The US neutrino community gathered at the Workshop on the Intermediate Neutrino Program at Brookhaven National Laboratory February 4-6, 2015 to explore opportunities in neutrino physics over the next five to ten years. Scientists from particle, astroparticle and nuclear physics participated in the workshop. The workshop examined promising opportunities for neutrino physics in the intermediate term, including possible new small to mid-scale experiments, US contributions to large experiments, upgrades to existing experiments, R&D plans and theory. The workshop was organized into (...) two sets of parallel working group sessions, divided by physics topics and technology. Physics working groups covered topics on Sterile Neutrinos, Neutrino Mixing, Neutrino Interactions, Neutrino Properties and Astrophysical Neutrinos. Technology sessions were organized into Theory, Short-Baseline Accelerator Neutrinos, Reactor Neutrinos, Detector R&D and Source, Cyclotron and Meson Decay at Rest sessions.This report summarizes discussion and conclusions from the workshop. (shrink)

'An extremely readable book that should provoke both economists and students of economic methodology to think more deeply about what they are doing.' Roger E. Backhouse, Professor of the History and Philosophy of Economics, University of BirminghamEconomic Methodology provides an accessible introduction to the subject-matter of and literature on the methodology of economics. It presents issues in economics in order to demonstrate the need for methodological awareness and debate. The core of the book then explains the content and development (...) of thought in methodology in relation to issues in economics, with an especial emphasis on the most recent thinking in the area. (shrink)

This book is parapsychological study of the meaningful coincidence of events, extrasensory perception, and similar phenomena.

In this paper, I discuss whether different interpretations of the ‘aim’ of belief—both the teleological and normative interpretations—have the resources to explain certain descriptive and normative features of suspended belief (suspension). I argue that, despite the recent efforts of theorists to extend these theories to account for suspension, they ultimately fail. The implication is that we must either develop alternative theories of belief that can account for suspension, or we must abandon the assumption that these theories ought to be able (...) to account for suspension. To close, I briefly consider some of the reasons we have in favour of pursing each of these options, and I suggest that it is worth exploring the possibility that suspension is best understood as its own attitude, independently of theories of belief’s ‘aim’. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAn essential and yet often neglected motivation of Bernard Suits’ elevation of gameplay to the ideal of human existence is his account of capacities along perfectionist lines and the function of games in eliciting them. In his work Suits treats the expression of these capacities as implicitly good and the purest expression of the human telos. Although it is a possible interpretation to take Suits’ utopian vision to mean that gameplay in his future utopia must consist of the logically inevitable (...) replaying of activities we conduct in the present for instrumental reasons, because gameplay for Suits is identical with the expression of sets of capacities specifically elicited by game rules, it is much more likely that he intends utopian gameplay to be an endless series of carefully crafted opportunities for the elicitation of special capacities, and thus embody his ideal of existence. This article therefore provides a new lens for understanding both... (shrink)

Reprint. Originally published: 1959; 1st Princeton/Bollingen pbk. ed. published: 1970.

Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the benefits of decreased health risk from others’ compliance with policies despite not contributing to or even undermining public safety themselves. At the same time, humans appear to carry a suite of evolved psychological mechanisms aimed at curbing (...) free riding in order to ensure the continued provision of public goods, which can be leveraged to develop more effective measures to promote compliance with regulations. We also highlight factors beyond free riding that reduce compliance rates, such as the emergence of conspiratorial thinking, which seriously undermine the effectiveness of measures to suppress free riding. Together, the current paper outlines the social dynamics that occur in public goods dilemmas involving the spread of infectious disease, highlights the utility and limits of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches for COVID-19 management, and suggests novel directions based on emerging challenges to cooperation. (shrink)

Proposed quantum experiments in deep space will be able to explore quantum information issues in regimes where relativistic effects are important. In this essay, we argue that a proper extension of quantum information theory into the relativistic domain requires the expression of all informational notions in terms of quantum field theoretic (QFT) concepts. This task requires a working and practicable theory of QFT measurements. We present the foundational problems in constructing such a theory, especially in relation to longstanding causality and (...) locality issues in the foundations of QFT. Finally, we present the ongoing Quantum Temporal Probabilities program for constructing a measurement theory that (i) works, in principle, for any QFT, (ii) allows for a first- principles investigation of all relevant issues of causality and locality, and (iii) it can be directly applied to experiments of current interest. (shrink)

