1. The last 25 years have seen an increasing interest in the area of formal argumentation. The ultimate goal of the field is to come up with computational models of how we make decisions, based on...

The paper deals with the problem of divine causation in relation to created agents in general and human rational agents in particular. Beyond creation and conservation, Aquinas specifies divine contribution to created agents’ operation as application in the role of the first cause and the operation of the principal cause employing an instrumental cause. It is especially the latter which is open to varying interpretation and which might be potentially threatening to human freedom. There are different readings of what it (...) is for the secondary agent to “act through the power of the principal cause”. Either the divine cause causes only the existence of the effect of the secondary cause, or it also causes the cause to operate in the sense that it determines its outcome. The latter seems to contradict human freedom. Both readings of Aquinas were developed in the latter half of the sixteenth century within scholastic philosophy and theology. (shrink)

This article outlines the gradually changing attitude towards instruments and materials in the philosophy and historiography of science and confronts contemporary revaluations of the material culture of science with Hans-Jörg Rhein- berger's concept of an experimental system and Don Ihde's notion of an epistemology engine.

If we had to identify the most controversial concept today, “happiness” would certainly figure among the main candidates for this role. On the one hand, “happiness” has represented one of the main ethical axes in the history of philosophy – from Greek _eudaimonia_ to Bentham’s “greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.” Ethics was almost inextricably connected with the search for happiness, which was already in Greek synonymous for the “good life”. On the other hand, capitalism today, notwithstanding the (...) general apathy and despair due to the permanent crises of the capitalist system (climate change, pandemics, financial crises, etc.), still legitimises itself with, if not guarantees, at least a promise of happiness. Despite different historical contexts which again and again gave meaning to the concept of happiness, a common denominator can still be identified, which today, in the era of late capitalism, has even gained the status of a cornerstone of our hegemonic image of happiness. Happiness is a question of being. The evocation of happiness usually raises the question of whether one is happy or not, what it means to be happy, and how we become so. Happiness is thus inextricably connected to the question of identity: it is the sensual expression of our being, of what we supposedly are. In contrast to this “ontologisation of happiness”, the article tries to show not only that there is a _materialist concept of happiness_, but also that the latter bases itself on the primacy of the verb “having” instead of “being”. From a materialist perspective, happiness is something that we have or encounter, and not something that we are. Two references are crucial in this articulation: first, Benjamin’s formulation of happiness from his last essay “On the concept of history”, and second, the Freudian-Lacanian theory of repetition. (shrink)

The paper explores the status of the proposition "God exists" in late scholastic debates of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in some key authors of the era. A proposition is said to be self-evident if its truth is known solely from the meaning of the terms and is not inferred from other propositions. It does not appear to be immediately evident from the terms that God exists, for the concept expressed by "God" is based on the relation to creatures and (...) negation of imperfection and does not reach to the divine essence. Thomas Aquinas maintains that there are two types of self-evident propositions: those self-evident in themselves but not to us and those self-evident in themselves as well as to us. "God exists" is of the fi rst type. For Scotus a self-evident proposition is such that if its terms are conceived by any intellect, the truth of the proposition becomes known from the terms, non-inferentially. In his view there is no distinction between a self-evident proposition in itself and that in relation to us, because any proposition self-evident in itself is known to be such to any intellect, even though it might not be actually known; it would be known, provided that the terms are conceived. So for Scotus the sentence "God exists" expresses diff erent propositions for the blessed in heaven, the angels and God on the one hand and humans on the other. The former is self-evident, the latter is not. While later scholastics accept either the solution of Thomas or that of Scotus, according to which "God exists" is not self-evident for humans, Thomas de Argentina diff ers in that for him "God exists" is self-evident for humans too. The position of Thomas Aquinas was defended by Domingo Ban¯ez, Francisco Zumel and Gregorio de Valentia. In contrast, Johannes Poncius was a famous adherent of Scotus. There is a fair number of scholastics harmonizing the doctrine of Thomas and Scotus: Bernard Sannig, Luis de Molina, Gabriel Vázquez, Rodrigo de Arriaga and Jean Lalemandet. According to these authors, when Thomas says that "God exists" is self-evident in itself, he speaks about the extensional proposition, i.e. the state of affairs being conceptualized, which does not contradict Scotus’s teaching. © FILOSOFIA, 2013. (shrink)

