I. Heureuse archi-tromperie À l’origine de la pensée il y a Eidos – éclat sans substance ni sens, archi-être de pure apparence avant toute chose. Ce qui advient d’abord, c’est le pur avoir lieu sans abord, qui concentre en soi tous les prestiges du non-être. Effraction sans plus, sans dépôt, dont le seul propre est l’absence de toute propriété, le rejet de tout attribut, la récusation de toute détermination, et par voie de conséquence l’impossibilité de toute individuation. Le premier est (...) l’u.. (shrink)

Driving behaviours and fitness to drive have been assessed using different tools over time: standardized neuropsychological, on-road and driving simulation testing. Nowadays, the great variability of topics related to driving simulation has elicited a high number of reviews. The present work aims to perform a scientometric analysis on driving simulation reviews and to propose a selective review of reviews focusing on critical issues related to validity and fidelity. A scientometric analysis of driving simulation reviews published from 1988 to 2019 was (...) conducted. Bibliographic data from 298 reviews were extracted from Scopus and WoS. Performance analysis was conducted to investigate most prolific Countries, Journals, Institutes and Authors. A cluster analysis on authors’ keywords was performed to identify relevant associations between different research topics. Based on reviews extracted from cluster analysis, a selective review of reviews was conducted to answer questions regarding validity, fidelity and critical issues. USA and Germany are the first two Countries for number of driving simulation reviews. USA is the leading Country with 5 Institutes in the top-ten. Top Authors wrote from 3 to 7 reviews each and belong to Institutes located in North America and Europe. Cluster analysis identified three clusters and eight keywords. The selective review of reviews showed a substantial agreement for supporting validity of driving simulation with respect to neuropsychological and on-road testing, while for fidelity with respect to real-world driving experience a blurred representation emerged. The most relevant critical issues were the a) lack of a common set of standards, b) phenomenon of simulation sickness, c) need for psychometric properties, lack of studies investigating d) predictive validity with respect to collision rates and e) ecological validity. Driving simulation represent a cross-cutting topic in scientific literature on driving, and there are several evidences for considering it as a valid alternative to neuropsychological and on-road testing. Further research efforts could be aimed at establishing a consensus statement for protocols assessing fitness to drive, in order to a) use standardized systems, b) compare systematically driving simulators with regard to their validity and fidelity, and c) employ shared criteria for conducting studies in a given sub-topic. (shrink)

Il saggio prende in esame due punti della teorizzazione di Harry Frankfurt in merito alla moral agency. Il primo è la corretta concettualizzazione del momento della ‘decisione’ all’interno del­­la ca­tena deliberativa. Vengono esaminati tre passaggi critici: a) la base normativa a cui la decisione ri­spon­de; b) la teoria della ‘unificazione della persona’ attraverso la decisione e c) la distinzione fra ‘scelta’ e ‘decisione’. Il secondo punto è l’ambiguità in­sita nel concetto di ‘doveri d’amore’ pro­posto da Frankfurt. A questo pro­posito vengono (...) esaminate: a) la di­stin­zione fra amore ‘attivo’ e ‘passivo’ e b) la mancata tematizzazione della ‘legittimità del­l’a­more’, ovvero del rap­porto fra l’a­more in quanto relazione sociale e i quadri interpretativi del­la cul­tura entro cui si sviluppa.In this paper two aspects of Harry Frankfurt’s theory of moral agency will be examined. First, his conceptualization of the moment of ‘decision’ wi­thin the deliberative chain will be addressed. Three critical junctures will be dis­cussed: a) the normative basis of the actor’s ‘decision’; b) Frankfurt’s view of the ‘unification’ of the person via decision and c) his distinction of ‘choice’ and ‘decision’. The second point addressed is the ambiguity in­herent in Frankfurt’s notion of ‘duties of love’. With regard to this notion, the following points will be discussed: a) the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ love and b) Frankfurt’s neglect of the dimension of the ‘le­gi­timacy of love’, i.e. of the nexus of love qua social relation and the inter­pre­tive cadres of the culture within which it unfolds. (shrink)

