The concept of structure, operation, and functionality, as they may be understood by clinicians or researchers using neural transplantation techniques, are briefly defined. Following Stein & Glasier, we emphasize that the question of whether an intracerebral graft is really functional should be addressed not only in terms of what such a graft does in a given brain structure, but also in terms of what it does at the level of the organism.

The emergence of modern sciences in the seventeenth century profoundly renewed our understanding of Nature. For the last three centuries new ideas of Nature have been continuously developed by theology, politics, economics, and science, especially the sciences of the material world. The situation is even more unstable today, now that we have entered an ecological mutation of unprecedented scale. Some call it the Anthropocene, but it is best described as a new climatic regime. And a new regime it certainly is, (...) since the many unexpected connections between human activity and the natural world oblige every one of us to reopen the earlier notions of Nature and redistribute what had been packed inside. So the question now arises: what will replace the old ways of looking at Nature? This book explores a potential candidate proposed by James Lovelock when he chose the name "Gaia" for the fragile, complex system through which living phenomena modify the Earth. The fact that he was immediately misunderstood proves simply that his readers have tried to fit this new notion into an older frame, transforming Gaia into a single organism, a kind of giant thermostat, some sort of New Age goddess, or even divine Providence. In this series of lectures on "natural religion", Bruno Latour argues that the complex and ambiguous figure of Gaia offers, on the contrary, an ideal way to disentangle the ethical, political, theological, and scientific aspects of the now obsolete notion of Nature. He lays the groundwork for a future collaboration among scientists, theologians, activists, and artists as they, and we, begin to adjust to the new climatic regime. (shrink)

Abstract: The standard picture of rationality requires that the agent acts so as to realize her most preferred alternative in the light of her own desires and beliefs. However, there are circumstances where such an agent can predict that she will act against her preferences. The story of Ulysses and the Sirens is the paradigmatic example of such cases. In those circumstances the orthodoxy requires the agent to be ‘sophisticated’. That is to say, she should take into account her (...) expected future choices and prevent her future self to act in certain ways. She should ‘bind’ herself to a certain course of action. This is a form of causal commitment. It is generally recognized that this form of self-commitment is the only one that is available to a rational agent. Rational commitment, where the agent gives herself a reason to act in a certain way rather than making herself act in that way, is considered not feasible. In this paper, I question this verdict. I sketch the broad outlines of a model of rational commitment, which takes as its starting point Michael Bratman’s ‘planning theory’ of intention. There are two important objections against this theory (one by John Broome and one by the Dutch philosopher Govert den Hartogh.) Both criticisms claim that such a theory is a form of ‘bootstrapping’ reasons for action into existence. In the remainder of the paper, I will defend the theory against these objections. This way, I hope to establish that defending the feasibility of rational commitment is not an obvious mistake. (shrink)

Are there ‘self-referential’ propositions? That is, propositions that say of themselves that they have a certain property, such as that of being false. There can seem reason to doubt that there are. At the same time, there are a number of reasons why it matters. For suppose that there are indeed no such propositions. One might then hope that while paradoxes such as the Liar show that many plausible principles about sentences must be given up, no such fate will (...) befall principles about propositions. But the existence of self-referential propositions would dash such hopes. Further, the existence of such propositions would also seem to challenge the widespread claim that Liar sentences fail to express propositions. The aim of this paper is thus to settle the question–at least given an assumption. In particular, I argue that if propositions are structured, then self-referential propositions exist. (shrink)

Necessitism, Contingentism, and Theory Equivalence is a dissertation on issues in higher-order modal metaphysics. Consider a modal higher-order language with identity in which the universal quantifier is interpreted as expressing universal quantification and the necessity operator is interpreted as expressing metaphysical necessity. The main question addressed in the dissertation concerns the correct theory formulated in this language. A different question that also takes centre stage in the dissertation is what it takes for theories to be equivalent.The whole dissertation consists of (...) an extended argument in defence of the truth of two seemingly inconsistent higher-order modal theories, specifically: 1.Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, a theory based on Plantinga’s [1] modal metaphysics that is committed to, among other things, the contingent being of some individuals and the necessary being of all possible higher-order entities;2.Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, a theory advocated by Williamson [3] which is committed to, among other things, the necessary being of every possible individual as well as of every possible higher-order entity.Part of the case for these theories’ joint truth relies on defences of the following metaphysical theses: Thorough Serious Actualism, the thesis that no things could have been related while being nothing, and Higher-Order Necessitism, the thesis that necessarily, every higher-order entity is necessarily something. It is shown that Thorough Serious Actualism and Higher-Order Necessitism are both implicit commitments of very weak logical theories. The defence of Higher-Order Necessitism constitutes a powerful challenge to Stalnaker’s [2] Thorough Contingentism, a theory committed to, among other things, the view that there could have been some individuals as well as some entities of any higher-order that could have been nothing.In the dissertation it is argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are in fact equivalent, even if they appear to be jointly inconsistent. The case for this claim relies on the Synonymy account, a novel account of theory equivalence developed and defended in the dissertation. According to this account, theories are equivalent just in case they have the same commitments and conception of logical space.By way of defending the Synonymy account’s adequacy, the account is applied to the debate between noneists, proponents of the view that some things do not exist, and Quineans, proponents of the view that to exist just is to be some thing. The Synonymy account is shown to afford a more nuanced and better understanding of that debate by revealing that what noneists and Quineans are really disagreeing about is what expressive resources are available to appropriately describe the world.By coupling a metatheoretical result with tools from the philosophy of language, it is argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are synonymous theories, and so, by the lights of the Synonymy account, equivalent. Given the defence of their extant commitments made in the dissertation, it is concluded that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are both correct. A corollary of this result is that the dispute between Plantingans and Williamsonians is, in an important sense, merely verbal. For if two theories are equivalent, then they “require the same of the world for their truth.”Thus, the results of the dissertation reveal that if one speaks as a Plantingan while advocating Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, or as a Williamsonian while advocating Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, then one will not go wrong. Notwithstanding, one will still go wrong if one speaks as a Plantingan while advocating Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, or as a Williamsonian while advocating Plantingan Moderate Contingentism.On the basis of a conception of the individual constants and predicates of second-order modal languages as strongly Millian, i.e., as having actually existing entities as their semantic values, in the appendix are presented second-order modal logics consistent with Stalnaker’s Thorough Contingentism. Furthermore, it is shown there that these logics are strong enough for applications of higher-order modal logic in mathematics, a result that constitutes a reply to an argument to the contrary by Williamson [3]. Finally, these logics are proven to be complete relative to particular “thoroughly contingentist” classes of models. (shrink)

