In “Why Forgiving the Unrepentant is not Demeaning or Insulting: A Reply to Nicholas Wolterstorff,” David E. Wright argues against Wolterstorff’s view in Justice in Love that it is wrong or impossible to forgive the unrepentant wrongdoer. In response to Wolterstorff’s claim that it is impossible to forgive the unrepentant, Wright presents the case of Timothy and Hubert, which seems to show that one can forgive the unrepentant and take the wrong seriously. In response to Wolterstorff’s claim that it is (...) not morally permissible to forgive the unrepentant, Wright employs Trudy Govier and Colin Hirano’s invitational model of forgiveness, in which the act of forgiveness serves as the impetus or “invitation” for reconciliation. To illustrate this, Wright presents the case of Timothy and Jake, which seems to show that forgiving the unrepentant can be respectful of both the victim and the wrongdoer. (shrink)

Originally published in 1987, Colin Campbell’s classic treatise on the sociology of consumption has become one of the most widely cited texts in sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, and the history of ideas. In the thirty years since its publication, The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism has lost none of its impact. If anything, the growing commodification of society, the increased attention to consumer studies and marketing, and the ever-proliferating range of purchasable goods and services have made (...) Campbell’s rereading of Weber more urgent still. As Campbell uncovers how and why a consumer-oriented society emerged from a Europe that once embodied Weber’s Protestant ethic, he delivers a rich theorization of the modern logics and values structuring consumer behavior. This new edition, featuring an extended Introduction from the author and an Afterword from researcher Karin M. Ekström, makes clear how this foundational work aligns with contemporary theory in cultural sociology, while also serving as major influence on consumer studies. (shrink)

Theories of distributive justice tend to focus on the issue of what constitutes a fair division of 'external' goods and opportunities; things like wealth and income, opportunities for education and basic liberties and rights. However, rapid advances in the biomedical sciences have ushered in a new era, one where the 'genetic lottery of life' can be directly influenced by humans in ways that would have been considered science fiction only a few decades ago. How should theories of justice be modified (...) to take seriously the prospect of new biotechnologies, especially given the health challenges posed by global aging? Colin Farrelly addresses a host of topics, ranging from gene therapy and preimplantation genetic diagnosis, to an 'anti-aging' intervention and the creation and evolution of patriarchy. This book aims to foster the interdisciplinary dialogue needed to ensure we think rationally and cogently about science and science policy in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

A book on human communication that is worthy of its subject must introduce the reader to the dynamic interaction of a number of diverse fields. Colin Cherry's book, over successive editions, has served for twenty years as perhaps the most literate and readable introduction to this interaction available. Readers have consistently found that fields within their specialty are covered with authority; that fields far removed are covered with clarity; and that the connections among them are shown to be close (...) and natural. This third edition includes a new chapter, "Feeling, Knowledge, and Understanding," that extends the book's reach into philosophy, and in particular communicates some existential points-of-view. In it the author undertakes to demonstrate that "The language of physical science is inadequate for discussion of what is essentially human about human communication." In addition, numerous changes have been introduced throughout the text, and the bibliography has been expanded and updated. (shrink)

