Quantum gravity poses the problem of merging quantum mechanics and general relativity, the two great conceptual revolutions in the physics of the twentieth century. The loop and spinfoam approach, presented in this book, is one of the leading research programs in the field. The first part of the book discusses the reformulation of the basis of classical and quantum Hamiltonian physics required by general relativity. The second part covers the basic technical research directions. Appendices include a detailed history of the (...) subject of quantum gravity, hard-to-find mathematical material, and a discussion of some philosophical issues raised by the subject. This fascinating text is ideal for graduate students entering the field, as well as researchers already working in quantum gravity. It will also appeal to philosophers and other scholars interested in the nature of space and time. (shrink)

Choice can be defined in thermodynamical terms, and shown to have a thermodynamic cost: choosing between a binary alternative at temperature T dissipates an energy $$E\ge kT\ln 2$$.

The concept of dignity is notoriously vague. In this paper it is argued that the reason for this is that there are three versions of dignity that are often confused. First we will take a short look at the history of the concept of dignity in order to demonstrate how already from Roman Antiquity two versions of dignity can be distinguished. Subsequently, the third version will be introduced and it will be argued that although the three versions of dignity hang (...) together, they should also be clearly distinguished in order to avoid confusion. The reason for distinguishing the three versions is because all three of them are only partially effective. This will be demonstrated by taking the discussion about voluntary ‘dying with dignity’ as an example. Inspired by both Paul Ricoeur’s concept of ethics and the ethics of care a proposition will be done as to how the three versions of dignity may sustain each other and help achieve what neither one of the versions can do on its own. (shrink)

Why do we remember the past and not the future? What does it mean for time to "flow"? Do we exist in time or does time exist in us? In lyric, accessible prose, Carlo Rovelli invites us to consider questions about the nature of time that continue to puzzle physicists and philosophers alike. For most readers this is unfamiliar terrain. We all experience time, but the more scientists learn about it, the more mysterious it remains. We think of it (...) as uniform and universal, moving steadily from past to future, measured by clocks. Rovelli tears down these assumptions one by one, revealing a strange universe where at the most fundamental level time disappears. He explains how the theory of quantum gravity attempts to understand and give meaning to the resulting extreme landscape of this timeless world. Weaving together ideas from philosophy, science and literature, he suggests that our perception of the flow of time depends on our perspective, better understood starting from the structure of our brain and emotions than from the physical universe. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to refute the hypothesis that the observer’s consciousness is necessary in the quantum mechanics measurement process. In order to achieve our target, we propose and investigate a variation of the Schrödinger’s cat thought experiment called “DAP”, short for “Dead-Alive Physicist”, in which a human being replaces the cat. This strategy enables us to logically disprove the consistency of the above hypothesis, and to oblige its supporters either to be trapped in solipsism or to rely (...) on an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics in which the conscious observer plays the sole role of acknowledging the experimental results. Our analysis hence provides support to clarify the relationship between the observer and the objects of her/his experimental observation; this and a few other implications are discussed in the fourth section and in the conclusions. (shrink)

This volume examines the limitations of mathematical logic and proposes a new approach to logic intended to overcome them. To this end, the book compares mathematical logic with earlier views of logic, both in the ancient and in the modern age, including those of Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant. From the comparison it is apparent that a basic limitation of mathematical logic is that it narrows down the scope of logic confining it to the study of deduction, without (...) providing tools for discovering anything new. As a result, mathematical logic has had little impact on scientific practice. Therefore, this volume proposes a view of logic according to which logic is intended, first of all, to provide rules of discovery, that is, non-deductive rules for finding hypotheses to solve problems. This is essential if logic is to play any relevant role in mathematics, science and even philosophy. To comply with this view of logic, this volume formulates several rules of discovery, such as induction, analogy, generalization, specialization, metaphor, metonymy, definition, and diagrams. A logic based on such rules is basically a logic of discovery, and involves a new view of the relation of logic to evolution, language, reason, method and knowledge, particularly mathematical knowledge. It also involves a new view of the relation of philosophy to knowledge. This book puts forward such new views, trying to open again many doors that the founding fathers of mathematical logic had closed historically. (shrink)

In this paper I will discuss Edmund Husserl’s critique of Franz Brentano’s interpretation of categorical judgments as Double Judgments (Doppelurteile). This will be developed mostly as an internal critique, within the framework of the school of Brentano, and not through a direct contrast with Husserl’s own theory of judgment, as presented e.g. in the Fifth Investigation. Already during the 1890s Husserl overcame the psychologistic aspects of Brentano’s approach, advocating the importance of analysing the logical structure underlying language independently from psychology. (...) Moreover, Husserl’s critique seems to be also applicable to Bertrand Russell’s analysis, which shares an important aspect of Brentano’s theory. I will try to avoid going too deep into the various theories of judgment and keep mostly to the issue of double judgments. (shrink)

