In this paper I will introduce a practical explication for the notion of expertise. At first, I motivate this attempt by taking a look on recent debates which display great disagreement about whether and how to define expertise in the first place. After that I will introduce the methodology of practical explications in the spirit of Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the state of nature along with some conditions of adequacy taken from ordinary and scientific language. This eventually culminates in the (...) respective explication of expertise according to which this term essentially refers to a certain kind of service-relation. This is why expertise should be considered as a predominantly social kind. This article will end up with a discussion of advantages and prima facie plausible objections against my account of expertise. (shrink)

Some moral theorists argue that innocent beneficiaries of wrongdoing may have special remedial duties to address the hardships suffered by the victims of the wrongdoing. These arguments generally aim to simply motivate the idea that being a beneficiary can provide an independent ground for charging agents with remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing. Consequently, they have neglected contexts in which it is implausible to charge beneficiaries with remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing, thereby failing to explore the limits (...) of the benefiting relation in detail. Our aim in this article is to identify a criterion to distinguish contexts in which innocent beneficiaries plausibly bear remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing from those in which they do not. We argue that innocent beneficiaries incur special duties to the victims of wrongdoing if and only if receiving and retaining the benefits sustains wrongful harm. We develop this criterion by identifying and explicating two general modes of sustaining wrongful harm. We also show that our criterion offers a general explanation for why some innocent beneficiaries incur a special duty to the victims of wrongdoing while others do not. By sustaining wrongful harm, beneficiaries-with-duties contribute to wrongful harm, and we ordinarily have relatively stringent moral requirements against contributing to wrongful harm. On our account, innocently benefiting from wrongdoing _per se_ does not generate duties to the victims of wrongdoing. Rather, beneficiaries acquire such duties because their receipt and retention of the benefits of wrongdoing contribute to the persistence of the wrongful harm suffered by the victim. We conclude by showing that our proposed criterion also illuminates why there can be reasonable disagreement about whether beneficiaries have a duty to victims in some social contexts. (shrink)

No one in philosophy has paid much attention to the virtue of honesty in recent years. Here is a trait for which it is easy to find consensus that it is a virtue, and furthermore, a very important virtue. It also has obvious relevance to what we see going on in contemporary politics, for instance, or in sports, the entertainment world, and education. Yet as far as I can tell, only one article in a philosophy journal has appeared in several (...) decades which discusses this virtue at any length. -/- In this chapter I have two central aims: (i) to sketch some of the conceptual parameters of the virtue of honesty in general, as well as its subordinate virtues, and then (ii) to draw on leading work in psychology to determine, at least in a preliminary way, whether we should think that most people instantiate this virtue or not. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to illuminate some core aspects of Leibniz’s conception of judgement and its place in his conception of the mind. In particular, the paper argues for three claims: First, the act of judgement is at the centre of Leibniz’s conception of the mind in that minds strive at actualising innate knowledge concerning derivative truths, where the actualising involves an act of judgement. Second, Leibniz does not hold a judgement account of predication, but a two-component account (...) that distinguishes between predication and alethic evaluation. Third, Leibniz understands the act of affirmative judgement in terms of establishing active dispositions, i.e. strivings, to make reasons available for future reasoning that aims at answering whether-questions. Correspondingly, he understands the act of negative judgement in terms of establishing dispositions to ban propositions from future reasoning that aims at answering whether-questions. In the final analysis, the acts of affirmative as well as of negative judgement turn out to be acts of changing memory dispositions. (shrink)

In an earlier article I argued that individuals are obligated not to exceed their fair share of emissions entitlements, that many exceed their fair share at present and thus ought to reduce their emissions as far as can reasonably be demanded. The peer commentators raised various insightful and pressing concerns, but the following objections seem particularly important: It was argued that the fair share argument is insufficiently justified, that it is incoherent, that it would result in more far-reaching duties than (...) acknowledged by me, that it is unable to provide a clear account of individual duties, and that duties to reduce individual emissions are not Kantian imperfect duties. This reply aims at clarifying the fair share argument and at addressing the major challenges. (shrink)

