American televised political shows are under tremendous pressure to succeed within an economic model that requires maximizing viewership. In response to this growing financial pressure, political shows invite contentious guests to discuss current events and issues. Such discussions are often confrontational, making a mockery of the responsibility the news industry has in disseminating information in an impartial and insightful way. Although outrage is a common discourse feature of televised political shows, little is known about what this language looks like and (...) how it is used to argue ideological positions. To this end, drawing from critical discourse analysis, this study investigates the multidimensional and multifunctional aspects of mocking, which is a type of outrage discourse. The findings show that mocking is an important argumentative tool for panel members, which occurs in the turn following an opposing viewpoint and is used to carry out a range of actions, including expressing disagreement, establishing a competing ideological position, and refuting an idea based on an opponent’s political identity, to name a few. These findings contribute to a better understanding of how mocking and mock news feed into partisan ideologies, creating both tribalism and skepticism within society. (shrink)

The months preceding and following the inauguration of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States have incited furious debate about the authenticity of media discourse in the shaping of reality, including in particular the reporting of refugees from predominantly Muslim regions and their resettlement in Western nations. Much of this debate is rooted in how opposing discourse clans, such as liberal and conservative ideologies, construct a narrative of nationhood around contested views of refugees. Examining mainstream and alternative (...) media from a critical discourse analytic perspective, the article uncovers how two key narratives about the Syrian refugee crisis emerge when the media attempt to orient their respective audiences to government policy through the discursive formation of the American Dream. Drawing on aspects of historicity, linguistic and semiotic action, and social impact, the analysis of the data reveals a discursive fracas between a humanistic perspective on the crisis that exploits a banal understanding of the American Dream and a more dichotomous narrative that homogenises refugees as a threat to the American way of life. These observations add to the growing body of literature that questions the ways in which the media discursively shapes, and is shaped by, political ideologies. (shrink)

One recently popular strategy for avoiding the moral error theory is via a ‘companions in guilt’ argument. I focus on those recently popular arguments that take epistemic facts as a companion in guilt for moral facts. I claim that there is an internal tension between the two main premises of these arguments. It is a consequence of this that either the soundness or the dialectical force of the companions in guilt argument is undermined. I defend this claim via (i) analogy (...) with philosophical debates concerning the indispensability of mathematical objects to natural science, and (ii) discussion of the ‘entanglement’ of epistemic concepts and moral concepts in deliberation. I conclude by proposing a positive view of what kind of argument must be used if moral error theories are to be successfully undermined. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Emily McTernan’s book, Taking Offence. I focus on how to evaluate taking offence comparatively against alternative attitudes such as anger or blame. Drawing on some of my work on blame, emotion and expressive action, I sketch a way in which we might reach a more convincing answer than that provided by McTernan.

in a nachlass fragment of 1888, Nietzsche refers to psychology as "Affektenlehre"—the doctrine or theory of the affects.1 Given his contention elsewhere that psychology represents the "path to the fundamental problems", it should come as no surprise that Nietzsche makes reference to affects in numerous prominent passages, and throughout some of his most important works.2 Yet, as Peter Poellner has claimed, one might "feel that not much is gained by [Nietzsche's] assertions in the absence of a detailed account of what (...) 'affects' are supposed to be". Literature on the topic has focused predominantly on the roles ascribed to affects in his moral... (shrink)

This book presents a theory that unifies these theories by using a philosophical approach to disclose an oversight in the theory of relativity.

The colonial period of Christian expansion was plagued by practices and systems that exploited non-European indigenous populations for the endgame interests of enriching the treasuries of European imperial powers and promoting Eurocentrism. Anderson Jeremiah has written an important paper that explains how the concepts of race and the caste system in South Asia functioned in the context of colonial Christian expansion, and argues that postcolonial Christian actors should prioritise intentionally replacing dehumanising forms of missional activity with the four ethically decolonising (...) paradigms of radical resistance, solidarity, hospitality, and joy in service of promoting racial justice in future global society. My response focuses on Jeremiah's ethical paradigm of hospitality, and engages with the challenge of applying this paradigm. In order for this hospitality paradigm to be applied in ways that lead to optimal missional outcomes, it must answer several questions, especially those linked to the existence of contesting hospitality-focussed frameworks and sociocultural attitudes endorsed by contemporary Christian agents and communities whose norms of hospitality appear radically different. (shrink)