Tous les empires dans l’histoire ont pu faire ce constat : la puissance n’est pas seulement une question d’armement, mais aussi de contrôle des céréales. Elles ont constitué, jusqu’à l’essor de la consommation de viande, le carburant du travail humain. Cet article permet une charnière bienvenue entre histoire et actualité (« pénurie » et déstabilisation des marchés mondiaux des céréales avec la guerre d’Ukraine). Il retrace l’histoire longue des marchés des céréales dans le monde, les successions des politiques visant leur (...) contrôle (stockage, contrôle des prix, blocage des approvisionnements) ou donnant libre cours à la spéculation, les effets de ces cycles sur les famines et les guerres. Ce qui spécifie le « nouveau capitalisme agraire » contemporain depuis les années 1980, c’est la spéculation totalement dérégulée sur les céréales : marchés virtuels, futures, accaparement des terres, contrôle du vivant et monopoles des semences, entrée de nouveaux acteurs comme banques, fonds de pension, hedge funds. L’auteur propose en conclusion quelques options politiques pour lutter contre cette hégémonie. (shrink)

Jerrold Levinson has elegantly defended a proposal for the ethical evaluation of popular songs, which looks at the ‘personal qualities’ a song exhibits. I claim that the personal-qualities theory of artistic expression importantly contributes to explaining how songs get to have their meanings, yet that it does not very profitably extend to their ethical evaluation. I propose that the notion of a work’s ethical perspective best generates a central way of ethically evaluating popular songs, by properly linking the ethical evaluation (...) of songs to their meanings. Reference to songs’ ethical perspectives proves able to (a) enjoy broad scope; (b) produce charitable ethical assessments; (c) generate fine-grained and comparative attributions of ethical value; and (d) deal, better than the personal-qualities view, with songs that include multiple characters, manifest despicable personae without explicitly condemning them, or exhibit a persona that eschews ethical evaluation. Investigating the theoretical centrality of this type of ethical judgment also provides us with an opportunity to better understand what construing the meaning of songs—and more generally works of art—involves: when relevant, the proper construal of works’ ethical perspectives’ objects, and of the perspectives themselves as often presenting us with outlooks just for our consideration, not approval. I close by suggesting a possible relationship between our song preferences and our sense of self, via David Hume’s notion of pride: the songs we favour help us with self-perception and -assessment, and perhaps with self-construction. (shrink)

Ce livre aborde une question qu'on ne trouve pas telle quelle, explicitement thématisée, chez Merleau-Ponty lui-même, mais qui travaille en profondeur toute sa pensée, à savoir l'expérience de la création. Il s'efforce de respecter la manière dont elle se profile dans les textes du philosophe, le style indirect selon lequel elle émerge chez lui. L'exploration s'en déploie entre quatre grandes régions : " nature ", " histoire ", " langage ", " art ". Chacun de ces domaines, qui interfère sans (...) cesse dans la pensée merleau-pontienne avec les autres, permet de faire ressortir les opérateurs de création qui s'entre-éclairent souvent et demeurent néanmoins irréductibles les uns aux autres. Qu'il s'agisse de spontanéité aveugle ou de " reprise " d'une situation contingente, de différentiel langagier ou de geste pictural relançant l'autophanie du visible même, chaque fois c'est à un autre schème singulier que l'on a affaire. Le phénoménologue vise toujours à élucider la même expérience, c'est-à-dire la manière dont se formule l'ouverture d'un monde. Il essaie de comprendre ce qui se passe entre ou avant les formes - l'effraction de l'événement, l'improbable nuance, le fugitif de l'idée, l'essence qui se met à rayonner. Ainsi apparaît la contribution de la " philosophie d'aujourd'hui " à des enjeux majeurs de l'esthétique. (shrink)

