The reinforcement sensitivity theory proposes that neurobiological systems mediate protective and appetitive behaviours and the functioning of these systems is associated to personality traits. In this manner, the RST is a link between neuroscience, behaviour, and personality. The theory evolved to the present revised version describing three systems: fight-flight-freezing, behavioural approach/activation, and behavioural inhibition. However, the most widely available measure of the theory, the BIS/BAS scales, only investigates two systems. Using a large longitudinal community survey, we found that the BIS/BAS (...) scales can be re-structured to investigate the three systems of the theory with a BIS scale, three BAS scales, and a separate fight-flight-freezing system scale. The re-structured scales were age, sex, and longitudinally invariant, and associations with personality and mental health measures followed theoretical expectations and previously published associations. The proposed framework can be used to investigate behavioural choices influencing physical and mental health and bridge historical with contemporary research. (shrink)

We examine how prior mental health predicts hopes and how hopes predict subsequent mental health, testing hypotheses in a longitudinal study with an Australian nation-wide adult sample regarding mental health consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak during its initial stage. Quota sampling was used to select a sample representative of the adult Australian population in terms of age groups, gender, and geographical location. Mental health measures were selected to include those with the best psychometric properties. Hypotheses were tested using generalized linear (...) models with random intercepts, with the type of GLM determined by the nature of the dependent variable. Greater anxiety, depression, distress, and loneliness predict less hope, but impaired quality of life and stress positively predict hopes of gaining new skills. Distress and loneliness predict hopes for social connectedness and an improved society, suggesting that predictors of hope depend on what is hoped for. These findings suggest the need for more nuanced theories of hope. Greater hopes for societal improvement predict lower anxiety, depression, distress, and impaired quality of life, but greater hopes for skills and better mental health predict higher levels of these covariates. Moreover, when relevant prior psychological states are more intense, the impact of hope state declines. These findings indicate that the consequences of hope are heterogeneous, and suggest a possible explanation for the seemingly inconsistent therapeutic effectiveness of raising hope. (shrink)

Adult stem cell populations must coordinate their own maintenance with the generation of differentiated cell types to sustain organ physiology, in a spatially controlled manner and over long periods. Quantitative analyses of clonal dynamics have revealed that, in epithelia, homeostasis is achieved at the population rather than at the single stem cell level, suggesting that feedback mechanisms coordinate stem cell maintenance and progeny generation. In the central nervous system, however, little is known of the possible community processes underlying neural stem (...) cell maintenance. Recent work, in part based on intravital imaging made possible in the adult zebrafish, conclusively highlights that homeostasis in neural stem cell pools may rely on population asymmetry and long‐term spatiotemporal coordination of neural stem cell states and fates. These results suggest that neural stem cell assemblies in the vertebrate brain behave as self‐organized systems, such that the stem cells themselves generate their own intrinsic niche. (shrink)

Syllogisms (e.g. “All A are B; All B are C; What is true about A and C?”) are a long‐studied area of human reasoning. Riesterer, Brand, and Ragni compare a variety of models to human performance and show that not only do current models have a lot of room for improvement, but more importantly a large part of this improvement must come from examining individual differences in performance.

This article discusses conceptions of modesty and humility and their key features. It gives a brief historical overview of debates about whether or not they’re really virtues at all. It also discusses theories of modesty and humility that root them in the presence or absence of particular beliefs, emotions, desires, and attention. it also discusses related phenomena in epistemology: rational limits on self-ascription of error, attitudes to disagreement, and openness to alternative views.

Research seeking a scientific foundation for the theory of art appreciation has raised controversies at the intersection of the social and cognitive sciences. Though equally relevant to a scientific inquiry into art appreciation, psychological and historical approaches to art developed independently and lack a common core of theoretical principles. Historicists argue that psychological and brain sciences ignore the fact that artworks are artifacts produced and appreciated in the context of unique historical situations and artistic intentions. After revealing flaws in the (...) psychological approach, we introduce a psycho-historical framework for the science of art appreciation. This framework demonstrates that a science of art appreciation must investigate how appreciators process causal and historical information to classify and explain their psychological responses to art. Expanding on research about the cognition of artifacts, we identify three modes of appreciation: basic exposure to an artwork, the artistic design stance, and artistic understanding. The artistic design stance, a requisite for artistic understanding, is an attitude whereby appreciators develop their sensitivity to art-historical contexts by means of inquiries into the making, authorship, and functions of artworks. We defend and illustrate the psycho-historical framework with an analysis of existing studies on art appreciation in empirical aesthetics. Finally, we argue that the fluency theory of aesthetic pleasure can be amended to meet the requirements of the framework. We conclude that scientists can tackle fundamental questions about the nature and appreciation of art within the psycho-historical framework. (shrink)

What does it mean to be a morally good person? It can be tempting to think that it is simply a matter of performing certain actions and avoiding others. And yet there is much more to moral character than our outward actions. We expect a good person to not only behave in certain ways but also to experience the world in certain ways within.

