Despite the impressive body of evidence supporting the existence of a mirror neuron (MN) system for action, the original claim regarding its crucial role in action understanding remains controversial. Emma Borg has recently launched a sharp attack on this claim, with the aim of demonstrating that neither the original version nor the subsequent revisions of the MN hypothesis tell us very much about how intentional attribution actually works. In this article I take up the challenge she issues in the title (...) of her paper (If Mirror Neurons are the Answer, What was the Question?) and argue that what MNs offer is not as Borg claims 'an extremely limited' picture of action understanding but rather an enriched picture that brings to light aspects of social cognition hitherto ignored in the mind-reading literature, showing how intentional motor components of action can shape social cognition prior to and apart from any forms of deliberate mentalizing. (shrink)

Several authors have recently pointed out the hyper-mentalism of the standard mindreading models, arguing for the need of an embodied and enactive approach to social cognition. Various attempts to provide an account of the primary ways of interacting with others, however, have fallen short of allowing for both what kind of intentional engagement is crucial in the basic forms of social navigation and also what neural mechanisms can be thought to underpin them. The aimof the paper is to counter this (...) fault by showing that most of the primary ways of making sense of others are motor in nature and rooted in a specific brain mechanism: the mirror mechanism. I shall argue that the mirror-based making sense of others not only can be construed within the enactive approach to social cognition, but also allows us to refine it, supplying a plausible and unitary account of the early forms of social interaction. (shrink)

Central to the still-nascent normative literature on counterspeech is the widespread belief that citizens should engage discursively with haters and the effects of hate speech. It is also increasingly clear that discursive engagement with intolerant members of society should be understood as a continuous and extended series of different and connected actions. Much less has been said about the ways that attempts in persuasion and direct responses to hate speech relate to one another and about when specific counterspeech actions should (...) happen. This essay advances a more expansive and refined account of counterspeech, which is understood as a combination of continuous discursive engagement with intolerant members of society and acts of distancing from haters (shaming, correcting falsehoods, “Not in my name” campaigns, protests, and forms of discursive exit). After reconsidering discursive agency distribution (that is, who is an active participant, how, and when) around public hate speech, I show that continuous discursive engagement with intolerant members of society should be interrupted by visible acts of distancing when haters make hateful representative claims. (shrink)

People walk, build, paint and otherwise act together with a purpose in myriad ways. What is the relation between the actions people perform in acting together with a purpose and the outcome, or outcomes, to which their actions are directed? We argue that fully characterising this relation will require appeal not only to intention, knowledge and other familiar philosophical paraphernalia but also to another kind of representation involved in preparing and executing actions, namely motor representation. If we are right, motor (...) representation plays a central role in the story of acting together. (shrink)

In the present article we discuss the relevance of the mirror mechanism for our sense of self and our sense of others. We argue that, by providing us with an understanding from the inside of actions, the mirror mechanism radically challenges the traditional view of the self and of the others. Indeed, this mechanism not only reveals the common ground on the basis of which we become aware of ourselves as selves distinct from other selves, but also sheds new light (...) on the content of our self and other experience, showing that we primarily experience ourselves and the others in terms of our own and of their motor possibilities respectively. -/- . (shrink)

La filosofia italiana è viva e vegeta. A testimoniarlo è il successo internazionale di cui gode ciò che è stato definito Italian Thought. Ma che cosa rende il pensiero italiano così apprezzato e studiato all’estero? Vi è qualcosa che accomuna, pur nella loro differenza tematica, i protagonisti della filosofia italiana e che permette di individuare un fil rouge – da Dante a Vico, da Machiavelli a Gramsci –, senza che per questo si debba parlare di una tradizione nazionale unitaria? E (...) che cosa vuol dire ripensare tale tradizione? È possibile farlo in modo non descrittivo-ricostruttivo? Ossia in modo tale da evitare quell’approccio “museale” volto solo a conservarne il glorioso passato, adottando invece un’altra prospettiva tesa a ripensarla, rivitalizzarla e renderla operativa nell’attualità? L’obiettivo del presente saggio è quello di rispondere ai suddetti interrogativi, mostrando come alcuni dei principali interpreti del pensiero italiano – da Spaventa a Gentile fino a Garin e Esposito – si rivolgano al patrimonio filosofico che ci precede individuando le caratteristiche distintive della tradizione nazionale con l’intento di renderle operanti e funzionali al proprio tempo. (shrink)

Motor representations live a kind of double life. Although paradigmatically involved in performing actions, they also occur when merely observing others act and sometimes influence thoughts about the goals of observed actions. Further, these influences are content-respecting: what you think about an action sometimes depends in part on how that action is represented motorically in you. The existence of such content-respecting influences is puzzling. After all, motor representations do not feature alongside beliefs or intentions in reasoning about action; indeed, thoughts (...) are inferentially isolated from motor representations. So how could motor representations have content-respecting influences on thoughts? Our aim is to solve this puzzle. In so doing, we shall provide the basis for an account of how experience links the motoric with thought. Such an account matters for understanding how humans think about action: in some cases, we have reasons for thoughts about actions that we would not have if we were unable to represent those actions motorically. (shrink)

