The focus of this study is cognitive choice: the selection of one cognitive option (a hypothesis, a theory, or an axiom, for instance) rather than another. The study proposes that cognitive choice should be based on the plausibilities of states posited by rival cognitive options and the utilities of these options' information outcomes. The proposal introduces a form of decision theory that is novel because comparative; it permits many choices among cognitive options to (...) be based on merely comparative plausibilities and utilities. This form of decision theory intersects with recommendations by advocates of decision theory for cognitive choice, on the one hand, and defenders of comparative evaluation of scientific hypotheses and theories, on the other. But it differs from prior decision-theoretic proposals because it requires no more than minimal precision in specifying plausibilities and utilities. And it differs from comparative proposals because none has shown how comparative evaluations can be carried out within a decision-theoretic framework. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive review of the emerging theories from cognitive science that integrate both decision processes and choice behavior.

Critics have argued that behaviorism must necessarily be inadequate to account for complex human behavior whereas cognitive psychology is adequate to account for such behavior. Recently, Fodor has focused this criticism on certain situations in which humans choose among a set of alternatives. We argue that this criticism applies to forms of behaviorism that are reductionistic but not to non-reductionistic behaviorisms like that of Skinner. Non-reductionistic behaviorism can be used to interpret human choice situations of varying degrees of (...) complexity. Such interpretations run into difficulty in accounting for certain aspects of verbal behavior, but so do cognitive theories. Although nothing, in principle, prohibits either type of theory from accounting for complex human behavior, neither current behavioral theory nor current cognitive theory is developed enough at the present time to do so. (shrink)

Distributed cognition refers to processes which are (i) cognitive and (ii) distributed across multiple agents or devices rather than performed by a single agent. Distributed cognition has attracted interest in several fields ranging from sociology and law to computer science and the philosophy of science. In this paper, I discuss distributed cognition from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. Drawing on models of judgment aggregation, I address two questions. First, how can we model a group of individuals as a distributed (...) class='Hi'>cognitive system? Second, can a group acting as a distributed cognitive system be ‘rational’ and ‘track the truth’ in the outputs it produces? I argue that a group’s performance as a distributed cognitive system depends on its ‘aggregation procedure’ – its mechanism for aggregating the group members’ inputs into collective outputs – and I investigate the properties of an aggregation procedure that matter. (shrink)

People often face preferential decisions under risk. To further our understanding of the cognitive processes underlying these preferential choices, two prominent cognitive models, decision field theory (DFT; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) and the proportional difference model (PD; González‐Vallejo, 2002), were rigorously tested against each other. In two consecutive experiments, the participants repeatedly had to choose between monetary gambles. The first experiment provided the reference to estimate the models’ free parameters. From these estimations, new gamble pairs were generated for (...) the second experiment such that the two models made maximally divergent predictions. In the first experiment, both models explained the data equally well. However, in the second generalization experiment, the participants’ choices were much closer to the predictions of DFT. The results indicate that the stochastic process assumed by DFT, in which evidence in favor of or against each option accumulates over time, described people’s choice behavior better than the trade‐offs between proportional differences assumed by PD. (shrink)

This paper examines the claims in the debate on cognitive enhancement in neuroethics that society wide pressure to enhance can be expected in the near future. The author uses rational choice modeling to test these claims and proceeds with the analysis of proposed types of solutions. The discourage use, laissez-faire and prohibition types of policy are scrutinized for effectiveness, legitimacy and associated costs. Special attention is given to the moderately liberal discourage use policy (and the gate-keeper and taxation (...) approaches within this framework), as many authors presuppose that this type of policy would best serve public interest. Different more or less articulated models in the taxation approach (Tobacco regulation analogy, Coffee-shop system, Regulatory Authority for Cognitive Enhancements and Economic Disincentives Model) are analyzed from the point of view of justificatory liberalism. The author concludes that prohibition and laissez-faire types of policy would neither be effective nor justified. A moderately liberal public policy shows more promise, but not all approaches within this type of policy would be legitimate and effective. The “gate-keeper” approach and related models could not be justified whereas approach based on taxation with suitable models might be legitimate and effective. (shrink)