In this article the author will discuss Franz Brentano’s theory of intentionality and the ontological status of the intentional object specifically with respect to symbolic presentations. The role and function of intentionality are compared to the process of semeiosis. Several interesting parallels can be found between fundamental problems in the interpretation of the Brentanian notion of intentionality and issues in semiotics. In particular, the author focuses on the theory of Charles W. Morris and attempts to apply core notions of his (...) semiotics to clarify Brentano’s ambiguous account of intentional reference, the role of signs in symbolic presentations and how this relates to outer perception. (shrink)

At least since Kuhn’s Structure, philosophers have studied the influence of social factors in science’s pursuit of truth and knowledge. More recently, formal models and computer simulations have allowed philosophers of science and social epistemologists to dig deeper into the detailed dynamics of scientific research and experimentation, and to develop very seemingly realistic models of the social organization of science. These models purport to be predictive of the optimal allocations of factors, such as diversity of methods used in science, size (...) of groups, and communication channels among researchers. In this paper we argue that the current research faces an empirical challenge. The challenge is to connect simulation models with data. We present possible scenarios about how the challenge may unfold. (shrink)

This article argues for a new interpretation of the realist claim that politics is autonomous from morality and involves specific political values. First, this article defends an original normative source: functional normativity. Second, it advocates a substantive functional standard: political institutions ought to be assessed by their capacity to select and implement collective decisions. Drawing from the ‘etiological account’ in philosophy of biology, I will argue that functions yield normative standards, which are independent from morality. For example, a ‘good heart’ (...) is one that pumps blood well, and a good army is one that it is effective at exerting military force. I then interpret realism’s naturalistic conception of politics as an etiological function of social groups: namely making binding collective decisions under persistent disagreement. I conclude that political institutions should be evaluated realistically by how well they perform this task. Finally, I assess trade-offs between this functional political normativity and other moral values. I conclude that justice, fairness, freedom and equality remain obviously important concerns, but only once the basic political function is secured. (shrink)

The paper examines the epistemological significance of the expe- rience of estrangement caused by some types of descriptions of objects and phenomena. It shows how, today, the main productive matrix of these descriptions is formed by natural science. A distinction is drawn between a reductionist and pluralist approach to the aspect of estrangement offered by science, and subsequently analysed. The paper then puts forward an argument in support of the latter attitude.

The contemporary society is characterised by a strong presence of different religious expressions, both traditional and new, community-based and individual. Therefore, we speak of a post-secular age in which there is a continuous exchange between beliefs and non-beliefs in everyday life. In this sense, the religious question takes on an increasingly intercultural connotation in the continuous biographical exchanges among people who give different existential meanings according to their own conscience. It is precisely the dimension of meaning, determined by the choice (...) of values, based on a perspective linked to Frankl’s existential analysis and logotherapy, that will be the subject of this contribution. In particular, proposing a theoretical approach to the question, we will outline what could be some aspects of Frankl’s psychology useful to lay the foundation of an educational stance on religiosity that could promote a democratic and supportive coexistence within an intercultural horizon. (shrink)

Testable predictions of quantum mechanics are invariant under time reversal. But the evolution of the quantum state in time is not so, neither in the collapse nor in the no-collapse interpretations of the theory. This is a fact that challenges any realistic interpretation of the quantum state. On the other hand, this fact raises no difficulty if we interpret the quantum state as a mere calculation device, bookkeeping past real quantum events.

Quantum mechanics is not about 'quantum states': it is about values of physical variables. I give a short fresh presentation and update on the *relational* perspective on the theory, and a comment on its philosophical implications.

The main point of the paper is the claim that a strong notion of cognitive context can answer the needs of a representation of dialogue context, with a higher generality than the "normative" notion suggested by Gauker. I will discuss some well known claims in the literature about communication and context, and I will suggest giving a central role to the notion of contract or semantic bargaining and to the normative constraints of indexicals and anaphora.

In the paper we survey the known connections between theories that extend a common base theory with typed truth axioms on the one hand and predicative set-existence assumptions on the other. How general can the mutual reductions between truth and comprehension be taken to be? In trying to address this question, we consider classical, positive truth and predicative comprehension as operations on theories.

