Many philosophers and laypeople have the following two intuitions about legal punishment: the state has a pro tanto moral reason to punish all those guilty of breaking a just law and to do so in proportion to their guilt. Accepting that there can be overriding considerations not to punish all the guilty in proportion to their guilt, many philosophers still consider it a strike against any theory if it does not imply that there is always a supportive moral reason to (...) do so. In this paper, I demonstrate that censure theory accounts for these intuitions much better than any other theory, including forms of retributivism such as desert theory and fairness theory, and explain why censure theory is able to do so. (shrink)

A number of jurisdictions, including England and Wales after their adoption of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act, require that sentences be `proportionate' to the severity of the crime. This book, written by the leading architect of `just deserts' sentencing theory, discusses how sentences may be scaled proportionately to the gravity of the crime. Topics dealt with include how the idea of a penal censure justifies proportionate sentences; how a penalty scale should be `anchored' to reduce overall punishment levels; how (...) non-custodial penalties should be graded and used; and how political pressures impinge on sentencing policies. (shrink)

In an article previously published in this journal, Phillip Montague critically surveys and rejects a handful of contemporary attempts to explain why state punishment is morally justified. Among those targeted is one of my defences of the censure theory of punishment, according to which state punishment is justified because the political community has a duty to express disapproval of those guilty of injustice. My defence of censure theory supposes, per argumentum, that there is always some defeasible moral reason (...) for the state to proportionately punish the guilty, and then demonstrates that censure theory best entails and explains this intuition. Montague does not question the intuition, but instead argues that three rival theories of punishment, including his societal-defence view, account for it to no worse a degree than my censure theory. In this article I defend my initial argument, noting resources for its defence that Montague does not appreciate and that, I maintain, provide those who believe that there is always pro tanto injustice in the state failing to proportionately punish the guilty reason to adopt censure theory over all competitors, including Montague’s societal-defence theory. (shrink)

Censure and exclusion of The Republic are characteristics of many utopias, which become dystopias precisely because of turning to them. Plato´s reasons to censure certain types of poetry are ethical and political ones, although his arguments are epistemological . This paper proposes reading these two aspects of the platonic proposal in the light of three specific points of the Timaeus: 1) the theory of discourse about the concept of verisimilar , 2) its relation to the question of whether (...) we can represent objects we do not know, and 3) the demiurge model proposed by Plato in this dialogue. The aim is to show that two of the most problematic aspects of The Republic, are dissolved today in the Timaeus. (shrink)

This article advances a censure-based case against sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Our argument justifies a retributive “second look” assessment of long-term prison sentences. The article focuses on the censuring element of long-term prison sentences while reconceptualizing penal censure as a dynamic and responsive concept. By doing so, the article explores the significance of the prisoner’s life after sentencing (largely ignored by retributivists) and promotes a more nuanced approach to censure-based proportionality. Policy-makers may (...) welcome this approach as a way to control excessive prison sentences while remaining within a retributive penal framework. Although we are making a general argument about the need for responsive censure within a retributive sentencing regime, the case for this approach is particularly compelling at the present time. Almost all Western nations, and particularly the US, impose very lengthy, often life sentences of imprisonment for a wide range of offences, thereby affecting large numbers of prisoners. (shrink)

This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.

Dans cet article, nous analysons les textes de G. W. Leibniz qui portent sur la censure et la liberté d’expression, notamment par rapport aux auteurs qu’il qualifie de « libertins » ou d’« athées ». Nous explorons le dispositif théorique qu’il propose pour déterminer les limites justes entre la censure et la liberté de pensée; dispositif qui permet, dans chaque cas, de choisir entre la réfutation savante et la suppression autoritaire des textes estimés pernicieux pour la morale ou (...) la piété. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous analysons les textes de G. W. Leibniz qui portent sur la censure et la liberté d’expression, notamment par rapport aux auteurs qu’il qualifie de « libertins » ou d’« athées ». Nous explorons le dispositif théorique qu’il propose pour déterminer les limites justes entre la censure et la liberté de pensée ; dispositif qui permet, dans chaque cas, de choisir entre la réfutation savante et la suppression autoritaire des textes estimés pernicieux pour la morale (...) ou la piété.In this article, I analyze G. W. Leibniz’s position on censorship and liberty of expression, in particular in relationship to the authors that he qualifies as « libertine » or « atheist ». I explore the theoretical framework he proposes to establish the just limits between censorship and liberty of thought and which allows, in each case, to choose between erudite refutation and authoritative suppression in relation to texts considered dangerous for morality or piety. (shrink)