English summary: This volume looks at the so far little studied connections between the philosophy of Schelling and the historiographic waves in theological, philosophical and historical discourse during the first half of the 19th century. The reception of Schelling in theology, philosophy and history relates primarily to his writings around 1800. The essays in this volume firstly analyze the considerable impact that these texts had on the structure of contemporary debate. Secondly, they analyze the interdependence of the historical theology that (...) was beginning to take root and Schelling's emerging later philosophy. Thirdly, they examine the reception of Schelling's philosophy of history from the perspective of Friedrich Schleiermacher and historical academic discourse, as well as David Friedrich Strauss, Ferdinand Christian Baur and the Landhut Romantics. German description: Der vorliegende Band thematisiert die bislang nur wenig erforschten Zusammenhange zwischen der Philosophie Schellings und den Historisierungsschuben in den theologischen, philosophischen und geschichtswissenschaftlichen Diskursen der ersten Halfte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Die Rezeption Schellings in Theologie, Philosophie und Geschichtswissenschaft bezieht sich vor allem auf dessen Schriften um 1800. Die Beitrage des Bandes untersuchen sowohl die breite Wirkung dieser Texte in den zeitgenossischen Debattenkonstellationen sowie die Wechselwirkungen zwischen der sich etablierenden historischen Theologie und der Herausbildung von Schellings Spatphilosophie als auch die Rezeption der Geschichtsphilosophie Schellings bei Friedrich Schleiermacher sowie in den geschichtswissenschaftlichen Diskursen, bei David Friedrich Strauss, Ferdinand Christian Baur sowie in der Landshuter Romantik. Mit Beitragen von: Christopher Arnold, Ulrich Barth, Christian Danz, Georg Essen, Malte Dominik Kruger, Christof Landmesser, Michael Murrmann-Kahl, Georg Neugebauer, Jan Rohls, Oliver Wintzek, Johannes Zachhuber. (shrink)

The question of why Nietzsche writes as he does defines his philosophy—much more so than for almost any other thinker. Let me begin with the following claim: Nietzsche does not primarily write books. Rather, he edits them from a huge reservoir of different kinds of notebooks. In the process, the “I” that is the subject of the “writing” becomes increasingly unstable. This is of course an intended philosophical effect. Take the case of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which Nietzsche considered to be (...) his most important and long-lasting book. Most philosophers, when they engage with it at all, still take it more or less at face value. Zarathustra’s speeches are quoted as if they were enunciations of Nietzsche himself... (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the most widely read philosophers of the twentieth century. But the books in which his philosophy was published – with the exception of his early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – were posthumously edited from the writings he left to posterity. How did his 20,000 pages of philosophical writing become published volumes? Using extensive archival material, this Element reconstructs and examines the way in which Wittgenstein's writings were edited over more than fifty years, and shows how the (...) published volumes tell a thrilling story of philosophical inheritance. The discussion ranges over the conflicts between the editors, their deviations from Wittgenstein's manuscripts, other scholarly issues which arose, and also the shared philosophical tradition of the editors, which animated their desire to be faithful to Wittgenstein and to make his writings both available and accessible. The Element can thus be read as a companion to all of Wittgenstein's published works of philosophy. (shrink)

Una de las cuestiones que más ha interesado a los historiadores modernos y contemporáneos del escepticismo antiguo es aquella que concierne a las diferencias entre las dos corrientes escépticas tradicionales, denominadas académica y pirrónica. Este interés está completamente justificado pues se trata, en realidad, de una cuestión clásica planteada por los antiguos, tal como nos informa Aulo Gelio en las Noches Áticas: “Es una cuestión antigua, considerada por muchos escritores griegos, en cuánto difieren los filósofos pirrónicos de los académicos. Pues (...) ambos son llamados escépticos, suspensivos, aporéticos, ya que ambos nada afirman y juzgan que nada se aprehende”. (shrink)

Certains individus très hautement placés dans l'échelle sociale se désignent volontiers comme transhumanistes. On les trouve souvent à la tête de grandes sociétés à la pointe de la pointe de la technologie. Cette super-élite, immensément riche, promeut le mythe de l'explosion technologique, avec une reprise fantastique de la croissance économique. Elle ne s'inquiète guère de tous les avertissements catastrophistes, car toutes les menaces seront annihilées par la Techno-Science! Pour faire partager cette vue radieuse à ceux qui en sont naturellement les (...) premières victimes, les puissants ont trouvé quelques philosophes savants qui ont construit le mythe du transhumanisme : édifice, séduisant et fascinant, mais véritable imposture. (shrink)

This text is a survey of main Marxist conceptions of contemporary capitalism. Is shows that, if Marxist problemacy is a fructuous one, the implicit model in Capital is radically insufficient as a foundation for today capitalism's analysis.