Today's physics has led to incredible advances in the technology we use in daily life - from cell phones and GPS systems to PET scans and more. Current theories in physics have been amazingly effective in practical terms. Yet all is far from well: the two foundational concepts in physics - Quantum Theory and General Relativity - are incompatible with each other, and observations of the universe show that our theories are incomplete - at best. While physicists have tried to (...) paper over this impasse by inventing dark matter and dark energy, they remain unobserved mysteries. Adding fuel to the fire of current crises, artificial intelligence threatens to replace our most cherished theories and procedures with arcane algorithms. Worse yet perhaps, the public understands physics poorly, either taking it for granted or fearing and rejecting it completely. Physicists dream of a new universal theory that will completely change how we see our world, much as Einstein did with relativity and Newton with gravity. Likewise, society loves the romantic notion of a single genius heroically creating a massive paradigm shift. Still, is this scenario likely today? Perhaps the next steps in physics will be incremental rather than gigantic. In Physics in Crisis, Bruno Mansoulié uses simple language, insightful examples, and his personal experience as a working physicist to address these fundamental questions and reflect on how today's crises in physics might be solved. (shrink)

The French, it is well known, love revolutions, political, scientific or philosophical. There is nothing they like more than a radical upheaval of the past, an upheaval so complete that a new tabula rasa is levelled, on which a new history can be built. None of our Prime Ministers starts his mandate without promising to write on a new blank page or to furnish a complete change in values and even, for some, in life. Each researcher would think of him (...) or herself as a failure, if he or she did not make such a complete change in the discipline that nothing will hereafter be the same. As to the philosophers they feed, from Descartes up to Foucault's days, on radical cuts, on ‘coupure épistémologique’, on complete subversion of everything which has been thought in the past by everybody. No French thinker, indeed no student of philosophy, would seriously contemplate doing anything short of a complete revolution in theories. To hesitate, to respect the past, would be to compromise, to be a funk, or worse, to be eclectic like a vulgar Anglo-Saxon! (shrink)

In the last few years, researchers have begun to investigate the emergence of novel forms of human communication in the laboratory. I survey this growing line of research, which may be called experimental semiotics, from three distinct angles. First, I situate the new approach in its theoretical and historical context. Second, I review a sample of studies that exemplify experimental semiotics. Third, I present an empirical study that illustrates how the new approach can help us understand the socio‐cognitive underpinnings of (...) human communication. The main conclusion of the paper will be that, by reproducing micro samples of historical processes in the laboratory, experimental semiotics offers new powerful tools for investigating human communication as a form of joint action. (shrink)

This article argues that using Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority to reject philosophical anarchism can be affected by political anarchism. Whereas philosophical anarchism only denies the authority of the state, political anarchism claims that anarchism is a better alternative to the state. Raz’s theory holds that an institution has authority if it enables people to better conform with reason. I argue that there are cases where anarchism is an existing alternative to the state and better fulfils this condition. Consequently, (...) in these cases, anarchist groups and societies and not the state have legitimate authority. When anarchism is not an existing alternative to the state, the state will, under Raz’s theory, have some legitimate authority, but that authority will be limited because anarchism remains a better possible alternative to the state. To support the political anarchist claim I discuss the anarchist collectives during the Spanish civil war, which I argue are an example of anarchism as an existing alternative to the state that better fulfils Raz’s service conception and also provide suggestive evidence that anarchism is in general a better possible alternative. I also discuss the relationship between political anarchism and authority and I argue that despite some tension they are not irreconcilable. I conclude that the interesting anarchist challenge for political theorists is political not philosophical. (shrink)

The Italian «constitutional compromise» between the liberal, catholic, and socialist-communist traditions and the «fordist-keynesian compromise» between capital and labor are two frequent set expressions. They are often put together, and sometimes overlapped, insofar as they share an emphasis on the central role of labor, the former putting it at the very foundation of the Republic, the latter at the core of the virtuous circle of mass production and mass consumption. Starting from a discussion of these formulas, the essay will (...) propose some lines of research for the history of the Italian Republic, not without significance for contemporary political discourse. (shrink)

This book is an edited collection of papers from international experts in philosophy and psychology concerned with time. The collection aims to bridge the gap between these disciplines by focussing on five key themes and providing philosophical and psychological perspectives on each theme. -/- The first theme is the concept of time. The discussion ranges from the folk concept of time to the notion of time in logic, philosophy and psychology. The second theme concerns the notion of present in the (...) philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and psychology. The third theme relates to continuity and flow of time in mind. One of the key questions in this section is how the apparent temporal continuity of conscious experience relates to the possibly discrete character of underlying neural processes. The fourth theme is the timing of experiences, with a focus on the perception of simultaneity and illusions of temporal order. Such effects are treated as test cases for hypotheses about the relationship between the subjective temporal order of experience and the objective order of neural events. The fifth and the final theme of the volume is time and intersubjectivity. This section examines the role of time in interpersonal coordination and in the development of social skills. -/- The collection will appeal to both psychologists and philosophers, but also to researchers from other disciplines who seek an accessible overview of the research on time in psychology and philosophy. (shrink)

