Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' (...) sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza un conjunto de obras sobre ríos y represas que pertenece a la serie titulada Represa /Represión (2012-) de la artista colombiana Carolina Caycedo. La pregunta de la que se ocupa esta investigación es ¿cómo las estrategias estéticas de estas obras identifican los problemas socio-ecológicos generados por las represas y contribuyen a articular imaginarios políticos de sostenibilidad? El argumento principal es que las obras de Caycedo sobre el río Yuma o Magdalena contribuyen con la construcción (...) de una memoria histórica ambiental, a partir de saberes populares, campesinos y cosmovisiones indígenas. Con este fin, este texto caracteriza el problema de las represas a partir de los conceptos de ‘extractivismo’, de Macarena Gómez-Barris, y ‘desterritorialización’, de Rob Nixon, para luego realizar un recorrido por las obras de la artista, de cuyo análisis se va construyendo una caracterización de la memoria histórica ambiental de un segmento del río Yuma. El marco conceptual del trabajo incluye las nociones de ‘seres-tierra’, de Marisol de la Cadena y ‘territorio’, de Arturo Escobar, así como ‘memoria de los ríos’, de Kristina Lyons. La metodología se basa en el análisis conceptual y técnico de las piezas de Caycedo en el marco interdisciplinar de las humanidades ambientales. El análisis concluye que las obras de Caycedo generan espacios de memoria histórica ambiental desde perspectivas trasnacionales y, en estos espacios de encuentro que constituyen las obras, se relacionan y rearticulan los extremos de falsos antagonismos como naturaleza/cultura, humano/no humano y ciencia/arte. (shrink)

Escasos trabajos han examinado las conductas específicas de ciberagresión por género y el papel de la adicción a Internet y el déficit en inteligencia emocional en la ciberagresión. Ser adicto a Internet y ciertos déficits emocionales explican la ciberagresión por género. Se subraya la importancia de programas sobre ciberagresión que incluyan el control parental y el fomento de habilidades emocionales.

The focus of this paper is an influential family of views in the ethics of self-defense and war: views that ground the agent’s liability to be attacked in self-defense in the agent’s moral responsibility for the threat posed (“Responsibility Views”). I critically examine the concept of responsibility employed by such views, by looking at potential connections with the contemporary literature on moral responsibility. I start by uncovering some of the key assumptions that Responsibility Views make about the relevant concept of (...) responsibility, and by scrutinizing those assumptions under the lens of more general theorizing about responsibility. I identify an important conflict that arises at that point. The problem is that the concept presupposed by Responsibility Views is in tension with the standard way of understanding the connection between the neutral and non-neutral forms of moral responsibility. I draw attention to a particular strategy that could be used to address this challenge, but I also identify some important obstacles that stand in the way. (shrink)

Some philosophers have claimed that causally determined agents are not morally responsible because they cannot make a difference in the world. A recent response by philosophers who defend the compatibility of determinism and responsibility has been to concede that causally determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on Frankfurt cases—cases where agents are intuitively responsible for acts that they couldn’t have failed (...) to perform. This essay argues, first, that the intuitive plausibility of the idea that responsibility is grounded in difference making is not completely put to rest by Frankfurt cases, even if those cases successfully show that responsibility is not grounded in difference making in the sense of access to alternative possibilities of action. It then goes on to develop a different compatibilist strategy, one according to which responsibility is grounded in difference making, but the type of difference making it is grounded in does not require access to alternative possibilities. Indeed, it is a form of difference making that is clearly compatible with determinism. (shrink)

Using data from 88 countries, we test hypotheses linking a country’s economic freedom and cultural values with the propensity and timing of decisions to impose stringent policies to combat the spread of Covid-19, as well as society’s compliance with those restrictive measures. Our analysis supports hypotheses that a country’s economic freedom and cultural dimensions of individualism and masculinity predict early implementation of stringent policies. After accounting for endogeneity, we find that individualism also helps explain residents’ compliance with stringent measures. These (...) findings illustrate how institutions and cultural values influence government policies and societal compliance. (shrink)