In this conceptual analysis contribution to the special issue on radical embodied cognition, we discuss how embodied cognition can exist with and without representations. We explore this concept through the lens of judgment and decision making in sports (JDMS). Embodied cognition has featured in many investigations of human behavior, but no single approach has emerged. Indeed, the very definitions of the concepts “embodiment” and “cognition” lack consensus, and consequently the degree of “radicalism” is not universally defined, either. In this paper (...) we address JDMS not from a rigid theoretical perspective, but from two embodied cognition approaches: one that assumes there is mediation between the athlete and the environment through mental representation, and another that assumes direct contact between the athlete and the environment and thus no need for mental representation. Importantly, our aim was not to arrive at a theoretical consensus or set up a competition between approaches, but rather to provide a legitimate scientific discussion about how to explain empirical results in JDMS from contrasting perspectives within embodied cognition. For this, we first outline the definitions and constructs of embodied cognition in JDMS. Second, we detail the theory underlying the mental representation and direct contact approaches. Third, we comment on two published research papers on JDMS, one selected by each of us: (1) Correia et al. (2012) and (2) Pizzera (2012). Fourth, following the interpretation of the empirical findings of these papers, we present a discussion on the commonalities and divergences of these two perspectives and the consequences of using one or the other approach in the study of JDMS. (shrink)

The term cognitive framework has appeared in modern theories of cognitive psychology. In theories of cognitive linguistics, the theory of metonymy, metaphors and conceptual amalgams, is a fundamental structure that makes it possible to understand the meaning. However, the nature of the cognitive framework understood as the limitations of our cognition is a universal reflection tool that can be used in other fields, especially in philosophy. The article deals with issues related to the origin of the (...) term, the construction material of the cognitive framework, the diversity of their occurrence and the possibilities of their transformation based on selected issues from epistemology, philosophy of science and philosophy of culture. (shrink)

Cognitive diagnostic models show great promise in language assessment for providing rich diagnostic information. The lack of a full understanding of second language listening subskills made model selection difficult. In search of optimal CDM that could provide a better understanding of L2 listening subskills and facilitate accurate classification, this study carried a two-layer model selection. At the test level, A-CDM, LLM, and R-RUM had an acceptable and comparable model fit, suggesting mixed inter-attribute relationships of L2 listening subskills. At the (...) item level, Mixed-CDMs were selected and confirmed the existence of mixed relationships. Mixed-CDMs had better model and person fit than G-DNIA. In addition to statistical approaches, the content analysis provided theoretical evidence to confirm and amend the item-level CDMs. It was found that semantic completeness pertaining to the attributes and item features may influence the attribute relationships. Inexplicable attribute conflicts could be a signal of suboptimal model choice. Sample size and the number of multi-attribute items should be taken into account in L2 listening cognitive diagnostic modeling studies. This study provides useful insights into the model selection and the underlying cognitive process for L2 listening tests. (shrink)

The prospects of enhancing cognitive or motor functions using neuroscience in otherwise healthy individuals has attracted considerable attention and interest in neuroethics (Farah et al., Nature Reviews Neuroscience 5:421–425, 2004; Glannon Journal of Medical Ethics 32:74–78, 2006). The use of stimulants is one of the areas which has propelled the discussion on the potential for neuroscience to yield cognition-enhancing products. However, we have found in our review of the literature that the paradigms used to discuss the non-medical use of (...) stimulant drugs prescribed for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) vary considerably. In this brief communication, we identify three common paradigms—prescription drug abuse, cognitive enhancement, and lifestyle use of pharmaceuticals—and briefly highlight how divergences between paradigms create important “ethics blind spots”. (shrink)

(2013). Why humans are (sometimes) less rational than other animals: Cognitive complexity and the axioms of rational choice. Thinking & Reasoning: Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 1-26. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2012.713178.

We report on two experiments investigating the effect of an increased cognitive load for speakers on the choice of referring expressions. Speakers produced story continuations to addressees, in which they referred to characters that were either salient or non-salient in the discourse. In Experiment 1, referents that were salient for the speaker were non-salient for the addressee, and vice versa. In Experiment 2, all discourse information was shared between speaker and addressee. Cognitive load was manipulated by the (...) presence or absence of a secondary task for the speaker. The results show that speakers under load are more likely to produce pronouns, at least when referring to less salient referents. We take this finding as evidence that speakers under load have more difficulties taking discourse salience into account, resulting in the use of expressions that are more economical for themselves. (shrink)