The long eighteenth century is a crucial period in the history of ethics, when our moral relations to God, ourselves and others were minutely examined and our duties, rights and virtues systematically and powerfully presented. Colin Heydt charts the history of practical morality - what we ought to do and to be - from the 1670s, when practical ethics arising from Protestant natural law gained an institutional foothold in England, to early British responses to the French Revolution around 1790. (...) He examines the conventional philosophical positions concerning the content of morality, and utilizes those conventions to reinterpret the work of key figures including Locke, Hume, and Smith. Situating these positions in their thematic and historical contexts, he shows how studying them challenges our assumptions about the originality, intended audience, and aims of philosophical argument during this period. His rich and readable book will appeal to a range of scholars and students. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Colin Falck STRUCTURE AND INTUITION I KANT'S ANSWER, in his Critique ofPure Reason, to the Humean problem that there seemed to be no way of explaining the principle of our experiential unity, of what it is that holds us together as experiencing selves or consciousnesses, was to argue that it was language itselfwhich underlay the whole possibility of our self-consciousness and of our consciousness of a world of (...) objects around us. Experience would not be possible without a unified consciousness, and a unified consciousness is only possible for us because of the use which we make of certain concepts of"the objects of experience." ' Kant argues at some length that there can be no perceptual experience without conceptual language, and in particular without our use of what he calls the a priori "categories" or "pure concepts of understanding " (CPR, B. 102 et seq.). (A similar, but more sophisticated, argument about the necessary dependence of perceptual experience on conceptual language was developed later by Wittgenstein.) Saussure, in his Course in General Linguistics,2 though never it seems in a fully aware or explicit way, founds his entire argument on this Kantian conclusion when he remarks that the notion "that ready-made ideas exist before words" is "open to criticism at several points" (p. 65), and goes on to elaborate a view of linguistic meanings as based in the relationships which hold between linguistic terms or units themselves rather than in any kind of "namingprocess " or "correspondence" between individual words and the things that they name (pp. 65, 111-18). A difficulty which faces, and which (unless certain amendments are made) must ultimately invalidate, the account of experience and language which Kant sets out in the Critique of Pure Reason is that the Kantian experiencing self, even though it is a concept-using and therefore perhaps 184 Colin Falck185 logically plausible subject, is at the same time also a disembodied subject. To that extent it is open to some of the same objections that can be brought against Descartes's conception of the thinking subject, or ego, as the foundation of all our experiencing. The problem which Kant did not recognize is that there could be no way for us to know about the existence of other experiencing agents, or therefore to have any awareness of the distinction between ourselves and other selves, if we could not in fact see the putative other person as an experiencing and thinking consciousness. To see another person in this way it must be possible to see him as, and it must be essential to his identity that he should really be, an embodied consciousness, rather than merely a Cartesian disembodied ego or (since the same arguments must apply) a Kantian disembodied concept-using self. (Without being embodied or located, there is no way for the Kantian self to be a perceiving agent with an identity which endures through time: the mere "unity of self-consciousness" which Kant offers us does not in fact give us any solution to Hume's problem at all.) The body, we might say, is that realm in which, or through which, we have our contact with, and therefore our awareness of, other consciousnesses — and at the same time, by contrast, our awareness of our own selfhood or consciousness as well.3 We cannot see another person only as "external" behavior, but must necessarily see his behavior as already inhabited by mind or spirit. Were this not so, there would be no way, to use the Kantian or "transcendental" turn of argument, for us to have the kind of experience which we indisputably do have. Ultimately therefore, if we reflect on the deficiencies of the Kantian position in the "disembodied" form in which Kant himself sets it out, we shall be obliged to recognize that the only kind of concept which will make the required connections between the "inside" and the "outside" of human behavior — a logical gap which seems all too easily to open up beneath us in this area — will be some kind of concept oí sympathy, or of preconscious imitative identification, which, by bridging the divide between "internally experienced" consciousness and "externally observable" movement, makes it... (shrink)

"After the first 40 pages I was hooked, and it has been a long time since I have been unable to put a book down unitl it was finished. I would highly recommend this book. Colin Feltham has brought together all the elements that have or do influence counselling, including placing counselling in a social context. As far as this publication goes I have actually put my money where my mouth is and paid for a copy of my own." (...) --Gladeana McMahon in British. (shrink)

I get to choose the excerpts, so take all this with a grain of salt (though I've tried to be reasonably balanced). Reviews are arranged chronologically (until I stopped updating this page, in 1998). I've also included a few non review articles focusing on the book. I give some very brief replies here; I have a separate page for more detailed responses to some articles on my work.

Can memory be cast as a system that meshes events to actions? This commentary considers the concepts of mesh versus association, arguing that thus far the distinction is inadequate. However, the goal of shifting to an action-based view of memory has merit, most notably in emphasizing memory as a skill and in focusing on processes as opposed to structures.

Among the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of condition among the people. (de Tocqueville 1990, 7)There are significant inequalities in the lives of America's children, including inequalities in the education that these children receive. These educational inequalities include not only disparities in funding per pupil but also in class size, teacher qualification, and resources such as books, labs, libraries, computers, and curriculum, as well (...) as the physical condition of the school and the safety of students within it. While not all schools attended by poor children are bad schools, and not all schools attended by well-off children are good schools, there are clear patterns. Poor children are more likely to attend crowded and poorly equipped schools with less qualified teachers than the children of more affluent families. They are less likely to have computers, books, and advanced placement academic courses. (Satz 2007, 623). (shrink)

Rose seems to be arguing against an extreme ultra-Darwinism that probably has no adherents. He incorrectly argues that a number of psychological traits are very difficult to measure. This is not the case. Rose argues that intelligence has no biological correlates. In fact, it is correlated with brain size, EEG evoked potentials, and cerebral glucose uptake during problem solving. Data that Rose should be aware of are omitted when they do not fit the case he is trying to make.

Steady direct current (dc) electric fields exist in many biological systems over many hours. At these times cells are dividing, differentiating, moving to final locations and extending motile processes. Each of these events may be influenced by physiological electric fields in tissue culture and when electric fields are disrupted in vivo, major developmental abnormalities arise. The likelihood of physiological electric fields playing a role in cell behaviours and some potential mechanisms are outlined.