This essay examines Henry More’s engagement with Jacob Böhme and compares the sympathetic critique of Böhme with More’s much more negative evaluation of Spinoza. More directs his criticism of Böhme at the similarities between Spinoza and Böhme: their materialism and confusion of God and world. The present essay suggests, however, that the perception of shared Platonism informs More’s more favourable approach to the Silesian. The problem of what “Platonism” means in this context is thus also addressed. Böhme’s writings were valued (...) by More because of a shared metaphysics that rejected both radical dualism and pantheism, and the Platonic theology of the goodness of God and the freedom of man, together with the rejection of predestination. Spinoza, on the other hand, is rejected because of his radical determinism, his denial of any substantial distinction between good and evil, and the transcendent being of the divine. (shrink)

The exploration of penal censure in this book is inspired by the fortieth anniversary in 2016 of the publication of Andreas von Hirsch's Doing Justice, which opened up a fresh set of issues in theorisation about punishment that eventually led von Hirsch to ground his proposed model of desert-based sentencing on the notion of penal censure. Von Hirsch's work thus provides an obvious starting-point for an exploration of the importance of censure for the justification of punishment, both (...) within von Hirsch's theory of just deserts and from the perspectives of other theoretical approaches. It also provides an opportunity for engaging with censure more broadly from philosophical, sociological-anthropological and individual-psychological perspectives. The essays in this collection map the conceptual territory of censure from these different perspectives, address issues for desert theory that arise from fuller understandings of censure, and consider afresh the role of censure within the jurisprudence of punishment. They show that analyses of censure from different vantage points can significantly enrich punishment theory, not least by providing a conceptual basis for perceiving common ground between and thus connecting different strands of penal theory. (shrink)

Hobbes' philosophy is one of the high points of a century of great philosophical achievement and Leviathan is recognized as one of the great classics of political theory. But the response from Hobbes's contemporaries to his secular analysis of society demonstrated the challenging nature of his ideas. This collection of many of the major contemporary responses to his thought by leading figures, mostly never republished, provides an outstanding source for assessing his immediate impact and the long-term importance of his work.

According to some philosophers, a necessary condition of morally permissible punishment is that it communicates deserved censure for the offender’s wrongdoing. The author calls this the Communicative Condition of punishment. The chapter considers whether the use of mandatory crime-preventing neurointerventions is compatible with the Communicative Condition. The author argues that it is not. If we accept the Communicative Condition, it follows that it is impermissible to administer mandatory neurointerventions on offenders as punishment. The author then considers whether it is (...) permissible to offer an offender a neurointervention as a replacement for incarceration or in exchange for a shorter sentence. He notes that this could meet the Communicative Condition, although, somewhat oddly, only in cases where the neurointerventions have harmful effects. (shrink)

The book documents thirty cases in which university-trained scholars were condemned for disseminating allegedly erroneous opinions in their teaching or writing.

Contrairement à ce qu’on continue d’affirmer, l’âge de la censure n’a pas été remplacé par un âge de la transparence. Dans les régimes post-répressifs qui caractérisent nos sociétés, la transparence représente une forme nouvelle, particulièrement efficace – car imperceptible – de censure. Si la nature de ce nouveau mécanisme de sélection nous échappe encore, c’est parce que nous restons prisonniers d’une conception moderne – et prohibitive – de ce qu’est la censure. Pourtant, à ses origines, l’institution du (...) « census » n’avait pas pour but d’interdire mais de recenser les vies afin de les gouverner plus efficacement. (shrink)

Le présent article explore la reconversion professionnelle de Marie Taglioni, vedette du ballet romantique de la Monarchie de Juillet devenue pédagogue et chorégraphe à l’Opéra de Paris sous le Second Empire. L’examen des sources montre le rôle joué par ses parents dans sa formation à la composition chorégraphique dans un contexte de féminisation de la danse théâtrale professionnelle à l’échelle de l’Europe occidentale. Si la composition féminine demeure l’objet de fortes censures, Marie Taglioni parvient à tisser un réseau professionnel favorable (...) à sa promotion au rang de chorégraphe. Son essai de reconversion, après la composition des ballets Le Papillon (1860) et Zara (1862), se heurte cependant à des normes de genre qui assignent les femmes à l’interprétation des œuvres et les excluent de l’accession à l’emploi de maître de ballet. (shrink)

