韓国のガンディーと呼ばれ、民衆運動の指導者であり、ノーベル平和賞候補にもなった咸錫憲のシアル思想について.

Students and teachers of Chinese history and philosophy will not want to miss Daniel Gardner's accessible translation of the teachings of Chu Hsi —a luminary of the Confucian tradition who dominated Chinese intellectual life for centuries. Homing in on a primary concern of our own time, Gardner focuses on Chu Hsi's passionate interest in education and its importance to individual development. For hundreds of years, every literate person in China was familiar with Chu Hsi's teachings. They informed the curricula of (...) private academies and public schools and became the basis of the state's prestigious civil service examinations. Nor was Chu's influence limited to China. In Korea and Japan as well, his teachings defined the terms of scholarly debate and served as the foundation for state ideology. Chu Hsi was convinced that through education anyone could learn to be fully moral and thus travel the road to sagehood. Throughout his life, he struggled with the philosophical questions underlying education: What should people learn? How should they go about learning? What enables them to learn? What are the aims and the effects of learning? Part One of _Learning to Be a Sage_ examines Chu Hsi's views on learning and how he arrived at them. Part Two presents a translation of the chapters devoted to learning in the _Conversations of Master Chu_. (shrink)

In his writings around 1930, Wittgenstein relates his philosophy to the idea of phenomenology. He indicates that his main philosophical project had earlier been the construction of a purely phenomenological language, and even after having given up this project he believed that "the world we live in is the world of sense-data," that is, of phenomenological objects. However, a problem is posed by the fact that he does not appear to have given a full, explicit account of what he means (...) by his 'phenomenology', 'phenomenological language', or 'phenomenological problems'. The aim of this dissertation is to unravel the nature of Wittgenstein's phenomenology and to examine its importance for his entire work in philosophy. ;Phenomenology can be characterized as philosophy whose primary concern is what is immediately given in one's experience. This 'immediately given' is not merely impressions inside one's mind, but includes also the part of objective reality that impinges upon one's consciousness. Thus, an aim of phenomenological enterprise is to grasp this objective reality by attending to immediate experience. Husserl's phenomenology is in fact a case in point. ;Similarly, Wittgenstein's main attention is directed to one's immediate experience. However, the early Wittgenstein's phenomenology is unusual because of the way he views immediate experience. For him, the nature of the immediately given is unique in the sense that the possibility of logic is also based on it. Indeed, the fact that Wittgenstein sees the foundation of logic in immediate experience is what makes his philosophy a kind of phenomenology. In the Tractatus, all logical forms are combinations of the logical forms of immediately given objects of experience. Also, immediate experience can only be grasped and understood by means of language, because Wittgenstein views language as the ultimate medium through which we understand the world. Therefore, the important problem for him is the way we use language to describe immediate experience. In my study, I examine Wittgenstein's concern with immediate experience and the way we describe it, a concern which guides his philosophical journey through the phenomenological problems that pervade his work. (shrink)

2. Saebyŏngnyŏk chʻodang esŏ on pʻyŏnji.

Wittgenstein frequently uses the word 'aspect' (Aspekt) in his writings from 1947 to 1949. There he uses the word along with aspect-seeing and aspect-change, so that readers are misled into thinking his primary concern in using the word is something like Gestalt psychology or philosophy of psychology per se. However, Wittgenstein's late treatment of aspect is only a special case of a more general problem, namely phenomenology. In the middle-period writings, the word 'aspect' refers to a phenomenological object. Basically, Wittgenstein's (...) aspect means the way an object appears to us. For him, an 'aspect' is a phenomenological object. (shrink)

Qualifying post-Westphalian sovereign statehood as a 'power' as argued for in Hendrik Berkhoff's political theology, this book addresses the decades-long theological-spiritual debate between Christian realism and Christian pacifism in U.S. foreign policy and global Christian circles. It approaches the debate by delving into the pacifist Anabaptist political theology and delineates empirically how sovereign statehood in post-colonial Africa and Asia has fallen into the hands of the devil Satan, as a 'fallen power' in the Foucaultian terms of power structures, techniques and (...) episteme. While the book offers intervention schemes and options, it holds that Christian statecraft remains the source of hope to effectively address a number of serious global issues. By extension, the book is thus an invitation to ignite debates on the suitability of Christian statecraft and the nexus between spirituality and world politics, making it especially interesting for scholars and students in the fields of International Politics, Politics of Asian and African States, Post-colonial Studies and Political Theology.. (shrink)