In the second edition of the Logische Untersuchungen Husserl claims to have investigated higher order objects and Gestalt qualities before anyone else in the School of Brentano. Indeed, in the Philosophie der Arithmetik we find a discussion of figural moments and fusion that could lend some support to such a claim. By considering the concepts of Gestalt and Verschmelzung in their relevant historical context, the latter especially in connection to Stumpf, we find that Husserl indeed gave a quite original and (...) interesting account of such higher order phenomena. (shrink)

This monograph addresses the question of the increasing irrelevance of philosophy, which has seen scientists as well as philosophers concluding that philosophy is dead and has dissolved into the sciences. It seeks to answer the question of whether or not philosophy can still be fruitful and what kind of philosophy can be such. The author argues that from its very beginning philosophy has focused on knowledge and methods for acquiring knowledge. This view, however, has generally been abandoned in the last (...) century with the belief that, unlike the sciences, philosophy makes no observations or experiments and requires only thought. Thus, in order for philosophy to once again be relevant, it needs to return to its roots and focus on knowledge as well as methods for acquiring knowledge. Accordingly, this book deals with several questions about knowledge that are essential to this view of philosophy, including mathematical knowledge. Coverage examines such issues as the nature of knowledge; plausibility and common sense; knowledge as problem solving; modeling scientific knowledge; mathematical objects, definitions, diagrams; mathematics and reality; and more. This monograph presents a new approach to philosophy, epistemology, and the philosophy of mathematics. It will appeal to graduate students and researchers with interests in the role of knowledge, the analytic method, models of science, and mathematics and reality. (shrink)

The question of clinical science in public health emergencies (e.g., natural disasters, environmental releases, infectious diseases, and especially pandemics) raised by Edwards (2013) is a typical...

The research “From Pure Quantity to Quantum in Hegel's Science of Logic reconstructs the 1st chapter of this session that poses the problem of passing from Quality to Quantity. The dialectic of being-for-itself led to the quantitative unit that is, initially, pure immediate quantity in relation to itself; the result of this process brings immanent moments of attraction and repulsion that are now continuous and of discrete magnitude; these two moments contain each other reciprocally forming an inseparable unit, that is, (...) quantity is an uninterrupted process of the ones. However, the limitation of quantity describes that both in continuity and in discretion there is a limit that leads to the quantum. Then, we briefly present the problematization of the quantitative being and mathematics, in order to show the relevance of making quantity explicit in Hegelian logic. (shrink)

Exchange of arguments in a discussion often makes individuals more radical about their initial opinion. This phenomenon is known as Group-induced Attitude Polarization. A byproduct of it are bipolarization effects, where the distance between the attitudes of two groups of individuals increases after the discussion. This paper is a first attempt to analyse the building blocks of information exchange and information update that induce polarization. I use Argumentation Frameworks as a tool for encoding the information of agents in a debate (...) relative to a given issue a. I then adapt a specific measure of the degree of acceptability of an opinion. Changes in the degree of acceptability of a, prior and posterior to information exchange, serve here as an indicator of polarization. I finally show that the way agents transmit and update information has a decisive impact on polarization and bipolarization. (shrink)

The essay analyses the notion of ‘purity’ in the early writings of Walter Benjamin, focusing more specifically on three essays written around the crucial year 1921: ‘Critique of Violence’, ‘The Task of the Translator’, and ‘Goethe's Elective Affinities’. In these essays, ‘purity’ appears in the notions of ‘pure means’, ‘pure violence’, ‘pure language’, and, indirectly, the ‘expressionless’. The essay argues, on the one hand, that the ‘purity’ of these concepts is one and the same notion, and, on the other, that (...) it is strongly indebted to, if not a by-product of, Kant's theorisation of the moral act. In order to make this claim, the essay analyses Benjamin's intense engagement with Kant's writings in the 1910s and early 1920s: ‘purity’ is a category strongly connoted within the philosophical tradition in which the young Benjamin moved his first steps, namely Kantian transcendental criticism. The essay argues that the notion of ‘purity’ in Benjamin, though deployed outside and often against Kant's theorisation and that of his followers, and moreover influenced by different and diverse philosophical suggestions, retains a strong Kantian tone, especially in reference to its moral and ethical aspects. Whereas Benjamin rejects Kant's model of cognition based on the ‘purity’ of the universal laws of reason, and thus also Kant's theorisation of purity as simply non empirical and a priori, he models nonetheless his politics and aesthetics around suggestions that arise directly from Kant's theorisation of the moral act and of the sublime, and uses a very Kantian vocabulary of negative determinations construed with the privatives-los and -frei (motiv-frei, zweck-los, gewalt-los, ausdrucks-los, intention-frei, etc). The essay explores thus the connections that link ‘pure means’, ‘pure language’ and ‘pure violence’ to one another and to the Kantian tradition. (shrink)

