Der vorliegende Band versammelt drei Texte: Johann Gustav Reinbecks 'Abhandlung Von dem Gebrauch der Vernunfft Und Welt-Weißheit In der GOttes-Gelahrtheit' (1733) und 'Erörterung Der Philosophischen Meynung von der sogenandten Harmonia Praestabilita (1737) und Johann Friedrich Bertrams dagegen gerichtete 'Beleuchtung Der Neu-getünchten Meynung von der Harmonia Praestabilita' (1737). Stellt die erste der drei Abhandlungen - schon mit ihrem Titel - so etwas wie Reinbecks Programmschrift des auf die Übereinstimmung von Vernunft und Offenbarung bedachten 'Theologischen Wolffianismus' dar, so dokumentieren die zwei (...) anderen die Debatte Reinbecks mit einem nicht unbedeutenden Vertreter des Halleschen Pietismus über ein zentrales Lehrstück des Leibnizischen Philosophie, die Praestabilierte Harmonie, zu der allerdings auch Reinbeck als Theologe eine differenzierte Meinung hat. (Aus dem Vorwort von Stefan Lorenz) This volume brings together three texts: Johann Gustav Reinbeck’s 'Abhandlung von dem Gebrauch der Vernunfft und Welt-Weißheit in der Gottes-Gelahrtheit' (1733) and 'Erörterung Der Philosophischen Meynung von der sogenandten Harmonia Praestabilita' (1737) and Johann Friedrich Bertram’s refutation of these, 'Beleuchtung Der Neu-getünchten Meynung von der Harmonia Praestabilita' (1737). While the first of these works presents – even in ist title – in effect Reinbeck’s programmatic statement of ‘theological Wolffianism’, concerned with the harmonisation of reason and revelation, the other two document Reinbeck’s debates with a not insignificant representative of Halle Pietism about a central teaching of Leibniz’s philosophy, pre-established harmony, which Reinbeck as a theologian had a sophisticated understanding. (From the introduction by Stefan Lorenz). (shrink)

Gegenstand des Bandes ist eine Profilierung der Kulturphilosophie mit dem Ziel ihrer notigen Selbstbehauptung gegenuber einem gegenwartigen Naturalismus. Ein zentrales Ratsel der Gegenwartsphilosophie ist das Verhaltnis unseres Bewusstseins, der Perspektive der ersten Person machtig und Urheber der Kultur zu sein, zu den Erkenntnissen der Kognitions- sowie der Evolutionswissenschaften seit Darwin. In diesen scheint von der Natur her auf die Kultur ein neues Licht zu fallen. Dies ist ebenso faszinierend wie interessant. Es ist aber auch eine Herausforderung: Der Begriff der "Welt" (...) wird naturwissenschaftlich praokkupiert, Extrapolationen ins Ontologische wie die "kausale Geschlossenheit der Welt" breiten sich auf Kosten fruherer, starker zuruckgenommener Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorien aus. Wie steht es demgegenuber mit den Beitragen von Kulturphilosophie und Kulturwissenschaften / Geisteswissenschaften? Deutlich wird in den Beitragen im Anschluss an Dilthey, Cassirer, Simmel und weitere Autoren: Die Notwendigkeit und der Eigencharakter kultureller Arbeit mussen offentlich wie in den Wissenschaften wieder bewusst werden. Mit Beitragen von Katharina Bauer, Jorn Bohr, Gunter Dux, Ralf Glitza, Kinga Golus, Julia Gruevska, Ralph Kohnen, Gudrun Kuhne-Bertram, Hans-Ulrich Lessing, Kevin Liggieri, Ernst Wolfgang Orth, Annika Schlitte, Gunter Scholtz und Rene Torkler. (shrink)

Der Raum ist ein eminent philosophisches Thema. Denn so selbstverstandlich es ist, dass wir in Raumen und im Raum leben, so unklar ist, was das bedeutet. Wie verhalten sich lebensweltliche Raume zu `dem Raum` uberhaupt? Gibt es bevorzugte Formen der Raumerfahrung? Wie verhalten sich Raum und Zeit zueinander? Was unterscheidet Nahe und Distanz, Bewegung und Aufenthalt?Die Beitrage des vorliegenden Bandes nahern sich der Philosophie des Raumes aus Richtung der Epistemologie, praktischen Philosophie und Asthetik. Dahinter steht die Uberzeugung, dass der Raum (...) nicht allein ein Thema der theoretischen Philosophie sein sollte, sondern Raumphanomene in allen Bereichen der Philosophie relevant sind. Im Zusammenspiel von klassischen und gegenwartigen Positionen ergibt sich ein Uberblick uber die Moglichkeit, eines der unscheinbarsten Phanomene uberhaupt zu thematisieren. Mit Beitragen von: Diego D'Angelo, Jocelyn Benoist, Christian Bermes, Georg Bertram, Steven G. Crowell, David Espinet, Michael N. Forster, Markus Gabriel, Volker Gerhardt, Tobias Keiling, Ole Meinefeld, Nikola Mirkovi'c, Inga Romer, John Sallis, Alexander Schnel. (shrink)