Introduction: The potential therapeutic efficacy of real-time fMRI Neurofeedback has received increasing attention in a variety of psychological and neurological disorders and as a tool to probe cognition. Despite its growing popularity, the success rate varies significantly, and the underlying neural mechanisms are still a matter of debate. The question whether an individually tailored framework positively influences neurofeedback success remains largely unexplored.Methods: To address this question, participants were trained to modulate the activity of a target brain region, the visual motion (...) area hMT+/V5, based on the performance of three imagery tasks with increasing complexity: imagery of a static dot, imagery of a moving dot with two and with four opposite directions. Participants received auditory feedback in the form of vocalizations with either negative, neutral or positive valence. The modulation thresholds were defined for each participant according to the maximum BOLD signal change of their target region during the localizer run.Results: We found that 4 out of 10 participants were able to modulate brain activity in this region-of-interest during neurofeedback training. This rate of success is consistent with the neurofeedback literature. Whole-brain analysis revealed the recruitment of specific cortical regions involved in cognitive control, reward monitoring, and feedback processing during neurofeedback training. Individually tailored feedback thresholds did not correlate with the success level. We found region-dependent neuromodulation profiles associated with task complexity and feedback valence.Discussion: Findings support the strategic role of task complexity and feedback valence on the modulation of the network nodes involved in monitoring and feedback control, key variables in neurofeedback frameworks optimization. Considering the elaborate design, the small sample size here tested impairs external validity in comparison to our previous studies. Future work will address this limitation. Ultimately, our results contribute to the discussion of individually tailored solutions, and justify further investigation concerning volitional control over brain activity. (shrink)

The present essay analyzes the understanding of epistemological behaviorism as a holism without metaphysical presuppositions, from Richard Rorty (1931-2007). In order to do so, we will start from the idea of ​​Wilfrid Sellars’ “Myth of the Given”, as a philosophical impulse that Rorty appropriates to develop his notion that epistemological behaviorism would be, at best, a holism to create justification contexts. Initially, we will propose a discussion on the question of psychological nominalism, presented in Margutti's text, Skepticism, pragmatism (...) and Sellars' critique of the “Myth of the Given”, observing how this assumption constitutes a Rortyan critique to reach the emphasis of the proposal. Next, we will emphasize the understanding that the neopragmatist philosopher has of what it is for him, the notion of epistemological behaviorism, without metaphysical connotations, one in which he starts from the vision of sensitive and epistemic data to explain our action with the world, until one that emphasizes the idea that it would be better perceived as a holism, that is, a language game that says what the best game can be played, through a practice of social justification. Our work relies on the theoretical contribution of Rorty (1979), Margutti (2000), among others. Our study indicates that in order to detach himself from metaphysical explanations and (re)describe epistemological behaviorism, Rorty points out a way out through linguistic apparatuses that provide an environment in social practices that allow going beyond sensitive impressions or cognitive data, clarifying how the proposal can be fuzzy if it aligns with justification rather than explanation. (shrink)

In the Freedom essay, Schelling charges that (1) idealism fails to grasp human freedom’s distinctiveness and that (2) this failure undermines idealism's attempt to refute pantheism, as exemplified by Spinoza. This raises two questions, which I will answer in turn: what, for Schelling, is distinctive of human freedom; and how does the idealists’ failure to grasp it render them unable to refute pantheism? To answer these questions, I will reconstruct Schelling’s argument that freedom has the distinctness of being (...) the unconditioned condition of the world’s intelligibility. My reconstruction will illustrate how Schelling’s notion of freedom as primal will grounds the alleged primacy of practical reason as Kant and Fichte conceive it. I will then consider three objections to Schelling’s argument. Throughout, I will develop the Schellingian idea that freedom is enacted in an unprethinkable decision that cannot be anticipated by any law or principle. (shrink)

Logical omniscience states that the knowledge set of ordinary rational agents is closed for its logical consequences. Although epistemic logicians in general judge this principle unrealistic, there is no consensus on how it should be restrained. The challenge is conceptual: we must find adequate criteria for separating obvious logical consequences (consequences for which epistemic closure certainly holds) from non-obvious ones. Non-classical game-theoretic semantics has been employed in this discussion with relative success. On the one hand, with urn semantics [15], an (...) expressive fragment of classical game semantics that weakens the dependence relations between quantifiers occurring in a formula, we can formalize, for a broad array of examples, epistemic scenarios in which an individual ignores the validity of some first-order sentence. On the other hand, urn semantics offers a disproportionate restriction of logical omniscience. Therefore, an improvement of this system is needed to obtain a better solution of the problem. In this paper, I argue that our linguistic competence in using quantifiers requires a sort of basic hypothetical logical knowledge that can be formulated as follows: when inquiring after the truth-value of ∀xφ, an individual might be unaware of all substitutional instances this sentence accepts, but at least she must know that, if an element a is given, then ∀xφ holds only if φ(x/a) is true. This thesis accepts game-theoretic formalization in terms of a refinement of urn semantics. I maintain that the system so obtained (US+) affords an improved solution of the logical omniscience problem. To do this, I characterize first-order theoremhood in US+. As a consequence of this result, we will see that the ideal reasoner depicted by US+ only knows the validity of first-order formulas whose Herbrand witnesses can be trivially found, a fact that provides strong evidence that our refinement of urn semantics captures a relevant sense of logical obviousness. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to discuss the relations between psychology and politics that guide the action of the different political positions. The starting point will be an analysis of the proposal of the political scientist Mark Lilla to consider the "reactionary spirit" as a position structurally linked to an anti-progressivism, which allows also, by contrast, to discuss the progressive positions. This analysis is anchored in the articulation between politics and temporality, understood here as one of the elements (...) that outline a psychology of conservatism. It helps to redescribe significant features of contemporary political dilemmas, offering, for example, a distinction between the reactionary and the conservative position, as well as defining features of the worldview of the reactionary and, consequently, clues to understanding the rise of the extreme right. (shrink)

Recently, Linda Zagzebski has proposed an “exemplarist virtue theory.” Her idea is to define moral terms such as “right act”, “duty”, “good end”, “good motive”, “virtue” etc. by referring directly to exemplars we admire upon reflection such as Confucius, Jesus Christ, St. Francis, St. Elisabeth etc. In this article, I will first present the main theses of Zagzebski’s theory and relate them to the program of virtue ethics. Secondly, I will confront her theory with what I call “the (...) Kant Complaint” according to which one could give no “worse advice to morality than by trying to get it from examples”, and thirdly, I will argue that Zagzebski has the resources to counter several versions of this complaint. (shrink)

