claim, with the aim of demonstrating that neither the original version nor the subsequent revisions of the MN hypothesis tell us very much about how intentional attribution actually works. In this article I take up the challenge she issues in the title (...) of her paper (If Mirror Neurons are the Answer, What was the Question?) and argue that what MNs offer is not as Borg claims 'an extremely limited' picture of action understanding but rather an enriched picture that brings to light aspects of social cognition hitherto ignored in the mind-reading literature, showing how intentional motor components of action can shape social cognition prior to and apart from any forms of deliberate mentalizing. (shrink)

Mature spermatozoa are permeable to foreign DNA and RNA molecules. Here I propose a model, whereby extrachromosomal genetic information, mostly encoded in the form of RNA in somatic cells, can cross the Weismann barrier and reach epididymal spermatozoa. LINE‐1 retrotransposon‐derived reverse transcriptase (RT) can play key roles in the process by expanding the RNA‐encoded information. Retrotransposon‐encoded RT is stored in mature gametes, is highly expressed in early embryos and undifferentiated cells, and becomes downregulated in differentiated cells. In turn, RT plays (...) a role in developmental control, as its inhibition arrests developmental progression of early embryos with globally altered transcriptomic profiles. Thus, sperm cells act as recipients, and transgenerational vectors of somatically derived genetic information which they pass to the next generation with the potential to modify the fate of the developing embryos. (shrink)

People walk, build, paint and otherwise act together with a purpose in myriad ways. What is the relation between the actions people perform in acting together with a purpose and the outcome, or outcomes, to which their actions are directed? We argue that fully characterising this relation will require appeal not only to intention, knowledge and other familiar philosophical paraphernalia but also to another kind of representation involved in preparing and executing actions, namely motor representation. If we are right, motor (...) representation plays a central role in the story of acting together. (shrink)

The scope of this essay is to introduce and explain the methodology underlying the Lanza Foundation Protocol for the analysis of clinical cases. The essay is divided in three parts. Part one examines the Protocol's methodology within the whole evolutionary framework of argumentation in bioethics. Particular attention is given to the most significant methodologies developed in European bioethics. Part two describes the system of argumentation which serves as a frame for both approaches, namely, the normative and the hermeneutical. Finally, the (...) third part presents in an analytic fashion the operations which define the Protocol itself. The Protocol is the result of an interdisciplinary effort and it provides a detailed grid for analyzing and tackling the ethical components of clinical cases. The Protocol is primarily directed toward Ethics Committees in their consulting activity, yet it has been proven of considerable importance at an educational level also, particular in continuing education programs for health care professionals. (shrink)

At the end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the 19th, Spain and the Italian States contributed to the development of European agricultural science and the improvement of manufacturing. They collaborated with each other and reworked the most advanced models of France, Central Europe and Great Britain. Despite their somewhat less prosperous economic status, they demonstrated great originality in research and experimentation. In this process, botanical knowledge served as a starting point for a new epistemological path. Through three case (...) studies – the botanists Antonio José Cavanilles and Domenico Nocca, and the agriculturist Filippo Re – my article analyses how Spanish and Italian naturalists and learned individuals contributed to forming the concept of ‘economic botany’ through the exchange of seeds, plant specimens, books, journals, and – more in general – opinions, becoming germinal forces in a large transnational network. (shrink)

This article discusses the concept of evidential reasoning in the context of qualitative research methods in the social sciences. A conceptualization of qualitative evidential reasoning is proposed...

In this article, I provide an argument against the idea that public hate-speech events are harmful because they cause a discrete, traceable and harmful change in one’s propositional attitudes. To do so, I identify the essential conceptual architecture of public hate-speech situations, I assess existing arguments for the direct and indirect harm of public hate speech and I propose a novel way to approach public hate-speech situations: a maieutic approach. On this perspective, public hate-speech events do not cause changes in (...) propositional attitudes, but rather, if successful, either such events bring a person’s latent propositional attitudes into clear consciousness, or they play with propositional attitudes speakers and their audience had prior to the public hate-speech situation. (shrink)

Justifying state punishment presents a difficulty for those who deny that human actions are free in the sense required by moral responsibility. The argument I make in this article, following work d...

This paper discusses the explanatory power of discourse analysis, an approach to typically considered one of the main qualitative methods for data analysis. Although discourse analysis is typically not used to develop explanatory models, some have claimed that discourse models can causally explain social phenomena, such as institutional change. I analyze a case of institutional change to discuss and provide arguments for two claims. First, discourse analysis cannot generate causal explanations of social phenomena. Secondly, discourse analysis can generate non-causal explanations, (...) specifically constitutive explanations of social phenomena. I conclude the paper by discussing possible implications for social research. (shrink)