ABSTRACTI argue that the apparently exclusive choice between Suits’ utopia of gameplay and death by suicide is a false dilemma, one which obscures a ‘third way’ of positive boredom. Further, I offe...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Reviewed by Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers by Brian C. Ribeiro Donald C. Ainslie Brian C. Ribeiro. Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers. Brill: Leiden, 2021. Pp. 165. Hardback, $154.00. Brian C. Ribeiro’s Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers is a charming and quirky investigation of his three titular skeptics. It is perhaps best understood as a skeptical investigation of skepticism. By that I mean that, like a good Pyrrhonist, Ribeiro explains how (...) things appear to him without claiming to lay down a doctrine or dogma. His topic is how and why skepticism still matters (7). And he suggests that those who are moved by skeptical arguments can learn intellectual modesty from them and thereby achieve a degree of philosophical “calmness of soul” (141).Ribeiro approaches his three figures by taking the cogency of their skeptical arguments for granted. There is little investigation of why these philosophers call various beliefs into question, and his concern is rather what remains once the skeptical doubts are taken on board. Because what he calls “Pyrrhonizing” philosophers reveal that large swaths of our beliefs lack epistemic merit, they also show us how we are not fully rational creatures in our everyday lives. In the case of Sextus, Ribeiro’s focus is on the famous question of whether skeptics can live their skepticism once they have actually suspended all belief. With Sextus, as with Montaigne and Hume, Ribeiro opts for the more radical of the interpretive options; he is not persuaded by Michael Frede’s suggestion that Pyrrhonists restrict their suspension only to abstruse matters, not the everyday (51). But even if we follow the “four-fold way” (20–23) that Sextus offers us as guides for life—the directives of nature, feelings, custom, and expertise—Ribeiro still thinks we will inevitably fall back into belief. He concludes that the original Pyrrhonists should be read aspirationally: insofar as we develop our capacities [End Page 517] to argue on both sides of every question and thus are able to suspend judgment, to that extent we will achieve tranquility. In the case of Montaigne, Ribeiro focuses on his Christian fideism. Once he recognizes the incapacity of reason to resolve intellectual problems, he falls back on faith. And Ribeiro argues that the Catholic flavor of this faith is simply a reflection of Montaigne’s surroundings. In a different community, he could just as easily have embraced a different faith. The heart of the book concerns Hume, whom Ribeiro discusses in three chapters, as opposed to the one each devoted to Sextus and Montaigne. In keeping with his interpretive preferences, Ribeiro’s Hume is a radical skeptic, though he acknowledges the significant yet “utterly perplexing” (95n22) naturalist strains that are also present. Ribeiro takes the resulting tension to be insoluble (98), though I was not convinced. Consider that, in both the Treatise and the Enquiry, Hume uses causal reasoning to investigate causal reasoning. He learns that our ideas are caused by prior impressions; that repeated experience of conjoint events causes us to associate our ideas of similar events; and so on. In the Treatise, he concludes the argument that association is at the root of such causal reasoning by presenting a set of rules, a “logic,” for it. The argument is not as such skeptical, though when Hume “recasts” it in the first Enquiry, he does so in terms of “sceptical doubts” and a “sceptical solution.” In the Treatise, “total” and “extravagant” skepticism come into play only as “systems of philosophy” that Hume uses to shed light on his own core commitments. The problem, I think, is that Ribeiro tends to read Hume a little too literally, as if he is himself falling prey to the skeptical upheaval of the conclusion to the first book of the Treatise, or the final section of the first Enquiry. But I would suggest that Hume is rather deploying the rhetoric of skepticism in these discussions, using it for his ultimate philosophical ends (a point that is especially clear in Ribeiro’s favorite of Hume’s works, the Dialogues). He is showing his reader how his naturalistic philosophical project is itself rooted in human nature, and thus does not yield insight into the intrinsic structure of... (shrink)

In his recent work, David DeGrazia (2020) explores the possibility of insect sentience, focusing on bees as a case study. He advances a novel evolutionary approach, arguing that, from an evolutionary perspective, it’s more likely that bees are sentient than insentient., insofar as bees (allegedly) would have a selective advantage if they are motivated—in the form of feeling—to achieve their aims. His argument assumes two questionable claims: (1) if X is a selective advantage for an organism, then the organism likely (...) has X, and (2) conscious creatures would have a selective advantage if they are sentient. I challenge both claims, and consequently call into question DeGrazia’s claim that we have an evolutionary-based reason to attribute sentience to bees (and other insects). (shrink)

Background: The role of nurses as patient advocates is one which is well recognised, supported and the subject of a broad body of literature. One of the key impediments to the role of the nurse as patient advocate is the lack of support and legislative frameworks. Within a broad range of activities constituting advocacy, whistleblowing is currently the subject of much discussion in the light of the Mid Staffordshire inquiry in the United Kingdom (UK) and other instances of patient mistreatment. (...) As a result steps to amend existing whistleblowing legislation where it exists or introduce it where it does not are underway. Objective: This paper traces the development of legislation for advocacy. Conclusion: The authors argue that while any legislation supporting advocacy is welcome, legislation on its own will not encourage or enable nurses to whistleblow. (shrink)