This research examines the methodologies employed by cognitive psychologists to study “false memory,” and assesses if these methodologies are likely to facilitate scientific progress or perhaps constrain the conclusions reached. A PsycINFO search of the empirical publications in cognitive psychology was conducted through January, 2004, using the subject heading, “false memory.” The search produced 198 articles. Although there is an apparent false memory research bandwagon in cognitive psychology, with increasing numbers of studies published on this topic over (...) the past decade, few researchers have studied false memory as the term was originally intended—to specifically refer to planting memory for an entirely new event that was never experienced in an individual’s lifetime. Cognitive psychologists interested in conducting research relevant to assessing the authenticity of memories for child sexual abuse should consider the generalizability of their research to the planting of entirely new events in memory. (shrink)

There is a close but largely unexplored connection between law and economics and cognitive psychology. Law and economics applies economic models, modes of analysis, and argument to legal problems. Economic theory can be applied to legal problems for predictive, explanatory, or evaluative purposes. In explaining or assessing human action, economic theory presupposes a largely unarticulated account of rational, intentional action. Philosophers typically analyze intentional action in terms ofdesiresandbeliefs. I intend to perform some action because Ibelievethat it will (is likely (...) to) produce an outcome that Idesire. This standard “belief-desire” model of action invokes what philosophers of psychology and action theorists aptly refer to as a “folk psychology.”. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky has failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of the "creativity of language" that he maintains is an essential part of the mental representation that makes the acquisition of languages possible. I argue that Chomsky's problems in articulating an acceptable concept of creativity is symptomatic of greater problems embedded in his idea of an "innateness hypothesis." An examination of the historical development of Chomsky's views on the nature of language shows that conclusions with regard to the creativity of language (...) remain either quite speculative or else untenable. This result establishes some agreement with Chomsky on the idea that cognitive capacities are largely structure determined. However, I argue against his idea that creativity is itself a part of those structures. In conclusion, I argue that creativity is an aspect of autonomy. In view of the integrative role of autonomy with respect cognitive capacities in general, we must conclude that creativity does not belong to the biological domain that Chomsky has characterized. (shrink)

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn claimed that theory choice is a conversion experience and depends upon the personality or psychology of the individual scientist making the choice. Critics charged Kuhn with an irrational and a relativistic position concerning theory choice, arguing he advocated a subjective instead of an objective approach to how scientists choose one theory over another and thereby undercut epistemic accounts for the generation of scientific knowledge. In response to critics Kuhn insisted that (...) his approach, although subjective, was still rational in that the criteria—composed of epistemic values—determining theory choice operate both objectively and subjectively. Recent work in cognitive neuropsychology, particularly in the dual-process theory of cognition, supports Kuhn’s notion of theory choice. In this paper, I initially discuss Kuhn’s approach to theory choice, along with criticism of it and his response to the criticism, followed by an examination of the dual-process theory of cognition. I then explore the application of dual-process theory to Kuhn’s notion of theory choice, especially in terms of a historical case study from the biomedical sciences. I finally discuss briefly the implications of the dual-process theory for contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

A significant problem in constructing the theory of rational choice (and rationality in gen­eral) at the moment is the question of explaining irrationality, or rather the fact that an agent can act irrationally for an external observer, and the models used for it may not work. However, the agent himself “inside”, if you find yourself in his “logic”, acts clearly rationally upon verification. It’s just that his “rationality” and the “rationality” of an ex­ternal observer turn out to be different, (...) hence they do not coincide, and hence this leads to a discrepancy in the language of their description of each other. To resolve this prob­lem and find a theoretical basis for the connection between the physiological states of or­ganisms and testable the theoretical constructs, and thus obtaining the opportunity, with­out changing the optics, to work with all agents, regardless of the types of rationality they have, psychological approaches have increasingly become involved. But for them, the basic problem is always “rootedness” in the “material substrate”. This work largely suggests and shows which mechanism can allow this problem to be solved. The paper draws atten­tion to the fact that the combination of the theory of predictive processing and the theory of cognitive dissonance turns out to be extremely promising for this task. This is due to the fact that both of these theories are engaged in reducing surprise or inconsistency (prediction errors and dissonance), with the former providing the latter with valuable and informative context within the broader perception – prediction – action framework (known as active inference) and also helps us to separate dissonant cognitive elements from dissonant psychological states, while considering them as part of the same process of perception and cognition. All this allows us to set a fundamental theoretical basis for the connection between the physiological states of organisms and testable theoretical con­structs about the degree of rationality of a particular agent, and, thus, gain access to the internal information processes in the brain for study. (shrink)