Plausibly, mathematical claims are true, but the fundamental furniture of the world does not include mathematical objects. This can be made sense of by providing mathematical claims with paraphrases, which make clear how the truth of such claims does not require the fundamental existence of mathematical objects. This paper explores the consequences of this type of position for explanatory structure. There is an apparently straightforward relationship between this sort of structure, and the logical sort: i.e. logically complex claims are explained (...) by logically simpler ones. For example, disjunctions are explained by their (true) disjuncts, while generalizations are explained by their (true) instances. This would seem as plausible in the case of mathematics as elsewhere. Also, it would seem to be something that the anti-realist approaches at issue would want to preserve. It will be argued, however, that these approaches cannot do this: they lead not merely to violations of the familiar principles relating logical and explanatory structure, but even to reversals of these. That is, there are cases where generalizations explain their instances, or disjunctions their disjuncts. (shrink)

The world has not always been there. At least not in philosophy. This two-part article examines the complex interplay of concepts among which the idea of the world appeared, and analyses the characteristics that allow it to play a central role in the space of philosophy. These are found to be fundamentally two. First, its capacity to identify with the idea of a closed, ordered totality, at the same time as it erodes the consistency of the latter and opens the (...) philosophical space onto a positive use of the idea of indetermination. And second, the way in which it operates inside several well-ordered philosophical systems as a point of confusion: as a blurred point that lacks the type of clarity and distinction normally required of philosophical concepts, and that nonetheless appears to be important enough not to be expelled from philosophy. The first part of the article, published in this issue, reconstructs some of the coordinates within which the problematic notion of the world comes to appear. The planned second part will investigate how the idea of the world comes to play a central role within contemporary philosophy by allowing for a new articulation between the idea of the universal and the idea of totality – which produces a cascade of effects, the most notable of which are a new articulation of the idea of subject, and of the relation between philosophy and praxis. (shrink)

The extent of the originality and relevance of Kant's ethics is undeniable. But it is not so evident the fact that the Kant's moral philosophy as a whole was not suddenly built, but it was dependent on a profound debate with the philosophical tradition, especially with the German scholastic tradition, a debate which led to the assimilation or appropriation of several of its aspects. With special regard to the history of the development of the categorical imperative, it is not possible (...) to be indifferent to the influence of the practical philosophy of the Enlightenment German philosopher and theologian, Christian August Crusius. The aim of this article is thus to try to identify, taking into account the distinction of praxis in problematic and moral and the contrast between prudence and morality, some points of intersection between the moral philosophy of Crusius and Kant in its origin. (shrink)

Throughout his career, Schelling assigns knowledge of the absolute first principle of philosophy to intellectual intuition. Schelling's doctrine of intellectual intuition raises two important questions for interpreters. First, given that his doctrine undergoes several changes before and after his identity philosophy, to what extent can he be said to “hold onto” the same “sense” of it by the 1830s, as he claims? Second, given that his doctrine of intellectual intuition restricts absolute idealism to what he calls a “science of reason”, (...) which he says cannot prove the absolute’s existence, what other doctrine does he require in order to prove this? I will answer these questions by tracing the shifts in Schelling’s doctrine of intellectual intuition from the 1790s to the 1830s and drawing out its evolving methodological role within his science of intelligibility. (shrink)

Here are two plausible ideas about belief. First: beliefs are our means of storing information. Second: if we believe something, then we are willing to use it in reasoning. But in this paper I introduce a puzzle that seems to show that these cannot both be right. The solution, I argue, is a new picture, on which there is a kind of belief for each idea. An account of these two kinds of belief is offered in terms of two components: (...) a relatively stable one, which represents our information; and a more variable one, which represents what we are taking seriously. I also consider the possibility of solving the puzzle by less radical means; and an alternative argument for the proposed account of belief in terms of considerations from desire. (shrink)

While the idea that philosophy requires self-transformation is historically pervasive, it exerts considerable influence on the post-Kantians who first aim to systematize Kant’s idealism by grounding it on a first principle. In the 1790s, Fichte and Schelling offer competing accounts of the self-transformation that they regard as essential to positing a first principle. Their accounts raise two central questions. First, what makes this kind of self-transformation possible? Second, are there different possible expressions of philosophical self-transformation? In what follows, I (...) class='Hi'>will articulate the Fichtean and Schellingian answers to these central questions. For Fichte, the one who summons me to posit a first principle makes possible my philosophical self-transformation, although the latter has an exclusively idealist expression in that I can only genuinely posit the I as first principle, which is to say that philosophical self-transformation depends on mutual recognition and vindicates precisely one philosophical system (Section 1). For Schelling, a brute act of will makes possible my philosophical self-transformation, although the latter has either an idealist or a realist expression in that I can genuinely posit either the I or the not-I as first principle, which is to say that philosophical self-transformation does not depend on mutual recognition and vindicates one of two possible philosophical systems (Section 2). Thus, whereas Fichtean self-transformation is recognitive and non-pluralistic, Schellingian self-transformation is pluralistic and non-recognitive. I conclude with a discussion of how Jacobi poses a challenge to Fichte’s and Schelling’s answers to the two central questions (Section 3). (shrink)

LaFollette proposed that the best way to protect children from abuse and neglect caused by their parents would be to implement parental licenses to prospective parents. In this paper, I re-evaluate his proposal by looking at various facts and data related to child abuse and neglect. It will be suggested that (a) parenting as a profession does not satisfy the third of LaFollette’s criteria for the introduction of licenses, which is “The benefits of the licensing program outweigh any theoretical (...) reasons against it” (LaFollette 2010, 328), (b) it would subject too many people to unnecessary tests and (c) parenting cannot be compared to other professions licenses are usually issued for. (shrink)