Résumé La critique éthique considère que la valeur éthique d’une œuvre d’art affecte sa valeur artistique. Elle s’intéresse ordinairement à la valeur éthique du point de vue que l’œuvre adopte, ou à celui des effets qu’elles produisent, mais ne considère guère celle du processus de production de l’œuvre. Or celui-ci peut intéresser l’éthique comme lorsqu’une toile est réalisée en laissant des poissons rouges enduits de peinture agoniser et s’agiter sur une toile. C’est précisément de la valeur éthique des procédés utilisés (...) dont il est ici question. L’auteur défend un moralisme des moyens, selon lequel le jugement éthique des procédés a une place légitime dans l’évaluation artistique, et formule deux versions compatibles de cette position : la thèse esthétique et la thèse artistique. (shrink)

This paper reports the framework, method and main findings of an analysis of cultural milieus in 4 European countries. The analysis is based on a questionnaire applied to a sample built through a two-step procedure of post-hoc random selection from a broader dataset based on an online survey. Responses to the questionnaire were subjected to multidimensional analysis-a combination of Multiple Correspondence Analysis and Cluster Analysis. We identified 5 symbolic universes, that correspond to basic, embodied, affect-laden, generalized worldviews. People in this (...) study see the world as either a) an ordered universe;b) a matter of interpersonal bond;c) a caring society;d) consisting of a niche of belongingness;e) a hostile place. These symbolic universes were also interpreted as semiotic capital: they reflect the capacity of a place to foster social and civic development. Moreover, the distribution of the symbolic universes, and therefore social and civic engagement, is demonstrated to be variable across the 4 countries in the analysis. Finally, we develop a retrospective reconstruction of the distribution of symbolic universes as well as the interplay between their current state and past, present and future socio-institutional scenarios. (shrink)

Philosophers have rightly condemned lookism—that is, discrimination in favor of attractive people or against unattractive people—in education, the justice system, the workplace and elsewhere. Surprisingly, however, the almost universal preference for attractive romantic and sexual partners has rarely received serious ethical scrutiny. On its face, it’s unclear whether this is a form of discrimination we should reject or tolerate. I consider arguments for both views. On the one hand, a strong case can be made that preferring attractive partners is bad. (...) The idea is that choosing partners based on looks seems essentially similar to other objectionable forms of discrimination. (In particular, the preference for attractive partners is arguably both unfair and harmful to a significant degree.) One can try to resist this conclusion in several ways. I consider three possible replies. The first has to do with the possibility of controlling our partner preferences. The second pertains to attractiveness and “good genes”. The last attempts to link certain aspects of attractiveness to a prospective partner’s personality and values. I argue that the first two replies fail conclusively, while the third only amounts to a limited defense of a particular kind of attractiveness preference. So the idea that we should often avoid preferring attractive partners is compelling. (shrink)

Much recent work on mathematical explanation has presupposed that the phenomenon involves explanatory proofs in an essential way. I argue that this view, ‘proof chauvinism’, is false. I then look in some detail at the explanation of the solvability of polynomial equations provided by Galois theory, which has often been thought to revolve around an explanatory proof. The article concludes with some general worries about the effects of chauvinism on the theory of mathematical explanation. 1Introduction 2Why I Am Not a (...) Proof Chauvinist 2.1Proof chauvinism and mathematical practice 2.2Proof chauvinism and philosophy 3An Example: Galois Theory and Explanatory Proof 4Conclusion. (shrink)

We discuss potential biorisks from large language models (LLMs). AI assistants based on LLMs such as ChatGPT have been shown to significantly reduce barriers to entry for actors wishing to synthesize dangerous, potentially novel pathogens and chemical weapons. The harms from deploying such bioagents could be further magnified by AI-assisted misinformation. We endorse several policy responses to these dangers, including prerelease evaluations of biomedical AIs by subject-matter experts, enhanced surveillance and lab screening procedures, restrictions on AI training data, and access (...) controls on biomedical AI. We conclude with a suggestion about future research directions in bioethics. (shrink)