In the recent literature a number of free will skeptics, skeptics who believe that punishment is justified only if deserved, have argued for these two points: first, that the free will realist who would justify punishment has the burden of establishing to a high level of certainty - perhaps beyond a reasonable doubt, but certainly at least by clear and convincing evidence - that any person to be punished acted freely in breaking the law; and, second, that that level of (...) evidence is simply not there. In this paper I make two parallel points against a quarantine theory of criminal justice. First, the free will skeptic who would justify universal criminal quarantine is also faced with a burden of proof, the burden to establish to a similarly high level that no human being ever acts freely. Second, there is not sufficient evidence for that conclusion either. I believe that the quandary that this creates for criminal justice can be resolved by distinguishing the methods associated with a particular approach from the approach itself: if our choice is between the methods of punishment and the methods of quarantine, the methods that constitute punishment are, I would argue, morally preferable to those that constitute quarantine. (shrink)

The study of perception has often taken the perspective of vision and, to date, less attention has been dedicated to the other senses, including hearing. Research in auditory perception itself has been predominantly occupied with sounds, overlooking further aspects of the auditory perceptual experiences that we ordinarily undergo. Carrying out an inquiry in auditory perception, I present an account of the material objects of auditory perceptual experience. Examining the objects of auditory perceptual experience via the notion of force, a power (...) essential to material bodies, we come to appreciate that we are ordinarily auditorily presented with material bodies. A set of auditory perceptual experiences, such as that of the crunching of a carrot, evidently present us with material bodies in presenting us with bodies in interaction, exerting and being governed by force. This will further provide an opportunity to uncover biases in our understanding of what constitutes objects of material nature and how we consider these to be present in perceptual experience. The first part of this thesis looks into the sources of these biases, beginning with a sceptical challenge set out by Hume and considering a set of responses to this. Hume is sceptical of the idea that what we perceive continues to exist unperceived which we may derive from experience of material bodies. As I will observe in chapter two, philosophers have often assigned a central role to spatial aspects of material bodies in the resolution of this issue. Given so, in chapter three, I identify the source of a challenge as to whether the auditory presents us with material bodies in the thesis that auditory perceptual experience does not present us with spatially extended bodies. In the second part, I develop my positive account. In chapter four, posing a challenge to indirect accounts of auditory perception, according to which we hear material bodies indirectly via auditory perceptual experience of sounds, I begin to put forward the claim that there is a set of cases of auditory perceptual experience in which we do appear to be presented with material bodies. In chapter five, I move on to assess our conception of the material taking a short historical excursus in the understanding of the power of bodies to exert and be governed by force. In chapter six, I turn to consider what it means to be perceptually sensitive to this condition of materiality and in what sense such power can be considered to be present in auditory perceptual experience. In chapter seven, I finally point to a further direction of inquiry into mind-independence that the account developed in this thesis opens. (shrink)

The paper discusses non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) as a collective form of protection that, in terms of health justice, benefits groups at risk, allowing them to engage in social life and activities during health crises. More specifically, the paper asserts that NPIs that realize social distancing are justifiable insofar as they are constitutive of a type of social protection that allows everyone, especially social disadvantaged agents, to access the public health sphere and other fundamental social spheres, such as the family and (...) civil society. (shrink)

Artefacts are usually understood in contrast with natural kinds and conceived as a unitary kind. Here we propose that there is in fact a variety of artefacts: from the more concrete to the more abstract ones. Moreover, not every artefact is able to fulfil its function thanks to its physical properties: Some artefacts, particularly what we call “institutional” artefacts, are symbolic in nature and require a system of rules to exist and to fulfil their function. Adopting a standard method to (...) measure conceptual representation (the property generation task), we have experimentally explored how humans conceptualise these different kinds of artefacts. Results indicate that institutional artefacts are typically opposed to social objects, while being more similar to standard artefacts, be they abstract or concrete. (shrink)

This article sheds light upon the role of the audience in the construction and amendment of populist representative claims that in themselves strengthen representative-represented relationships and simultaneously strengthen ties between the represented who belong to different constituencies. I argue that changes in populist representative claims can be explained by studying the discursive relationship between a populist representative and the audience as a conversation in which both poles give and receive something. From this perspective, populist representative claims, I also argue, can (...) be understood as acts of bonding with the intended effect of constituting ‘the people,’ and inputs from the audience can be seen as conversational exercitives. Populist appeals therefore may change when the audience enacts new permissibility facts and signals to populist representatives that there is another way to strengthen relationships between several individuals belonging to otherwise-different constituencies. (shrink)

In the present article we discuss the relevance of the mirror mechanism for our sense of self and our sense of others. We argue that, by providing us with an understanding from the inside of actions, the mirror mechanism radically challenges the traditional view of the self and of the others. Indeed, this mechanism not only reveals the common ground on the basis of which we become aware of ourselves as selves distinct from other selves, but also sheds new light (...) on the content of our self and other experience, showing that we primarily experience ourselves and the others in terms of our own and of their motor possibilities respectively. -/- . (shrink)

If a theory addressing problems that are global in scope aims to be convincing outside its own tradition, it should be robust-enough to deal with the simple observation that, around the world, there are multiple systems of norms, rules and institutionalized normative orders.

Scott Sehon is someone who takes the philosophy of criminal justice seriously, who believes that if we are going to condemn people to prison we should have pretty good grounds...