Verstehen ist nicht nur ein Grundbegriff menschlicher Lebensfuhrung und Lebenswelt, sondern besitzt auch in der Philosophie und den verschiedenen Wissenschaften eine zentrale Bedeutung. Die Frage nach der Moglichkeit von Verstehen ist dabei immer auch die Frage nach dem Subjekt und Objekt des Verstandnisses. Wer versteht wen oder was? Ist "Verstehen" also nur rationales Erfassen, Erkennen tieferer Einsichten und komplexerer Zusammenhange oder impliziert es mehr? Versteht man den Anderen, den Fremden, aber auch den Text wirklich so einfach? Und wenn ja, wie (...) strukturiert sich dieses Verstehen? Es soll in dem interdisziplinaren Band versucht werden, mit den genannten Fragen Anschlussfahigkeit zu evozieren, so dass die Vieldimensionalitat des Verstehens thematisiert und nach Funktion, Leistung und Grenzen des Verstehens vor allem in Philosophie, Geistes- und Naturwissenschaft gefragt werden kann. Mit Beitragen von Christina Brandt, Selin Gerlek, Julia Gruevska, Felix Huttemann, Bernhard Irrgang, Gudrun Kuhne-Bertram, Hans-Ulrich Lessing, Kevin Liggieri, Kate Meyer-Drawe, Sabine Ohlenbusch, Tobias Schlicht, Gunter Scholtz und Volker Steenblock. (shrink)

John Lockes Essay uber den menschlichen Verstand (zuerst 1690 erschienen) ist eines der einflussreichsten Bucher der Philosophiegeschichte. Es behandelt vorwiegend erkenntnis- und wissenschaftstheoretische Themen, nimmt aber auch Stellung zu Fragen aus der Philosophie des Geistes, der Religionsphilosophie und der Ethik. Locke war einer der Initiatoren und fuhrenden Kopfe der europaischen Aufklarung. Die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Essay wird auch in der Philosophie der Gegenwart vehement fortgesetzt. Die elf Beitrage dieses Bandes, die Bibliographie und ein ausfuhrliches Glossar machen das Buch zu einem (...) wichtigen Begleittext zu Lockes Werk. Mit Beitragen von: Michael Ayers, Reinhard Brandt, John Colman, Bertram Kienzle, Heiner F. Klemme, Lorenz Kruger, Michel Malherbe, Rolf W. Puster, G.A.J. Rogers, Rainer Specht, Jurgen Sprute und Udo Thiel". (shrink)

In der Forschung wird der Koran viel zu oft als ein sich selbst genügender Text betrachtet. Von dieser Sicht machten sich die Teilnehmer des im Mai 2006 am Historischen Kolleg veranstalteten Kolloquiums über den Koran frei. Die in diesem Band veröffentlichten Beiträge zeigen auf bisweilen überraschende Weise, dass der Koran als ein erstrangiges Zeugnis der vorderasiatischen Religionsgeschichte der Spätantike zu gelten hat. Sie eröffnen hiermit neue Wege der Erforschung der frühesten Geschichte des Islams. Die Autoren zeigen die unterschiedlichsten Perspektiven (...) auf, widmen sich etwa Engelsdarstellungen in der frühchristlichen Kunst ebenso wie dem "Höllenbaum" oder den "rätselhaften Buchstaben" am Beginn einiger Suren. Beiträge von: Achim Arbeiter, Dieter Ferchl, Johannes Koder, Tilman Nagel, Mathias Radscheit, Bertram Schmitz, Jean-Michel Spieser, Harald Suermann, Martin Tamcke. (shrink)

Es gibt offensichtlich nicht nur Moden der Kleidung, der Frisur oder des Wohnens, sondern auch Moden in den Wissenschaften, in Kunst, Philosophie und vielleicht sogar in der Religion. Das heisst aber gerade in Bereichen, die doch eigentlich 'feste Prinzipien' gegen den Wechsel des Zeitgeistes und der Moden verteidigen. Aber was bedeutet dann in diesen Zusammenhängen "Mode"? Und wie lassen sich solche geistigen Moden erklären? Gehören "Mode" und "Moderne" zusammen? Der vorliegende Band versucht eine systematische Antwort auf diese Fragen, indem (...) er zunächst das Phänomen des Modischen auf seinen offenkundigen Feldern untersucht: den Kleidungsmoden, Wohnmoden, Körpermoden und den Moden in Freizeitgestaltung und Tourismus sowie im Sport. Von hier aus wird nach den spezifisch intellektuellen Moden in den Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften, in der Kunst, in der Philosophie und in der Religion gefragt. Mit Beiträgen von: Georg Bertram, Hubertus Busche, Yvonne Förster, Robert Gugutzer, Rainer Hartmann, Frank Hillebrandt, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Irene Nierhaus, Daria Pezzoli-Olgiati, Verena Potthoff, Tim Rojek. (shrink)

In this provocative monograph, Bertram Malle describes behavior explanations as having a dual nature -- as being both cognitive and social acts -- and proposes...

