In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Environmental Goodness and the Challenge of American CultureSandra Jane Fairbanks (bio)Until recently, Western virtue ethics has never recognized nature-focused virtues. This is not surprising, since western philosophies and religions have promoted the ideas that humans are superior to nature and that there are no moral principles regulating our relationship to nature. Environmentalists call for a radical change in our attitude towards nature if we are to meet the (...) challenge posed by today’s environmental problems. Thus, recognition of new virtues governing human attitudes and behavior towards nature is highly desirable, both by way of addressing an egregious lacuna in western thought, and as a necessary condition for anything like a viable planet. Unfortunately, a capitalist, consumer culture such as that of the United States presents a variety of serious obstacles to the successful inculcation of any new environmental virtues. Hence, inculcation of environmental virtues should not be the sole focus of environmental education. Such education should also appeal to human self-interest, at least until such time as the very idea of environmental virtue will not seem contrarian relative to prevailing views of the good life.IntroductionWhile there is room for disagreement over details and cases, it is safe to say that traditional Western philosophies and religions have generally [End Page 79] promoted domination and exploitation of the environment. Traditional, predominantly anthropocentric views such as Christianity or Greek philosophy, conjoined with a consumerist model of the good life, have conditioned the attitudes, values, and beliefs of human beings, with disastrous consequences for the environment. As a result, we face a variety of environmental problems—global warming, destruction and depletion of natural resources and wilderness areas, explosive population growth, toxic waste, and so on—that are serious right now, and that may well be catastrophic for future generations. Environmental philosophers, including biocentrists, ecocentrists, and ecofeminists, call for a shift away from anthropocentric theories to theories that emphasize the intrinsic value of nonhuman life, or that of nature in general.All of these environmental philosophies call for a radical change in our attitude towards nature if we are to meet the challenge posed by today’s environmental problems. Since this change in attitude is intended to ground novel and more adequate ways of behaving toward the environment, environmentally-sensitive writers are in the business, implicitly or explicitly, of promoting a new environmental virtue, or a new set of environmental virtues.1 Until recently, Western virtue ethics has never recognized a nature-focused virtue. This is not surprising, since western philosophies and religions have generally promoted the ideas that humans are superior to nature and that there are no moral principles regulating our relationship to nature, except (as, famously, in Kant2) for indirect duties toward humans. The idea that nature, including nonhuman life, natural objects, and ecological wholes has intrinsic value and, hence, moral standing, is a very recent development in Western philosophy.Thus recognition of new virtues governing human attitudes and behavior towards nature is highly desirable, both by way of addressing an egregious lacuna in Western thought, and as (almost certainly) a necessary condition for anything like a viable planet. Unfortunately, as I will argue, a capitalist, consumer culture such as that of the United States—on which I will focus due to its paradigm status—presents a variety of obstacles to the successful inculcation of any new environmental virtues. Thus, inculcation of environmental virtues should not be the sole, and perhaps not even the primary, focus of environmental education, at least in the short term. As I will argue, such education should also appeal, importantly, to human self-interest, at least until such time as the very idea of environmental [End Page 80] virtue will not seem contrarian relative to prevailing views of the good life.The structure of the discussion is as follows: First, I develop a brief sketch of an environmentally good person. I do so by compiling a set of environmental virtues recommended by various prominent biocentrists, ecocentrists and ecofeminists. Second, I address problems posed by American culture for the development of these environmental virtues. Finally, I conclude with practical suggestions for influencing American culture in the direction of environmental awareness and... (shrink)

In the philosophy of logic, the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the claim that reasoners can, in certain ways, rationally change which logic they use. The (alleged) problem is that if someone does not already infer in accordance with some fundamental logical principles (such as Universal Instantiation or Modus Ponens), then they cannot rationally begin to do so: the “adoption” of these principles is either unnecessary or impossible. In the literature, three issues have emerged as especially contentious: (1) How (...) should we understand the argument for the Adoption Problem? What exactly is the argument’s conclusion, and how is it established, if at all? (2) How could someone who thinks that the rational adoption of logic is possible respond to the Adoption Problem? (3) What are the consequences of the Adoption Problem for related issues in the philosophy of logic? In this paper, we address each question in turn. We suggest that the Adoption Problem is best understood in the form of an inconsistent quartet of theses regarding logical inference. We classify positions on logical adoption in terms of which of these theses is abandoned, and we show that such a taxonomy of positions is useful for delineating the scope and consequences of the Adoption Problem. (shrink)

Which epistemic skills or attributes must a journalist possess in order to produce competent science journalism? I aim to answer this question by bringing together insights from journalism, science communication, and epistemology. In §1, I outline the Epistemic Challenge for Science Journalism. In §2, I present the dominant answer in the literature, the Knowledge-Based Solution, and argue against it. In §3, I propose an alternative, the Confirmation-Based Solution. In §4, I argue that this solution can address recent concerns regarding journalistic (...) objectivity. §5 discusses my proposal in the context of epistemological debates about norms of assertion. §6 concludes. (shrink)

Dr Edwards' stimulating and provocative book advances the thesis that the appropriate axiomatic basis for inductive inference is not that of probability, with its addition axiom, but rather likelihood - the concept introduced by Fisher as a measure of relative support amongst different hypotheses. Starting from the simplest considerations and assuming no more than a modest acquaintance with probability theory, the author sets out to reconstruct nothing less than a consistent theory of statistical inference in science.