Este trabajo intenta dilucidar el significado de la afirmación polémica de Platón relativa a la índole peculiar de los relatos literarios que, aunque falsos, encierran también algunas verdades, pues resulta problemático que Platón, al mismo tiempo, critique esos relatos y, sin embargo, proponga también hacer uso de otros igualmente falsos. Examino tres posibilidades de desambiguar el sentido de pseûdos en estos contextos -"falso" designaría ficción o mentira verbal o el carácter de uno de los dos niveles que constituiría un relato (...) literario- y defiendo que la falsedad rechazable para Platón es sólo la atinente al núcleo tipológico contenido en esos relatos. This paper attempts to elucidate the meaning of the controversial Platonic statement in relation to the peculiarity in the literary accounts which, in spite of being false, contain at the same time certain truths. Furthermore, there seems to be contradiction in the fact that Plato critiques those writings and still proposes using others equally false. I analyze three possibilities to disambiguate the meaning of pseûdos in these contexts -"false" would point to fiction or to a verbal lie or the character of one of the two levels which would comprise a literary account; and I support the fact that, for Plato, the undesirable falsity is only the one related to the typological core comprised in those accounts. (shrink)

Este trabajo examina el tópico de la poesía imitativa en Platón. Su objetivo es averiguar si, para Platón, puede haber una mimesis de valor y, consiguientemente, una poesía mimética aceptable. Para ello se analizan dos secciones de República concernientes a una imitación válida. Esta se basaría en el conocimiento dialéctico de las realidades inteligibles; condición que no puede ser cubierta por el poeta. Mi hipótesis es que la solución a este problema reside en la idea platónica de 'diseño', que -derivado (...) del paradigma ideal- sería la herramienta de trabajo para el imitador. Filón ha conceptualizado esa herramienta en su idea de arquetipo. This paper examines the topic of imitative poetry in Plato. Its aim is to determine whether, for Plato, may be a mimesis of value and consequently an acceptable mimetic poetry. For this, two sections concerning a valid Republic imitation will be analyzed. This would be based on the dialectical understanding of intelligible realities; condition that the poet can not be covered. My hypothesis is that the solution to this problem is the Platonic idea of 'design', which -derived the ideal paradigm- would be the tool for the imitator. Philo has conceptualized this tool in his idea of archetype. (shrink)

Does a person's liability to attack during a war depend on the nature of their individual causal contribution to the (unjust) threat posed? If so, how? The recent literature on the ethics of war has become increasingly focused on questions of this kind. According to some views on these matters, your liability hinges on the extent of your causal contribution: the larger your contribution to an unjust threat, the larger the amount of harm that we can impose on you in (...) order to avert the threat. Some philosophers have suggested that we can ground a quite general principle of civilian immunity on this basis. But, do causal contributions really come in degrees? Can we make sense of a graded notion of causal contribution that can be relevant to debates about liability in war? I argue there is good reason to be sceptical. The appearance that causal contributions come in degrees is just an illusion that can be explained away. (shrink)

[Esotericism. One-day Workshop about the Annale n. 25 of the Storia d'Italia Einaudi]. This section contains the proceedings of the one-day workshop on the book Esoterismo, published as the Annale n. 25 in the collection "History of Italy" by Einaudi. The workshop was organized by ISPF on the October 26, 2011 to promote the discussion on the significance of Western esotericist traditions in Italian history. S. Caianiello’s introduction highlights some major concepts and goals of the recent field of studies about (...) Western Esotericism, and some open problems about its definition. M. Cambi comments on the substantial transformation of esotericist themes in Giordano Bruno’s natural philosophy, whereby the sources of the magician’s power are completely enclosed in the realm of nature, thus rejecting any transcendent foundation. M. Conforti focuses on "the function and opportunities" offered by the Western Esotericism approach "to the genesis and development of early modern science" and comments from this perspective on different contributions in the volume, emphasizing however the importance of largely pre-existing traditions in the history of science and medicine which have long challenged the wiggish separation between science and magic, rational and irrational thought. L. Simonutti provides new material to the general theme, with a historical-philosophical analysis of the esotericist elements in Picart’s iconography of the 18th Century edition of "Cymbalum mundi". F. Sofia discusses the effective role of esotericist traditions in the attempts to establish a "civil religion" in Italy from Risorgimento to Fascism, a history in which, she argues, it is difficult to establish "how much esotericism was an intentional choice or the product of an unavoidable nicodemism". C. Castellano reviews the contributions dedicated to the "political teology" of Italian Risorgimento, dealing in depth with the complex relationship between Freemasonry and Carbonari in Italy – in her view, more of a cultural than of a strictly political connection – and highlights the relevance of the anticurial component in their esotericist inspiration. G.M. Cazzaniga, author and editor of the Annale, beyond reacting to the different stimuli offered by the discussion, provides a brief history of Western Esotericism studies in Europe and of the reasons of their difficult reception in Italy. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