Moral reasoning is as fallible as reasoning in any other cognitive domain, but we often behave as if it were not. I argue for a form of epistemically-based moral humility, in which we downgrade our moral beliefs in the face of moral disagreement. My argument combines work in metaethics and moral intuitionism with recent developments in epistemology. I argue against any demands for deep self-sufficiency in moral reasoning. Instead, I argue that we need to take into account significant socially sourced (...) information, especially as a check for failures on our own moral intuitions and reasoning. -/- First, I argue for an epistemically plausible version of moral intuitionism, based on recent work in epistemic entitlement and epistemic warrant. Second, I argue that getting clear on the epistemic basis shows the defeasibility of moral judgment. Third, I argue the existence of moral disagreement is a reason to reduce our certainty in moral judgment. Fourth, I argue that this effect is not a violation of norms of autonomy for moral judgment. (shrink)

Стаття С. Присухіна «Іван Павло ІІ про логіку діалогу між Католицькою Церквою та ісламом» присвячена філософськобогословським напрацюванням Папи Римського Івана Павла ІІ щодо аналізу змістовних характеристик поняття «діалог між католицизмом і ісламом», а також логіки його здійснення в непростому й суперечливому сьогоденні.

Abstract:This article is about how a very specific section of the Rio Grande was transformed through human intervention over the course of the twentieth century. Geographically, I focus on the stretch of river between and around the twin border towns of El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. This is an important area of analysis not only because of the historic importance of the urban complex to U.S.-Mexico relations, but also because it is a desert. I analyze two major river (...) engineering projects, one in the 1930s, the other in the 1960s, as well as the transformation of the water itself due to increased toxicity beginning in the 1990s. In sum, the river was straightened, completely relocated, lined in concrete, and poisoned. No other place on the entire international divide underwent such extreme changes. I explain this by arguing that both political forces and environmental conditions combined to produce such totalizing interventions in the riverine ecosystem. I also argue that these processes reversed the age-old meaning of water in the desert. Historically, water in the desert has been associated with life and biodiversity, but over the course of the twentieth century the desert section of the Rio Grande border was converted into a deadened zone. (shrink)

This PhD responds to a two fold problem with the philosophy of design and the practice of design. The philosophical problem is stated as the discrepancy between a dominant philosophical framework that orders the world according to eternal essences and the actual conditions of the world in which we exist: the conditions of becoming and of flux. Commencing with a critique of the western metaphysical tradition of statics this research project proposes that we need to find a way of describing (...) an evolutionary model of practice, and by so doing to provide a revitalised narration of process. Consequently, the PhD explores the meanings of process through a critical examination of an ensemble of projects created by the author. Within this framework, a number of questions are posed in order to explore the proposition of a process practice. These questions are: What is process? How does one think process? Indeed, how do we get to grasp change? What are the consequences of process thinking on the practices of design, their fields of operation, and their productions? And, how can the thematising of process contribute to the design of the constructed environment, as well as reconfigure the practices of design? This thematising of process is argued to involve a necessary address to the constitutive and interrelated characteristics of process: space/time, movement, change, form and matter. Such an address is also seen to problematise the status of the object, the paradigms of representation, the modes of creation, the economies of exchange, and the structures of community, and to offer a modality of practice which would re-imagine the forms of social exchange to offer an ethical alternative to the tyranny of supply and demand, and thereby reconfigure the potential for dwelling. Making an overview of the discourses and practices engaging with theories of becoming, this thesis argues that almost all of these re-inscribe statics and that consequently the practice of design seems to drag behind our understanding of the world. Through a meditation on dis/appearance, in which the dynamics of being and becoming and the restless ambiguity of the gap are examined, the work establishes a process vocabulary, and makes clear through a material practice, the domains of process thinking, its inclinations, and the kinds of operations and procedures that flourish there. Foregrounding the fertile character of process practice, the PhD then proceeds to introduce notions of the movement-form, the duration-form, the transformational-form, the geometry of encounter, and to argue for physical form as an in-movement poise. Advocating new modes of approach and of attentiveness, and demonstrating new generative methods, this PhD argues that process thinking is not simply an operational stance, but an ethical position that identifies a field of care, and that consequently the design practices be expanded by taking seriously the relationship between process thinking and place making. Thus, this thesis concludes by advocating a mode of place making which, rather than reproduce planned environments as systems of control, configures place as the discursive contested place of encounter and exchange. (shrink)

Martin Luther King, Jr drew upon his early grounding in family and church to forge a praxis of egalitarian justice in the rigidly segregated American South of his youth. King?s ethical outlook was eclectic, reflecting the influence of such figures as Mays, Davis, Rauschenbusch, Niebuhr, Thurman and Gandhi, alongside such doctrines as personalism and liberalism, nationalism and realism. Yet King?s subsequent academic study more nearly enhanced than restructured his early, formative exposure to black church and community. King became committed to (...) nonviolence, not as passive resistance, but as an active, aggressive, individual and self?improving solution to problems of gross injustice in society. Nonviolence for King was not an end, but a means, to the achievement of what he called ?Beloved Community? (shrink)