Whether on the theoretical level or by analyzing specific cases, this collection examines the different ways of experiencing and dealing with precarity. Its goal is to elucidate the uses of rhetoric so as to grasp to what extent the "minus" may (sometimes) represent a "plus".

Las reflexiones que conforman el presente artículo intentan brindar un aporte a la cuestión de la naturaleza y de la problemática medioambiental desde el punto de vista de lo que denominaremos una filosofía del suelo. Se emprenderá dicha tarea a través de los planteos de una serie de autores y autoras pertenecientes a la contemporaneidad filosófica, que se han preocupado, en distinta medida y de modos muy diferentes, por la problemática de la tierra o el suelo: Donna Haraway, Tim Ingold (...) y Bruno Latour. Para esto, nos serviremos de una serie de elementos que extraeremos de la experiencia visual y táctil de las Líneas de Nazca, legado de nuestro pasado amerindio en el desierto peruano. El trabajo se dividirá en tres partes, dedicada cada una de ellas a explicitar ciertas reflexiones de los autores que puedan asociarse a una filosofía como la que pretendemos mentar. El enfoque priorizará los entrelazos entre los mismos y el desarrollo de elementos que nos permitan un entrecruzamiento de sus respectivas teorías. (shrink)

_ _ Nick Bostrom popularizó y difundió las intuiciones básicas del movimiento transhumanista desde una perspectiva filosófica. Sin embargo, hoy en día sus ideas pueden considerarse auto contradictorias respecto a su pretensión de superar al humanismo. De hecho, se podría marcar el pensamiento de Bostrom como de ultrahumanista e incluso de materialista ingenuo (Gabriel 2018, 2019). No obstante, admitiendo que la filosofía progresa en cuanto disciplina, es posible identificar pensadores transhumanistas de segunda generación, es decir, pensadores transhumanistas capaces de comprender (...) los límites y presupuestos de las intuiciones presentadas por Bostrom. Consideraremos la actividad filosófica de James Hughes y Stefan L. Sorgner como un transhumanismo de segunda generación en tanto que sus propuestas de transhumanismo son coherentes respecto de sus propios presupuestos. El caso de Hughes refleja la posibilidad de un transhumanismo democrático y consistente con las exigencias morales de nuestros tiempos, mientras que el caso de Sorgner es una invitación a edificar un transhumanismo desde presupuestos no humanistas, a saber, desde la filosofía dinámica de Nietzsche. De este modo, el transhumanismo de segunda generación sería el producto de una reflexión respecto a la coherencia de las propias condiciones de posibilidad del transhumanismo. Palabras clave: Bostrom - Materialismo ingenuo - Filosofía Dinámica - Transhumanismo democrático - Filosofía del transhumanismo. (shrink)

This article offers a justification for accommodating claims of conscience. The standard justification points to the pain that acting against one’s conscience entails. But that defense cannot make sense of the state’s refusal to accommodate individuals where the law interferes with their deeply meaningful but nonmoral projects. An alternative justification, we argue, arises once one recognizes the connection between conscience and moral address: One’s lived moral convictions determine when and with what force one can hold others to account. Acting against (...) one’s convictions can undermine one’s standing to blame others who act in similar ways. When the state compels someone to act against conscience, it renders her complicit in conduct she takes to be wrong and thereby impairs her ability to condemn similar conduct in the future, in a manner akin to the hypocrite. The reason the state should not compel people to act against conscience, then, is that doing so would undercut their moral standing. (shrink)

