Emergent digital technologies provide cultural heritage spaces with the opportunity to reassess their current user journey. An immersive user experience can be developed that is innovative, dynamic, and customised for each attendee. Museums have already begun to move towards interactive exhibitions utilising Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Internet of Things (IOT), and more recently, the use of Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) has become more common in cultural heritage spaces to present items of historical significance. VR concentrates on (...) the provision of full immersion within a digitised environment utilising a headset, whilst AR focuses on the inclusion of digitised content within the existing physical environment that can be accessed through a medium such as a mobile phone application. Machine learning techniques such as a recommender system can support an immersive user journey by issuing personalised recommendations regarding a user’s preferred future content based on their previous activity. An ethical approach is necessary to take the precautions required to protect the welfare of human participants and eliminate any aspect of stereotyping or biased behaviour. This paper sets out a human-centred manifesto intended to provide guidance when inducing smart digital immersion in cultural heritage spaces. A review of existing digital cultural heritage projects was conducted to determine their adherence to the manifesto with the findings indicating that Education was a primary focus across all projects and that Personalisation, Respect and Empathy, and Support were also highly valued. Additionally, the findings indicated that there were areas with room for improvement such as Fairness to ensure that a well-balanced human-centred system is implemented. (shrink)

Bullying remains a pervasive problem in healthcare, and evidence suggests systems in place are not utilised due to perceptions of ineffectiveness and inequity. This study examines bystander responses to bullying and factors that influence decisions to intervene. We explore relationships between bystanders’ perceptions of psychological safety across three levels (organisation, supervisor and colleague) and reactions to witnessing bullying. We suggest psychological safety would be positively associated with the decision to intervene. Findings indicate the most pervasive reaction to witnessing incidents of (...) bullying is to discuss with colleagues, a low‐involvement reaction. We find perceptions of supervisory and organisational safety/support are positively related to high‐involvement decisions such as formal reporting of the incidents, highlighting the importance of support from those in power. However, perceptions of collegial support may lead to low‐involvement responses, which risk reinforcing and underpinning dysfunctional organisational dynamics by providing informal social and emotional responses that may substitute more formal organisational responses to this persistent problem. This study highlights the importance of support from individuals in power if bystanders are to feel comfortable making high‐involvement interventions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOn 28 October 2012, Savita Halappanavar, an Indian woman living in Ireland, died in hospital while under medical care for a miscarrying pregnancy. According to her husband, her repeated requests for an abortion were ignored because of the presence of a foetal heartbeat. Ms Halappanavar’s death was a critical event in the process leading to a referendum on 25 May 2018, when the Irish electorate voted to repeal the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, removing the constitutional ban on abortion. The (...) name Savita has become indelibly linked to the changing course of abortion politics, so it is timely to reassess the role of the media in shaping the parameters of the debate about the impact of her death on the issue. This study presents a frame analysis of Irish newspapers in the weeks following her death, mapping the political, medical, legal and socio-ethical discourses, as well as the related contemporaneous events that set the agenda for the type of debate that was to follow. It identifies four media frames: Public Tragedy, Political Opportunity, Abortion Legacy and Maternal Health. Our central argument is that the overall effect of media framing provided much face-saving for politicians in the way that the legislative issue was viewed through a conservative party-political lens, despite public outrage. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that feminist legal scholars should engage directly and explicitly with the question of evil. Part I summarises key facts surrounding the prosecution and life-long imprisonment of Myra Hindley, one of a tiny number of women involved in multiple killings of children in recent British history. Part II reviews a range of commentaries on Hindley, noting in particular the repeated use of two narratives: the first of these insists that Hindley is an icon of female evil; (...) the second, less popular one, seeks to position her as a victim. In Part III, the article broadens out and we explain why we think feminist legal scholars should look at the question of evil. In large part, the emphasis is on anticipating the range of possible objections to this argument, and on trying to answer these objections by showing how a focus on evil might benefit feminist legal thinking – specifically in relation to the categories of perpetrator and victim and, more generally, in relation to laws motivated by a desire to secure women’s human rights. (shrink)