Increasingly, psychologists and neuroscientists have become interested in moral psychology and moral judgment. Despite this, much of moral philosophy remains isolated from this empirical research. I seek to integrate these two literatures. Drawing on a wide range of research, I develop an empirically adequate account of moral judgment. I then turn to issues in philosophical moral psychology, arguing that empirical research sheds light on old debates and raises new questions for investigation. The neuropsychological mechanisms underlying moral judgment exhibit a large (...) degree of complexity. Different processes contribute to moral judgment under different conditions, depending both upon the kind of case under consideration and on individual differences. Affective processes subserved by a broad base of brain regions including the orbitofrontal cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and basal ganglia are crucial for normal moral judgment. These affective processes also provide an important link to motivation. More explicit cognition dependent upon areas of the medial temporal lobe and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex also play a crucial role in some kinds of moral judgment though they exhibit less direct connections to motivation. The descriptive account of moral judgment I defend makes sense of debates in moral psychology over two influential views: motivation internalism, according to which moral judgment necessitates motivation to act accordingly and the Humean Theory of Motivation, according to which belief and desire are distinct and motivation requires both a desire and an appropriate means-end belief. Moral judgments that derive from affective processes exhibit a connection between motivation and moral judgment. However, not all moral judgments derive from such processes. More explicit representations are not closely connected to motivation, thus motivation can come apart from moral judgment. While explicit beliefs are distinct from desires, affective representations have both cognitive (albeit nonpropositional) content and direct connections to motivation. This challenges Humean theories of motivation. This account helps resolve these traditional disputes. Anti-Humean, internalist theories offer an approximately accurate account of these affective mechanisms. Externalist, Humean theories offer an approximately accurate account of more explicit cognitive processes. Thus, several prominent philosophical theories offer a plausible account of some aspect of moral psychology. Because of the complexity of moral psychology, none of these accounts offers a complete account. This account also raises new questions for investigation. Some researchers have argued that the representation of a moral rule like the Doctrine of Double Effect helps explain the pattern of judgments in response to different kinds of Trolley cases. I argue that these judgments are better explained in terms of the details of the associative mechanisms underlying these judgments and not in terms of the representation of a moral rule. These findings raise a unique concern about the evidential value of our intuitions in these cases—a concern that could not arise from armchair reflection alone. The approach taken in this dissertation illustrates how integrating the results of empirical research contributes to philosophical work in ethical theory. (shrink)

Perhaps we should change our focus from constitutionalized practices of democracy to democratized practices of constitutionalism. Dworkin and Perry both seek to respond to democratic objections to judicial review by relying on a theory of the legitimacy constraints of democracy itself. According to this view, on some matters, legitimate democracy requires getting the right moral answers. Thus democratic processes must be constitutionalized to ensure such right outcomes on fundamental moral matters. To the extent that judges are better positioned to engage (...) in principled moral reasoning, the arguments continue, we ought to entrust them with ensuring the constitutionalized legitimacy conditions of democracy. I argued that this latter institutional move, however, threatened to simply revive the paternalist worries forcefully articulated by Learned Hand. Waldron’s rights-based objection to rightsbased judicial review, although not dispositive, provided further warning of the moral costs of treating fellow citizens as incapable of reasoning together about the content and proper scope of the legal rights required for democracy. An alternative strategy for justifying judicial review that this chapter investigates is to understand a constitution itself as a product of true democracy, of real popular sovereignty. It is then up to the people, exercising their constituent power at the level of a constitutional assembly, to decide what particular institutional arrangements will best carry forward their collective ideals and decisions. The specific character and structure of those arrangements—whether they are populist or elitist, deliberative or aggregative, sensitive or insulated, electorally accountable or politically independent, and so on—is then a secondary matter. What is central is that the constitutional arrangements the people decide on are, first and foremost, democratically legitimated by the fact that they are the result of authentic popular sovereignty.. (shrink)

This is a study of the psychological ideas of Galen (AD 129-c.210, the most important medical writer in antiquity) and Stoicism (a major philosophical theory in ...

Chester Barnard's classic, The Functions of the Executive, is premised on an Aristotelean conception of human nature. This reliance ramifies throughout his analysis of the cooperative basis of human organizations. Perhaps its most important manifestation appears in his definition of willing cooperation as self-abnegation. For by so removing cooperation from its utilitarian and contractarian assumptions, he avoids the well known criticisms of those assumptions while retaining his fundamental liberalism. Put positively, self-abnegation informs Barnard's liberalism with an heroic dimension. This, in (...) turn, enables him to provide an account of organizational effectiveness which is at once realistic and optimistic and which values its unique human participants. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Der Islam Jahrgang: 94 Heft: 1 Seiten: 234-275.

Explores the topic of ethics in sports, including stories of good sportsmanship in action, playing by the rules, and game preparation.