Summary Acoustic depth is an elusive indicator that touches the world of emergencies, or perceptual focus, in a peculiar way. The realm in which these forms of recognition operate indeed links media theory to perception theory and aesthetic reflection. Expressions such as acoustic scene, sound depth or sharpness, or acoustic image when discussing the receptive forms of various microphone models, are just a few cases where imaginative synthesis translates the sense of phenomena arising from the resistance of sensory properties to (...) the structures of linguistic formalization. The language of media is full of these references, which seem to refer to a common sense that emerges in the differentiation of perceptual channels, but is rarely made explicit in a clear manner. To understand acoustic depht’s nature, we can use the concept of emergence: every time we hear a sound, that acoustic process is always surrounded by a myriad of small sounds that interact with it. The notion of emergence can be applied to anything present in the surrounding environment. It can be applied to any configuration that breaks the homogeneity of a perceptual field. So, we can analyze the complexity of this synthetic formation by tracing it back to increasingly simpler synthetic planes. When talking about composition, synthesis, and association, it has already the results of compositional operations and which provided the ultimate or primary material – either term suffices, depending on the direction we choose to take. These are essential factors in spatial orientation processes, but they are structurally opaque: we’ll work on three examples taken from classical music, ethnomusicology, and hearing aids. (shrink)

In this paper I unpack a realistic conception of politics by tightly defining its constitutive features: conflict and order. A conflict emerges when an actor is disposed to impose his/her views against the resistance of others. Conflicts are more problematic than moralists realize because they emerge unilaterally, are potentially violent, impermeable to content-based reason, and unavoidable. Order is then defined as an institutional framework that provides binding collective decisions. Order is deemed necessary because individuals need to cooperate to survive, but (...) groups cannot spontaneously secure collective decisions and are prone to conflicts. Particularly, the fact that potentially violent conflicts emerge unilaterally means that order requires coercion. I conclude that mischaracterizing conflict and order leads to undesirable normative principles, and that this criticism can be leveraged not only against Rawlsian liberals who moralize conflicts away, but also against some agonists who underestimate the need for order and some communitarians who underplay both circumstances. (shrink)

This is a contribution to a book on quantum gravity and philosophy. I discuss nature and origin of the problem of quantum gravity. I examine the knowledge that may guide us in addressing this problem, and the reliability of such knowledge. In particular, I discuss the subtle modification of the notions of space and time engendered by general relativity, and how these might merge into quantum theory. I also present some reflections on methodological questions, and on some general issues in (...) philosophy of science which are are raised by, or a relevant for, the research on quantum gravity. (shrink)

This introduction to the special issue “Umwelt Theory and Phenomenology” is composed of a brief theoretical introduction to phenomenology seen as a key attitude of philosophical research, an investigation of the possibilities offered by a combined application of phenomenology and biosemiotics, and an overview of the articles that are included in the special issue. The theoretical introduction stresses the possibility of distinguishing, within phenomenology, between approaches centred on the object (in other terms, the phenomenon), and subject-centred approaches which have emerged (...) in the wake of Kantian transcendental idealism. The connection with biosemiotics is explored for both kinds of approaches, showing how Uexküll, and many other scholars after him, have used phenomenological tools and perspectives in the study of biological meaning and meaning-making processes. For each article in the collection, the overview of the articles indicates one or two points that we believe are of the greatest interest for the reader. (shrink)

According to the implicit commitment thesis, once accepting a mathematical formal system S, one is implicitly committed to additional resources not immediately available in S. Traditionally, this thesis has been understood as entailing that, in accepting S, we are bound to accept reflection principles for S and therefore claims in the language of S that are not derivable in S itself. It has recently become clear, however, that such reading of the implicit commitment thesis cannot be compatible with well-established positions (...) in the foundations of mathematics which consider a specific theory S as self-justifying and doubt the legitimacy of any principle that is not derivable in S: examples are Tait’s finitism and the role played in it by Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, Isaacson’s thesis and Peano Arithmetic, Nelson’s ultrafinitism and sub-exponential arithmetical systems. This casts doubts on the very adequacy of the implicit commitment thesis for arithmetical theories. In the paper we show that such foundational standpoints are nonetheless compatible with the implicit commitment thesis. We also show that they can even be compatible with genuine soundness extensions of S with suitable form of reflection. The analysis we propose is as follows: when accepting a system S, we are bound to accept a fixed set of principles extending S and expressing minimal soundness requirements for S, such as the fact that the non-logical axioms of S are true. We call this invariant component the semantic core of implicit commitment. But there is also a variable component of implicit commitment that crucially depends on the justification given for our acceptance of S in which, for instance, may or may not appear reflection principles for S. We claim that the proposed framework regulates in a natural and uniform way our acceptance of different arithmetical theories. (shrink)

