I distinguish among three senses in which meaning may be said to be normative, one trivial, the other two more robust. According to the trivial sense, meaningful expressions have conditions of correct application. According to the first robust sense, these conditions are determined by norms. According to the second robust sense, statements about these conditions have normative implications. Normativity in one or the other of the robust senses, but not in the trivial sense, is commonly thought to pose a threat (...) to naturalism. I argue that, given its trivial normativity, meaning cannot be normative in the first robust sense but it is normative in the sense that statements about the meaning of terms have hypothetical normative implications that are essential to meaning. I further argue that this normativity itself poses no threat to naturalism. Rather, this normativity follows from the fact that the trivial normativity of meaning precludes its naturalization. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the view that our knowledge of our desires is inferential and based on the consciousness we have of our emotions, and on our experiences of pain and pleasure.

Subjectivism about well-being holds that an object contributes to one's well-being to the extent that one has a pro-attitude toward this object under certain conditions. Most subjectivists have contended that these conditions should be ideal. One reason in favor of this idea is that when people adapt their pro-attitudes to situations of oppression, the levels of well-being they may attain is diminished. Nevertheless, I first argue that appealing to idealized conditions of autonomy or any other condition to erase or replace (...) adaptive pro-attitudes is mistaken. Second, I show that the most natural version of subjectivism that does not appeal to any such idealizing condition can explain why the well-being of people having adaptive pro-attitudes should not be restricted to the fulfillment of these pro-attitudes. In sum, the existence of adaptive preferences does not militate in favor of the introduction of conditions of idealization but against it. (shrink)

Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is one of the most celebrated and important books in philosophy of language and mind of the past forty years. It generated an avalanche of responses from the moment it was published and has revolutionized the way in which we think about meaning, intentionality, and the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It introduced a series of questions that had never been raised before concerning, most prominently, the normativity of meaning and the prospects for (...) a reductionist account of meaning. This volume of new essays reassesses the continuing influence of Kripke's book and demonstrates that many of the issues first raised by Kripke, both exegetical and philosophical, remain as thought-provoking and as relevant as they were when he first introduced them. (shrink)

Kritische bijdragen over ideologisch gekleurde vormen van westerse culturele antropologie.

Wittgenstein and Davidson are two of the most influential and controversial figures of twentieth-century philosophy. However, whereas Wittgenstein is often regarded as a deflationary philosopher, Davidson is considered to be a theory builder and systematic philosopher par excellence. Consequently, little work has been devoted to comparing their philosophies with each other. In this volume of new essays, leading scholars show that in fact there is much that the two share. By focusing on the similarities between Wittgenstein and Davidson, their essays (...) present compelling defences of their views and develop more coherent and convincing approaches than either philosopher was able to propose on his own. They show how philosophically fruitful and constructive reflection on Wittgenstein and Davidson continues to be, and how relevant the writings of both philosophers are to current debates in philosophy of mind, language, and action. (shrink)

Dans cette introduction, je situe en premier lieu la métaéthique vis-à-vis des autres recherches qui s’intéressent à la morale. Je distingue pour commencer la métaéthique de l’éthique normative et des éthiques appliquées. Alors que ces dernières s’intéressent à ce que la morale nous demande de faire, la métaéthique est une interrogation de second ordre sur la nature de la morale, du discours moral et sur la possibilité de justifier des jugements moraux. Je distingue ensuite parmi ces questions de second ordre (...) celles qui constituent plus proprement la métaéthique par opposition à la psychologie morale tout en soulignant leurs relations de dépendance. Pour finir, je présente assez brièvement les questions centrales propres aux différents sous-domaines de la métaéthique : la sémantique morale qui porte sur la signification des termes moraux, l’épistémologie morale qui porte sur la connaissance morale, et l’ontologie morale qui porte sur les faits moraux susceptibles d’expliquer pourquoi certains de nos jugements moraux sont vrais. Dans cette brève introduction à la métaéthique, notre ambition sera essentiellement de situer la métaéthique par rapport aux autres approches philosophiques de la morale. Nous nous efforcerons en outre de présenter assez sommairement les grandes questions qui structurent ce vaste domaine de recherche. (shrink)

The paper presents the main lines of arguments recently offered by Brian Ellis and Steven Mumford in favor of some versions of dispositional essentialism and tries to evaluate them, especially as far as a dispositionalist account of laws is concerned. Favoring herself some form of dispositional realism (rather than essentialism), the author makes some suggestions about the major difficulties which any kind of dispositionalism should be ready to face.

The aim of the text is not so much to stress the importance of Peirce's formal contributions to the semantic view in formal logic as to argue that Peirce's semantic trend is part and parcel of his semiotic treatment of a general theory of meaning, understanding, and interpretation, a theory of how signs function which enables him to classify different sorts of signs in a natural way.

