Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At (...) least since Hume argued that reason "is and of right ought to be the slave of the passions," many philosophers have held that desires play an essential role both in practical reason and in the explanation of intentional action. G. F. Schueler looks at contemporary accounts of both roles in various belief-desire models of reasons and explanation and argues that the usual belief-desire accounts need to be replaced. Schueler contends that the plausibility of the standard belief-desire accounts rests largely on a failure to distinguish "desires proper," like a craving for sushi, from so-called "pro attitudes," which may take the form of beliefs and other cognitive states as well as desires proper. Schueler's "deliberative model" of practical reasoning suggests a different view of the place of desire in practical reason and the explanation of action. He holds that we can arrive at an intention to act by weighing the relevant considerations and that these may not include desires proper at all. (shrink)

The ‘error theory’ holds that all normative claims are false. Of course, if there is any reason to believe the error theory then, since it would be a reason to believe something, that would show the error theory itself to be false. A recent book (Streumer, 2017) tries to block this argument by arguing on the basis of the claim that the error theory itself can’t be believed that there can be no reason to believe it. This is a paradoxical (...) conclusion since it leaves the possibility that the error theory is true even though it is impossible to believe it and we can have no reason to believe it. In this paper I argue for a different paradox. Even if we can believe the error theory, we are committed to rejecting it, but this still leaves normative skepticism unanswered. (shrink)

People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact (...) that the reasons for an action are not always good reasons. (shrink)

Le bassin caribéen élaborée par Benoît Berard, MCF en archéologie, université des Antilles. Premières terres abordées par Christophe Colomb dans sa traversée vers les Indes occidentales, point de départ de l’entreprise de conquête du continent américain, enjeu des guerres européennes pour la domination de l’espace maritime atlantique et l’exploitation des « îles à sucre », l’espace Caraïbe s’est retrouvé à la croisée des « mondes » européen, africain, américain, asiatique, dans le circuit de...

This paper investigates the analysis of the de re/de dicto distinction and related facts. I start with the assumption, supported by Cresswell 1990, that the evaluation of the truth of a proposition relative to a particular possible world/situation is mediated via the presence in the syntax of a silent pronoun with type-s denotation. In this system, the de re/de dicto distinction arises from a difference in which an operator binds a given situation pronoun. Percus 2000 shows that such a system (...) potentially overgenerates, in that a third type of reading is predicted to exist for sentences which actually have only two: de re and de dicto. Percus proposes constraints on the binding of situation pronouns, which correctly rule out these third readings. This paper shows, however, that extrinsic constraints on the binding of situation pronouns are not necessary to rule out the unwanted readings, as long as we develop a more precise theory of binding in the first place. I adapt the binding operator argued for by Büring 2004, originally developed only for overt pronouns, and show that when used as an operator for situation pronouns, the unwanted readings are not predicted to occur. (shrink)

Patients with psychotic disorders experience a range of reality distortions. These often include auditory-verbal hallucinations, and thought insertion to a lesser degree; however, their mechanisms and relationships between each other remain largely elusive. Here we attempt to establish a integrative model drawing from the phenomenology of both AVHs and TI and argue that they in fact can be seen as ‘spectra’ of experiences with varying degrees of agency and ownership, with ‘silent and internal own thoughts’ on one extreme and ‘fully (...) external and clearly audible voices’ in the absence of a speaker on the other. We believe a spectral model will add emphasis to the continuity of experience and help to better understand how one type of psychotic symptom may interact with another, and put forward the argument that the experience of TI itself is not sufficient to classify as a delusion. In addition we aim to discuss some of the conceptual issues surrounding AVHs and TI with first-person accounts and current philosophical and neuropsychological theories in mind. We propose that the mechanisms behind AVHs and TI are more complex than source-monitoring deficits; indeed, to understand such phenomena one must appreciate that their very ‘existence’ and ‘reality’ as experienced by the individual have much deeper implications and meaning, both philosophically and clinically. (shrink)

In Gendered Readings of Change, Clara Fischer develops a unique theory of change by drawing on American philosophy and contemporary feminist thought. Via a select history of ancient Greek and Pragmatist philosophies of change, she argues for a reconstruction of transformation that is inclusive of women's experiences and thought. With wide-ranging analysis, this book addresses ontological, moral, epistemological, and political questions, and includes an insightful exploration of the philosophies of Parmenides, Aristotle, John Dewey, Iris Young, and Jane Addams.