Popper’s three world doctrine, it has been argued by Peyerahend and Krige, is a rejection of the type of critical dualism of facts and norms articulated in The Open Society. Peyerabend argues further that world 3 acts as a methodological prison designed to restrict the free decision of the individual theoretical scientist. It is my position that Popper's concept of world 3 is not a rejection of critical dualism but rather an attempt to allow for the existence of free normative (...) decisions within the context of a binding tradition. The key to understanding this move is the notion of an objective norm. Specifically I argue that Popper's pluralistic epistemology is based on a traditional many-levelled semantics developed originally to combat psychologism and used now to place the issue of the choice of methodological norms within the framework of a theory of tradition. (shrink)

Volume 25, Issue 6, September 2020, Page 687-691.

In this paper I use a feminist relational approach to critically examine contemporary mainstream assumptions in the field of development concerning the relationship between poverty and prosperity....

This paper considers how counterfactuals should be evaluated on the assumption that determinism is true. I argue against Lewis's influential view that the actual laws of nature would have been false if something had happened that never actually happened, and in favour of the competing view that history would have been different all the way back. I argue that we can do adequate justice to our ordinary practice of relying on a wide range of historical truths in evaluating counterfactuals by (...) saying that, in typical cases, history would have been only *very slightly* different until shortly before the relevant time. The paper also draws some connections between the puzzle about counterfactuals under determinism and the debate about whether determinism entails that no-one can ever do otherwise than they in fact do. (shrink)

Mark Johnston (2016, 2017) has argued on ethical grounds against a wide variety of "naturalistic" world views, which imply 'in our close vicinity, there are many persisting things all ontologically on a par, very similar in their features and such that they come into being and cease to exist at various times'—'personites', for short. Johnston argues that if personites exist, their intrinsic properties are compatible with their being people and thus having moral status; but since moral status is an intrinsic (...) matter, this implies that personites enjoy the same kind of moral status as people, a conclusion which leads to various bizarre ethical consequences. In response, we defend the view that although personites exist, they lack moral status, and have intrinsic properties (including modal properties) which no person could have. We also isolate a different argument for the moral status of certain personites, based on the claim that they instantiate properties which 'person' could very easily have expressed; we show how this argument can be resisted by adopting a pluralistic semantics, on which predicates like 'person' and 'being with moral status' express many properties even at the actual world. (shrink)

Most meanings we express belong to large families of variant meanings, among which it would be implausible to suppose that some are much more apt for being expressed than others. This abundance of candidate meanings creates pressure to think that the proposition attributing any particular meaning to an expression is modally plastic: its truth depends very sensitively on the exact microphysical state of the world. However, such plasticity seems to threaten ordinary counterfactuals whose consequents contain speech reports, since it is (...) hard to see how we could reasonably be confident in a counterfactual whose consequent can be true only if a certain very finely tuned microphysical configuration obtains. This essay develops the foregoing puzzle and explores several possible solutions. (shrink)

The urban environment is increasingly engaging with artificial intelligence, a focus on the automation of urban processes, whether it be singular artefacts or city-wide systems. The impact of such technological innovation on the social dynamics of the urban environment is an ever changing and multi-faceted field of research. In this paper, the space and time defined by the autonomous vehicle is used as a window to view the way in which a shift in urban transport dynamics can impact the temporal (...) experience of an individual. Using the finite window of time created by an autonomous vehicle, a theoretical framework is put forward that seeks to show how contrasting narratives exist regarding the experience of the window of time within the autonomous vehicle. By taking a theoretical approach informed by social theory, the dissolution of barriers between separate spheres of life is explored to highlight the increased commodification of time. In focusing on both the space and time created by the autonomous vehicle this approach seeks to highlight how artificial intelligence can provide a contemporary space in the urban environment while also opening a new window of time. The cognitive dissonance observed when comparing the narratives of autonomous vehicle stakeholders and the historical shift in time use leads to a belief that technology makes the user more free in terms of time. With this paper the autonomous vehicle is shown to be an ideal space and time to view the way in which the use of such technology does not increase free-time, but further dissolves the boundaries between what is and what is not work-time. (shrink)

Lewis's notion of a "natural" property has proved divisive: some have taken to the notion with enthusiasm, while others have been sceptical. However, it is far from obvious what the enthusiasts and the sceptics are disagreeing about. This paper attempts to articulate what is at stake in this debate.

