Au cours de cette recherche, nous réfléchissons à la question de la couverture médiatique du domaine sportif. Nous nous concentrons sur l’impact de la présence des médias sur la construction de l’information sportive elle-même. Nous discutons de la position de l’analyste du discours vis-à-vis de ce contexte de production de discours ; production fortement influencée par l’outil technologique. Par exemple, nous montrons que le placement de microphones sur les acteurs de la rencontre sportive pousse l’analyste à considérer ces participants comme (...) des objets et des producteurs de la couverture médiatique. Par l’analyse de ce type de corpus, nous proposons donc d’étudier ces questions de positionnement de l’analyste au sein de ce double contexte de production. (shrink)

Le mouvement laïque du Moyen Age nous est apparu, en gros, comme un phénomène chrétien, parce qu'inhérent à la structure même du christianisme médiéval. Georges de Lagarde le définit comme la revendication par les princes chrétiens d'attributions exercées par les autorités ecclésiastiques, tant dans l'ordre spirituel que dans l'ordre temporel. Il reflète un état social caractéristique du Moyen Age chrétien. D'une part, en effet, les nations chrétiennes appartiennent à une même et unique chrétienté où la distinction entre le citoyen (...) et le chrétien n'a de conséquences pratiques que pour d'infimes minorités juives ou hérétiques vivant en marge de la communauté. D'autre part, l'autorité civile se présente plus volontiers comme une participation à la plénitude de puissance du pape, au temporel comme spirituel, que comme une institution de droit naturel. (shrink)

Cette étude a un double objectif: 10 dégager les grandes lignes de l'ouvrage de Georges de Lagarde, La Naissance de l'Esprit laïque au Moyen Age, tout spécialement du volume V, Guillaume d'Ockham, Critique des structures ecclésiales; 20 retracer les origines de la doctrine actuelle de la laïcité de l'État et ses incidences dans la Constitution dogmatique de l'Église. En un temps où l'Église catholique prend pleinement conscience d'elle-même et approfondit le message qu'elle doit transmettre au monde, l'histoire des manifestations (...) de l'esprit laïque, à une époque qui passe pour avoir réalisé mieux qu'aucune autre l'idéal de la chrétienté, mérite de retenir l'attention. Car cette histoire se prolonge jusqu'à nous. (shrink)

La question de la religion - de son essence, de sa fonction, de son origine - a été centrale dans la sociologie et l'anthropologie classiques. Pour la tirer des impasses et de la stagnation où elle est reléguée de nos jours, Camille Tarot propose ici un bilan critique des œuvres des meilleurs comparatistes, à travers leurs théories si contradictoires de la religion. Huit auteurs principaux sont soumis à examen : Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Mircéa Eliade, Georges Dumézil, Claude Lévi-Strauss, (...) René Girard, Pierre Bourdieu et Marcel Gauchet. L'important en la matière est d'abord d'esquiver les faux irénismes comme les querelles stériles ou haineuses, pour confronter les doctrines en profondeur et systématiquement. Ensuite, de déceler l'impensé et les refoulements que produit chaque cadre théorique, pour proposer le modèle ou l'idéal-type de la religion qui paraît le mieux fondé. Au fil de cet examen, il apparaît que l'essence du fait religieux est à rechercher à l'intersection du symbolique et du sacré, à comprendre à partir des fondations d'Emile Durkheim et de Marcel Mauss, complétées par les apports de René Girard. La possible fécondité du modèle qui se dégage ainsi s'atteste par sa capacité à relire les sources et à renouveler en profondeur les vieux problèmes des fonctions de la religion, qui n'avaient guère avancé depuis Emile Durkheim. (shrink)