Résumé Le problème complexe de la réception tardive de tout l’œuvre du marquis de Sade doit être considéré dans le contexte de l’histoire de la censure en Hongrie au cours de plusieurs siècles. Mon article se nourrit de mon expérience de traductrice, en particulier de ma traduction de La Philosophie dans le boudoir (1989). L’aperçu historique sur l’absence de réception de ses textes avant 1989 puis sur la période suivante qui a commencé avec le changement de régime et une (...) grande liberté dans le domaine éditorial, illustre bien les limites et les avatars de la censure en Europe Centrale et Orientale. (shrink)

Contrairement à ce que l'on admet généralement, la mesure de l'audience en continu , bien que l'instrument ait été inspiré par les publicitaires et serve en principe à la fixation des tarifs des spots de publicité, ne signifie pas la fin de la censure politique au profit d'une pure soumission aux logiques économiques. La course à l'audience entre les chaînes généralistes, loin de favoriser une diversification de l'offre de programmes, a conduit à une recherche des programmes rassemblant le maximum (...) de téléspectateurs. Tout se passe comme si les programmes étaient désormais soumis au vote des téléspectateurs dans une sorte de «démocratie culturelle». La mesure de l'audience instantanée a ainsi imposé, dans le domaine culturel, un nouveau principe de légitimité, hétéronome parce que politique, qui repose sur la loi de la majorité.Contrary to what is generally admitted, although non-stop audience rating is a tool designed by advertisers to evaluate the prices of TV advertising spots, this does not mean that political censorship is thus being replaced by pure submission to economic logic. The competition for audience between the traditional channels has not led to a greater level of variety in the programmes they offer since they have tended rather to tailor their schedules to attract the most viewers possible. Everything happens as if schedules were from now submitted to the viewers’ vote in a kind of "cultural democracy". In the cultural field, instant audience ratings have imposed a new principle of legitimacy which is heteronomous because it is political and which is based on majority rule. (shrink)

I focus on the metaphysical underpinnings of the censure theory of punishment, according to which punishment is justified if and because it expresses disapproval of injustice. Specifically, I seek to answer the question of what makes claims about proportionate censure true or false. In virtue of what is it the case that one form of censure is stronger than another, or that punishment is the censure fitting injustice? Are these propositions true merely because of social conventions, (...) as per the dominant view of philosophers such as Jean Hampton and Joel Feinberg, or is there an objective fact of the matter to which these propositions correspond? Such questions have been scarcely addressed in the analytic literature, but it is urgent to do so in a systematic way. As I make clear, what is probably the primary motivation for holding the censure theory of punishment depends on the truth of certain controversial theses about normative realism. -/- . (shrink)

This paper explores the historical and palaeographical features linking together three manuscripts of Plato that bear - as previous researchers have shown - marginalia and textual corrections in the hand of the Byzantine humanist George Gemistos Pletho: Marc. Gr. 188 and 189 and Laur. 80, 19. There is, however, one more astonishing peculiarity associating precisely these three manuscripts: at several points there are erasures of passages dealing with ancient theology or with pagan myths and gods.The first part of this study (...) provides a general analysis of the censored passages, showing that they are part of a coherent project aiming at altering Plato's theology: in the manuscripts in his possession Pletho radically altered Plato's text, sometimes improving it, but sometimes censoring or entirely rewriting it; it is this very distinctive text of Plato that circulated in his school. In the second part, Pletho's acts of censorship as a whole are compared with his philosophical ideas as they can be reconstructed from the surviving portions of his Laws , proving that he tried to remove discrepancies between Plato and himself. In the third part of the essay, the ideological reasons for this censorship are investigated, with a special focus on the relations between Pletho's manuscripts and some miscellaneous codices belonging to his students or circulating in the platonic milieu of Mystra.The stemma codicum drawn up by Müller can thus be understood in its deeper cultural meaning, i.e. as an outline enabling us to understand how the philosopher propagated his ideas and to follow where and how they were received. (shrink)