According to a widespread view in metaphysics and philosophy of science, all explanations involve relations of ontic dependence between the items appearing in the explanandum and the items appearing in the explanans. I argue that a family of mathematical cases, which I call “viewing-as explanations”, are incompatible with the Dependence Thesis. These cases, I claim, feature genuine explanations that aren’t supported by ontic dependence relations. Hence the thesis isn’t true in general. The first part of the paper defends this claim (...) and discusses its significance. The second part of the paper considers whether viewing-as explanations occur in the empirical sciences, focusing on the case of so-called fictional models. It’s sometimes suggested that fictional models can be explanatory even though they fail to represent actual worldly dependence relations. Whether or not such models explain, I suggest, depends on whether we think scientific explanations necessarily give information relevant to intervention and control. Finally, I argue that counterfactual approaches to explanation also have trouble accommodating viewing-as cases. (shrink)

The field of AI safety aims to prevent increasingly capable artificially intelligent systems from causing humans harm. Research on moral alignment is widely thought to offer a promising safety strategy: if we can equip AI systems with appropriate ethical rules, according to this line of thought, they'll be unlikely to disempower, destroy or otherwise seriously harm us. Deontological morality looks like a particularly attractive candidate for an alignment target, given its popularity, relative technical tractability and commitment to harm-avoidance principles. I (...) argue that the connection between moral alignment and safe behavior is more tenuous than many have hoped. In general, AI systems can possess either of these properties in the absence of the other, and we should favor safety when the two conflict. In particular, advanced AI systems governed by standard versions of deontology need not be especially safe. (shrink)

In this groundbreaking work, C. D. C. Reeve uses a fundamental problem--the Primacy Dilemma--to explore Aristotle's metaphysics, epistemology, dialectic, philosophy of mind, and theology in a new way. At a time when Aristotle is most often studied piecemeal, Reeve attempts to see him both in detail and as a whole, so that it is from detailed analysis of hundreds of particular passages, drawn from dozens of Aristotelian treatises, and translated in full that his overall picture of Aristotle emerges. Primarily a (...) book for philosophers and advanced students with an interest in the fundamental problems with which Aristotle is grappling, Substantial Knowledge's clear, non-technical and engaging style will appeal to any reader eager to explore Aristotle's difficult but extraordinarily rewarding thought. (shrink)

Gauss’s quadratic reciprocity theorem is among the most important results in the history of number theory. It’s also among the most mysterious: since its discovery in the late 18th century, mathematicians have regarded reciprocity as a deeply surprising fact in need of explanation. Intriguingly, though, there’s little agreement on how the theorem is best explained. Two quite different kinds of proof are most often praised as explanatory: an elementary argument that gives the theorem an intuitive geometric interpretation, due to Gauss (...) and Eisenstein, and a sophisticated proof using algebraic number theory, due to Hilbert. Philosophers have yet to look carefully at such explanatory disagreements in mathematics. I do so here. According to the view I defend, there are two important explanatory virtues—depth and transparency—which different proofs (and other potential explanations) possess to different degrees. Although not mutually exclusive in principle, the packages of features associated with the two stand in some tension with one another, so that very deep explanations are rarely transparent, and vice versa. After developing the theory of depth and transparency and applying it to the case of quadratic reciprocity, I draw some morals about the nature of mathematical explanation. (shrink)