One of the main issues in philosophy is the refl ection on sciences. In order to conciliate the unity and plurality of sciences, this paper sets out a new strategy for theory reduction by means of functional sub-concepts. This strategy is intended to get around the multiple realization objection that leads to a dilemma for the scientifi c quality of the special sciences. Taking Kim’s argument for token identity as starting point, I shall show a strategy to establish a systematic (...) link between concepts of the special sciences with physical concepts. By this means, a conservative theory reduction is in principle possible despite multiple realization. (shrink)

In this essay I focus on Wittgenstein's discussion of how we understand and feel about people that come from cultures very different from our own. Wittgenstein writes about "guessing thoughts", "regularities", and "common human behaviour" (gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise) in this context. I argue that his idea about given forms of life that we should "accept", will be problematic if we want to find a meaningful way of relating to such people with whom we "cannot find our feet" (in die man (...) sich nicht finden kann). (shrink)

Lacan himself ends up missing the opportunity to relate his notion of the objet petit a to Marxist ideas about production, reproduction and consumption in political economy, and therefore scotomises the possible forms of « social enunciation » that could act as vehicles for political agency precisely during periods of technological revolution. Industrial capitalism, once set in motion, generates deterritorialised subjects, and through the very process of constant de-skilling and re-skilling, engenders new, in principle universal, machinic forms of subjectivity. Lacan (...) had discovered the mechanism, but had not yet unfolded its historical conditions and political implications. Guattari suggests that the entire direction of social institutions has been radically transformed as a result of the capitalist expropriation of the results of the industrial revolution. (shrink)

Nicolaus Cusanus (1401-1464) konzipiert menschliche Erkenntnis als kreative, asymptotische Assimilation: Auf kreative Weise verähnlichen sich Menschen in Erkenntnisprozessen Denkunabhängigem, ohne diesen Verähnlichungsprozess je zum Abschluss bringen zu können. Obwohl menschliche Erkenntnis als kreativ charakterisiert wird, verliert sie nicht die Welthaftung. Obwohl sie asymptotisch verläuft, führt sie nicht zu Pessimismus und einem Ablassen von Erkenntnisbemühungen überhaupt. Cusanus macht die beiden Kernaspekte seines Modells menschlicher Erkenntnis trotz einiger systematischer Unschärfen im Rahmen eines massvollen Erkenntnisoptimismus kompatibel. Die vorliegende Monographie befasst sich mit diesem (...) Modell in zwei Hinsichten. Zunächst wird seine systematische Gestalt über das cusanische Oeuvre hinweg untersucht. Die zu diesem Zweck herangezogenen Werke sind De docta ignorantia, De coniecturis, Idiota de mente, De beryllo und das Compendium. Im Anschluss werden dann zentrale epistemologische Anfragen eingehender betrachtet und historisch kontextualisiert: Cusanus' Intellektverständnis, seine Stellung zu species-Theorien von Erkenntnis, seine Wahrheitsauffassung und sein Modell menschlichen Weltbezugs. Vergleiche mit den Positionen von Aristoteles und Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin und Dietrich von Freiberg, Anselm von Canterbury sowie John McDowell machen dabei sowohl die Eigenheiten von Cusanus als auch seine Verhaftung in der epistemologischen Tradition sichtbar. (shrink)

Populist leaders and their radical policies attract the interest of the media across borders. The aim of the current article is to uncover whether interviews centered on one populist leader, but involving interviewers located in different European countries, lead to the same production of populist equivocation across the EU. In addition, two types of journalistic elements that can explain potential differences are investigated: the broad interactions between the media and politicians in a given country, or the reporters belonging to a (...) specific media segment such as the tabloid press or public broadcasters. The research is based on interviews given by Viktor Orbán during the 2019 EU election campaign. Critical discourse analysis is carried out to investigate the equivocal populist narratives produced. (shrink)

I start by explaining what attitude-related reasons are and why it is plausible to assume that, at least in the domain of practical reason, there are such reasons. Then I turn to Raz’s idea that the practice of practical reasoning commits us to what he calls exclusionary reasons. Being excluded would be a third way, additional to being outweighed and being undermined, in which a reason can be defeated. I try to show that attitude-related reasons can explain the phenomena Raz (...) appeals to equally well. Attitude-related reasons, however, are weighted against other reasons and, thus, don’t determine a third relation of defeat. On this basis, I voice some doubts about Raz’s conception of exclusionary reasons. (shrink)