Seth Yalcin has pointed out some puzzling facts about the behaviour of epistemic modals in certain embedded contexts. For example, conditionals that begin ‘If it is raining and it might not be raining, … ’ sound unacceptable, unlike conditionals that begin ‘If it is raining and I don’t know it, … ’. These facts pose a prima facie problem for an orthodox treatment of epistemic modals as expressing propositions about the knowledge of some contextually specified individual or group. This paper (...) develops an explanation of the puzzling facts about embedding within an orthodox framework. (shrink)

I explicate and defend the claim that, fundamentally speaking, there are no numbers, sets, properties or relations. The clarification consists in some remarks on the relevant sense of ‘fundamentally speaking’ and the contrasting sense of ‘superficially speaking’. The defence consists in an attempt to rebut two arguments for the existence of such entities. The first is a version of the indispensability argument, which purports to show that certain mathematical entities are required for good scientific explanations. The second is a speculative (...) reconstruction of Armstrong's version of the One Over Many argument, which purports to show that properties and relations are required for good philosophical explanations, e.g. of what it is for one thing to be a duplicate of another. (shrink)

We present and discuss a counterexample to the following plausible principle: if you know that a coin is fair, and for all you know it is going to be flipped, then for all you know it will land tails.

I motivate and briefly sketch a linguistic theory of vagueness, on which the notion of indeterminacy is understood in terms of the conventions of language: a sentence is indeterminate iff the conventions of language either forbid asserting it and forbid asserting its negation, under the circumstances, or permit asserting either. I then consider an objection that purports to show that if this theory (or, as far as I can see, any other theory of vagueness that deserved the label "linguistic" were (...) true, there would be no such thing as indeterminacy. I respond to this objection by arguing on independent grounds against its main premise, the widely-accepted claim that if it is indeterminate whether P, no human being knows whether P. I defend an alternative view according to which, when it is indeterminate whether P, it is often also indeterminate whether we know that P. (shrink)

This paper defends the claim that although ‘Superman is Clark Kent and some people who believe that Superman flies do not believe that Clark Kent flies’ is a logically inconsistent sentence, we can still utter this sentence, while speaking literally, without asserting anything false. The key idea is that the context-sensitivity of attitude reports can be - and often is - resolved in different ways within a single sentence.

Even if non-cognitivists about some subject-matter can meet Geach’s challenge to explain how there can be valid implications involving sentences which express non-cognitive attitudes, they face a further problem. I argue that a non-cognitivist cannot explain how, given a valid argument whose conclusion expresses a belief and at least one of whose premises expresses a non-cognitive attitude, it could be reasonable to infer the conclusion from the premises.

This three-part chapter explores a higher-order logic we call ‘Classicism’, which extends a minimal classical higher-order logic with further axioms which guarantee that provable coextensiveness is sufficient for identity. The first part presents several different ways of axiomatizing this theory and makes the case for its naturalness. The second part discusses two kinds of extensions of Classicism: some which take the view in the direction of coarseness of grain (whose endpoint is the maximally coarse-grained view that coextensiveness is sufficient for (...) identity), and some which take the view in the direction of fineness of grain (whose endpoint is the maximally fine-grained theory containing all distinctness claims compatible with Classicism). The third part introduces some techniques for constructing models of Classicism, and uses them to prove the consistency of many of the extensions of Classicism introduced in the second part. (shrink)

