Former discussions of biological generalizations have focused on the question of whether there are universal laws of biology. These discussions typically analyzed generalizations out of their investigative and explanatory contexts and concluded that whatever biological generalizations are, they are not universal laws. The aim of this paper is to explain what biological generalizations are by shifting attention towards the contexts in which they are drawn. I argue that within the context of any particular biological explanation or investigation, biologists employ two (...) types of generations. One type identifies causal regularities exhibited by particular kinds of biological entities. The other type identifies how these entities are distributed in the biological world. (shrink)

This book describes a program of research in computable structure theory. The goal is to find definability conditions corresponding to bounds on complexity which persist under isomorphism. The results apply to familiar kinds of structures (groups, fields, vector spaces, linear orderings Boolean algebras, Abelian p-groups, models of arithmetic). There are many interesting results already, but there are also many natural questions still to be answered. The book is self-contained in that it includes necessary background material from recursion theory (ordinal notations, (...) the hyperarithmetical hierarchy) and model theory (infinitary formulas, consistency properties). (shrink)

Philosophers’ traditional emphasis on theories, theoretical modeling, and explanation misguides research in philosophy of science. Articulating and applying core theories is part of scientific practice, but it is not the essence of scientific practice. Insofar as science has an essence, it is to systematically investigate and learn about what is not yet understood. This lecture analyzes genetics to articulate a broad-practice-centered approach to philosophy of science. It concludes by arguing that this approach can lead to richer, deeper, and more useful (...) philosophies of science, philosophies that can better inform science policy and the public’s understanding of science. (shrink)

In their simplest form, hybrid languages are propositional modal languages which can refer to states. They were introduced by Arthur Prior, the inventor of tense logic, and played an important role in his work: because they make reference to specific times possible, they remove the most serious obstacle to developing modal approaches to temporal representation and reasoning. However very little is known about the computational complexity of hybrid temporal logics.In this paper we analyze the complexity of the satisfiability problem of (...) a number of hybrid temporal logics: the basic hybrid language over transitive trees; nominal Until logic; and referential interval logic. We discuss the effects of including nominals, the @ operator, the somewhere modality E, and the difference operator D. Adding nominals to tense logic leads for several frame-classes to an increase in complexity of the satisfiability problem from PSPACE to EXPTIME. On transitive trees, however, the satisfiability problem for this language can be decided in PSPACE. Along the way we make a detour through hybrid propositional dynamic logic: we establish upper bounds for a number of temporal logics by generalizing results due to Passy and Tinchev [29] and De Giacomo [16]. We conclude with some remarks on the relevance of our results to description logic, and draw attention to the utility of the spypoint technique for proving upper and lower bounds. (shrink)

Christology seems to fall fairly clearly into two divisions. The first is concerned with the truth of the two propositions: ‘Christ is God’ and ‘Christ is a man’. The second is concerned with the mutual compatibility of these propositions. The first part of Christology tends to confine itself to what is sometimes called ‘positive theology’: that is to say, it is largely given over to examining the Jons revelationis —let us not prejudge currently burning issues by asking what this is—to (...) see what evidence can be found for the truth of these propositions. Clearly, the methods used will be above all those of New Testament exegesis. The second part of Christology will necessarily consist entirely of that speculative theology which is contrasted with positive theology. Even if the earliest speculation on this topic is to be found in the New Testament itself and thus becomes fair game for the exegetes, any attempt to relate the primary truths, ‘Christ is God’ and ‘Christ is a man’, to eachother is a work of reflection, and in the terminology I am using speculative. (shrink)

Bermejo-Luque, Lilian. Giving Reasons. A Linguistic-Pragmatic Approach to Argumentation Theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s10503-011-9258-z Authors C. Andone, Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam, Spuistraat 134, 1012 VB Amsterdam, The Netherlands Journal Argumentation Online ISSN 1572-8374 Print ISSN 0920-427X.

Background: The role of nurses as patient advocates is one which is well recognised, supported and the subject of a broad body of literature. One of the key impediments to the role of the nurse as patient advocate is the lack of support and legislative frameworks. Within a broad range of activities constituting advocacy, whistleblowing is currently the subject of much discussion in the light of the Mid Staffordshire inquiry in the United Kingdom (UK) and other instances of patient mistreatment. (...) As a result steps to amend existing whistleblowing legislation where it exists or introduce it where it does not are underway. Objective: This paper traces the development of legislation for advocacy. Conclusion: The authors argue that while any legislation supporting advocacy is welcome, legislation on its own will not encourage or enable nurses to whistleblow. (shrink)

In this paper I shall use terms such as “intrinsically good” which may be deemed old fashioned by many readers and which certainly to my own mind presuppose an objective non-naturalistic theory of ethics. I still hold such a theory and I have not mastered the new jargon by which a sort of higher synthesis between that and other theories is supposed to have been effected, but I do not think that such a view as mine of ethics in general (...) is necessarily presupposed if one is to understand or even agree with the contentions of my article. These relate to a specific problem as to certain ethical actions, which will arise on any view that admits the possibility of giving any sort of legitimate reasons for ethical judgments, as we all do in practice. After all a naturalist can easily translate “intrinsically good” into his own terms, say, valued for its own sake by most people who experience it, and there will still be a question as to what is intrinsically and what is merely instrumentally good and other questions as to what is the logical nature of certain arguments in ethics. (shrink)