Which epistemic skills or attributes must a journalist possess in order to produce competent science journalism? I aim to answer this question by bringing together insights from journalism, science communication, and epistemology. In §1, I outline the Epistemic Challenge for Science Journalism. In §2, I present the dominant answer in the literature, the Knowledge-Based Solution, and argue against it. In §3, I propose an alternative, the Confirmation-Based Solution. In §4, I argue that this solution can address recent concerns regarding journalistic (...) objectivity. §5 discusses my proposal in the context of epistemological debates about norms of assertion. §6 concludes. (shrink)

In the philosophy of logic, the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the claim that reasoners can, in certain ways, rationally change which logic they use. The (alleged) problem is that if someone does not already infer in accordance with some fundamental logical principles (such as Universal Instantiation or Modus Ponens), then they cannot rationally begin to do so: the “adoption” of these principles is either unnecessary or impossible. In the literature, three issues have emerged as especially contentious: (1) How (...) should we understand the argument for the Adoption Problem? What exactly is the argument’s conclusion, and how is it established, if at all? (2) How could someone who thinks that the rational adoption of logic is possible respond to the Adoption Problem? (3) What are the consequences of the Adoption Problem for related issues in the philosophy of logic? In this paper, we address each question in turn. We suggest that the Adoption Problem is best understood in the form of an inconsistent quartet of theses regarding logical inference. We classify positions on logical adoption in terms of which of these theses is abandoned, and we show that such a taxonomy of positions is useful for delineating the scope and consequences of the Adoption Problem. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the intersection of feminism and logic, posing questions such as: Can any or all logics be feminist? If feminist logic exists, then how might it be identified? How one answers these questions will be determined by one’s understanding of logic and of feminism. Given how many controversial questions there are regarding logic, this is not a trivial remark: some disagreements about feminist logic may turn out to be mere misunderstandings. In order to address (...) the issue properly, we need to attend to fundamental concepts. In this paper, I argue that the best way of understanding feminist logic is by focusing, first, on feminist philosophy of logic. In Section 1, I introduce the Feminist Critique of Reason, from the 1980s–90s. In Section 2, I discuss contemporary work on feminist logic and show that it is in some ways a continuation of, and in other ways a departure from, this history. In Section 3, I emphasize what is common to all work in feminist logic: a higher-order commitment to feminist methodology while studying logic. I consequently define feminist philosophy of logic as philosophy of logic that answers and is answerable to feminist philosophy. Feminist logic is a theory of logical consequence that is grounded in feminist philosophy of logic. I show that this definition correctly captures the scope of feminist logic. In Section 4, I argue that, despite recent objections, exceptionalism—understood as commitment to traditional conceptions of logical consequence—is compatible with feminist logic. (shrink)