À partir de l’œuvre de Marie-Dominique Chenu sur la théologie du travail et de sa contribution à la revue Lumière et vie, cet article s’interroge sur les conditions de possibilité d’une telle démarche aujourd’hui et invite à en dessiner les contours. Plus que tout autre projet théologique, la théologie du travail doit à la fois s’enraciner dans une lecture des signes des temps, lecture difficile qui interroge les conditions d’exercice de l’activité humaine, les modes de sociabilité qui l’accompagne et son (...) impact sur la nature. Les enjeux climatiques et environnementaux invitent à privilégier une réflexion sur le travail comme soin, soin de chacun, de la société, de la nature, et à continuer d’engager une démarche ecclésiale de discernement social en commun. À cet égard, la revue Lumière et vie apparaît comme un laboratoire, qui a trouvé un écho dans les démarches des mouvements d’Action catholique. Avec des ressources moindres, mais des facilités plus grandes pour engager une conversation globale, il paraît utile de continuer dans cette direction, à même de soutenir une espérance pour notre monde commun. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: Neurophenomenology requires a first-person report at the sub-personal level. Thus, the neurophenomenology of dreaming and sleep can be figuratively located in a model of perspectives and levels of analysis. Even when Solomonova and Sha do admit creativity to explain bizarreness and emphasize dreams’ enaction and, especially, dreams’ perception-dependence, an innate and developmental framework (...) of neurophenomenology becomes a requirement to understand fully its sub-personal counterpart, i.e., sleep, especially the evidence derived from innate processing observed during the sleep of neonates - even without the dreaming counterpart. Finally, precisions about the depth of dreaming in Hobson’s work are presented. (shrink)

This book brings together an introduction to the social sciences of religions - intended for the general public, which generally ignores them - in a critical essay in order to update them in the face of a current situation that strongly challenges them and will continue to do so. Indeed, the news of globalization imposes the confusing spectacle of a world of religions caught between the two extremes of forms so exclusivist that they justify violence, even terrorism, and such irenic (...) forms that they seek a spirituality fit to go beyond all borders, even religious ones. The place given to Islam in this way is explained, among other things, because during the conflicts of Salafist jihadist and certain branches of Sufism, it illustrates this contradiction in a particularly strong, but by no means exclusive way. (shrink)

It is often claimed that there is an explanatory divide between an expressivist account of normative discourse and a realist conception of normativity: more precisely, that expressivism and realism offer conflicting explanations of (i) the metaphysical structure of the normative realm, (ii) the connection between normative judgment and motivation, (iii) our normative beliefs and any convergence thereof, or (iv) the content of normative thoughts and claims. In this paper I argue that there need be no such explanatory conflict. Given a (...) minimalist approach to the relevant metaphysical and semantic notions, expressivism is compatible with any explanation that would be acceptable as a general criterion for realism. (shrink)

The past 10 years have seen considerable developments in the use of narrative in medicine, primarily through the emergence of the so-called narrative medicine. In this article, I question narrative medicine’s self-understanding and contend that one of the most prominent issues is its lack of a clear epistemological framework. Drawing from Gadamer’s work on hermeneutics, I first show that narrative medicine is deeply linked with the hermeneutical field of knowledge. Then I try to identify which claims can be legitimately expected (...) from narrative medicine, and which ones cannot be. I scrutinize in particular whether narrative medicine can legitimately grasp the patient’s lived experience of his or her illness. In the last section of this article, I begin to explore the potential usefulness of this epistemological clarification. This analysis allows for a further understanding of what is really at stake with narrative medicine, and thus to identify when it may be convenient, and when it may not. Furthermore, this clarification opens up promising new possibilities of dialogue with critics of the field. I conclude that narrative medicine finds its proper place as a possible tool available to mediate dialogue, which is at the heart of the clinical encounter in medical practice. (shrink)

The following scenario seems possible: a community uses concepts that play the same role in guiding actions and shaping social life as our normative concepts, and yet refer to something else. As Eklund argues, this apparent possibility poses a problem for any normative realist who aspires to vindicate the thought that reality itself favors our ways of valuing and acting. How can realists make good on this idea, given that anything they might say in support of the privileged status of (...) our normative concepts can be mirrored by the imagined community? E.g., the realist might claim that using our concepts is what we ought to do if we are to describe normative facts correctly, but members of the other community can claim the same about their concepts, using their own concept of ought. A promising approach to this challenge is to try to rule out the possibility of alternative normative concepts, by arguing that any concepts that have the same normative role must share a reference as well. In this paper I argue that normative quasi-naturalism, a view that combines expressivism about normative discourse with a naturalist metaphysics of normativity, supports referential normativity and solves the problem of alternative normative concepts. (shrink)