Midwest Studies In Philosophy, EarlyView.

I explore the question of how to ground the responsibility of agents in some tricky cases involving multiple agents who act in a non-coordinated fashion. These are scenarios where no single agent has the individual ability to make a difference to a harmful outcome, but where the outcome would have been avoided if they had all acted as they should have (thus, the agents collectively made a difference to the outcome’s occurrence). I argue that an important source of the problem (...) is that it’s hard to motivate a concept of cause that can be behind the agents’ responsibility in these cases. I illustrate the problem with a particular example: Yablo’s proportionality criterion on causation. I then sketch a possible solution. (shrink)

Starting from the notions of q-entailment and p-entailment, a two-dimensional notion of entailment is developed with respect to certain generalized q-matrices referred to as B-matrices. After showing that every purely monotonic singleconclusion consequence relation is characterized by a class of B-matrices with respect to q-entailment as well as with respect to p-entailment, it is observed that, as a result, every such consequence relation has an inferentially four-valued characterization. Next, the canonical form of B-entailment, a two-dimensional multiple-conclusion notion of entailment based (...) on B-matrices, is introduced, providing a uniform framework for studying several different notions of entailment based on designation, antidesignation, and their complements. Moreover, the two-dimensional concept of a B-consequence relation is defined, and an abstract characterization of such relations by classes of B-matrices is obtained. Finally, a contribution to the study of inferential many-valuedness is made by generalizing Suszko’s Thesis and the corresponding reduction to show that any B-consequence relation is, in general, inferentially four-valued. (shrink)

This theoretical paper proposes a new perspective to understand the moral distress of nurses more fully, using virtue ethics. Moral distress is a widely studied subject, especially with respect to the determination of its causes and manifestations. Increasing the theoretical depth of previous work using ethical theory, however, can create new possibilities for moral distress to be explored and analyzed. Drawing on more recent work in this field, we explicate the conceptual framework of the process of moral distress in nurses, (...) proposed by Ramos et al., using MacIntyrean virtue ethics. Our analysis considers the experience of moral distress in the context of a practice, enabling the adaptation of this framework using virtue ethics. The adoption of virtue ethics as an ethical perspective broadens the understanding of the complexity of nurses’ experiences of moral distress, since it is impossible to create a ready model that can cover all possibilities. Specifically, we describe how identity, social context, beliefs, and tradition shape moral discomfort, uncertainty, and sensitivity and how virtues inform moral judgments. Individuals, such as nurses, who are involved in a practice have a narrative history and a purpose ( telos) that guide them in every step of the process, especially in moral judgment. It is worth emphasizing that the process described is supported by the formation of moral competence that, if blocked, can lead to moral distress and deprofessionalization. It is expected that nurses seek to achieve the internal good of their practice, which legitimizes their professional practice and supports them in moral decision-making, preventing moral distress. (shrink)

What is the relationship between moral responsibility and causation? Plainly, we are not morally responsible for everything that we cause. For we cause a multitude of things, including things that we couldn't possibly foresee we would cause and with respect to which we cannot be assessed morally. Thus, it is clear that causing something does not entail being morally responsible for it. But, does the converse entailment hold? Does moral responsibility require causation? Intuitively, it does: intuitively, we can only be (...) morally responsible for things that we cause. (shrink)

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

Much confusion exists within the robotics and the biology communities regarding the definition of biorobotics and the aims and strategies that characterize this approach. Not even the basic criteria for identifying biorobotic research are being applied consistently. Barbara Webb has taken a crucial step towards setting a common ground from which biorobotic systems can be described, analyzed, and compared.