In the recent literature a number of free will skeptics, skeptics who believe that punishment is justified only if deserved, have argued for these two points: first, that the free will realist who would justify punishment has the burden of establishing to a high level of certainty - perhaps beyond a reasonable doubt, but certainly at least by clear and convincing evidence - that any person to be punished acted freely in breaking the law; and, second, that that level of (...) evidence is simply not there. In this paper I make two parallel points against a quarantine theory of criminal justice. First, the free will skeptic who would justify universal criminal quarantine is also faced with a burden of proof, the burden to establish to a similarly high level that no human being ever acts freely. Second, there is not sufficient evidence for that conclusion either. I believe that the quandary that this creates for criminal justice can be resolved by distinguishing the methods associated with a particular approach from the approach itself: if our choice is between the methods of punishment and the methods of quarantine, the methods that constitute punishment are, I would argue, morally preferable to those that constitute quarantine. (shrink)

When witnessing someone else's action people often take advantage of the same motor cognition that is crucial to successfully perform that action themselves. But how deeply is motor cognition involved in understanding another's action? Can it be selectively modulated by either the agent's or the witness's being actually in the position to act? If this is the case, what does such modulation imply for one's making sense of others? The paper aims to tackle these issues by introducing and discussing a (...) series of experimental studies showing how body and space may constrain one's own motor cognition reuse in understanding another's action. These findings, I shall argue, may shed new light on the mechanisms underlying the primary ways of identifying ourselves with other people and of being connected to them . (shrink)

Mature spermatozoa are permeable to foreign DNA and RNA molecules. Here I propose a model, whereby extrachromosomal genetic information, mostly encoded in the form of RNA in somatic cells, can cross the Weismann barrier and reach epididymal spermatozoa. LINE‐1 retrotransposon‐derived reverse transcriptase (RT) can play key roles in the process by expanding the RNA‐encoded information. Retrotransposon‐encoded RT is stored in mature gametes, is highly expressed in early embryos and undifferentiated cells, and becomes downregulated in differentiated cells. In turn, RT plays (...) a role in developmental control, as its inhibition arrests developmental progression of early embryos with globally altered transcriptomic profiles. Thus, sperm cells act as recipients, and transgenerational vectors of somatically derived genetic information which they pass to the next generation with the potential to modify the fate of the developing embryos. (shrink)

While most of the literature has attempted to justify harsh and soft containment given some fundamental commitments of political liberalism, I focus on how justified forms of containment can in themselves be deemed effective. This article shows that a reading of Rawls allows for a comparison of different containment practices based on their capacity to protect the stability of liberal democracies under serious threat. And, in making it possible to compare harsh and soft containment, I evaluate immediate stability gains against (...) citizens’ judgements about their liberal democratic institutions. (shrink)

Artefacts are usually understood in contrast with natural kinds and conceived as a unitary kind. Here we propose that there is in fact a variety of artefacts: from the more concrete to the more abstract ones. Moreover, not every artefact is able to fulfil its function thanks to its physical properties: Some artefacts, particularly what we call “institutional” artefacts, are symbolic in nature and require a system of rules to exist and to fulfil their function. Adopting a standard method to (...) measure conceptual representation (the property generation task), we have experimentally explored how humans conceptualise these different kinds of artefacts. Results indicate that institutional artefacts are typically opposed to social objects, while being more similar to standard artefacts, be they abstract or concrete. (shrink)

In three experiments, we investigated the priming effects induced by an image change on a successive animate/inanimate decision task. We studied both perceptual and conceptual priming effects, under correct change detection and change blindness . Under correct change detection, we found larger positive priming effects on congruent trials for probes representing animate entities than for probes representing artifactual objects. Under CB, we found performance impairment relative to a “no-change” baseline condition. This inhibition effect induced by CB was modulated by the (...) semantic congruency between the changed item and the probe in the case of probe images, but not for probe words. We discuss our results in the context of the literature on the negative priming effect. (shrink)

In this article, I provide an argument against the idea that public hate-speech events are harmful because they cause a discrete, traceable and harmful change in one’s propositional attitudes. To do so, I identify the essential conceptual architecture of public hate-speech situations, I assess existing arguments for the direct and indirect harm of public hate speech and I propose a novel way to approach public hate-speech situations: a maieutic approach. On this perspective, public hate-speech events do not cause changes in (...) propositional attitudes, but rather, if successful, either such events bring a person’s latent propositional attitudes into clear consciousness, or they play with propositional attitudes speakers and their audience had prior to the public hate-speech situation. (shrink)

Food allergy represents an increasing public health issue, and a large number of food control authorities have provided regulations aimed to minimize the risk of allergic reaction for sensitized consumers. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations together with the World Health Organization established the Codex Alimentarius Commission whose main goal is to protect the consumers’ health. To purse this task the Commission listed the foods and ingredients causing the most severe allergic reactions that should be labelled. It (...) has been reported that some cases of specific foods hypersensitivity display a different prevalence among different Countries. Thus, the European Union drew up a list of mandatory allergens longer than that provided by Codex Alimentarius. As a consequence of the complexity of the legal phraseology of the European Union and/or European Community the Regulations and/or Directives were differently translated in all EC/EU official languages determining possible misinterpretations of the legislation. Moreover, food labelling regulations were also established with the goal to promote the consumers’ conscious choice about what they eat. Starting from the case of the fermented beverages, we analysed the European legislative scenario concerning the allergen labelling of the last fifteen years, highlighting that mistranslations, misinterpretations and lack of information in the EU Regulations might lead to health and ethical issues. (shrink)

In the era of fake news, truth has become a different and more urgent political problem than the traditional issues of the arcana imperii and the lies of the rulers. Starting from this observation, and deepening some considerations contained in the essay by Hannah Arendt _Thruth and Politics_, the article offers a worried report on the possibility of truth (scientific and factual) not to be reduced to mere opinion among others, and concludes that only a loyal collaboration between epistemic authorities (...) and politics can make the judicial road for the protection of truth less attractive. (shrink)