Empirical educational research enjoys a methodological and theoretical debate that is characterized by a number of unresolved and lively debated controversies. This compilation thesis is an attempt to contribute to this debate using the toolbox of philosophy of science. -/- The thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four essays. In the introductory chapter I identify three methodological and theoretical controversies that are discussed within the field of educational research. These are: 1) the controversy concerning the scientific status of educational (...) research; 2) the controversy between cognitive and sociocultural theories of learning; and, 3) the controversy between realist and constructionist interpretations of theories of learning. -/- I provide in the essays a critical assessment of the claims behind each of these controversies, and argue for an alternative reconstruction of these issues. -/- In Essay I, I criticize a view about the interpretation of human action, labeled in the text as interpretivism. This view posits a sharp separation between the natural and social sciences, to the effect that the methods of the latter cannot be applied to the former. The first controversy seems to rest on this position. As I argue, the arguments in support of interpretivism are contradicted by actual research practice. I conclude that the interpretivistic claims lack support and that the general separation claim appears as problematic. -/- A further debate has fueled the first controversy, that is, the supposed distinction between qualitative and quantitative methods. In Essay II, I argue against this distinction. More specifically, I discuss the concept of empirical support in the context of qualitative methods (for short, qualitative support). I provide arguments that although there are two specific and non-trivial properties of qualitative support, there is no methodological separation between quantitative and qualitative methods concerning empirical support. -/- Considered together, the first two essays indicate two points of methodological continuity between educational research and other scientific practices (such as the natural sciences). I therefore conclude that the controversy concerning the scientific status of educational research rests in large part on unjustified claims. -/- Essay III focuses on the second controversy. In this article I argue that Suárez’ inferential approach to the concept of scientific representation can be used as an account of scientific representation in learning, regardless of whether learning is understood as a cognitive or social phenomenon. -/- The third controversy is discussed in Essay IV. Here, I discuss some ontological aspects of the framework of the actor-network theory. Reflecting on the use of this framework in the research field of Networked Learning, I argue that the assumption of an ontology of relations provides the solution for two puzzles about the ontology of networks. The relevance of my argument for the third controversy is that it suggests a point of connection between constructionist and realist interpretations of the ontology of learning. -/- The last two essays suggest two points of continuities between theoretical frameworks that have been and still are argued to be incompatible. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct and critically assess the evidential relationship between neuroscience and educational practice. To do this, I reconstruct a standard way in which evidence from neuroscience is used to support recommendations about educational practice, that is, testing pedagogical interventions using neuroimaging methods, and discuss and critically assess the inference behind this approach. I argue that this inference rests on problematic assumptions, and, therefore, that neuroimaging intervention studies have no special evidential status for basing educational (...) practice. I conclude arguing that these limitations could be resolved by integrating evidence from neurocognitive and educational science. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with John Stuart Mill’s democratic theory. In chapter I, I examine the relations between political philosophy and political theory and science before providing a detailed outline of the aims of the dissertation. In chapter II, I argue that in order to reconcile the concepts of progress and equality within a utilitarian theory, a Millian political system needs to devise institutions that promote general happiness, protect individual autonomy, safeguard society from mediocrity. Chapter III discusses what different authors (...) have said about Mill and liberty, then explores James Mill’s theory of education and Coleridge’s influence on John Stuart Mill’s thought. I conclude by criticising Richard Arneson’s interpretation according to which the Considerations and On Liberty are inconsistent, and some of Gregory Claeys’ conclusions on Mill and paternalism. Chapter IV explores the methodology of the social sciences and the philosophy of history as found in Mill’s writings; then it considers Mill’s thought in regard to his father’s Radical proposals. I also discuss at some length the idea of the tyranny of the majority. Chapter V begins with a discussion of Hanna Pitkin’s theory of representation. I then provide a critical account of Richard Krouse and Nadia Urbinati’s interpretations of Mill. I conclude by arguing that, in a Millian democracy, the higher is the degree of complexity or the need for expertise in dealing with affairs, the greater is the bearing of the principle of competence in assessing whether a representative should act as a trustee or a delegate. I also introduce the idea of rational debate as a sort of ‘influence multiplier’, arguing that this would help to make a democracy rational and effective along Millian lines. In the last two chapters, I stress the relevance of Mill’s political philosophy as for some contemporary issues (nationalism, European federalism, current social and economic changes) while suggesting some potential further investigations, and summarise my conclusions. (shrink)

Le rejet de End of Track de Mou Tunfei (fin années 60), film “invisible”, jamais distribué, prouve à quel point les thématiques abordées (homosexualité, différence de classes, nihilisme) étaient taboues pour toute une génération. Banana Paradise (années 80) évoque la façon dont deux frères d’armes survivent en usurpant l’identité de camarades décédés, et finissent par s’épanouir dans une société en exil taraudée par la mémoire du continent. Enfin, Gf/Bf (années 2000) développe des thématiques jadis censurées (homosexualité, démocratisation) et qui refont (...) surface via le prisme du triangle amoureux. Malgré leur hétérogénéité, ces films permettent de constituer une histoire de ce rapport fraternel dans des contextes ambigus et dissonants ; à travers trois films d’époques différentes, je retrace l’évolution dans le temps de la représentation de l’amitié entre hommes, une évolution qui révèle un « changement de paradigme » au sein même de la société taiwanaise. (shrink)