Mathematicians often describe the importance of well-developed intuition to productive research and successful learning. But neither education researchers nor philosophers interested in epistemic dimensions of mathematical practice have yet given the topic the sustained attention it deserves. The trouble is partly that intuition in the relevant sense lacks a usefully clear characterization, so we begin by offering one: mature intuition, we say, is the capacity for fast, fluent, reliable and insightful inference with respect to some subject matter. We illustrate the (...) role of mature intuition in mathematical practice with an assortment of examples, including data from a sequence of clinical interviews in which a student improves upon initially misleading covariational intuitions. Finally, we show how the study of intuition can yield insights for philosophers and education theorists. First, it contributes to a longstanding debate in epistemology by undermining epistemicism, the view that an agent’s degree of objectual understanding is determined exclusively by their knowledge, beliefs and credences. We argue on the contrary that intuition can contribute directly and independently to understanding. Second, we identify potential pedagogical avenues towards the development of mature intuition, highlighting strategies including adding imagery, developing associations, establishing confidence and generalizing concepts. (shrink)

Philosophers of science since Nagel have been interested in the links between intertheoretic reduction and explanation, understanding and other forms of epistemic progress. Although intertheoretic reduction is widely agreed to occur in pure mathematics as well as empirical science, the relationship between reduction and explanation in the mathematical setting has rarely been investigated in a similarly serious way. This paper examines an important particular case: the reduction of arithmetic to set theory. I claim that the reduction is unexplanatory. In defense (...) of this claim, I offer evidence from mathematical practice, and I respond to contrary suggestions due to Steinhart, Maddy, Kitcher and Quine. I then show how, even if set-theoretic reductions are generally not explanatory, set theory can nevertheless serve as a legitimate foundation for mathematics. Finally, some implications of my thesis for philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science are discussed. In particular, I suggest that some reductions in mathematics are probably explanatory, and I propose that differing standards of theory acceptance might account for the apparent lack of unexplanatory reductions in the empirical sciences. (shrink)

Is there a circular relationship between trust and ethics? Is it possible to alter their relationship, changing the perception that social actors have of them? How has trust changed in the transition from modernity to post-modernity and how does it change in times of crisis? Starting from the epistemological assumption that progress in the social sciences is determined by the change in the theoretical horizon produced by “a reformulation of metaphysical assumptions” [1] and combining this path with the relational perspective, (...) according to which “not the facts, but the relationship between the facts is what requires analysis” [2], we will examine definitions, meanings, functions and relationships between trust and ethics. Following the theoretical logical method, we will understand that trust and ethical behaviour are particular forms of gift [3] that co-own each other. As such, they are ambivalent in nature and their circle can also produce dysfunctional outcomes that depend on the ability of social systems to modify collective perceptions through forms of communication, in the awareness that distrust constitutes an ineliminable and, paradoxically, preparatory element for the restoration of the trust circle. The relational circle between gift, trust, collective ethics and personal morality does not end with distrust, but changes in a contingent way, determining perverse effects: correct behaviour could produce, unintentionally, a disaster; incorrect actions could generate unforeseen positive effects.The perverse effects cannot be defined as exceptional - as is believed in the theory of rational choice - but recurrent because daily practices are marked by an intuitive, emotional and moralistic trust circle that prevails over logical reasoning, as ascertained by both relational theory and behavioural economics. Functionalist paradigms cannot engineer and optimise the performance of trust. [1] See J. Alexander's strong programme in S. Segre, Le teorie sociologiche contemporanee, Carocci, Rome, 2019, p. 12. It is not enough to observe reality, it is necessary to interpret it, taking into account theories and traditions whose foundations have a metaphysical character. [2] F. Ferrarotti, La sociologia come analisi critica della società, in R. Cipriani, Nuovo Manuale di Sociologia, Maggioli, Sant’Arcangelo di Romagna, 2018 p. 24. [3] The classical meaning in M. Mauss, Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques, 1ª ed. 1925, revisited by G. Satta, L’ambiguità del dono. Note su dono, violenza e potere nell’ Essai di Mauss, in V. Rasini, Aggressività. Un’indagine polifonica, Mimesis, Milano 2011. (shrink)