In this, his first philosophical publication, McGinn introduces a distinction between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility, in order to diagnose the reason for Mackie's misinterpretation of Kripke's essentialism about natural kinds. McGinn then argues—on behalf of Kripke and pace Mackie—that the secondary qualities of natural kind substances are rigidly identical to the underlying primary qualities.

This review of Julian Barbour's The End of Time (1999) discusses his Machian theories of dynamics, and his proposal that a Machian perspective enables one to solve the problem of time in quantum geometrodynamics, viz. by saying that there is no time!1 Introduction2 Machian themes in classical physics2.1 The status quo2.2 Machianism2.2.1 The temporal metric as emergent2.2.2 Machian theories2.2.3 Assessing intrinsic dynamics3 The end of time?3.1 Time unreal? The classical case3.1.1 Spontaneity3.1.2 Barbour's vision: time capsules3.2 Evidence from quantum physics?3.2.1 Mott (...) scattering as a model for time capsules3.2.2 Solving the problem of time? (shrink)

This chapter is an extensive critique of the thesis of moral psychologism. Appealing to the Naturalistic Fallacy, McGinn argues that moral psychologism, as instanced in emotivism, the dispositional theory of goodness and relativism, confuses what ought to be the case with what is the case, psychologically. After a discussion of moral intentionality, McGinn concludes that goodness and other moral values are not mental properties but conceptually primitive, evaluative properties that have no place in an empirical science like psychology.

Beginning outside the boarded-up windows of Columbine High School and ending almost twelve years later on the fields of Shiloh National Military Park, Hallow This Ground revolves around monuments and memorials--physical structures that mark the intersection of time and place. In the ways they invite us to interact with them, these sites teach us how to negotiate shared histories. Colin Rafferty explores places as familiar as his hometown of Kansas City and as alien as the concentration camps of Poland (...) in an attempt to understand not only our common histories, but also his own past, present, and future. Rafferty blends the travel essay with the lyric, the memoir with the analytic, in this meditation on the ways personal histories intersect with history, and how those intersections affect the way we understand and interact with place"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

In an issue of Common Knowledge given over to experiments in scholarly form and to the discussion of them, this piece is one of three on the genre of microhistory. The other two argue the merits and demerits of the genre, while this piece seeks to exemplify both its virtues and its risks. To show how microhistory offers intense deliberation on a narrowly defined topic, yet also a kind of hastiness — an impatience with demands for broader scope — (...) class='Hi'>Colin Richmond examines one limited facet of the relationship between two Americans resident in England at the turn of the last century: the novelist Henry James and the painter Edwin Austin Abbey. Detailed evidence is mustered to document James's love of fresh hens' eggs and of the undignified lengths he would go to obtain them through the agency of Abbey and his wife. This short piece is written as if a parable, and while its moral goes unstated, the reader's attention is drawn to the unsettled question of whether James exerted maximal effort for minimal results, or whether he knew something about the value of freshness undreamed of by those more patient and dignified in pursuing their desires. (shrink)

Current approaches to contemporary political philosophy are disproportionately western, and the need for more diverse and global perspectives is urgent. To address this imbalance Colin J. Lewis and Jennifer Kling take up a series of contemporary topics in political philosophy and consider how the application of classical Chinese thought can engender new insights and enable progress on some of the thorniest sociopolitical issues. They argue that classical Chinese political theories and views have much to say that is relevant to (...) our contemporary life, and buttress their argument with case studies. Each chapter takes up a particular contemporary sociopolitical issue, describes standard Western approaches to it, and then applies classical Chinese thought to the task of either re-framing it, or suggesting a novel solution. -/- The book engages with and makes progress on several current sociopolitical issues, including the construction and deconstruction of political narratives, the legal standing of robots, the relationships between people, communities, and the environment, the funding (or defunding) of police, the status of private militias, and the question of justified revolution in liberal democracies, among others. While classical Chinese philosophy has been previously dismissed in some circles as inaccessible or banal, Lewis and Kling argue that, to the contrary, it is a powerful lens through which to view and dissect today's challenges. (shrink)

In challenging the implications of my putative counter‐example to Wittgenstein's claim that “It's on the tip of my tongue” (TT) is not the expression of an experience (cf. Philosophical Investigations, p.219)1, Professor Slater writes2 … the obvious way in which to meet the threat to the adequacy of (b1) [which is that the speaker should believe that he may be able to produce the missing word (fairly soon)] is to claim that the utterer of “It's on the tip of my (...) tongue” must not merely believe that he may recall the word fairly soon, he must also believe, i.e., not rule out the possibility that, he may do so without any treatment, i.e., without being prompted by an external source such as cues, pills, or shock, (p.51). (shrink)