The main purpose of this paper is to answer the question of how it is that a person who incites another to do something can be held morally responsible for this second person's acts. Professor bruce franklin's dismissal from stanford university is taken as the main example and it is argued that though those incited act 'because' of what the incitor does, This 'because' is not explainable on the standard models of physical causation, Coercion or hypnosis. It is closer to (...) the truth to think of the incitor as arguing, To those incited, That they should perform some action. (shrink)

This paper argues that both teleological and causal concepts are required for explanations of intentional actions. It argues against ‘causalism’, the idea that action explanations are essentially causal. This requires analyzing Mele’s Q-Signals-from-Mars argument that having a purpose and behaving so as to achieve it aren’t sufficient to explain an intentional action. Though Mele’s example shows that external causal interference can defeat the claim that an intentional action has been performed, this is consistent with teleological concepts being required (even if (...) not sufficient) for action explanation. Mele’s example would work even if causalism were true. But causalism is false. Causalism depends on the idea that ‘agents always do what they want’ can be understood as saying agents have mental states, desires, that cause their behavior. But intentional actions involve what agents want only in the sense that actions have purposes, which are not mental states and cannot be the causes of actions. To perform an intentional action is to pursue some purpose in some way. This paper argues that neither the reference to the purpose that explains why the action was performed, nor the causal account of how this purpose was pursued, can be eliminated. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References.

The difference between cognitive and conative mental states, such as beliefs and desires, has sometimes been held to be that they have different “directions of fit” between the mind and the world – mind-to-world for beliefs and world-to-mind for desires (see Desire). Some philosophers have pursued the idea that if this thought can be given a plausible explanation it can be used to ground Hume's claim that “reason is the slave of the passions,” i.e., that no moral or other “practical” (...) belief, e.g., about what is best or right to do, can ever by itself be enough to motivate action. A desire or desire-like state is always required (see Reason and Passion; Hume, David). This issue will be discussed below. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that the latter group [of Non-Humeans] is correct. My argument focuses on practical deliberation and has two parts. I will discuss two different problems that arise for the Humean Theory and suggest that while taken individually each problem appears to have a solution, for each problem the solution Humeans offer precludes solving the other problem. I will suggest that to see these difficulties we must take seriously the thought that we can only understand an (...) agent’s reasons for her action by looking at her actual or possible practical deliberation. (shrink)

A partir de los años 90, la expansión del capitalismo y la globalización ubicaron a las fronteras como espacios privilegiados para el intercambio de bienes, servicios y personas. Paralelamente, y en consecuencia, también se convirtieron en el lugar de movimiento de aquellos actos considerados como delitos y de aquellas personas consideradas como criminales. En este marco, aparecerán las llamadas nuevas amenazas a la seguridad, que ya no se circunscriben a una ideología o territorio determinado, sino que tienen múltiples (des)localizaciones. Los (...) nuevos riesgos serán el terrorismo, el narcotráfico, la trata de personas y los migrantes, en sus diversos procesos de movilidad y asociados directamente al terrorismo. En este artículo, propongo entonces analizar los marcos internacionales y regionales para identificar narrativas y actores, internacionales y regionales, involucrados en el proceso de (in)securitización de la migración, a través del cual esta aparece dentro del espectro de las nuevas amenazas, principalmente aquella catalogada como irregular. A partir del análisis de documentos, intentaré hacer un aporte en relación a la construcción del sujeto terrorista en el Cono Sur, identificando cómo la migración se convierte también en un posible vector del riesgo terrorista a través de la figura del asilo y el refugio —migración forzada. (shrink)

The article points out, in L'Action (1893) and in Le point de départ de la recherche philosophique (1903) by Blondel, a refined characterisation of the relation between the intentional structure of action, as well as the practical significance of logical categories such as possibility, reality, contrariety, and the concept of future. There can be action only if man prepares for reality according to a prospectus of the future; which, in turn, emerges as the spring field of the 'possible' itself, potential (...) space of free intervention. The articles discusses the connections between the transcendental conditions of action, and the notions of possibility and future. (shrink)

G. Bateson believed that the scientific school of the future would be ‘ecology of mind’. The first aim of this paper is to understand what he meant by ‘mind’, and the other is to understand how this concept emerged in his thought, i.e., how its meaning would become more flexible throughout his life and work. Furthermore, we will approach the epistemological implications of ecology of mind for scientific education in the West. Bateson’s concept of mind emerged when he became aware (...) (in 1926) of his own way of thinking, i.e., of his immense abductive capacity. This led him to search for patterns of similarity and difference between organisms (like in homology). Later, he identified this thought process as being abstract and formal, relating not just facts but also ideas. Afterwards, Bateson developed criteria for us to consider a system as being mental, with special emphasis on living and cybernetic systems. (shrink)