We defend a noetic account of intramathematical explanation. On this view, a piece of mathematics is explanatory just in case it produces understanding of an appropriate type. We motivate the view by presenting some appealing features of noeticism. We then discuss and criticize the most prominent extant version of noeticism, due to Inglis and Mejía Ramos, which identifies explanatory understanding with the possession of well-organized cognitive schemas. Finally, we present a novel noetic account. On our view, explanatory understanding arises from (...) meeting specific explanatory objectives. We defend a cluster-concept account of explanatory objectives and identify four important subfamilies within the relevant network of resemblance relations. The resulting view is objectivist (in the sense that it takes explanatory success to be a matter of observer-independent fact), broader in scope than why-question-based accounts, compatible with empirical findings on experts’ explanatory judgments, and capable of generalizing (with appropriate provisos) to scientific explanation as a whole. It thus fulfills Friedman’s half-century-old demand for a general and objectivist theory which accounts for the link between explanation and understanding. (shrink)

This article argues that William James's thinking in The Varieties and elsewhere contains the view that social institutions, such as religious congregations and schools, are mediators between the private and public spheres of life, and are necessary for transforming personal feelings, ideals and beliefs into moral action. The Exercises of St Ignatius and the Just Community moral education approach serve as examples. Criticisms of the more commonly held view that James recognised only individual personal experiences as valid religious expressions are (...) marshalled. Furthermore, we argue that moral action or saintliness, the ultimate expression of religious faith according to James, is fundamentally social. The commonalities that the phenomenologies of moral action of St Ignatius and Lawrence Kohlberg have with William James's view are used to support the argument. (shrink)

Reeve's classic work provides an interpretation of Republic that makes a case for the coherence of Plato's argument.

Iglesias et al. (2025) argue that “some of the aims or ostensible goods of person-span expansion could plausibly be fulfilled in part by creating a digital doppelgänger”—that is, an AI system desig...

The problem of truth in fiction concerns how to tell whether a given proposition is true in a given fiction. Thus far, the nearly universal consensus has been that some propositions are ‘implicitly true’ in some fictions: such propositions are not expressed by any explicit statements in the relevant work, but are nevertheless held to be true in those works on the basis of some other set of criteria. I call this family of views ‘implicitism’. I argue that implicitism faces (...) serious problems, whereas the opposite view is much more plausible than has previously been thought. After mounting a limited defence of explicitism, I explore a difficult problem for the view and discuss some possible responses. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This is a teaching and learning guide to accompany "Explanation in Mathematics: Proofs and Practice".

Propositions are the result of hypostatization in accordance with the principle of the identification of indiscernibles wherever differences among inscribed or uttered statemental units are systematically ignored. Criteria for identity of propositions are, thus, to be found in each context of discourse about statemental units where qualitatively different units are treated as interchangeable. Ayer's notion of proposition as opposed to statement, Goodman's notion of replication, and the notion of constructional definition or reduction are discussed in the light of this thesis. (...) The so-called "problem of identifying propositions" is shown to be a bogus problem because the propositions simpliciter to be identified are incoherently conceived, though in the course of discussion the prospect appears that many different and limitedly applicable sets of criteria for identification of propositions relative to different discourses can be given. (shrink)

A proof P of a theorem T is transferable when a typical expert can become convinced of T solely on the basis of their prior knowledge and the information contained in P. Easwaran has argued that transferability is a constraint on acceptable proof. Meanwhile, a proof P is fixable when it’s possible for other experts to correct any mistakes P contains without having to develop significant new mathematics. Habgood-Coote and Tanswell have observed that some acceptable proofs are both fixable and (...) in need of fixing, in the sense that they contain nontrivial mistakes. The claim that acceptable proofs must be transferable seems quite plausible. The claim that some acceptable proofs need fixing seems plausible too. Unfortunately, these attractive suggestions stand in tension with one another. I argue that the transferability requirement is the problem. Acceptable proofs need only satisfy a weaker requirement I call “corrigibility”. I explain why, despite appearances, the corrigibility standard is preferable to stricter alternatives. (shrink)