A revival of the dialogue between phenomenology and psychiatry currently takes place in the best international journals of psychiatry. In this article, we analyse this revival and the role given to phenomenology in this context. Although this dialogue seems at first sight interesting, we show that it is problematic. It leads indeed to use phenomenology in a special way, transforming it into a discipline dealing with empirical facts, so that what is called “phenomenology” has finally nothing to do with phenomenology. (...) This so-called phenomenology tallies however with what we have always called semiology. We try to explain the reasons why phenomenology is misused in that way. In our view, this transformation of phenomenology into an empirical and objectifying discipline is explained by the role attributed to phenomenology by contemporary authors, which is to solve the problems raised by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

"Descartes ou la philosophie française : le caractère fondateur qui a été reconnu de droit à Descartes au regard de toute la philosophie moderne a masqué l'importance toute particulière que les penseurs français lui ont toujours accordée, de fait, dans leur propre édification intellectuelle. Descartes fournit en France moins les idées que la trame qui a servi à les ordonner -- ce qui n'est le cas d'aucun philosophe ailleurs. Sartre, toute sa vie durant, fut tenu par le projet de construire (...) une morale. Par la suite, il ne s'est jamais lassé de conclure : « Et j'ai toujours échoué. » Conscient de cet échec où son projet de métaphysique l'a mené, il reconduit les motifs qu'il avait de l'écrire à son enfance : « Ma seule affaire était de me sauver. » Il avait cru être au monde ; il a vécu dans l'imaginaire. Il avait bâti tout une œuvre afin de s'y mettre tout entier. Or ce Moi immortalisé, celui auquel il aspirait, c'était secrètement Descartes, médiateur caché dans la pénombre mais qui lui avait tracé un chemin pour le rejoindre. Sartre ne l'a pas dit. Néanmoins il savait qu'il était en train de récrire les Méditations métaphysiques de Descartes. C'était son secret et le propre du secret est d'appartenir à ce qui relève en chacun non pas de l'inconscient mais de ce « fonds sombre qui refuse d'être dit » -- le vécu. Un tel secret, encore enveloppé et obscur à lui-même, explique également que Sartre ait pu se dire à la fois existentialiste et cartésien. D'un côté, l'existentialisme est le nom que l'adversaire avait donné à la doctrine. Il est la manière objective dont sa pensée s'est extériorisée dans l'histoire, il est la doctrine vue du dehors. De l'autre côté, le cartésianisme est la même doctrine mais telle qu'elle est comprise du dedans par Sartre. Il est la manière subjective dont Sartre a intériorisé sa doctrine dans l'histoire de la philosophie. Deux courants de pensée dont l'un, tout en surface, a recouvert malencontreusement l'autre qui était pourtant le seul qui fût profond."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

In Older Adults (OAs), Electroencephalogram (EEG) slowing in frontal lobes and a diminished muscle atonia during Rapid Eye Movement sleep (REM) have each been effective tracers of Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI), but this relationship remains to be explored by non-linear analysis. Likewise, data provided by EEG, EMG (Electromyogram) and EOG (Electrooculogram)—the three required sleep indicators—during the transition from REM to Non-REM (NREM) sleep have not been related jointly to MCI. Therefore, the main aim of the study was to explore, with (...) results for Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (DFA) and multichannel DFA (mDFA), the Color of Noise (CN) at the NREM to REM transition in OAs with MCI vs. subjects with good performances. The comparisons for the transition from NREM to REM were made for each group at each cerebral area, taking bilateral derivations to evaluate interhemispheric coupling and anteroposterior and posterior networks. In addition, stationarity analysis was carried out to explore if the three markers distinguished between the groups. Neuropsi and the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) were administered, as well as other geriatric tests. One night polysomnography was applied to 6 OAs with MCI (68.1 ± 3) and to 7 subjects without it (CTRL) (64.5 ± 9), and pre-REM and REM epochs were analyzed for each subject. Lower scores for attention, memory and executive funcions and a greater index of arousals during sleep were found for the MCI group. Results confirmed that EOGs constituted significant markers of MCI, increasing the CN for the MCI group in REM sleep. The CN of the EEG from the pre-REM to REM was higher for the MCI group vs. the opposite for the CTRL group at frontotemporal areas. Frontopolar interhemispheric scaling values also followed this trend as well as right anteroposterior networks. EMG Hurst values for both groups were lower than those for EEG and EOG. Stationarity analyses showed differences between stages in frontal areas and right and left EOGs for both groups. These results may demonstrate the breakdown of fractality of areas especially involved in executive functioning and the way weak stationarity analyses may help to distinguish between sleep stages in OAs. (shrink)

Review of Ronald Dworkin, Religion without God , (Harvard University Press, 2013), 180 pages.

