This paper explores whether egg donation could still be ethically justified if in vitro gametogenesis (IVG) became reliable and safe. In order to do this, issues and concerns that might inform a patient’s reasoning in choosing to use donor eggs instead of IVG are explored and assessed. It is concluded that egg donation would only be ethically justified in a narrow range of special cases given the (hypothetical) availability of IVG treatment and, further, that egg donation could itself be replaced (...) by donation through IVG techniques. Two possible criticisms of this position are then considered: Ones based on respect for patient wishes, and on loss of donor benefit. It is concluded that whilst neither argument constitutes a strong enough reason to continue with programmes of egg donation, egg‐sharing programmes could still be permitted come the advent of IVG; these could then provide a morally acceptable source of “natural” donor eggs. (shrink)

This article takes as a starting point the current popular anti realist position, Fictionalism, with the intent to compare it with actual mathematical practice. Fictionalism claims that mathematical statements do purport to be about mathematical objects, and that mathematical statements are not true. Considering these claims in the light of mathematical practice leads to questions about how mathematical objects are handled, and how we prove that certain statements hold. Based on a case study on Riemann’s work on complex functions, I (...) propose that mathematicians deal with systems of representations and that truth—or what we can prove—depends on available representations in some context where the problem can be solved. (shrink)

Doctoral learning entails transition from experienced student to stance-defending researcher, exposed to international critique: a disorientation and reorientation into a new identity. Arts and Hum...

In reply to Michael Campbell, I reformulate my questions of Raimond Gaita, avoiding the expression “form of life”. I examine what might remove the need for my questions, before taking up Campbell's line of thought about what he calls the “inwardness” of moral concepts. Campbell helps to clarify the picture of moral concepts advanced by Wittgensteinian moral philosophers. But at a general level, the picture remains unclear where a grammar meets its scaffolding of facts. Some may find this unproblematic, and (...) indeed unavoidable. But I remain unsure of this, and hope to provide at least a useful caution. (shrink)

Michael Tooley defends infanticide by analysing ‘A has a right to X’ as roughly synonymous with ‘If A desires X, then others are under a prima facie obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive him [or her] of it.’ An infant who cannot conceive of himself or herself as a continuing subject of experiences cannot desire to continue existing. Hence, on Tooley’s analysis, killing the infant is not impermissible, for it does not go against any of the infant’s desires. (...) However, Tooley’s argument in support of his analysis seems to justify, instead, a slightly more subtle analysis—namely, ‘A has a right to X’ is roughly extensionally equivalent with ‘Unless A expresses his or her desire that not‐X, then others are under a prima facie obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive him or her of X.’ But given this analysis, the infant’s purported lack of any capacity to conceive of himself or herself as a continuing subject of experiences implies that we cannot be released from any duty that we might have not to harm him or her. In short, Tooley’s argument in support of his analysis actually implies that infanticide may well be impermissible. (shrink)

Part I of this essay will examine how the interplay between philosophy and art over the past century is reflected in the aesthetic theories of four leading Twentieth century aestheticians: Walter Benjamin, Merleau-Ponty, Gilles Deleuze, Arthur Danto. The philosophers’ theories are linked to the developments in art most directly related to their respective approaches to problems in aesthetics. Part II will explore selected non-philosophical social and technological developments that are in the process of altering the course of contemporary art today. (...) Among these are globalization, the art market, social/political issues, popular culture, virtual reality, and new manifestations of the avant-garde. Key factors that warrant consideration for future developments in aesthetics are identified in the hope that today’s and future aestheticians will begin to consider what changes are required in aesthetics to address these new developments in art. (shrink)

What might be termed 'the problem of morality' concerns how freedom-restricting principles may be justified, given that we value our freedom. Perhaps an answer can be found in freedom itself. For if the most obvious reason for rejecting moral demands is that they invade one's personal freedom, then the price of freedom from invasive demands that others would otherwise make may well require everyone accepting freedom in general, say, as a value that provides sufficient reason for adhering to principles that (...) serve to maximize, or at least safeguard, freedom in general. But then it is precisely such a value, freedom in general, which can be argued to ground an adequate moral system. Hence whereas the value of freedom appears at first sight to pose problems for moral systems, it can be employed to ground a certain variety of them. (shrink)