Článek z oblasti analytické metafyziky se věnuje problému, zda vágní objekty implikují vágní (neurčitou) identitu. Pokud by tomu tak bylo, pak lze s Evansem argumentovat tak, že nemohou existovat, protože vágní identita vede k nekoherenci. Studie představuje argument pro zmíněnou implikaci (Weathersonovský argument) a ukazuje, jak se jeho závěru vyhnout. Evansův argument předpokládá, že jména v tvrzeních o neurčité identitě referují určitě. Nejlepší cesta, jak se celému problému vyhnout, je tedy ukázat, že vágní objekty sice implikují vágní (neurčitou) identitu, ale (...) v takových tvrzeních o identitě vystupují výrazy, které nereferují určitě. Tím vyřešíme i námitku, že sice tvrzení o identitě mezi vágním objektem a jeho přesnou realizací není neurčité, ale neurčité je tvrzení o identitě dvou vágních objektů. (shrink)

Gabriel Vásquez discusses two deterministic arguments ascribed to John Wyclif. He appeals to the Anselmian solution based on the distinction between two types of necessity: antecedent and subsequent necessity. Unlike the former, the latter necessity does not destroy future event’s contingency, which is required if it is to result from a free choice. The paper discusses the Aristotelian objection according to which a statement describing some contingent future event is either without truth-value, and thus antecedently contingent but not subsequently necessary (...) at present, or it has a truth-value, but then it is not merely subsequently necessary but also antecedently necessary. The Anselmian temporal ontology is such that no absolute present parameter is to be included in the evaluation of modal tensed statements. This recognition disposes of modal notions tied to the absolute temporal qualification of statements and thus undercuts the objection. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the fact that already in his early essay “The Logical Time” Lacan suggested that the “ontological form of anxiety” is the constitutive element in the process of the constitution of subjectivity, thus far there have only been rare attempts at inquiring into the relation between the affect of anxiety and Lacan’s critique of classical ontology, which this article will try to explore. Specifically, my argument will be that Lacanian anxiety, unlike, for instance, its Heideggerian variation, is inextricably connected with (...) the third dimension of being, which amounts to what Lacan in Seminar XI labelled “the unrealized,” i.e. to the peculiar structure of the unconscious, which distorts the classical ontological opposition between being and non-being. For Lacan, the unconscious, rather than referring simply to repressed unconscious content, is instead structured around a “pre-ontological” gap or “ontological negativity”. While anxiety notoriously “does not deceive,” it does not deceive only regarding the subject’s encounter with the real, but also – and most importantly – regarding the specific ontological structure of the unconscious, which includes the negativity as its own “material cause”. In this respect, anxiety might be regarded as an “ontological” or even objective material affect – yet not in a posthumanist sense of the affect of being/matter, but rather as the affective correlate or material signal for the fracture of being itself. In short, without this specific ontological gap/negativity, there would only be fear and frustration, not anxiety, which brings anxiety into the domain of metapsychology. (shrink)

This article tries to establish a possible dialogue between the way in which two influential contemporary theories, Roberto Esposito's biopolitical theory and Jacques Lacan's psychoanalysis, approach racism and the constitution of Otherness. After summing up key concepts in Esposito's theory, the article lays out the very deadlock in his work, represented by his assumption of racial difference or Otherness as inscribed in the bio-logical content of human life. However, by interpreting Jewishness under Nazism in terms of ‘undead’ ‘flesh without body’, (...) Esposito himself crosses paths with the psychoanalytic approach, in so far as Lacan defined the Freudian death drive using the same term. The second part of the article is thus dedicated to the articulation of the relations between primal repression, trauma and jouissance, out of which can be derived an alternative conception of biopolitics, based on the discursive constitution of Otherness, rather than on the assumption that it is a biological fact. (shrink)

This paper first outlines the key traits of some critiques of Agamben’s theory of the subject. What they have in common is an emphasis on the limitations of his conception of political agency, which is based on the one hand on an apathetic and passive figure such as the Muselmann, and on the other, on Bartleby, the Scrivener, who epitomises Agamben’s notion of potentiality. Following this short review I then focus on Agamben’s recent article “K.,” in which he compares and (...) contrasts the two Kafkian figures of K. from The Trial and The Castle in the context of Roman law. Considering Benjamin’s distinction between a virtual and real state of exception, Josef K. and land surveyor K. adopt two different positions with regard to the form of law on which the structure of sovereignty is based. Josef K. represents bare life, which persists along the internal boundary that is constitutive of the form of law, while land surveyor K. is the subject that manages to erase this internal boundary and, thus, represents the only Agambenian figure that can effectively suspend and abolish the form of law. (shrink)

This article examines Giorgio Agamben’s rejection of the religious term Holocaust as a name for the extermination of the Jewish people. Agamben rejects this term (and eventually prefers the...