We study the relationships between two clusters of axiomatizations of Kripke’s fixed-point models for languages containing a self-applicable truth predicate. The first cluster is represented by what we will call ‘\-like’ theories, originating in recent work by Halbach and Horsten, whose axioms and rules are all valid in fixed-point models; the second by ‘\-like’ theories first introduced by Solomon Feferman, that lose this property but reflect the classicality of the metatheory in which Kripke’s construction is carried out. We show that (...) to any natural system in one cluster—corresponding to natural variations on induction schemata—there is a corresponding system in the other proving the same sentences true, addressing a problem left open by Halbach and Horsten and accomplishing a suitably modified version of the project sketched by Reinhardt aiming at an instrumental reading of classical theories of self-applicable truth. (shrink)

The world appears to be well described by gauge theories; why? I suggest that gauge is more than mathematical redundancy. Gauge-dependent quantities can not be predicted, but there is a sense in which they can be measured. They describe “handles” though which systems couple: they represent real relational structures to which the experimentalist has access in measurement by supplying one of the relata in the measurement procedure itself. This observation leads to a physical interpretation for the ubiquity of gauge: it (...) is a consequence of a relational structure of physical quantities. (shrink)

Dans le livre Λ de la Métaphysique, en accord avec sa thèse fondamentale de la primauté ontologique de l’individu sur l’universel, Aristote refuse d’attribuer le statut de substances immatérielles et de principes premiers de la réalité aux Formes platoniciennes et aux Nombres de la tradition académicienne. Il croit que ces principes platoniciens – selon lui des universels privés de vie – doivent être remplacés par une série d’êtres vivants, d’individus doués d’intelligence, en activité contin...

La investigación presente analizará las semejanzas y relaciones encontradas entre los planteamientos de Edmund Husserl y Simone Weil respecto al fenómeno religioso de la idolatría. Para ello, señalaremos en primer lugar el tratamiento que la religión podría tener dentro del marco fenomenológico husserliano; posteriormente, nos enfocaremos en el análisis de una de las publicaciones póstumas de autoría weiliana. Respecto al filósofo austríaco, se recurrirá a textos de distintos períodos de su obra, por lo que implícitamente se contemplará una continuación entre (...) sus denominados análisis estáticos y los genéticos. (shrink)

Chaque fois que nous "donnons forme" à quelque chose, cette représentation nous figure, par signes, l'objet évoqué, mais nous confirme également qu'il ne s'agit que d'un simulacre. D'où le besoin, à chaque époque, de créer du vivant pour pallier cette déception : tel est le sens du mythe de Pygmalion. Ce livre s'organise donc autour de deux pôles : d'un côté la nécessité de figurer, et de figurer l'acte même de la perception (voir le chapitre "Un oeil immense artificiel") ; (...) de l'autre, l'impératif de dépasser le signe. Il s'agit d'un défi radical, qui concerne l'avenir même des arts. C'est la raison de ce titre, A vif, qui témoigne d'un "coup d'oeil" : un regard et une incision pratiquée à vif dans l'objet, un désir de définitif qui ne caresse plus la forme, mais qui pénètre, met à nu, éviscère dans les paroles et dans les actes. Dedans et derrière l'oeil, comme dans l'un des plus impassibles traités d'anatomie du Cinquecento. Aujourd'hui, est-il encore vif notre oeil qui cherche le vivant? N'est-il pas lui-même défiguré par l'informe qui s'est logé en nous? Où est la pupilla viva qui illumine le Paradis et qui, de Dante à Baudelaire, a animé, de longs siècles durant, tant de quête mentale? Il faut remonter à ces origines, parcourir les espaces séculaires et sidéraux dans lesquels le cosmos était ordre, beauté, compréhension ; où, justement, il était nécessaire de "captiver les yeux pour avoir l'âme". Cet essai se voudrait une parabole déployée au fil de l'ardente soif humaine d'"exorbiter", de brûler la distance du point de vue, pour accéder, maintenant et à jamais, au vivant. (shrink)