Cognitive archaeologists attempt to infer the cognitive and cultural features of past hominins and their societies from the material record. This task faces the problem of _minimum necessary competence_: as the most sophisticated thinking of ancient hominins may have been in domains that leave no archaeological signature, it is safest to assume that tool production and use reflects only the lower boundary of cognitive capacities. Cognitive archaeology involves selecting a model from the cognitive sciences and (...) then assessing some aspect of the material record through that lens. We give examples to show that background theoretical commitments in cognitive science that inform those models lead to different minimum necessary competence results. This raises an important question: what principles should guide us in selecting a model from the cognitive sciences? We outline two complementary responses to this question. The first involves using _independent_ lines of evidence to converge on a particular capacity. This can then influence model choice. The second is a broader suggestion. Theoretical diversity is a good thing in science, but is only beneficial over a limited amount of time. According to recent modelling work, one way of limiting diversity is to introduce extreme priors. We argue that having a broad spectrum of views in the philosophy of cognitive science may actually help cognitive archaeologists address the problem of minimum necessary competence. (shrink)

A framing bias shows risk aversion in problems framed as “gains” and risk seeking in problems framed as “losses,” even when these are objectively equivalent and probabilities and outcomes values are explicitly provided. We test this framing bias in situations where decision makers rely on their own experience, sampling the problem's options and seeing the outcomes before making a choice. In Experiment 1, we replicate the framing bias in description-based decisions and find risk indifference in gains and losses in (...) experience-based decisions. Predictions of an Instance-Based Learning model suggest that objective probabilities as well as the number of samples taken are factors that contribute to the lack of framing effect. We test these two factors in Experiment 2 and find no framing effect when a few samples are taken but when large samples are taken, the framing effect appears regardless of the objective probability values. Implications of behavioral results and cognitive modeling are discussed. (shrink)

This article reports an empirical investigation of the cognitive effort required to decide in multiattribute binary choice using a variation of the Additive Difference strategy. In contrast with other studies, this paper focuses on the effect of various context variables (rather than task variables) on cognitive effort. In order to select the context variables to be manipulated, we used the model proposed by Shugan (1980; J. Consumer Res. 75 (1980) 99). Our results indicate that there is a (...) positive relationship between the cognitive effort required to decide and the mean of the differences between the dimensions of the choice alternatives. We have also found an inverse relationship between cognitive effort and the variance of the differences between the dimensions of the choice alternatives. Finally, we have found that in negative correlation contexts the effort needed to decide is greater than in positive and null correlation contexts. (shrink)

The study of moral decision-making presents to us two approaches for understanding such choices. The cognitive and the neurocognitive approaches postulate that reason and reasoning determines moral judgments. On the other hand, the intuitionist approaches postulate that automated intuitions mostly dominate moral judgments. There is a growing concern that neither of these approaches by itself captures all the key aspects of moral judgments. This paper draws on models from neurocognitive research and social-intuitionist research areas to propose an integrative (...) class='Hi'>cognitive–intuitive model of moral decision-making. The model suggests that moral decision-making includes five interdependent, yet functionally distinct steps, issue framing, pre-processing, moral judgment, moral reflection, and moral intent. The model proposes a cognitive–intuitive view of moral judgment and it describes how emotion regulation, perceived moral intensity, and perceived ethical climate constructs impact the formation of moral intent. The paper discusses the theories that link emotions to moral judgment and implications of the model for future research and its implication for managers. (shrink)

One of the most discussed issues in psychology—presently and in the past—is how to define and measure the extent to which human cognition is rational. The rationality of human cognition is often evaluated in terms of normative standards based on a priori intuitions. Yet this approach has been challenged by two recent developments in psychology that we review in this article: ecological rationality and descriptivism. Going beyond these contributions, we consider it a good moment for psychologists and philosophers to join (...) forces and work toward a new foundation for the definition of rational cognition. We take a first step in this direction by proposing that the rationality of both cognitive and normative systems can be measured in terms of their cognitive success. Cognitive success can be defined and gauged in terms of two factors: ecological validity (the system's validity in conditions in which it is applicable) and the system's applicability (the scope of conditions under which it can be applied). As we show, prominent systems of reasoning—deductive reasoning, Bayesian reasoning, uncertain conditionals, and prediction and choice—perform rather differently on these two factors. Furthermore, we demonstrate that conceptualizing rationality according to its cognitive success offers a new perspective on the time-honored relationship between the descriptive (“is”) and the normative (“ought”) in psychology and philosophy. (shrink)