A precursor to the hard problem of consciousness confronts nihilism. Like physicalism, nihilism collides with the first-personal fact of what perception and action are like. Unless this problem is solved, nature’s inclusion of conscious experience will remain, as Chalmers warns the physicalist, an “unanswered question” and, as Jacobi chides the nihilist, “completely inexplicable". One advantage of Kant’s Copernican turn is to dismiss the question that imposes this hard problem. We need not ask how nature is accompanied by the first-person (...) standpoint because “I think” is an apperceptive form of thinking that must be able to accompany any cognition of nature. Kant’s formal conception of apperception worries Fichte in his Nova Methodo lectures. This conception arguably cannot exhaust the ground of experience, for it does not show why we posit objects “at all". For Fichte, it is our agency that first opens a world of objects, viz., as subjects, means, ends, and obstacles. In what follows, I argue that, for Fichte, the I poses no hard problem because it collides exclusively with nihilistic views like Spinozism, which are refuted by a properly transcendental idealist conception of apperception, according to which the first-person standpoint is the absolute ground of our experience of nature. If transcendental idealism refutes nihilism, nature is no more explicable than that there is something it is like for me to perceive and act. In Section 1, I show why Kantian apperception is necessary for possible experience. In Section 2, I reconstruct Fichte’s argument that a modified conception of apperception refutes guises of nihilism, thereby solving the hard problem of consciousness. In Section 3, I suggest that transcendental idealism undermines Chalmers’ proposed solution to and Dennett’s dismissal of this problem. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to present a distinct interpretation of the moral problem in young Kant's major writings, namely, Preisschrift and Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime. In contrast to the traditional reading, I will try to stress, that from analysis of the relation between the formal and material aspects of morality, we are able to verify that there is, indeed, underlying these writings, a rational demand of ethics. Therefore, we can remark that (...) these writings, more than a mere reproduction of British morality, represent a moment of transition in which Kant frees himself from scholastic influence, to investigate in another way the primary concept of moral obligation. (shrink)

Ethics and robotics in the fourth industrial revolution The current industrial revolution, characterised by a pervasive spread of technologies and robotic systems, also brings with it an economic, social, cultural and anthropological revolution. Work spaces will be reshaped over time, giving rise to new challenges for human‒machine interaction. Robotics is hereby inserted in a working context in which robotic systems and cooperation with humans call into question the principles of human responsibility, distributive justice and dignity of work. In particular, (...) the responsibilities for using a robotic system in a surgical context will be discussed, along with possible problems of medium- or long-term technological unemployment to be tackled on the basis of shared concepts of distributive justice. Finally, the multiple dimensions of human dignity in the working context are dealt with in terms of dignity of work, dignity at work and dignity in human‒machine interaction. (shrink)

Theological thinking is hard. It takes various forms depending on its object of reflection, and needs to be doctrinally informed, contextually appropriate and methodologically consistent. Theological thinking about evolutionary creation meets all said conditions and restrictions on some sort of a larger-than-usual scale. I, thus, introduce a thinking tool – intuition pump, as Daniel Dennett calls it – that can help us theologically contemplate evolutionary creation. This approach aims to put together and to combine evolution and creation within the context (...) of the structure and form of Dennett’s proposed methodology and thought experiments using at one instance Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. This intuition pump has its implications and effects in other theological domains (Trinity, Christology and Sacramentology) but its natural context lies within theology of creation. I will start by presenting Dennett’s heterophenomenological method for scientific research of consciousness, stretching our theological imagination by using it. This thinking tool enables us to see this world as God’s heterophenomenological world. At the same time, it enables us to recognize and confirm intrinsic properties or essences in nature and it warrant thinking about historicity of Adam and Eve. (shrink)

During his Jena period, Fichte endorses a curious dictum: ‘the kind of philosophy one chooses depends on the kind of person one is’. How can Fichte’s dictum support a vindication of German idealism over Spinozism, which he also calls ‘dogmatism’? I will show that the answer to this seemingly straightforward question reveals a rather complex series of metametaphysical objections that shape the development of the entire German idealist tradition. Ultimately, as I will suggest, the series of metametaphysical questions (...) that shape the German idealist tradition must culminate in the question of how to understand the relation between philosophy and its presuppositions. I will conclude by briefly considering a hermeneutical response to this question. (shrink)

Purpose of this article in the reconstruction and from the contemporary perspective to the knowledge of Aristotle's theory of moral beliefs do outline introduction. First, I would like to clarify a moral belief that knowledge of semantics on the premise of why. Then I will pick out a variety of moral beliefs theory of knowledge. Third, I will try to rebuild this discussion in Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics", especially in Chapter VI of the position. The aim of this article (...) is to reconstruct roughly and in outline Aristotle's epistemology of moral belief from a contemporary point of view. First, I will make clear what the semantical presuppositions of an epistemology of moral beliefs are. Second, I will sort out kinds of epistemologies of moral belief. Third, I will try to reconstruct Aristotle's position as it is presented in the Nicomachean Ethics , especially in book Ⅵ. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is an overview of the theory of knowledge in recent years in religious discussion, and discussion with some of the more traditional, which outlines the future direction of further development. This paper describes the religion that advocates for the challenge, and the reply made ​​by Kaplan Dingge, in addition to other early works, his recent book "confirms Christian faith" have gradually shed light on this issue. The problem is that Kaplan Dingge for the formation of (...) the will of the religious factor, have not made ​​proper discussion. At the same time to Newman's view of faith, complementary to, roughly sketched out. Concludes virtue epistemology, in order to illustrate the value of the knowledge of several intuitive. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of recent discussions in religious epistemology, to compare it with some traditional accounts, and to sketch a direction of further development. The article presents the evidentialist's challenge to religious belief and Alvin Plantinga's replay to it as he developed it in his earlier writings but also in his recent book Warranted Christian Belief. The question arises whether Plantinga does justice to the voluntary element in the formation of religious belief. As a complementary accout, John Henry Newman's view of Faith is sketched. Finally a version of virtue epistemology is presented as a general epistemology which tries to account for several intuitions concerning epistemic value. (shrink)

Giordano Bruno’s Cabala del cavallo pegaseo _ _grew out of the great Italian philosopher’s experiences lecturing and debating at Oxford in early 1584. Having received a cold reception there because of his viewpoints, Bruno went on in the Cabala to attack the narrow-mindedness of the university--and by extension, all universities that resisted his advocacy of intellectual freethinking. _The Cabala of Pegasus _consists_ _of vernacular dialogues that turn on the identification of the noble Pegasus and the humble ass. In (...) the interplay of these ideas, Bruno explores the nature of poetry, divine authority, secular learning, and Pythagorean metempsychosis, which had great influence on James Joyce and many other writers and artists from the Renaissance to the modern period. This book, the first English translation of _The Cabala of Pegasus, _contains both the English and Italian versions as well as helpful annotations. It will have particular appeal to all Renaissance scholars and those interested in the Renaissance cabalistic underpinnings of modern literature. (shrink)