Giles of Orleans' philosophy evolved from an orthodox Christian interpretation of Aristotle to an Averroism; and his successive commentaries testify to this evolution: De generatione version I, De generatione version II, Physics version I and Physics version II. The first work presents orthodox Christian solutions, the second and the third testify to some Averroistic influences and the last is a clearly Averroistic commentary. Giles did not obey the regulation of 1272 which forbade the masters of the facilitas artium to discuss (...) theological problems. De generatione I discusses the question of world history as a chain of eternal reversions and solves it according to Christian orthodoxy. De generatione II and Physics I put forward the question whether accidents can exist without substance. The first work cites amply the Aristotelian solution and tries to reconcile it with a Christian understanding of the problem, whereas the second commentary accepts the opinion of Thomas Aquinas. In De generatione II and Physics II, Giles inquires whether an annihilated substance can reappear. The first commentary cites arguments for the negative answer, but it also gives a short declaratio fidei. The second commentary cites an and an orthodox solution, stating that one can solve the problem on two different planes - Christian or philosophical, both offering a different solution and unable to be reconciled. All three questions are listed in Tempier's Condemnation of 1277 - propositions 92, 196 and 215 - censuring heterodox answers. (shrink)

Some consider Hume’s denunciation of what he calls the “monkish virtues” an unwarranted attack, redolent of an anticlerical bias. Hume rejects these virtues as antithetical to his own conception of happiness, so the complaint goes, without considering the possibility that when judged from the monkish point of view, they are both useful and agreeable. Only prejudice could explain such blatant question-begging. We argue, to the contrary, that when one reads Hume’s critique in light of his views on natural religion, it (...) becomes apparent that the monkish, as Hume understands them, cultivate their virtues for ends other than happiness but unwisely. If Hume is right, the monkish virtues are worse than useless for monkish purposes, making them vices rather than virtues. (shrink)

Empirical support is offered for the claim that the original Knobe effect, whereby our intentional action ascriptions exhibit certain asymmetries in light of our moral attitudes, can be successfully cancelled. This is predicted by the view that the Knobe effect can be explained in purely pragmatic terms (Adams and Steadman 2004a, 2004b, 2007). However, previous cancelling studies (Adams and Steadman 2007; Nichols and Ulatowski 2007) have failed to identify evidence of cancellability. The key to the successful cancelling strategy presented here (...) is to provide subjects with the opportunity to assent to statements that involve sufficiently strong forms of moral censure. (shrink)

Thaddeus Metz defends the retributive theory of punishment against challenges mounted by some of the contributors to this collection. People, he thinks, ought to be censured in a way that is proportional to what they have done and for which they are responsible. Understanding does not conflict with judging. On the contrary, according to him, the more we understand, the better we are able to censure appropriately. Metz’s argument is Kantian insofar as he argues that ‘respect for persons [victims, (...) responsible wrongdoers and the community at large] requires condemning people proportionately to their responsible wrongdoing and hence that understanding a person merely indicates what would be proportionate, not that proportionality is unjustified’. His reason for thinking that Kantian respect requires retribution is that, as in non-retributive cases such as economic justice, compensatory justice, and justice in healthcare rationing, it requires imposing burdens on persons consequent to an awareness of their responsible choices. To use his slogan, ‘judging is apt because of understanding’. (shrink)

Il contributo intende ricostruire il dibattito storiografico intorno all’eredità di Averroè a partire dalla sua nascita, con la riscoperta di Averroè da parte dell’orientalismo francese arrivando fino agli intellettuali arabo-musulmani contemporanei, che hanno fatto del filosofo di Cordoba un rappresentante dell’illuminismo ante litteram. Scopo del saggio è dunque quello di ripercorrere brevemente la storia di questo dibattito per mettere in luce l’uso esplicitamente politico e ideologico di un autore medievale e, in ultima analisi, sottolineare che ogni storia delle filosofia porta (...) con sé uno sguardo orientato e mai neutro sulla propria tradizione. This paper aims to outline the historical debate about the Averroes’ heritage since its beginning, with the revival of Averroes by French Orientalism coming up to contemporary Arab-Muslim intellectuals, who made this author an Enlightenment’s representative before its time. The aim of the contribution is therefore to recall briefly the history of this debate to highlight the political and ideological utilization of a medieval author and, ultimately, to emphasize that every history of philosophy implies a view oriented and never neutral on its tradition. (shrink)