We analyze the dynamics of repeated interaction of two players in the Prisoner's Dilemma under various levels of interdependency information and propose an instance-based learning cognitive model to explain how cooperation emerges over time. Six hypotheses are tested regarding how a player accounts for an opponent's outcomes: the selfish hypothesis suggests ignoring information about the opponent and utilizing only the player's own outcomes; the extreme fairness hypothesis weighs the player's own and the opponent's outcomes equally; the moderate fairness hypothesis (...) weighs the opponent's outcomes less than the player's own outcomes to various extents; the linear increasing hypothesis increasingly weighs the opponent's outcomes at a constant rate with repeated interactions; the hyperbolic discounting hypothesis increasingly and nonlinearly weighs the opponent's outcomes over time; and the dynamic expectations hypothesis dynamically adjusts the weight a player gives to the opponent's outcomes, according to the gap between the expected and the actual outcomes in each interaction. When players lack explicit feedback about their opponent's choices and outcomes, results are consistent with the selfish hypothesis; however, when this information is made explicit, the best predictions result from the dynamic expectations hypothesis. (shrink)

Our discussion of the commentaries begins, at the evolutionary level, with issues raised by our account of the evolution of morality in terms of partner-choice mutualism. We then turn to the cognitive level and the characterization and workings of fairness. In a final section, we discuss the degree to which our fairness-based approach to morality extends to norms that are commonly considered moral even though they are distinct from fairness.

Some current attempts to go beyond the narrow scope of rational choice theory (RCT) in the social sciences and the artificial reconstructions it sometimes provides focus on the arguments that people give to justify their beliefs and behaviors themselves. But the available argumentation theories are not constructed to fill this gap. This article argues that relevance theory, on the contrary, suggests interesting tracks. This provocative idea requires a rereading of Sperber and Wilson's theory. Actually, the authors do not explicitly (...) support RCT, and Sperber has even strongly criticized methodological individualism, which most of the time underlies RCT, in favor of infra-individualism. A key point of the argument presented here is to show that Sperber and Wilson do not firmly distinguish between infra-individualism and subintentionality. Only subintentionality is needed. Key Words: argumentation • rational choice • relevance theory • methodological individualism. (shrink)

Throughout the world, female students are less likely than males to take advanced physics courses. This mixed-methods study uses a concurrent, nested design to study an online homework intervention designed to address choice and achievement. A choice of three different contexts (biological, sports, and traditional) were offered to students for each physics problem, intending to stimulate females’ interest and enhance achievement. Informed by aspects of Artino’s social-cognitive model of academic motivation and emotion, we investigated: Which context of (...) physics problems do males and females select?; What explanations do students give for their choices?; Are there differences in the achievement of males and females?; and Is there a relationship between student achievement and the context selected? Fifty-two high school physics students from five U.S. states participated. Data included pre and post Force Concept Inventory scores, homework context choices and achievement, and rationales for choices. Findings indicate that females were most likely to select biology contexts; males, traditional. All students made more attempts on video questions over word questions, although females did not score as well. For all questions, students generally persisted until they answered them correctly, with females taking fewer attempts on problems. Context choice was mostly driven by interest, for males, and perceptions of difficulty level for females; however, rationales were indistinguishable by gender. On their first homework question attempt, females scored significantly better than the males. Initially, males had significantly higher FCI scores; post homework intervention, females increased their mean scores significantly on the FCI, erasing the initial gender gap, with no growth nor decline in males’ scores. Females with FCI growth were equally as likely to choose biology contexts as traditional contexts; males were more likely to choose biology contexts. Findings from this study suggest that modest changes to homework problems that provide choice and make the physics problems more contextually interesting - even without changes in classroom instruction - could increase interest and motivation students and increase achievement for both male and female students. Recommendations will be discussed. (shrink)