In this paper we present some considerations derived from the development of the project "Indigenous knowledge and practices in a context of health emergency: contributions to health, education and the environment in the framework of the planning of control, prevention and monitoring strategies of COVID 19", aiming at identifying and evaluating the consequences of the pandemic in indigenous communities of the Metropolitan Region of Buenos Aires, as well as the responses and strategies deployed by these groups to face it. Based (...) on the information gathered in a process of mutual accompaniment -participation of indigenous people in academic spaces; of academics in collective-community spaces; dialogue between communities and governmental agencies and virtual and face-to-face meetings- we propose two key points to consider in the planning and activation of health policies, where indigenous peoples "are part of the solution" not only of the contemporary health emergency but also of the multiple emergencies we face as a society. (shrink)

This article points out that the great theses formulated by the analytic philosophy of the XX century, were anticipated in the XVII century by Thomas Hobbes. In The Leviathan, the author states the existing relationship between science and language. He had in mind the need of discerning between the sensible propositions and the absurd ones. Language is what provides the conditions for the construction of scientific thought and discovery of the truth. It also can be a source of error, absurdity (...) and nonsense. To avoid this danger, the philosopher must employ a method of analytic character that allows him to distill clearly the meaning of the expressions he uses, always appealing to an attitude of rigor, precision and exactitude. (shrink)

A billionaire tells you: “That chair is in my way; I don’t feel like moving it myself, but if you push it out of my way I’ll give you a hundred dollars.” You decide you don’t want the billionaire’s money and you’d actually prefer that the chair stay in the billionaire’s way, so you graciously turn down the offer and go home. As it turns out, the billionaire is also a stingy old miser; he was never willing to let go (...) of a hundred dollars. Knowing full well that the chair couldn’t be moved due to the existence of several tons of weight tying it to the ground, he simply wanted to have a laugh at your expense. (shrink)

In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view – the view I argue for – is that causation is the vehicle of transmission of moral responsibility. (...) According to this view, although moral responsibility does not require causation, causation still grounds moral responsibility. (shrink)

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

Some classical studies in social psychology suggest that we are more sensitive to situational factors, and less responsive to reasons, than we normally recognize we are. In recent years, moral responsibility theorists have examined the question whether those studies represent a serious threat to our moral responsibility. A common response to the “situationist threat” has been to defend the reasons-responsiveness of ordinary human agents by appeal to a theory of reasons-responsiveness that appeals to patterns of counterfactual scenarios or possible worlds. (...) In this paper I identify a problem with that response and I offer a better solution. (shrink)

The 18th century figure, Joseph de Maistre, has long been regarded as characterising the Counter-Enlightenment, but his intellectual relationship to 18th-century philosophy remains unexplored. This is a comprehensive assessment of his response to the Enlightenment.

A modo de preámbulo, consideramos importante mencionar que el presente ensayo pretende entrelazar los conceptos mirada y seducción desde distintas ópticas. Se plantean someramente algunas ideas desde la filosofía hasta el psicoanálisis. Se inicia con una “mirada” a las construcciones literarias de creadores de gran importancia, tales como Jean Braudrillard y Georges Bataille, en quienes se estudia la idea del ojo perverso, de la mirada y el deseo, subjetividad que nos atrapa. Se ambiciona articular con teorizaciones psicoanalíticas de lo inconsciente, (...) abundando en investigaciones freudianas y de otros teóricos del psicoanálisis para analizar e interpretar sus “seductoras” aportaciones.By way of preamble, we consider important to mention that this essay intends to link the concepts of look and seduction from different angles. Some ideas are raised from philosophy to psychoanalysis. The article starts with a “look” to the creators of literary constructions of great importance such as Jean Braudrillard and Georges Bataille, in order to study the idea of the evil eye, the gaze and desire, the subjectivity that catch us. The article aspires to articulate psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious, abounding in Freudian investigations and other theorists of psychoanalysis to analyze and interpret “seductive” contributions. (shrink)