After reading the article by Professor R. S. Conway, ‘Vergil, Probus and Pietole Again,’ I should like to make certain observations on the points that concern me. The first refers to the Mons Virgilii. Professor Conway, who is evidently satisfied with the edition of the Vita Probiana published by Sabbadini, and with the notes Sabbadini has added to it, speaks in particular of the testimony of Bremio: ‘Locum appellant incolae Montem Virgilii,’ etc. I do not propose to discuss here the (...) accuracy or the critical acumen of Sabbadini as shown in the preparation of this mediocre edition, nor to repeat what I have already said on this subject; but I cannot refrain from noting that the reading of milia passuum XXX certainly takes us outside of what can be conjectured to have been the ager Mantuanus, whether in the direction of Brescia or in that of Verona. That Egnatius corrected this error in his text is a purely arbitrary conjecture on the part of Sabbadini, who has not perceived that the Venetian edition, on careful examination, shows a much greater fidelity to the uetustas of the Codex of Bobbio than VPM and the Roman edition of Bussi. In proof of this it will be sufficient to cite the fate that befell the lacunae, which Egnatius respected, and the strange inversion of the phrase bellum, ueteranis post mutinense which would make the most humble schoolmaster smile, but which on the contrary pleased Sabbadini! Again, his estimate of the value of the Vatican Codex, is undermined by the observations of Monsignor Giovanni Mercati, who not only affirms that the Cod. (shrink)

In order to address social and ecological crises that business-as-usual practices have contributed to, we will need firms that emphasise Universal care (e.g., who place greater commitment on the well-being of the larger community versus on the firm itself) and Benefaction (e.g., who treat stakeholders with dignity and generosity rather than seeing them as means to instrumental financial ends). This study examines two kinds of family firms that have been identified as exhibiting Universal care and Benefaction, which are two (...) components of the social emotional wealth (SEW) family firms are thought to be more likely to emphasize than business-as-usual firms. In particular, we compare Stewardship family firms and Universal family firms, and find support for the proposition from the literature that Universal firms place greater emphasis on Universal care and Benefaction. Implications are discussed. (shrink)

This paper addresses debates in German idealism that arise in response to the modal shift in logic, proposed by Kant, from a logic of thinking to a logic of experience. With the Kantian logic of experience arises a problem of radical contingency or 'rhapsodic determination' for logic. While Fichte and Hegel attempt to resolve the problem of contingency by constructing rational systems aimed at established the grounds for logic, I show how Schelling brings into view, in a proto-existentialist movement, the (...) way in which the indeterminacy of the will undergirds rational system construction and, thereby, presents a limiting problem for the question of the value of system-building itself. (shrink)

This book approaches the question of the relation between financial crises and earnings management from two philosophical perspectives: positivism and critical realism. The results obtained using the positivist approach indicate that financial crises tend to have no consistent effect on earnings quality since managers’ earnings behavior does not differ from the pre-crisis to the crisis period. The author accordingly argues against the existence of a causal law based on a constant conjunction model and concludes that financial crises cannot be seen (...) as the cause of earnings management. The critical realism perspective, on the other hand, casts light on managers’ reasons for acting like an earnings manager; in conjunction with the more traditional positivist approach, it assists in refuting the idea of financial crises as a generative mechanism for earnings management. The author concludes by exploring other structures at work that might be responsible for earnings management. This book will be of interest to both academics and a wide range of professionals. (shrink)

Strong forces lead to a withering of academia as it exists today. The major causal forces are the rankings mania, increased division of labor in research, intense publication pressure, academic fraud, dilution of the concept of ‘university’, and inadequate organizational forms for modern research. Academia, in a broader sense understood as ‘the locus of seeking truth and learning through methodological inquiry’, will subsist in different forms. The conclusion is therefore pessimistic with respect to the academic system as it presently (...) exists but not to scholarly endeavour as such. However, the transformation predicted is expected to be fundamental. (shrink)

SummaryMutations in human genes encoding transcription factors are often dominant because one active allele cannot ensure a normal phenotype (haploinsufficiency). In other instances, heterozygous mutations of two genes are required for a phenotype to appear (combined haploinsufficiency). Here, we explore with models (i) the basis of haploinsufficiency and combined haploinsufficiency owing to mutations in transcription activators, and (ii) how the effects of such mutations can be amplified or buffered by subsequent steps in a transcription cascade. We propose that the non‐linear (...) (sigmoidal) response of transcription to the concentration of activators can explain haploinsufficiency. We further show that the sigmoidal character of the output of a cascade increases with the number of steps involved, the settings of which will determine the buffering or enhancement of the effects of a decreased concentration of an upstream activator. This exploration provides insights into the bases of compensatory mutations and on interloci interactions underlying oligogenic inheritance patterns. (shrink)