Transhumanism aims to bring about radical human enhancement. In ‘Truly Human Enhancement’ Agar (2014) provides a strong argument against producing radically enhancing effects in agents. This leaves the transhumanist in a quandary—how to achieve radical enhancement whilst avoiding the problem of radically enhancing effects? This paper aims to show that transhumanism can overcome the worries of radically enhancing effects by instead pursuing radical human enhancement via incremental moderate human enhancements (Weak Transhumanism). In this sense, weak transhumanism is much like traditional (...) transhumanism in its aims, but starkly different in its execution. This version of transhumanism is weaker given the limitations brought about by having to avoid radically enhancing effects. I consider numerous objections to weak transhumanism and conclude that the account survives each one. This paper’s proposal of ‘weak transhumanism’ has the upshot of providing a way out of the ‘problem of radically enhancing effects’ for the transhumanist, but this comes at a cost—the restrictive process involved in applying multiple moderate enhancements in order to achieve radical enhancement will most likely be dissatisfying for the transhumanist, however, it is, I contend, the best option available. (shrink)

Presupposing that most predicates do not correspond directly to genuine relations, I argue that all genuine relations are symmetric. My main argument depends on the premise that there are no brute necessities, interpreted so as to require logical and metaphysical necessity to coincide for sentences composed entirely of logical vocabulary and primitive predicates. Given this premise, any set of purportedly primitive predicates by which one might hope to express the facts about non-symmetric relations order their relata will generate an objectionable (...) multiplication of possibilities. In the final section I give a different argument, based on the weaker premise that brute necessities should not be multiplied without necessity. (shrink)

This paper is an investigation of the general logic of "identifications", claims such as 'To be a vixen is to be a female fox', 'To be human is to be a rational animal', and 'To be just is to help one's friends and harm one's enemies', many of which are of great importance to philosophers. I advocate understanding such claims as expressing higher-order identity, and discuss a variety of different general laws which they might be thought to obey. [New version: (...) Nov. 4th, 2016]. (shrink)

We argue that all comparative expressions in natural language obey a principle that we call Comparability: if x and y are at least as F as themselves, then either x is at least as F as y or y is at least as F as x. This principle has been widely rejected among philosophers, especially by ethicists, and its falsity has been claimed to have important normative implications. We argue that Comparability is needed to explain the goodness of several patterns (...) of inference that seem manifestly valid, that the purported failures of Comparability would have absurd consequences, and that the influential arguments against Comparability are less compelling than they may have initially seemed. (shrink)

An examination of Smith’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres and The Theory of Moral Sentiments as complementary to one another and as refinements in earlier eighteenth-century revisions of rhetorical theory and moral philosophy. Smith’s scientific approach to language, rhetoric, and moral thinking emphasizes the improvement of the individual by exposure to stimulating works of art, literature, and spoken language, and encourages individuals to produce such works in order to provide examples to their fellows. Smith’s emphasis upon history in all (...) his works provides an example of his theory and practice of perspicuity and mutually beneficial social exchanges past and present. Smith’s recommendations to the historian, later seen as exemplary, led Dugald Stewart to refer to Smith’s histories and those of his contemporaries as speculative and conjectural vehicles for advancing the science of man. (shrink)

Background and AimsRecent studies suggest cognitive, emotional, and behavioral impairments occur in patients after SARS-CoV-2 infection. However, studies are limited to case reports or case series and, to our knowledge, few of them have control groups. This study aims to assess the prevalence of neuropsychological and neuropsychiatric impairment in patients after hospitalization.MethodsWe enrolled 29 COVID+ patients who needed hospitalization but no IC, about 20 days post-dismission, and 29 COVID− healthy matched controls. Neuropsychological and neuropsychiatric assessments were conducted via teleneuropsychology using (...) the following tests: MMSE, CPM47, RAVLT, CDT, Digit-Span Forward/Backward, Verbal fluencies; BDI-II, STAI. People with previous reported cognitive impairment and neurological or psychiatric conditions were excluded. Clinical and demographics were collected. Comparison between groups was conducted using parametric or non-parametric tests according to data distribution. Within COVID+ group, we also evaluated the correlation between the cognitive and behavioral assessment scores and clinical variables collected.ResultsAmong COVID+, 62% had at least one pathological test and significantly worst performances than COVID− in RAVLT learning, RAVLT recall, and recognition. STAI II was higher in COVID−. Chi-square on dichotomous values showed a significant difference between groups in Digit backward test.ConclusionsPatients COVID+ assessed by teleneuropsychology showed a vulnerability in some memory and executive functions. Intriguingly, anxiety was higher in the control group. Our findings therefore confirm the impact of COVID-19 on cognition even in patients who did not need IC. Follow-up is needed to evaluate the evolution of COVID-19-related cognitive deficit.Clinical Trial Registration[ClinicalTrials.gov], identifier [NCT05143320]. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Theodore Sider's book, Writing the Book of the World. It raises some puzzles about Sider's favoured methodology for finding out about naturalness (or 'structure').