Commonplace things such as hawks and handsaws pose philosophical problems at least as imposing as those presented by abstract objects such as numbers and divine beings. Van Inwagen's metaphysic of material beings emerges from what he perceives to be the proper answer to the Special Composition Question, which is, roughly, the following: Under what conditions do various things compose a single thing? The first eight sections of the book address and dismiss various extreme and moderate proposals for resolving this question. (...) Van Inwagen argues vigorously for the view that our world contains, aside from mereologically "simple" entities, only living organisms, the activity of whose various parts constitutes a life. Strictly speaking, there are no tables, chairs, ships, or handsaws. A handsaw is merely a "virtual" and not a genuine object, whereas my cat is a genuine and not merely a virtual object. Felines and humans and other macroscopic individuals are composed of various cells, which themselves are composed of simples, whereas the nonentity that is my bicycle is merely virtually composed of various macroscopic and microscopic virtual objects. Van Inwagen argues that none of this contradicts our ordinary beliefs about the world we inhabit. Although there are, strictly speaking, no inanimate objects other than simples, there are various simples that are arranged bicycle-wise and still other simples arranged ship-wise. It is a corollary of van Inwagen's answer to the Special Composition Question that such simples compose nothing. Since there is nothing such simples compose, there really are no such things as bicycles and ships. Artisans do not create in the sense of causing things to exist, but only rearrange simples in ship-like and table-like ways. The situation is different when we consider biological conception and the emergence of a human life. In this case, but not in artifact cases, a new individual arrives on the cosmic stage. Van Inwagen argues that conception leaves us with "a new individual" which itself perishes when it divides. You were never a zygote, since you presently exist, although your zygote--the zygote from which you developed--does not. It is argued that lives are "infected with vagueness at both ends." In various borderline cases, there are simples such that there is simply no correct yes or no answer to the question, Does the activity of these simples constitute a life? Accordingly there is no determinate answer to the question, Do these simples compose something? Van Inwagen argues against the Linguistic Theory of Vagueness and offers a detailed defense of the vagueness of identity. In cases of vague diachronic identity, there is a sense in which the transitivity of identity principle fails. Starting with premises that are half-truths, this principle may in certain cases license a false conclusion. (shrink)

Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental, and one common way action theorists have attempted to explain this is with reference to control. The idea, in short, is that intentional action implicates control, and control precludes accidentality. But in virtue of what, exactly, would exercising control over an action suffice to make it non-accidental in whatever sense is required for the action to be intentional? One interesting and prima facie plausible idea that we wish to explore in this paper is (...) that control is non-accidental in virtue of requiring knowledge – either knowledge-that or knowledge-how (e.g., Beddor and Pavese 2021; cf., Setiya 2008; 2012 and Habgood-Coote 2018). We review in detail some key recent work defending such knowledge-centric theories of control, and we show that none of these accounts holds water. We conclude with some discussion about how control opposes the sort of luck intentional action excludes without doing so by requiring knowledge (that- or how). (shrink)

Strange inversions occur when things work in ways that turn received wisdom upside down. Hume offered a strangely inverted story about causation, and Darwin, about apparent design. Dennett suggests that a strange inversion also occurs when we project our own reactive complexes outward, painting our world with elusive properties like cuteness, sweetness, blueness, sexiness, funniness, and more. Such properties strike us as experiential causes, but they are really effects—a kind of shorthand for whole sets of reactive dispositions rooted in the (...) nuts and bolts of human information processing. Understanding the nature and origins of that strange inversion, Dennett believes, is thus key to understanding the nature and origins of human experience itself. This paper examines this claim, paying special attention to recent formulations that link that strange inversion to the emerging vision of the brain as a Bayesian estimator, constantly seeking to predict the unfolding sensory barrage. (shrink)

Despite the fact that Levinas has often been accused of having little or no room for the maternal in his writing, his rhetoric nonetheless applies maternal tendencies that complicate his ethical st...

Social and moral issues in business have drawn attention to a gap between theory and practice and fueled the search for a reconciling perspective. Finding and establishing an alternative remains a critical initiative, but a daunting one. In what follows, the assumptions of two prominent contenders are considered before introducing a third in the form of Aristotle’s ancient theory of virtue. Comparative case studies are used to briefly illustrate the practical implications of each paradigm. In the quest for a better (...) sense-making and sense-giving lens, this paper refines and encourages the search by highlighting some of the key features required of a worthy paradigmatic challenge. The author proceeds to identify a particular type of institutional community, and a promising champion, for the practical unification of strategic and normative excellence. (shrink)

The possibility of extended cognition invites the possibility of extended knowledge. We examine what is minimally required for such forms of technologically extended knowledge to arise and whether existing and future technologies can allow for such forms of epistemic extension. Answering in the positive, we explore some of the ensuing transformations in the ethical obligations and personal rights of the resulting ‘new humans.’.

When it comes to evolution, we've all heard about fossils and fruit flies, Darwin and Dawkins. But the idea of evolution is far more profound-and far-reaching. Today, a movement of visionary scientists, philosophers, and spiritual thinkers is forging a new understanding of evolution that honors science, reframes culture, and radically updates spirituality. Carter Phipps calls them Evolutionaries."--Page 4 of cover.