Peirce's realism is a sophisticated realism inherited from the Avicennian Scotistic tradition, which may be briefly characterized by its opposition to metaphysical realism (Platonism) and various forms of nominalism. In this chapter, I consider how Peirce's realism fits his approach to mathematics, which is often presented as a somewhat incoherent mixture of Platonistic and conceptualistic elements. Without denying these, I claim that Peirce's subtle position not only helps to clear up some of these so-called inconsistencies but offers many insights for (...) contemporary ways of dealing with the mathematical aspects of the problem of universals. (shrink)

Contra an expanding number of deflationary commentators onWittgenstein, I argue that philosophical questions about meaningare meaningful and that Wittgenstein gave us ample reason tobelieve so. Deflationists are right in claiming that Wittgensteinrejected the sceptical problem about meaning allegedly to befound in his later writings and also right in stressing Wittgenstein''s anti-reductionism. But they are wrong in taking these dismissals to entail the end of all constructive philosophizing about meaning. Rather, I argue, the rejection of the sceptical problem requires that we (...) abandon the questions that philosophers have traditionally addressed and that we replace them with more appropriate ones, to which constructive answers are forthcoming. However, though quietism is not the only alternative to reductionism, the rejection of reductionism does oblige us seriously to revise our sense of what constructive philosophy can achieve. (shrink)

Joining a vast Wittgensteinian anti-theoretical movement, John Canfield has argued that it is possible to read the claims that (1) “language is essentially communal” and (2) “it is conceptually possible that a Crusoe isolated from birth should speak or follow rules” in such a way that they are perfectly compatible, and, indeed, that Wittgenstein held them both at once. The key to doing this is to drain them of any theoretical content or implications that would put each claim at odds (...) with the other. I argue here, first of all, that it is not possible to detheorize both (1) and (2) and still hope to say anything illuminating about the nature of language. In fact, Canfield himself does not succeed in detheorizing both (1) and (2) but ends up trivializing (1) and leaving (2) with quite a bit of theoretical content. I further argue, however, that this is getting the matter the wrong way around. Contra Canfield et al., it is only when we recognize this that we can appreciate how radical and innovative Wittgenstein's claims about language really are. (shrink)

A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from outside. We then (...) deal with the only two views that can make sense of the perceptual thesis. On the response–dependence view, emotional experiences present evaluative responsedependent properties (being fearsome, being disgusting, etc.) in the way visual experiences present response-dependent properties such as colors. On the response–independence view, emotional experiences present evaluative response-independent properties (being dangerous, being indigestible, etc.), conceived as ‘Gestalten’ independent of emotional feelings themselves. We show that neither view can make plausible the idea that emotions present values as such, i.e., in an open and transparent way. If emotions have apparent evaluative contents, this is in fact due to evaluative enrichments of the non-evaluative presentational contents of emotions. (shrink)

O presente artigo trata do fenômeno da judicialização da saúde no Brasil, a partir do significativo acúmulo de demandas judiciais promovidas pela cidadania ativa, como forma de concretização do direito social fundamental à saúde. Valendo-se de pesquisa bibliográfica e recurso a bancos de dados oficiais, apresenta o percurso doutrinário, a base constitucional e legal, bem como trata das decisões judiciais a essa demanda social como inseridas no contexto de uma política pública judiciária necessária a efetivação de tais direitos, como resposta (...) ao pungente drama existencial humano de acesso aos serviços de saúde. (shrink)

This article considers the origins of alphabetic writing, tracing its probable source to ancient Egypt, southern Levant or the Sinai during the Egyptian Middle Kingdom (17th century BCE). It supports the view that the earliest scripts were acrophonic representations of a West-Semitic language, whose use developed under the rule of the Hyksos in Egypt but was arrested there with the expulsion of this foreign dynasty at the end of the 16th century BCE. The development is then traced through the Levant, (...) with particular attention given to the emergence of cuneiform alphabetic scripts in Ugarit (c. 1300 BCE). This form of writing disappeared with the fall of Ugarit, but linear alphabetic scripts were preserved in a variety of Near-Eastern languages, notably Aramaic and Phoenician. These two languages, by becoming linguae francae respectively of the Syria-northern Mesopotamia and the Anatolia-Eastern Mediterranean regions, brought about the spread of alphabetic writing up until the 8th century BCE. The article concludes by examining the influence of the Phoenician script on Greek, Etruscan and ultimately Latin forms of writing. (shrink)

On examine dans cette étude les effets des flux sensoriels et informationnels continus et accélérés sur la conscience, sur les capacités de penser et de réfléchir. Ces flux conduisent – au-delà de l’inachèvement intrinsèque à toute science dont parlait Weber – à des formes instables, changeantes et illimitées, perçues comme telles par le sujet, et tendant dès lors à provoquer un état de crise de la conscience, d’insécurité psychique profonde dans la fluidité contemporaine.We deal here with the effects caused by (...) continuous, accelerated sensory and information flows on consciousness, on thinking. Quite beyond Weber’s conclusion on the intrinsically boundless character of science, those flows lead to unstable, changing and unlimited forms of knowledge, perceived as such by the individual, and tend from now on to induce a permanent state of crisis in consciousness, a strong psychological insecurity in contemporary fluidity. (shrink)