In order to describe the logic of morality, "contractualist" philosophers have studied how individuals behave when they choose to follow their moral intuitions. These individuals, contractualists note, often act as if they have bargained and thus reached an agreement with others about how to distribute the benefits and burdens of mutual cooperation. Using this observation, such philosophers argue that the purpose of morality is to maximize the benefits of human interaction. The resulting "contract" analogy is both insightful and puzzling. On (...) one hand, it captures the pattern of moral intuitions, thus answering questions about human cooperation: why do humans cooperate? Why should the distribution of benefits be proportionate to each person's contribution? Why should the punishment be proportionate to the crime? Why should the rights be proportionate to the duties? On the other hand, the analogy provides a mere as-if explanation for human cooperation, saying that cooperation is "as if" people have passed a contract-but since they didn't, why should it be so? To evolutionary thinkers, the puzzle of the missing contract is immediately reminiscent of the puzzle of the missing "designer" of life-forms, a puzzle that Darwin's theory of natural selection essentially resolved. Evolutionary and contractualist theory originally intersected at the work of philosophers John Rawls and David Gauthier, who argued that moral judgments are based on a sense of fairness that has been naturally selected. In this book, Nicolas Baumard further explores the theory that morality was originally an adaptation to the biological market of cooperation, an arena in which individuals competed to be selected for cooperative interactions. In this environment, Baumard suggests, the best strategy was to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation in a fair way, so that those who offered less than others were left out of cooperation while those who offered more were exploited by their partners. It is with this evolutionary approach that Baumard ultimately accounts for the specific structure of human morality. (shrink)

Most people believe that suffering is intrinsically bad. In conjunction with facts about our world and plausible moral principles, this yields a pro tanto obligation to reduce suffering. This is the intuitive starting point for the moral argument in favor of interventions to prevent wild animal suffering. If we accept the moral principle that we ought, pro tanto, to reduce the suffering of all sentient creatures, and we recognize the prevalence of suffering in the wild, then we seem committed to (...) the existence of such a pro tanto obligation. Of course, competing values such as the aesthetic, scientific or moral values of species, biodiversity, naturalness or wildness, might be relevant to the all-things-considered case for or against intervention. Still, many argue that, even if we were to give some weight to such values, no plausible theory could resist the conclusion that WAS is overridingly important. This article is concerned with large-scale interventions to prevent WAS and their tractability and the deep epistemic problem they raise. We concede that suffering gives us a reason to prevent it where it occurs, but we argue that the nature of ecosystems leaves us with no reason to predict that interventions would reduce, rather than exacerbate, suffering. We consider two interventions, based on gene editing technology, proposed as holding promise to prevent WAS; raise epistemic concerns about them; discuss their potential moral costs; and conclude by proposing a way forward: to justify interventions to prevent WAS, we need to develop models that predict the effects of interventions on biodiversity, ecosystem functioning, and animals’ well-being. (shrink)

We provide a translation of Binet and Henri’s pioneering 1894 paper on the influence of suggestibility on memory. Alfred Binet is famous as the author who created the IQ test that bears his name, but he is almost unknown as the psychological investigator who generated numerous original experiments and fascinating results in the study of memory. His experiments published in 1894 manipulated suggestibility in several ways to determine effects on remembering. Three particular modes of suggestion were employed to induce false (...) recognitions: indirect suggestion by a preconceived idea; direct suggestion; and collective suggestion. In the commentary we suggest that Binet and Henri’s paper written over 115 years ago is still highly relevant even today. In particular, Binet’s legacy lives on in modern research on misinformation effects in memory, in studies of conformity, and in experiments on the social contagion of memory. (shrink)

Henrich and Boyd (2002) were the first to propose a formal model of the role of attraction in cultural evolution. They came to the surprising conclusion that, when both attraction and selection are at work, final outcomes are determined by selection alone. This result is based on a deterministic view of cultural attraction, different from the probabilistic view introduced in Sperber (1996). We defend this probabilistic view, show how to model it, and argue that, when both attraction and selection are (...) at work, both affect final outcomes. (shrink)

A scholarly edition of Nicolas Malebranche's Treatise on Nature and Grace by Patrick Riley. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

The picture of moral development defended by followers of Aristotle takes moral cultivation to be like playing a harp; one gets to be good by actually spending time playing a real instrument. On this view, we cultivate a virtue by doing the actions associated with that virtue. I argue that this picture is inadequate and must be supplemented by imaginative techniques. One can, and sometimes must, cultivate virtue without actually performing the associated actions. Drawing on strands in Buddhist philosophy, I (...) explain several methods of moral development that rely on imagination and visualization rather than overt action. These techniques are essential in cases where cultivating virtue the way one practices the harp is impossible. In particular, I focus on single-event virtues, first-time virtuous acts, and morally dangerous situations. (shrink)