Schelling scholars face an uphill battle. His confinement to the smallest circles of ‘continental’ thought puts him at the margins of what today counts as philosophy. His eclipse by Fichte and Hegel and inheritance by better-read thinkers like Kierkegaard and Heidegger tend to reduce him to a historical footnote. And the sometimes obscure formulations he uses makes the otherwise difficult writings of fellow post-Kantians seem comparatively more accessible. For those seeking to widen these circles, see through this eclipse and elucidate (...) these formulations, a deeper internal challenge is to make sense of the appearance and disappearance of intellectual intuition in Schelling’s work. The term’s apotheosis is often attributed to the height of German idealism and especially to Schelling’s identity philosophy, outside which he subjects the term to a radical critique. The identity philosophy aims to cognize the absolute ground of the system of knowledge and the system of nature, for which cognition Schelling enlists intellectual intuition. While the identity philosophy falls between a Fichtean debut and a late attack on Hegel, it is difficult to determine its exact parameter. I propose that a necessary condition for doing so is to clarify the explanatory role of intellectual intuition—that is, the specific problem to which it is the intended solution—on which the identity philosophy depends. To this end, I will trace a nexus of problems that Schelling’s use of intellectual intuition is meant to solve. Doing so will not only help to delineate the identity philosophy, but show it to be continuous with Schelling’s earlier and later periods. In §1, I account for the nexus of the problems of grounding, freedom and meaning. These problems demand, respectively, a principle by which cognition forms a system rather than an aggregate, a principle by which a system of cognition is compatible with freedom rather than incompatible and a principle by which a system of freedom can show why there is meaning rather than none. In §2, I reconstruct Schelling’s argument in the identity philosophy for why intellectual intuition can resolve this nexus of problems and, in §3, his arguments during other periods of his thought for why it cannot. I conclude in §4 by suggesting why the identity philosophy is continuous with these periods. Beyond fulfilling the interpretive task of making sense of intellectual intuition in Schelling’s sprawling corpus, my aim is thus to contribute to a unified reading of the latter. (shrink)

This paper will be concerned with the role acquaintance plays in contemporary theories of introspection. Traditionally, the relation of acquaintance has been conceived in analytic epistemology and philosophy of mind as being only epistemically relevant inasmuch as it causes, or enables, or justifies a peculiar kind of propositional knowledge, i.e., knowledge by acquaintance. However, in recent years a novel account of the role of acquaintance in our introspective knowledge has been offered. According to this novel constitutive approach, acquaintance is, (...) in itself, a sui generis—i.e., non-propositional—kind of knowledge. As we will suggest, a stalemate between David Chalmers’ account of direct phenomenal concepts—as a prototypical example of a causal view—and Anna Giustina’s account of primitive introspection—as a prototypical example of a constitutive view—is looming in the current controversy between the two families of theories. Towards the end of the essay, we will point to some possible ways for a constitutive theorist to break the stalemate. (shrink)

The aim of this paper will be to show how significant the logical theories of judgement which were worked out at the end of the nineteenth century have been for the ontological thought during the twentieth century. Against the classical - Aristotelian and Scholastic - analysis of predicative judgement, Franz Brentano on one hand and Gottlob Frege on the other hand have leveled two different criticisms, which then generated two radically divergent ontological paradigms. On one side, despite Brentano’s own (...) nominalistic stands, there was a tremendous extension of the general category of “object” as well as of the notion of “being” with, as a consequence, the exceptionnally luxuriant ontologies of Brentano’s heirs. On the other side, notwithstanding Frege’s own Platonistic affinities, there was a drastic deflation of the realm of objects to the benefit of the realm of concepts taken as classifying functions, and therefore a strong nominalistic trend among Frege’s heirs. The development of quantified modal logics at the middle of twentieth century however forced contemporary ontology to reconsider this simple alternative in order to give place to some hybrid entities such as individual concepts or other kinds of “intensional objects”. (shrink)

Johan Huizinga u svojoj knjizi Homo ludens tvrdi kako civilizacija proizlazi i razvija se u igri i kao igra. Ona jest jedna od ljudskih karakteristika, ljudski obred, a služi za rekreaciju, zabavu, ali i učenje. Može li se onda dobro usmjerenom igrom razvijati ljudsko mišljenje? Cilj programa filozofije za djecu jest uvježbavanje multidimenzioniranog mišljenja. Po Mathew Lipmanu multidimenzionirano mišljenje jest cjelina koja se sastoji od kritičkog, kreativnog i skrbnog mišljenja. Program filozofije za djecu usmjeren je i prema predškolskoj i osnovnoškolskoj (...) populaciji. Radi toga je u programu neizbježna igra kao put k razvitku multidimenzioniranog mišljenja. U radu ćemo prikazati i nekoliko igara usmjerenih k uvježbavanju umnih sposobnosti koje se koriste u programu filozofije za djecu.Johan Huizinga, in his book Homo ludens, claims that civilization arises and develops through play and as a play. Playing is a characteristic of humans, a human ritual and yet it is for recreation, fun, but also for learning. Can it be then that well-directed play leads to a development of human thinking? The aim of philosophy for children programme is practising multidimensional thinking. According to Mathew Lipman, multidimensional thinking is the entirety consisted of critical, creative and caring thinking. Philosophy for children programme is directed towards pre-school as well as towards elementary-school population. For that reason this programme considers play as an inevitable way into the development of multidimensional thinking. In this paper we will also present a few games which are being used in philosophy for children programme, and which are also directed towards practising intellectual abilities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nonplaces:An Anecdoted Topography of Contemporary French TheoryBruno Bosteels (bio)In its juridical sense, a non-lieu is a judgment that suspends, annuls, or withdraws a case without bringing it to trial. It is thus a judgment that announces or enunciates that there will be no judgment as to guilt or innocence, a finding that there is no place to judge. It therefore renders justice by refusing to render it under (...) the law, which it does when it pronounces or enunciates the non-lieu.—Peggy Kamuf, "Béance"1Inside the Spatial TurnIf modernity will always be remembered as an era dominated by questions of time and history, then perhaps the steady waning of modern ideals invites us to think of the entry into something called the postmodern as a passage dominated by questions of space and geography. As Michel Foucault once famously observed in a 1967 conference paper, first published two decades ago: "Perhaps we might say that some of the ideological conflicts that animate today's polemics oppose the pious descendants of time and the willful inhabitants of space" ["Of Other Spaces" 22]. This conflict over time and space presupposes a much larger argument that is not only historical but also methodological in nature. What is at stake is both a question of the passage, or transition, from modernity to postmodernity, if that is indeed what we decide to name modernity's aftermath, and a question of the theoretical consequences that follow from giving precedence to space over time in treating this very transition. With regard to this second question, too, Foucault's work stands as exemplary insofar as he was able to show the degree to which a vital emphasis on space, geography, and territoriality [End Page 117] forces us to take leave of the modern paradigm of consciousness—typically associated with the category of time and its unfolding in the mind or spirit—in favor of a situated understanding of knowledge, subjectivity, and power. "Metaphorizing the transformations of discourse in a vocabulary of time necessarily leads to the utilisation of the model of individual consciousness with its intrinsic temporality," Foucault observes in an interview with the editors of the French journal of geography Hérodote, and he continues: "Endeavouring on the other hand to decipher discourse through the use of spatial, strategic metaphors enables one to grasp precisely the points at which discourses are transformed in, through and on the basis of relations of power" ["Questions on Geography" 69–70]. Whether real or metaphorical, a willful displacement of our categorial apparatus from time to space thus might enable one to avoid the idealist temptation inherent in a strictly discursive or textual model, by inscribing all discourses and practices in the geopolitics of power relations.My aim in the following pages is not to go over the much-discussed shift from time to space once more, even as I take advantage of several of its methodological principles along the way. Instead, I want to map out a momentous change of perspective that has been taking place over the past few decades within the parameters of the so-called spatial turn itself. In fact, if and when modernity is coming to an end, both in the sense of completing itself and of revealing its character as a finite historical entity, not only does whatever shape critical thought takes in the face of this turnabout need to be securely fastened onto specific places and spaces but, if we are to believe a growing number of authors, particularly but by no means exclusively in France, the study of art, literature, politics, philosophy, and even anthropology would also require a thorough consideration of so-called "nonplaces" as a rigorous category for critical thinking today [for a brief discussion of the use of "nonplace" in Anglo-American anthropology, including Melvin M. Webber's notion of "nonplace urban realm" from the mid-1960s, see Weiner]. In the end, these proponents of the nonplace confront us with one disarmingly simple question: how can critical thinking in the present time respond to the task of having to work through whatever lies outside of the order that is actually in place?The Exhaustion of... (shrink)