According to a tradition stemming from Quine and Putnam, we have the same broadly inductive reason for believing in numbers as we have for believing in electrons: certain theories that entail that there are numbers are better, qua explanations of our evidence, than any theories that do not. This paper investigates how modal theories of the form ‘Possibly, the concrete world is just as it in fact is and T’ and ‘Necessarily, if standard mathematics is true and the concrete world (...) is just as it in fact is, then T’ bear on this claim. It concludes that, while analogies with theories that attempt to eliminate unobservable concrete entities provide good reason to regard theories of the former sort as explanatorily bad, this reason does not apply to theories of the latter sort. (shrink)

There is a common practice of providing natural-language ‘glosses’ on sentences in the language of higher order logic: for example, the higher-order sentence ∃X(X Socrates) might be glossed using the English sentence ‘Socrates has some property’. It is widely held that such glosses cannot be strictly correct, on the grounds that the word ‘property’ is a noun and thus, if meaningful at all, should be meaningful in the same way as any other noun. Against this view, this paper argues that (...) natural languages feature pervasive type-ambiguity in such a way that the relevant English sentences are in fact semantically equivalent to the higher-order sentences of which they serve as ‘glosses’. It also responds to some objections that have often been taken to be fatal to such type-ambiguity, such as the challenge of accounting for the meaning of ‘mixed disjunctions’ like ‘Either Mars or the property of being red is interesting’. (shrink)

David Builes presents a paradox concerning how confident you should be that any given member of an infinite collection of fair coins landed heads, conditional on the information that they were all flipped and only finitely many of them landed heads. We argue that if you should have any conditional credence at all, it should be 1/2.

Let me regale you with yet another variant of the story of Sleeping Beauty. In this one, the experiment takes place in a room with a skylight, so that Beauty can see what the weather is like outside as soon as she wakes up. The weather can be in any one of n different states on any given day. Beauty regards each of these states as equiprobable; moreover, she takes there to be no correlation between the weather on Monday and (...) the weather on Tuesday, or between the weather on either day and the coin-toss. The rest of the story works as usual: Beauty will be awoken on Monday, after which a coin will be tossed; if it lands Tails, she will be woken again on Tuesday having had her memories of the Monday awakening erased; otherwise, she will stay asleep until Wednesday.1 The weather is the only source of variation in her wakings, so if it should happen that the weather is the same on Monday and Tuesday, her total evidence will be exactly the same on both wakings. (shrink)

Some commentators confer the right to children on those who gestate them because of the personal intimate relationship they say obtains in gestation.1 Benjamin Lange criticises two variants of that argument.2 He argues against the view that gestation creates a sui generis relationship that in its distinctiveness confers the right to the child on its gestator and the right of the child to its gestator. He also argues against the view that gestation involves a relationship whose dissolution necessarily causes morally (...) significant harm. I do not dispute these lines of reasoning, but the analysis goes further than Lange indicates. The reasons that Lange deploy to reject the relationship involved in gestation as conferring any kind of proprietary right to children also undercut that relationship as a ground of a presumptive duty towards those children. In the first instance, Lange disputes the idea that gestation produces a non-instrumental good that both the gestator and child have an interest in maintaining. In part, he argues that this kind of relationship lacks the emotional complexity, intimacy and intensity that underwrite other kinds of relationships, namely the very qualities that constitute the value of those relationships. More tellingly, he says, there is no unambiguous evidence that …. (shrink)