This anthology, Defining Public Administration , is designed to assist beginning and intermediate level students of public policy, and to stir the imaginations of readers concerned with public policy and administration. The forty-five articles included in the text are all reprinted from the International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and Administration , and these accessible, interesting articles have been assembled to offer a sample of the riches to be found within the larger work. The articles provide definitions of the vocabulary of (...) public policy and administration as it is used throughout the world-from the smallest towns, to the largest national bureaucracies. Defining Public Administration is organized into twelve parts. Each part focuses on a domain pertinent to the study of public administration, including overviews, policy making, intergovernmental relations, bureaucracy, organization behavior, public management, strategic management, performance management, human resource management, financial management, auditing and accountability, and ethics. (shrink)

My paper is a discussion of Bas van Fraassen’s important, but neglected, paper on self‐deception, “The Peculiar Effects of Love and Desire.” Paradoxes of self‐deception are widely thought to follow from the ease with which we know ourselves. For example, if self‐deception were intentional, how could we fail to know as target of our own deception just those things necessary to undermine the deception? Van Fraassen stands that reasoning on its head, arguing that is the ease with which we accuse (...) ourselves of self‐deception that undermines our confidence in our claims to know ourselves. I unpack and modify his argument, attempting to show that it makes a powerful case for scepticism about self‐knowledge. I argue, contra van Fraassen, that local scepticism about self‐knowledge threatens our claims to know ourselves in a way that global scepticism does not threaten our claims about the external world. I support this claim by showing that the Wittgensteinian response to the sceptic in On Certainty—that we don’t know what to do with the sceptic’s doubts, that we don’t know how to incorporate those doubts into our practices—does not succeed in deflecting scepticism about self‐knowledge because the local sceptic’s doubts—about whether we can distinguish genuine claims to know ourselves from self‐deceived claims—are integral to language game of self‐knowledge. The local sceptic’s doubts are our doubts because it is natural to ask whether we are deceiving ourselves when we claim to know ourselves. However, because, we have no way of distinguishing genuine claims to know ourselves from self‐deceived claims, our claims to self‐knowledge are systematically undermined. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This paper describes the case-based approach to teaching philosophy of science courses and argues for its merits. The paper first presents a case study that debates whether the “shock features” of the Slate Islands in Lake Superior were formed by meteorite impact or have an endogenous origin, e.g. from explosive volcanic activity. Next, the virtues of the Slate-Island case are considered, e.g. the case is focused insofar as what is at stake is relatively clear and the case illustrates the truisms (...) that creditable scientists disagree and the claims made in natural science are probable rather than indubitable. Finally, the paper argues for the case-based approach to teaching the philosophy of science by responding to two objections: (i) that case studies get in the way of doing philosophy and (ii) that students won’t be able to understand scientific literature well enough to reflect upon how it relates to science in general. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show peirce's critical attitude toward two basic elements in the positivistic view of human knowledge, sensation and hypothesis. by 'positivism' i mean the nineteenth-century brand, this is the version peirce knew and attacked. the logic of the paper is simple. i state the positivistic position as found in the writings of comte, pearson, mach and poincare. i follow with peirce's criticism in the light of his realistic view of sensation and his belief that (...) hypothesis or abduction is a valid form of inference. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the intersection of feminism and logic, posing questions such as: Can any or all logics be feminist? If feminist logic exists, then how might it be identified? How one answers these questions will be determined by one’s understanding of logic and of feminism. Given how many controversial questions there are regarding logic, this is not a trivial remark: some disagreements about feminist logic may turn out to be mere misunderstandings. In order to address (...) the issue properly, we need to attend to fundamental concepts. In this paper, I argue that the best way of understanding feminist logic is by focusing, first, on feminist philosophy of logic. In Section 1, I introduce the Feminist Critique of Reason, from the 1980s–90s. In Section 2, I discuss contemporary work on feminist logic and show that it is in some ways a continuation of, and in other ways a departure from, this history. In Section 3, I emphasize what is common to all work in feminist logic: a higher-order commitment to feminist methodology while studying logic. I consequently define feminist philosophy of logic as philosophy of logic that answers and is answerable to feminist philosophy. Feminist logic is a theory of logical consequence that is grounded in feminist philosophy of logic. I show that this definition correctly captures the scope of feminist logic. In Section 4, I argue that, despite recent objections, exceptionalism—understood as commitment to traditional conceptions of logical consequence—is compatible with feminist logic. (shrink)