Článek souhrnně odpovídá na vybrané podněty a námitky čtyř textů, jež polemizují s některými aspekty Dvořákovy knihy Kauzalita činitele (Togga 2020). Ve vztahu k článku J. Peregrina vysvětluje, proč nelze přijmout jeho řešení antinomie mezi svobodným rozhodováním a determinismem oddělením dvou druhů jazyků či výkladových rámců. Kritiku S. Sousedíka Dvořák považuje za založenou na příliš úzkém pojetí schopnosti. Odmítá to, že by z pojmu schopnosti plynulo, že ta může být determinována pouze něčím jiným, než je její nositel. Podstatnou část (...) námitky D. Peroutky Dvořák přijímá a upřesňuje, nakolik je existence alternativních možností nutnou podmínkou svobodného charakteru rozhodování. Konečně, v polemice s V. Punčochářem se Dvořák snaží vyložit, ve kterém smyslu náhoda ruší svobodu a ve kterém nikoliv. Dále, autor nepovažuje epistemické alternativy za dostatečné pro skutečnou svobodu rozhodování. (shrink)

This article introduces the Special Issue on cameraless photography and the translation of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg’s treatise on electrical figures. It summarizes previous discussions on cameraless photography, namely those by Geoffrey Batchen and suggests relating the photogram to current post-lenticular technologies such as radiography, digital scanning or machine vision. It outlines the emergence of cameraless imaging in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century scientific research, taking Lichtenberg’s figures as an emblem of automatically generated images situated between duration and instantaneity, between image (...) making and measurement, between nature and culture. (shrink)

The paper explores two avenues to the union of the believer with God in Thomas Aquinas inspired by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite; namely, the intellectual union in faith through the gift of understanding and the union in charity as the basis for the knowledge associated with the gift of wisdom. The former amounts to an intellectual grasp of revealed truths without full understanding of the terms used (without the apprehension of the essences), yet with a clear understanding of what would be (...) erroneous interpretations and meanings. The latter is an (quasi-)experimental knowledge of God based on connaturality with him due to the infused virtue of charity. Both kinds of knowledge or “mystical theology” are open to any believer in the state of sanctifying grace and are its effects. (shrink)

[The Molinist theory of the relation of divine prescience and human freedom in late Scholasticism and current analytic philosophy].

[Aquinas and Cajetan on the analogy of names].

Maßgebliche Vertreter der wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung des Wiener Kreises wie Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath oder Edgar Zilsel waren jenseits aller sonstigen Differenzen gemeinsam bemüht, gegenüber den im Gefolge der "Krise des mechanistischen Weltbüdes" auftretenden Strömungen des Anti-Empüismus, Irrationalismus und Erkenntnispessimismus die Errungenschaften der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft zu bewahren.Für die Auseinandersetzung mit der gegenwärtigen Phüosophie und Wissenschaft und üirer gesellschaftlichen Stellung wäre ein Anknüpfen an die damaligen Debatten von großer Bedeutung.

This article offers a critical examination of the contemporary imperative to ‘trust science’ from the point of view of Lacanian psychoanalysis. It begins by putting contemporary scientific research...

The article first resumes up-to-date conceptualisations of the superego in psychoanalytic theory, stretching from the superegoic sense of guilt (Freud) up to the superego as an “imperative od jouissance” (Lacan), and at the same time as an imperative of transgression insofar as enjoyment is by definition based upon transgression of the law. Against this background, the article develops another conceptualisation of the superego, which consist in the completion of the superegoic dialectics of “dirty and necessary” in perversion. This conception is (...) based upon perverse self-instrumentalisation of the subject, which transforms the “dirtiness” of subjective enjoyment and transgression into their necessity. The article then moves toward the analysis of how especially this new conceptualisation of the superego manifests itself in the popular crime series Chicago Police Department (CPD), and in some logically and structurally similar phenomena, which occurred during Donald Trump’s presidency. (shrink)

The paper outlines the understanding of emergence in Ontic Structural Realism of James Ladyman (and his co-author Ross). First, the notion of emergence is explored, surveying the various distinctions associated with it (ontological vs. epistemological, diachronic vs. synchronic, weak vs. strong). It turns out that Ross and Ladyman’s notion of emergence is that of weak epistemological emergence compatible with ontic reduction. Particular notions of emergence are associated with the objection embodied in the Generalized Causal Exclusion Argument. The latter is sketched (...) and the solution of Ross and Ladyman is presented: first, in general, the notion of weak emergence is not threatened by this objection. Causal reduction associated with it ensures that there are no competing causal explanations, so no overdetermination arises. Second, there is a peculiar feature of Ross and Ladyman’s theory; namely, there is no causation on the fundamental level, only pattern dynamism. Causation emerges only on higher levels of special sciences. Hence, there is no problem of causal overdetermination. (shrink)