While 4E approaches to cognition are increasingly introduced in educational contexts, little has been said about how 4E commitments can inform pedagogy aimed at fostering ethical competencies. Here, we evaluate a 4E-inspired ethics exercise that we developed at a technical university to enliven the moral imagination of engineering students. Our students participated in an interactive tinkering workshop, during which they materially redesigned a healthcare artifact. The aim of the workshop was twofold. Firstly, we wanted students to experience how material choices (...) at the levels of design and functionality can enable morally significant reimaginings of the affordances commonly associated with existing artifacts. We term this type of reimagining world-directed moral imagination. Secondly, through the design process, we wanted students to robustly place themselves in the lived embodied perspectives of (potential) users of their selected artifacts. We term this person-directed moral imagination. While student testimonies about the exercise indicate that both their world-directed and person-directed moral imagination were enlivened, we note that the fostering of robust person-directed moral imagination proved challenging. Using 4E insights, we diagnose this challenge and ask how it might be overcome. To this end, we engage extensively with a recent 4E-informed critique of person-directed moral imagination, raised by Clavel Vázquez and Clavel-Vázquez (2023). They argue that person-directed moral imagination is profoundly limited, if not fundamentally misguided, particularly when exercised in contexts marked by emphatic embodied situated difference between the imaginer and the imagined. Building upon insights from both the 4E field and testimonies from critical disability studies, we argue that, while their critique is valuable, it ultimately goes too far. We conclude that a 4E approach can take on board recent 4E warnings regarding the limits of person-directed moral imagination while contributing positively to the development of moral imagination in engineering ethics education. (shrink)

Cognitive deficits are part of the normal aging process and are exacerbated by various diseases that affect adults in old age, such as dementia, depression, and stroke. A significant scientific and social effort has been expended to evaluate whether cognitive deficits can be remedied through systematic interventions. The editors, as well as the chapter authors, represent a variety of viewpoints that span theory as well as practice. Overall, they aim to address concepts in cognitive rehabilitation that are (...) useful in intervention research -- research which examines problems and issues in normal and pathological aging -- and focusing on the application of cognitive training strategies in natural settings. Thus, the book is grounded in contemporary theory in cognitive aging and is applicable to both the practicing clinician as well as the researcher. It is organized into four sections. The first highlights prominent theoretical principles; the second looks at cognitive rehabilitation strategies in normal aging; the third examines the interplay between lifestyle patterns and cognitive function through applying a broad definition of lifestyle choices; and the fourth focuses on rehabilitation strategies that address issues in pathological aging. (shrink)

Let me first state that I like Antti Revonsuo’s discussion of the various methodological and interpretational problems in neuroscience. It shows how careful and methodologically reflected scientists have to proceed in this fascinating field of research. I have nothing to add here. Furthermore, I am very sympathetic towards Revonsuo’s general proposal to call for a Philosophy of Neuroscience that stresses foundational issues, but also focuses on methodological and explanatory strategies.2 In a footnote of his paper, Revonsuo complains – as many (...) others do today – about what is sometimes called “physics imperialism”. This is the view that physics dominates the philosophy of science. I am not sure if this is still the case nowadays, but it is certainly historically correct that almost all work in the field of methodology centered around cases from physics. Although this has been changing, there are still plenty of special sciences philosophers did not worry about much. Admittedly, I am myself a trained physicist and not a neuroscientist and will therefore probably be biased negatively. As it is, I will discuss some examples from physics in order to illustrate my points. (shrink)

A widely shared view in the cognitive sciences is that discovering and assessing explanations of cognitive phenomena whose production involves uncertainty should be done in a Bayesian framework. One assumption supporting this modelling choice is that Bayes provides the best approach for representing uncertainty. However, it is unclear that Bayes possesses special epistemic virtues over alternative modelling frameworks, since a systematic comparison has yet to be attempted. Currently, it is then premature to assert that cognitive phenomena (...) involving uncertainty are best explained within the Bayesian framework. As a forewarning, progress in cognitive science may be hindered if too many scientists continue to focus their efforts on Bayesian modelling, which risks to monopolize scientific resources that may be better allocated to alternative approaches. (shrink)