Algorithms can now identify patterns and correlations in the (big) datasets, and predict outcomes based on those identified patterns and correlations with the use of machine learning techniques and big data, decisions can then be made by algorithms themselves in accordance with the predicted outcomes. Yet, algorithms can inherit questionable values from the datasets and acquire biases in the course of (machine) learning, and automated algorithmic decision-making makes it more difficult for people to see algorithms as biased. While researchers have (...) taken the problem of algorithmic bias seriously, but the current discussion on algorithmic fairness tends to conceptualize ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness primarily as a technical issue and attempts to implement pre-existing ideas of ‘fairness’ into algorithms. In this paper, I show that such a view of algorithmic fairness as technical issue is unsatisfactory for the type of problem algorithmic fairness presents. Since decisions on fairness measure and the related techniques for algorithms essentially involve choices between competing values, ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness should be conceptualized first and foremost as a political issue, and it should be (re)solved by democratic communication. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to explicitly reconceptualize algorithmic fairness as a political question and suggest the current discussion of algorithmic fairness can be strengthened by adopting the accountability for reasonableness framework. (shrink)

The burgeoning literature on the ethical issues raised by climate engineering has explored various normative questions associated with the research and deployment of climate engineering, and has examined a number of responses to them. While researchers have noted the ethical issues from climate engineering are global in nature, much of the discussion proceeds predominately with ethical framework in the Anglo-American and European traditions, which presume particular normative standpoints and understandings of human–nature relationship. The current discussion on the ethical issues, therefore, (...) is far from being a genuine global dialogue. The aim of this article is to address the lack of intercultural exchange by exploring the ethics of climate engineering from a perspective of Confucian environmental ethics. Drawing from the existing discussion on Confucian environmental ethics and Confucian ethics of technology, I discuss what Confucian ethics can contribute to the ethical debate on climate engineering. (shrink)

The topic of this thesis is about one of the simplest linguistic expressions in our natural languages, names. The debate about the meaning of names has a longstanding history in philosophy of language. One camp, as known as Millianism, maintains that a name only contributes its referent to the meaning of sentence which contains it, and the other camp, as known as Descriptivism, maintains that a name is disguised definite description. My thesis aims to contribute to this continuing debate. Millianism, (...) which holds that a name n only contributes its referent to the meaning of the sentence which contains it, seems to have problem in explaining the cognitive role of names. For, it seems intuitive true that a rational person will take ‘Superman is Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ to have different meaning, even though the names have the same referent. Also, if we substitute co-referring names in belief ascriptions, e.g. ‘Lois believes that Superman flies’ and ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent flies’, their truth-values appear to change. The intuitions as such come into conflict with Millianism, and appear to show that the view is false. In this thesis, I will examine two Millian responses to the above problems. I shall criticize a response famously defended by Salmon and (early-)Soames, and to defend a version of Millianism proposed by Soames, which, while holding that a name only contributes its referent to the meaning of a sentence which contains it, allows a speaker to assertively utter these sentences and belief ascriptions to assert something beyond the meaning of them. So, the meaning of the two sentences ‘Superman is Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ is just the same; and, the belief ascriptions ‘Lois believes that Superman flies’ and ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent flies’ do not differ in truth-value. But, a speaker can assert something in fact different in meaning or truth-value via these sentences and ascriptions. In the thesis, I shall show that this version of Millianism is preferable to the one defended by Salmon and (early-)Soames. (shrink)

Researchers have explored questions concerning public participation and consent in geoengineering governance. Yet, the notion of consent has received little attention from researchers, and it is rarely discussed explicitly, despite being prescribed as a normative requirement for geoengineering research and being used in rejecting some geoengineering options. As it is noted in the leading geoengineering governance principles, i.e. the Oxford Principles, there are different conceptions of consent; the idea of consent ought to be unpacked more carefully if, and when, we (...) invoke it in the discussion. This article offers a theoretical reflection on different conceptions of consent and their place in geoengineering governance. More specifically, I discuss three models of consent, i.e. explicit consent, implied consent and hypothetical consent, and assess their applicability to geoengineering governance. Although there are different models of consent, much discussion of geoengineering governance has committed only to explicit consent. I note that such a commitment springs from a specific ideal political order. Accordingly, we should be wary of any naïve commitment to it so long as the political order we hope for remains open to debate. Finally, I illustrate two approaches to introduce consent into a geoengineering governance framework. (shrink)

It is hard to disagree with the idea of responsible innovation (henceforth, RI), as it enables policy-makers, scientists, technology developers, and the public to better understand and respond to the social, ethical, and policy challenges raised by new and emerging technologies. RI has gained prominence in policy agenda in Europe and the United States over the last few years. And, along with its rising importance in policy-making, there is also a burgeoning research literature on the topic. Given the historical context (...) of which RI emerges, it should not be surprising that the current discourse on RI is predominantly based on liberal democratic values. Yet, the bias towards liberal democratic values will inevitably limit the discussion of RI, especially in the cases where liberal democratic values are not taken for granted. As such, there is an urgent need to return to the normative foundation of RI, and to explore the notion of ‘responsible innovation’ from nonliberal democratic perspectives. Against this background, this paper seeks to demonstrate the problematic consequences of RI solely grounded on or justified by liberal democratic values. This paper will cast the argument in the form of a dilemma to be labelled as The Decent Nonliberal Peoples’ Dilemma and use it to illustrate the problems of the Western bias. (shrink)