Les enfants peuvent apprendre à penser et " conceptualiser"s'ils sont mis dès leur plus jeune âge en situation de réfléchir et discuter des questions philosophiques. Matthew Lipman a développé une méthodologie, la " philosophie pour enfants ", qui a fait ses preuves dans le monde entier. Cet ouvrage, qui s'ouvre par un texte de Matthew Lipman, a pour objectif de confronter le modèle lipmanien à d'autres points de vue pour en dégager les points forts, tout en l'enrichissant de la recherche (...) actuelle en pédagogie menée par des auteurs aussi différents que Marie-France Daniel, Jacques Lévine, Michel Tozzi et Britt-Mari Barth, etc. Cet ouvrage s'adresse aux enseignants et étudiants des IUFM et Hautes Ecoles. Il intéressera également les chercheurs et étudiants en Sciences de l'éducation, de même que les étudiants en Philosophie. Il est destiné, plus largement, à toute personne amenée à travailler avec des enfants et à expérimenter de nouvelles formes d'apprentissage et à stimuler l'esprit critique et la réflexion. (shrink)

Nous nous demandons souvent ce que nous aurions interet a faire ou ce que nous devrions faire, ce que les autres peuvent legitimement exiger de nous. Rien ne nous semble plus immediat que cette reflexion sur nos desirs et nos devoirs. Pourtant, des que l'on s'efforce de decrire les processus effectifs qui sont en jeu et les normes de rationalite ou morales qui pesent sur cette reflexion, l'evidence s'evanouit. Comment connaissons-nous nos desirs? Qu'est-ce qui sous-tend nos jugements moraux? Quelle place (...) les demandes de la morale laissent a nos desirs? La reflexion pratique ne nous sert-elle qu'a justifier nos actions a posteriori ou nous permet-elle de guider nos actions? Le present livre s'attache a repondre a ces questions, anciennes pour la plupart, en discutant les recherches recemment menees a leur sujet en philosophie de l'action, en philosophie de l'esprit et en philosophie morale, dans l'esprit de la tradition analytique. (shrink)

Ce livre apporte des éclaircissements et des compléments à Passions et raison aujourd'hui à la lumière de Descartes et de Spinoza, en centrant encore davantage sur le monde actuel la description des passions ou affects, prolongée par l'étude de leurs relations avec la raison. Il est question en particulier de trois oppositions qui ne sont pas aussi tranchées qu'on le croit. En effet, ces philosophes sont proches l'un de l'autre en dépit de leurs différences de principe ; malgré les siècles (...) qui nous séparent d'eux, il existe des liens de proximité entre notre temps et le leur ; surtout, les passions et la raison ne sont pas forcément antinomiques. Des passions remarquablement analysées il y a plus de trois siècles prédominent aujourd'hui : en particulier les passions de l'opinion (comme la faveur et l'indignation) et celles du mimétisme (comme la compassion et l'envie). Outre ces analyses qui nous aident à ouvrir davantage les yeux sur notre temps, Descartes et Spinoza nous ont transmis une leçon : la mise en question des idées reçues, qui n'est pas moins nécessaire aujourd'hui. Ils ont écrit leurs oeuvres au début du grand développement de la raison scientifique, et ils ont toujours quelque chose à nous dire à ce sujet. (shrink)

Cultuurfilosofisch essay over onze verhouding tot de natuur.

Despite its intuitive appeal and the empirical evidence for it, the hypothesis of cognitive polyphasia (Moscovici, 1961/1976/2008) remains largely unexplored. This article attempts to clarify some of the ideas behind this concept by examining its operations at the level of individuals and by proposing a conceptual model that includes some elements of social cognition. Indeed, calls for a rapprochement between the theory of social representations and cognitive psychology have been made by Moscovici, in particular, in his 1984 paper on The (...) myth of the lonely paradigm and in his paper on La nouvelle pensée magique (1992) in which he argues that the theory of social representations provides an explanatory framework for the descriptions offered by cognitive psychology and that their combining could translate into a finer understanding of contemporary social phenomena.Building on the results of an empirical examination of the controversy that surrounded the MMR vaccination programme in the UK between 1998 and 2005, different ways of engaging into cognitive polyphasia are proposed, including what can be described as cognitive “monophasia”, that is, the exclusive use of one type of knowledge, at least at the level of the individual. A brief discussion about the implications of the proposed conceptual model for our understanding of cognitive polyphasia and of the different ways of making sense of the world around us concludes this article. (shrink)

Protogaea, an ambitious account of terrestrial history, was central to the development of the earth sciences in the eighteenth century and provides key philosophical insights into the unity of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s thought and writings. In the book, Leibniz offers observations about the formation of the earth, the actions of fire and water, the genesis of rocks and minerals, the origins of salts and springs, the formation of fossils, and their identification as the remains of living organisms. Protogaea also includes (...) a series of engraved plates depicting the remains of animals—in particular the famous reconstruction of a “fossil unicorn”—together with a cross section of the cave in which some fossil objects were discovered. Though the works of Leibniz have been widely translated, Protogaea has languished in its original Latin for centuries. Now Claudine Cohen and Andre Wakefield offer the first English translation of this central text in natural philosophy and natural history. Written between 1691 and 1693, and first published after Leibniz’s death in 1749, Protogaea reemerges in this bilingual edition with an introduction that carefully situates the work within its historical context. (shrink)