Battle Hall Davies' brother Nick ran away from home when she was in high school. Now he has found her and she is going to stay with him for the summer before starting college. Battle discovers that neither she nor her brother is the person she thought they were.

After surveying and criticizing some earlier definitions of "disease", we propose that a general term--malady--be used to represent what all diseases, illnesses, injuries, etc., have in common. We define a malady as the suffering, or increased risk of suffering an evil in the absence of a distinct sustaining cause. We discuss the key terms in the definition: evil, distinct sustaining cause, and increased risk. We show that the role of abnormality is to clarify these terms rather than to be used (...) directly in the definition of malady. (shrink)

In his article 'Specifying, balancing and interpreting bioethical principles' (Richardson, 2000), Henry Richardson claims that the two dominant theories in bioethics - principlism, put forward by Beauchamp and Childress in Principles of Bioethics , and common morality, put forward by Gert, Culver and Clouser in Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals - are deficient because they employ balancing rather than specification to resolve disputes between principles or rules. We show that, contrary to Richardson's claim, the major problem with principlism, either the (...) original version, or the specified principlism of Richardson, is that it conceives of morality as being composed of free-standing principles, rather than as common morality conceives it, as being a complete public system, composed of rules, ideals, morally relevant features, and a procedure for determining when a rule can be justifiably violated. (shrink)

Many journalists, readers and scholars exhibit confusion concerning the nature and justification of deception. In this article, we clarify those acts that should count as deception. Before discussing if any cases of deception can be construed as morally justified, we clarify which investigative, interrogative, and information-giving techniques are deceptive on their face. We also bracket borderline cases.

Although the definition of a mental disorder has remained essentially the same from Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder, Third Edition, Revised (DSM-III-R) through DSM-IV to DSM-IV-TR, the account of the paraphilias has changed continually. Although the definition in all the DSMs explicitly rules out deviant sexual behavior as sufficient for labeling someone as having a mental disorder, deviant sexual behavior counts as sufficient for all the paraphilias in DSM-III-R. In DSM-IV, the account of all the paraphilias is made (...) consistent with the definition. In DSM-IV-TR, mere deviant sexual behavior is not sufficient for being classified as having a paraphilia, but immoral deviant sexual behavior is. Thus, in DSM-IV-TR, only those paraphilias that involve immoral deviant sexual behavior are inconsistent with the definition, but deviant sexual behavior by itself does not count as a mental disorder. (shrink)

Coercion is commonly said to invalidate consent, and that is always true if the source of the coercion is the physician. However, if it is a family member who coerces the patient to consent, the resultant consent may be quite valid and treatment should proceed.

Book reviewed in this article: Philosophy in Medicine: Conceptual and Ethical Problems in Medicine and Psychiatry. By Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert. Psychiatric Ethics. Edited by Sidney Block and Paul Chodoff. Man, Mind, and Morality: The Ethics of Behavior Control. By Ruth Macklin.

Book reviewed in this article: To Hurt and To Heal. University of California Media Extension Center.