Can animals be agents? Do they want to be free? Can they have meaningful lives? If so, should we change the way we treat them? This paper offers an account of animal agency and of two continuums: between human and nonhuman agency, and between wildness and captivity. It describes how a wide range of human activities impede on animals’ freedom and argues that, in doing so, we deprive a wide range of animals of opportunities to exercise their agency in ways (...) that can give meaning to their lives. (shrink)

Many of us, even on our happiest days, struggle to quiet the constant buzz of anxiety in the background of our minds. All kinds of worries--worries about losing people and things, worries about how we seem to others--keep us from peace of mind. Distracted or misled by our preoccupations, misconceptions, and, most of all, our obsession with ourselves, we don't see the world clearly--we don't see the world as it really is. In our search for happiness and the good life, (...) this is the main problem. But luckily there is a solution, and on the path to understanding it, we can make use of the rich and varied teachings that have developed over centuries of Buddhist thought. With clarity and compassion, Nicolas Bommarito explores the central elements of centuries of Buddhist philosophy and practice, explaining how they can improve your life and teach you to live without fear. Mining important texts and lessons for practical guidance, he provides a friendly guide to the very practical goals that underpin Buddhist philosophy. After laying out the basic ideas, Bommarito walks readers through a wide range of techniques and practices we can adopt to mend ingrained habits. Rare for its exploration of both the philosophy that motivates Buddhism and its practical applications, this is a compassionate guide to leading a good life that anyone can follow. (shrink)

This article focuses on the following three novel and original philosophical approaches to classical liberalism: Den Uyl and Rasmussen’s perfectionist argument from meta-norms, Gaus’s justificatory model, and Kukathas’s conscience-based theory of authority. None of these three approaches are utilitarian or consequentialist in character. Neither do they appeal to the notion of a rational bargain as it is typical within contractarianism. Furthermore, each of these theory rejects the idea that classical liberalism should be grounded on considerations of interpersonal justice such as (...) those that are central to the Lockean tradition. It is argued that these three theories, despite their many attractive features, fail to articulate in a convincing manner some central classical liberal concerns. (shrink)

Written seven years after publication of his Search after Truth, Malebranche's Treatise on Ethics develops a detailed, experimental science of ethics in two parts - the ethics of virtue and the ethics of duty.

This paper demonstrates the central role of the Socratic elenchus in the Sophist. In the first part, I defend the position that the Stranger describes the Socratic elenchus in the sixth division of the Sophist. In the second part, I show that the Socratic elenchus is actually used when the Stranger scrutinizes the accounts of being put forward by his predecessors. In the final part, I explain the function of the Socratic elenchus in the argument of the dialogue. By contrast (...) with standard scholarly interpretations, this way of reading the text provides all the puzzles about being (241c4–251a4) with a definite function in the dialogue. It also reveals that Plato’s methodology includes a plurality of method and is more continuous than what is often believed. (shrink)

This article examines HIV-positive patients’ experiences of treatments within a context characterized by the multiplicity of opinions expressed both by specialists and the public domain. It is based upon a survey of 63 patients encountered in a Paris hospital. The authors demonstrate the contrasts between these patients in terms of two main dimensions: the degree of the patients’ proximity to specialist knowledge, and the level of homogeneousness that the patients attribute to medical know-how. At the point where these two dimensions (...) meet, the article distinguishes between three forms of patient attitude towards treatment; in other words, three ways of simultaneously positioning oneself with regard to the media, associations, doctors and family circles/entourage: resorting to exteriority; self-integration into biomedical institutions; arranging heterogeneous actors. It analyses the transformations relating to the main experience profiles highlighted by sociological studies of other pathologies. (shrink)

Se aborda la polémica entre Leibniz y Malebranche en torno a la relación entre las sustancias. Se plantean cuatro hipótesis para explicar esta interacción: la influencia física, la asistencia divina inmediata, la identidad y la armonía previa. Se explica la posición crítica de Leibniz respecto a las otras tres. En relación con la primera hipótesis Leibniz y Malebranche están de acuerdo en que no es viable. Se explican la crítica de Leibniz al ocasionalismo de Malebranche y al monismo sustancialista de (...) Spinoza. Y finalmente se analiza, desde la hipótesis de la armonía previa, el modo en que Leibniz aprovecha la disputa con el ocasionalismo, tanto en la versión de Malebranche como en la de Pierre Bayle, para reivindicar la autonomía de la razón en el ámbito de las causas segundas. En ello juegan un papel fundamental la noción de naturaleza de las cosas, el principio de diversidad y el principio de razón suficiente. (shrink)