This paper examines the nexus between climate change and trade governance from a normative perspective. Only little research attention has been paid to assessing the interactions between empirical and normative approaches to climate change in the context of potential trade measures. To this end, the paper focuses on currently discussed border carbon adjustment measures. The paper assesses these trade measures from a normative perspective: it explores whether they are compatible or in conflict with development ethics on the one hand and (...) with climate ethics on the other. The paper finds that border adjustment measures are both a potential threat to development, as well as to a workable climate agreement. It argues that they are therefore both in conflict with development as well as climate ethics concerns. From a development ethics perspective, border adjustment measures are objectionable for two reasons. First, they hurt developing countries and above all the ones that are vulnerable in terms of relying only on few export goods. Second, border adjustment measures restrict market access for developing countries and thereby undermine the potential of trade to foster development. From a climate ethics perspective, border adjustment measures are objectionable for three reasons. First, border adjustment measures amount to unilaterally changing whatever global burden-sharing deal has been agreed to—thereby undermining procedural justice. Second, border adjustment measures disregard the consumption-dimension: it might be questioned whether it is fair to focus exclusively on making producers pay for emissions rather than also holding those responsible that import and consume the goods that incorporate these emissions. Third, even if border adjustment measures and countries with low emissions are exempted from border adjustment measures, they still burden countries that bear no historic responsibility for current high levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, thereby undermining distributive justice by being in conflict with the polluter pays principle. (shrink)

En este trabajo se analizan ciertos aspectos de la sociedad nazarí de finales del siglo XV. Para hacerlo, se emplean las informaciones contenidas en un pleito de hidalguía de principios del siglo XVI. Este pleito afectó a los descendientes de un converso granadino hijo de un alcaide de Iznalloz. La particular perspectiva que proporcionan estos testimonios, que realizan una equiparación entre hidalguía castellana y parte de la oligarquía granadina, plantean numerosas preguntas sobre la sociedad del Reino de Granada a finales (...) de la Edad Media. (shrink)

Tanto en las políticas de memoria en Argentina como en la vasta producción académica en torno a las experiencias traumáticas de violencia estatal durante la última dictadura genocida, las memorias indígenas han sido tematizadas en forma marginal o subsidiaria respecto a otras categorías identitarias (Lenton, 2014). Estos silencios comienzan a romperse partir de la propia agencia indígena en los procesos de recuperación de las raíces ancestrales al calor de las luchas territoriales de las últimas décadas (Delrio, Lenton, Musanti, Nagy, Papazian (...) y Pérez, 2010), y por un creciente campo de estudios en el que abreva la tesis de Sabrina Rosas “Warmikunamanta Atipaq Sonqokuna: Mujeres de corazones valientes”. Memoria, identidad y territorio indígena kolla en la ciudad de La Plata. (shrink)

Pour penser le moment de l’après-expulsion, il faut franchir les limites de la souveraineté politique et des territoires qui lui sont attachés, pour envisager les effets sociaux et politiques induits par les mesures d’expulsion dans les pays d’origine et/ou de passage des migrants. Les refuges des migrants expulsés à la frontière du Mali et de l’Algérie montrent comment, dans une situation extrême d’abandon et d’isolement, ceux-ci s’organisent pour survivre, mais mettent également en place des stratégies de dépassement de la coercition (...) exercée à leur endroit par les pouvoirs étatiques. Les murs de leurs abris précaires marquent l’amorce d’une opposition organisée contre les murs des États.Any thinking on the moment that follows expulsion has to cross the bounds of political sovereignty and the territories it governs, to move into the social and political effects of expulsion that arise in migrants’ countries of origin and/or transit. The shelters erected by migrants expelled at the frontier between Mali and Algeria show how, in a situation of extreme abandonment and isolation, migrants not only organise their own survival but also develop strategies to overcome the coercion that the State apparatus exerts upon them. The walls that form these precarious shelters are the beginnings of organised opposition to the barriers erected by states. (shrink)

El presente artículo relaciona el concepto de apariencia en la crítica de la economía política de Marx con “La doctrina de la esencia” de la Ciencia de la lógica de Hegel. Tras presentar algunas cuestiones de método y el proyecto de Marx desde las categorías de fetichismo y mistificación como formas de apariencia, se realiza la lectura de la crítica de la economía política de Marx desde las tres secciones de la Wesenslogik: apariencia, aparición y realidad efectiva. La sociedad moderna (...) aparecerá como una totalidad que produce su representación invertida, aprehendida en sucesivas determinaciones cada vez más concretas, desde la esfera de circulación, el valor, el dinero y el capital hasta las formas derivadas de plusvalor y el sistema de apariencia en la Fórmula Trinitaria. Por último, se plantean algunas cuestiones sobre crítica y sistema. (shrink)