Integrating the concept of place meanings into protected area management has been difficult. Across a diverse body of social science literature, challenges in the conceptualization and application of place meanings continue to exist. However, focusing on relationships in the context of participatory planning and management allows protected area managers to bring place meanings into professional judgment and practice. This paper builds on work that has outlined objectives and recommendations for bringing place meanings, relationships, and lived experiences to the forefront of (...) land-use planning and management. It proposes the next steps in accounting for people’s relationships with protected areas and their relationships with protected area managers. Our goals are to 1) conceptualize this relationship framework; 2) present a structure for application of the framework; and 3) demonstrate the application in a specific protected area context, using an example from Alaska. We identify three key target areas of information and knowledge that managers will need to sustain quality relationship outcomes at protected areas. These targets are recording stories or narratives, monitoring public trust in management, and identifying and prioritizing threats to relationships. The structure needed to apply this relationship-focused approach requires documenting and following individual relationships with protected areas in multiple ways. The goal of this application is not to predict relationships, but instead to gain a deeper understanding of how and why relationships develop and change over time. By documenting narratives of individuals, managers can understand how relationships evolve over time and the role they play in individual’s lives. By understanding public trust, the shared values and goals of individuals and managers can be observed. By identifying and prioritizing threats, managers can pursue efforts that steward relationships while allowing for the protection of experiences and meanings. The collection and interpretation of these three information targets can then be integrated and implemented within planning and management strategies to achieve outcomes that are beneficial for resource protection, visitor experiences, and stakeholder engagement. By investing in this approach, agencies will gain greater understanding and usable knowledge towards the achievement of quality relationships. It represents an investment in both place relationships and public relations. By integrating such an approach into planning and management, protected area managers can represent the greatest diversity of individual place meanings and connections. relationships, place meanings, trust, narratives, planning, protected areas. (shrink)

The article is a presentation of the Thomist response to Scotist criticism of analogy; namely, the defense of St. Thomas’ teaching in some leading renaissance and post-renaissance Thomists: Thomas de Vio, better known as Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara, John Versor and John of Saint Thomas. The author first explains the general core of the semantic doctrine of analogy and outlines the basic terminology. Then he exposes the way Cajetan and other Thomists knit Aquinas’ dispersed remarks on analogy into a systematic (...) doctrinal whole. (shrink)

The well-known Ratio Studiorum of 1599 states that logical instruction should follow F. Toletus or P. Fonseca. The latter authored the famous Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo, the former a similar manual, Introductio in Dialecticam Aristotelis. As is often observed, the contrast between the Aristotelian and present symbolic logics is perhaps most striking in their analysis of relational statements. Both authors recognize the relational logical form as independent from the traditional subject-predicate form and see the need to recognize relational inferential rules. (...) They differ in their specific rules, however, so neither of the authors has captured the system of relational syllogism in its entirety. (shrink)

We show that there is a hidden freedom in quantum many-body theory associated with overcompleteness of the time evolution through the single-particle subspace of a many-body system. To fix the freedom, an additional constraint is necessary. We argue that the appropriate constraint on the time evolution through the subspace is to quantize the propagation of entangled pairs of particles, represented by the single-particle spectral function, instead of individual particles. This solution method creates a surface that indicates the multiplicity of every (...) solution to the inverse problem defined by matching the freedom to the constraint. Upon measurement, the system collapses nonlocally onto a single quantized solution. In addition to a combinatoric multiplicity, each solution acquires a multiplicity due to its stability when subject to a small variation in the microscopic degrees of freedom. Numerical calculations for a two-level system show that our theory improves upon standard theory in the description of non-quasiparticle spectral features. Our reinterpretation of quantum many-body theory is not based on the Born rule and offers a more faithful representation of experiments than current theory by modeling individual, quantized events with an explicit collapse model. (shrink)

The paper deals with various species of fatalism originating either in causal determinism, in the semantic fact that propositions about the future may be true in the present, or in divine omniscience. The common argument form is identified as well as the relevant notion of modality at play, that of power necessity. Finally, the paper examines briefly a strategy to combat theological fatalism, the socalled Ockhamism and various attempts to disprove the underlying transfer principle (of power necessity).

The article deals with various modal versions of the ontological argument from N. Malcolm’s to P. Tichý’s interpretation of Anselm’s second proof. Three key presuppositions of the modal proof are pin-pointed and examined. The principal problem with the proof seems to be the notion of necessary existence attributed to God. More precisely, the question is whether this is not too strong an attribute, for then there would not be a situation, i.e. a possible world, consistently thinkable which precludes the existence (...) of God. However, this seems to be wrong. (shrink)