In this paper we want to re-examine the traditional belief that phenomenological sociology owes its pedigree primarily to Alfred Schütz. More specifically, we will try to show that Max Scheler is equally worthy of the title of founder of phenomenological sociology. Our argument has three interlocking themes. First of all, we will recognize, like many others before us, the undoubtedly essential contribution made by Schütz, who is generally viewed as the father of phenomenological sociology. Our second step, however, (...) will be to return to the foundations of this approach and to show that it throws up certain difficulties. As is widely known, Schütz’s project is nothing less than to apply the Husserlian transcendental to the empirical. But, we will show that because Schütz remains caught in a king of egologic sociology, reducing intersubjectivity—and the social—to a face-to-face relationship, he fails to give to phenomenology a real sociological dimension. Nevertheless this does not mean that phenomenology does not have a powerful sociological dimension. By exploring concepts insufficiently explored by Schütz in a third step, such as Husserl’s notion of intentionality and its equivalent in Max Scheler’s thought (the frame of mind), we will explore the empirical potential of phenomenology. Scheler, considering a social environment independent (and even constitutive) of the subject, gives the final form to a phenomenological sociology, a sociology which gives us even the mean to think a sympathetic relationship with the natural world, critical of capitalism and prefiguring ecology. (shrink)

Kant‘s moral philosophy is one of the great cornerstones of the Western ethical reflection. The little that is known is that the basic conception on which Kantian ethics was built – videlicet, the concept of autonomy of the will – was developed from the attempt to solve a set of problems of metaphysical and theological character that could only have been overcome through the adoption of a new practical metaphysics. With this in mind, this research is an attempt at (...) a reconstruction of the Kantian moral thought in its development, having as a higher aim the emphasis on the importance of the problem of theodicy in the genesis of Kant‘s original conceptions of freedom and the moral world, which emerged from the middle of the 1760s and only came to a bloom on the next decade. Such an attempt at a reconstruction will be guided by the chronological sequel of the pre-critical writings and Kant‘s reflections on the Manuscript Legacy, besides his Lectures on Ethics, sources that are temporally circumscribed from the late 1750s and the first half of the 1780 decade. In a first moment, the genesis of the moral problem will be analyzed from Kant‘s critical position – due to the objections that were raised precisely by the theodicy – in front of the intellectualistic comprehension of the concepts of perfection and will such as they were received by the German Scholastic. In a second moment, the beginning of a reformulation directly influenced by Crusius and the British moralists will be highlighted, and it will culminate in a repositioning of the ethical problem, having in mind the roles of reason and feeling. The third moment is marked by the Kantian assimilation of Rousseau‘s thought. Rousseau‘s influence will propel the emergency of a new understanding of the concept of perfection as an inner attribute of the will, enabling support for a new concept of practical philosophy. Indeed, a solution to the ethical problem regarding the conditions of possibility of free actions within the natural world will emerge and, besides that, a path to an adequate answer to the problem of theodicy will rise by means of the concept of a practical rational faith. Finally, the development of the Kantian doctrine of the categorical imperative will be highlighted – by means of the debate with Baumgarten‘s compendium – as the first attempts to lay down a systematic and unified view of morality that will try to establish a connection between the concepts of virtue and happiness – in this contexts, approach from the perspective of the highest Good. (shrink)

Lacan and Marx: The Invention of the Symptom provides an incisive commentary on Lacan's reading of Marx, mapping the relations between these two vastly influential thinkers. Unlike previous books, Bruno provides a detailed history of Lacan's reading of Marx and surveys his references to Marx in both his writings and seminars. Examining Lacan's key argument that Marx "invented the symptom", Bruno shows how Lacan went on to criticize Marx and contrasts Marx's concept of surplus-value with Lacan's surplus-enjoyment. Exploring (...) the division between Marxist and psychoanalytic perspectives on social and psychological need and Lacan's formalisation of the capitalist discourse, the book compares the positions of Althusser, Deleuze and Guattari, and Zizek on the relations between Lacan, Marx and capitalism, using a wide range of cultural examples, from Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde to Brecht's Joan Dark and Pierpont Mauler. Through these readings, Bruno also elaborates an extended commentary on Lacan's central idea of the division of the subject. His focus is not only on showing how we can exit from capitalism but also, and just as importantly, on showing how we can make capitalism exit from us. This book will be of great interest to scholars and readers of Lacan and Marx from across the fields of psychoanalysis, philosophy and political economy, and will also appeal to Lacanian psychoanalysts in clinical practice. (shrink)