How can we distinguish between quasi-realist expressivism and normative realism? The most promising answer to this question is the “explanation” explanation proposed by Dreier (2004), Simpson (2018), and others: the two views might agree in their claims about truth and objectivity, or even in their attributions of semantic content to normative sentences, but they disagree about how to explain normative meaning. Realists explain meaning by invoking normative facts and properties, or representational relations between normative language and the world, the thought (...) goes, while expressivists appeal instead to desire-like mental states in their explanations of meaning. However, I argue that, if we adopt a deflationary approach to representation and other related notions, there need be no such explanatory divide between expressivism and anything recognizable as a plausible notion of normative realism. Any alleged explanatory criterion for realism will either be incompatible with deflationism, or it will fail to capture some standard versions of normative realism. I conclude that, in a deflationary framework, expressivism is compatible with genuine realism. (shrink)

Michel Henry recognized himself within Maine de Biran’s work, while rejecting the French spiritualistic tradition to which this one was attached. However, without occulting the great differences which separate him from this tradition, it seems that we find in Bergson’s first book, more than in Maine de Biran, the premises of an ontological dualism, such as he supported, which announces an authentic philosophy of the conscience, beyond any intentionality. In return, as if Michel Henry had emphasized a tendency already present (...) in Time and Free Will, we could read again Bergson’s first book in the light of material phenomenology itself. (shrink)

Dancers and dance philosophers report on experiences of a certain form of sense making and bodily thinking through the dancing body. Yet, discussions on expertise and consciousness are often framed within canonical philosophical world-views that make it difficult to fully recognize, verbalize, and value the full variety of embodied and affective facets of subjectivity. Using qualitative interviews with five professional dancers and choreographers, I make an attempt to disclose the characteristics of what I consider to be a largely overseen state (...) of consciousness: embodied reflection. Dancers are familiar with this attentive bodily presence, which constitutes their work mode and heightens their abilities as experts. Detailed descriptions of their daily work at the theatre help us grasp the qualities and understand the enigmas of the absorbed state of bodily thinking. Husserl’s theories on reflection and Merleau-Ponty’s work on motoricity support our understanding of the structures behind embodied reflection. I believe it is a common human resource, and that whether we are experts or not, we all have the ability to reflect non-conceptually through bodily and/or affective activity. (shrink)

Over the last decade, personalized medicine has become a buzz word, which covers a broad spectrum of meanings and generates many different opinions. The purpose of this article is to achieve a better understanding of the reasons why personalized medicine gives rise to such conflicting opinions. We show that a major issue of personalized medicine is the gap existing between its claims and its reality. We then present and analyze different possible reasons for this gap. We propose an hypothesis inspired (...) by the Windelband’s distinction between nomothetic and idiographic methodology. We argue that the fuzzy situation of personalized medicine results from a mix between idiographic claims and nomothetic methodological procedures. Hence we suggest that the current quandary about personalized medicine cannot be solved without getting involved in a discussion about the complex epistemological and methodological status of medicine. To conclude, we show that the Gadamer’s view of medicine as a dialogical process can be fruitfully used and reveals that personalization is not a theoretical task, but a practical one, which takes place within the clinical encounter. (shrink)

It has been argued that there is something morally objectionable about moral realism: for instance, according to realism, we are justified in believing that genocide is wrong only if a certain moral fact obtains, but it is objectionable to hold our moral commitments hostage to metaphysics in this way. In this paper, I argue that no version of this moral argument against realism is likely to succeed. More precisely, minimal realism―the kind of realism on which realist theses are understood as (...) internal to moral discourse―is immune to this challenge, contrary to what some proponents of the moral argument have suggested, while robust non-naturalist realists might have good answers to all versions of the argument as well, at least if they adopt a certain stance on how to form metaphysical beliefs in the moral domain. (shrink)