Representing moral choice as a function of rational choice is carried out by formalizing moral evaluation into a functional mechanism called "Moral Choice Function" whose domain is information on a state of affairs and range is a moral judgment, and upon which formal and substantive requirements are imposed. The notions such as impartiality, universalizability, proportionality, and informational invariance are employed for the issue of how to solve conflict of values faced by an individual as well as collective (...) moral agent. By utilizing the structural affinity with post-Arrovian social choice theory, it is shown that inter-attribute commensurability is indispensable for any serious moral agent who wants to solve conflict of values through pluralistic maximizing. It is also shown that once the morally relevant attributes are identified, formal requirements are powerful enough to qualify the function to behave in a certain way such that the formulas for pluralistic maximizing vary with the modes of inter-attribute commensurability. It is also shown how it is still possible to manage conflict of values rationally without value commensurability by interpreting John Rawls's theory of justice as neo-Kantian in dealing with conflicting desiderata from Kantian deontology and utilitarian consequentialism. The metaethical tenets for the project are also argued for such that it is neutral about the ontological status of morality; but it is anti-Humean with its supervenience thesis, anti-Moorean with its reducibility thesis, and anti-naturalist with its syntheticity thesis. It is also argued that behind the project there lies a fundamental metaphysical conception of an entity as a bundle of properties conjoined with epistemic foundationalism, which is evidenced not only in moral evaluation but also in other kinds of cognitive activity. (shrink)

The susceptibility of decision-makers’ choices to variations in option framing has been attributed to individual differences in cognitive style. According to this view, individuals who are prone to a more deliberate, or less intuitive, thinking style are less susceptible to framing manipulations. Research findings on the topic, however, have tended to yield small effects, with several studies also being limited in inferential value by methodological drawbacks. We report two experiments that examined the value of several cognitive-style variables, including (...) measures of cognitive reflection, subjective numeracy, actively open-minded thinking, need for cognition, and hemispheric dominance, in predicting participants’ frame-consistent choices. Our experiments used an isomorph of the Asian Disease Problem and we manipulated frames between participants. We controlled for participants’ sex and age, and we manipulated the order in which choice options were presented to participants. In Experiment 1 (N = 190) using an undergraduate sample and in Experiment 2 (N = 316) using a sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, we found no significant effect of any of the cognitive style measures taken on predicting frame-consistent choice, regardless of whether we analyzed participants’ binary choices or their choices weighted by the extent to which participants preferred their chosen option over the non-chosen option. The sole factor that significantly predicted frame consistent choice was framing: in both experiments, participants were more likely to make frame consistent choices when the frame was positive than when it was negative, consistent with the tendency towards risk aversion in the task. The present findings do not support the view that individual differences in people’s susceptibility to framing manipulations can be substantially accounted for by individual differences in cognitive style. (shrink)

Individual choices are commonly taken to manifest personal preferences. The present study investigated whether social and statistical cues influence young children's inferences about the generalizability of preferences. Preschoolers were exposed to either 1 or 2 demonstrators’ selections of objects. The selected objects constituted 18%, 50%, or 100% of all available objects. We found that children took a single demonstrator's choices as indicative only of his or her personal preference. However, when 2 demonstrators made the same selection, then children inferred that (...) it generalized to other agents of the same kind as the original demonstrator's, but not to agents of a different kind. Lastly, only when both demonstrators blatantly violated random selection (i.e., in the 18% condition) did children generalize the preference even to an agent of a different kind. Thus, from a young age, social and statistical cues inform children's naïve sociology. (shrink)

Peter Auriol argues that sensation and intellection are both passive and active. They are passive insofar as they involve the reception of species or impressions of extra-mental objects. They are active insofar as both senses and intellect process these species and produce an intentional object. The way in which the senses and the intellect receive and process their own impressions is quite different, though. While perception is beyond our control, Auriol claims that the imagination, and the activity of the agent (...) and possible intellect depend on an act of the will. His idea is that the will pushes the intellect to focus on one of the impressions it receives from external objects, so that the corresponding impression is allowed to be imprinted in the intellect itself and the relevant concept formed. This paper examines the role that Auriol attributes to the will in our intellectual cognition, inasmuch as it is able to determine both (i) what kind of impressions can be picked and then embedded into the mind and, (ii) consequently, which concepts the intellect will form. My view is that, by envisioning the intellect and the will as already interacting during the process of concept formation, and not just during that of choice-making, Auriol provides an account of the intellect and the will strongly integrated with one another, thus offering a unitary vision of our cognitive life. (shrink)