The aims of this book are: to explain the notion of phenomenal consciousness in a non-metaphorical way that minimizes controversial assumptions; to characterize the relationship between the phenomenal character and intentionality of visual experience, visual imagery and non-imagistic thought; and to clarify the way in which conscious experience is intrinsically valuable to us. It argues for the legitimacy of a first-person approach to these issues--one which relies on a distinctively first-person warrant for judgments about one's own experience. Thought experiments are (...) employed in which one is asked to conceive of having various forms of blindsight, so as to make consciousness intellectually conspicuous by its absence in such hypothetical scenarios. It is argued that theories of mind that would commit us to denying either the conceptual or the metaphysical possibility of these scenarios neglect the occurrence of consciousness in this phenomenal sense. (shrink)

The question of the status and the mode of functioning of technologies which participate in our cognitive activity (action, perception, reasoning) is inseparable from the question of the bodily inscription of these faculties. One can adopt the principle that a tool is fully appropriate when it functions as a component of the organs of our lived body. However, these technical entities can be differentiated along a scale according to the role played by their separability. The possibility of picking up and (...) putting down a hammer, a pair of spectacles, an agenda is part of the meaning of these tools. When they are “in hand”, they become transparent for the subject and serve in the constitution of his lived experience. Put down, they can be transmitted, modified, received. According to the frequency of the transition picking up/putting down, the tool can be picked up while anticipating that it can just as quickly put down again (the mouse of a computer, cutlery at table, an agenda, …). At the other extreme, another sort of tool functions rather as a prosthetic device that is taken up with the prospect of remaining attached to the body for a long time (an artificial leg, spectacles, clothes, …). This differentiation of technologies along a continuum which depends on forms of use seems to us sufficient to distinguish extension and embodiment. (shrink)

This is a brief reflection published in the now extinct Oratre Fratres. The consequences of the turning from common Fatherhood and the resulting loss of common brotherhood are as evident today as when this was first written. McCoy was in St. Paul Seminary at the time and was to be ordained in May 1941. He had earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 1938.

In the aftermath of the Aum case, various suggestions as to the causes of dangerous cult mentality, and possible measures for its prevention have been offered in the Japanese media, but it seems that a much more penetrating diagnosis is necessary than that thus far proffered. To merely lay blame to the person of Shoko Asahara, or the phenomenon of mind control, or an insensitivity, ineptitude, or lack of resources on the part of the Japanese police, is to grossly oversimplify (...) and objectify a problem which has complex roots within the structure of the very institutions and values which Japanese society regards as its greatest assets. (shrink)

Using St. Thomas Aquinas's natural law philosophy and Divine Exemplar argument to prompt new discussion of ethical questions that lawyers and judges should confront, the author delivers a complete occupational profile for the professional conduct of judges and lawyers. This text challenges current beliefs and suggests a return to the "roots" of the system, in which reason, virtue, and justice guide the law and its practice.

Natural law, as a school of jurisprudence or a means to decide or consider legal cases, is considered by some as nothing more than an emotive reminiscence and by others as a foundational system upon which legal reasoning must depend.

I comment on Feferman’s views on set theory, in particular criticizing a priori arguments claiming that the continuum hypothesis has no determinate truth value and commenting on his responses to my paper on his skepticism about set theory. I respond to criticisms of his of the structuralism that I have advocated and comment on his view of proof theory. On Koellner’s paper, I register little disagreement but note a difference of sympathy about views such as constructivism. On Tait’s paper, I (...) note that Kant gives more play to the notion of whole number than Tait seems to allow and that Kant’s conception of real numbers is unclear. Responding to Sieg’s paper, I note his emphasis on how much mathematics and its foundations changed from Kant’s time to that of Dedekind and Hilbert and mention my effort to find a limited role for an intuition distantly descended from Kant’s. (shrink)

Positive psychology is about fostering strength and living well-about how to do a good job at being human. Charles Hackney connects this still-new movement to foundational concepts in philosophy and Christian theology. He then explores topics such as subjective states, cognitive processes, and the roles of personality, relationships, and environment.

In thirteenth-century philosophical psychology, it is commonly held that the powers of the soul, responsible for a living being’s various operations, “flow” from the soul’s essence. The phrase is used systematically by Albert the Great, who imports it from Avicenna. It suggests that the soul, considered as a separate substance, is ontologically distinct from its powers. This is how Albert understands Avicenna, and how modern interpreters understand both Avicenna and Albert. The aim of this paper is to call into question (...) such an understanding, as a reading of Avicenna and as a philosophical doctrine. It argues that an ontological distinction between the soul and its powers isn’t intended in Avicenna, and isn’t successfully established in Albert. It further argues that psychological emanation yields such a distinction only in Aquinas, where the soul is no longer considered a separate substance, but a material form. (shrink)

Dissipative systems are described by a Hamiltonian, combined with a “dynamical matrix” which generalizes the simplectic form of the equations of motion. Criteria for dissipation are given and the examples of a particle with friction and of the Lotka-Volterra model are presented. Quantization is first introduced by translating generalized Poisson brackets into commutators and anticommutators. Then a generalized Schrödinger equation expressed by a dynamical matrix is constructed and discussed.

Parmi les nombreuses occurrences du terme «argent» dans le corpus kantien, celle que développe la Doctrine du droit s'annonce assurément comme la plus décisive pour l'intelligence de la conception kantienne de l'argent. Précisément parce que Kant y procède au dévoilement de l'essence de l'argent.