States claim the right to choose who can come to their country. They put up barriers and expose migrants to deadly journeys. Those who survive are labelled ‘illegal’ and find themselves vulnerable and unrepresented. The international state system advantages the lucky few born in rich countries and locks others into poor and often repressive ones. In this book, Christopher Bertram skilfully weaves a lucid exposition of the debates in political philosophy with original insights to argue that migration controls must (...) be justifiable to everyone, including would-be and actual immigrants. Until justice prevails, states have no credible right to exclude and no-one is obliged to obey their immigration rules. Bertram’s analysis powerfully cuts through the fog of political rhetoric that obscures this controversial topic. It will be essential reading for anyone interested in the politics and ethics of migration. (shrink)

A widespread assumption in recent research on attitudes is that self-reported evaluations reflect conscious attitudes, whereas indirectly assessed evaluations reflect unconscious attitudes. The present article reviews the available evidence regarding unconscious features of indirectly assessed “implicit” attitudes. Distinguishing between three different aspects of attitudes, we conclude that people sometimes lack conscious awareness of the origin of their attitudes, but that lack of source awareness is not a distinguishing feature of indirectly assessed versus self-reported attitudes, there is no evidence that people (...) lack conscious awareness of indirectly assessed attitudes per se, and there is evidence showing that, under some conditions, indirectly assessed attitudes influence other psychological processes outside of conscious awareness. Implications for the concept of “implicit attitudes” are discussed. (shrink)

Even though morally competent artificial agents have yet to emerge in society, we need insights from empirical science into how people will respond to such agents and how these responses should inform agent design. Three survey studies presented participants with an artificial intelligence agent, an autonomous drone, or a human drone pilot facing a moral dilemma in a military context: to either launch a missile strike on a terrorist compound but risk the life of a child, or to cancel the (...) strike to protect the child but risk a terrorist attack. Seventy-two percent of respondents were comfortable making moral judgments about the AI in this scenario and fifty-one percent were comfortable making moral judgments about the autonomous drone. These participants applied the same norms to the two artificial agents and the human drone pilot. However, people ascribed different patterns of blame to humans and machines as a function of the agent’s decision of how to solve the dilemma. These differences in blame seem to stem from different assumptions about the agents’ embeddedness in social structures and the moral justifications those structures afford. Specifically, people less readily see artificial agents as embedded in social structures and, as a result, they explained and justified their actions differently. As artificial agents will perform many actions with moral significance, we must heed such differences in justifications and blame and probe how they affect our interactions with those agents. (shrink)

Drawing on our Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) Model, we argue for the usefulness of distinguishing between basic operating principles of learning processes (associative linking vs. propositional reasoning) and secondary features pertaining to the conditions of their operation (automatic vs. controlled). We review empirical evidence that supports the joint operation of associative and propositional processes in the formation of new associations.

This volume provides an overview of recent research on the nature, causes, and consequences of cognitive consistency. In 21 chapters, leading scholars address the pivotal role of consistency principles at various levels of social information processing, ranging from micro-level to macro-level processes. The book's scope encompasses mental representation, processing fluency and motivational fit, implicit social cognition, thinking and reasoning, decision making and choice, and interpersonal processes. Key findings, emerging themes, and current directions in the field are explored, and important questions (...) for future research identified. (shrink)

Robot ethics encompasses ethical questions about how humans should design, deploy, and treat robots; machine morality encompasses questions about what moral capacities a robot should have and how these capacities could be computationally implemented. Publications on both of these topics have doubled twice in the past 10 years but have often remained separate from one another. In an attempt to better integrate the two, I offer a framework for what a morally competent robot would look like and discuss a number (...) of ethical questions about the design, use, and treatment of such moral robots in society. Instead of searching for a fixed set of criteria of a robot’s moral competence I identify the multiple elements that make up human moral competence and probe the possibility of designing robots that have one or more of these human elements, which include: moral vocabulary; a system of norms; moral cognition and affect; moral decision making and action; moral communication. Juxtaposing empirical research, philosophical debates, and computational challenges, this article adopts an optimistic perspective: if robotic design truly commits to building morally competent robots, then those robots could be trustworthy and productive partners, caretakers, educators, and members of the human community. Moral competence does not resolve all ethical concerns over robots in society, but it may be a prerequisite to resolve at least some of them. (shrink)

The current chapter provides an overview of research on responses in moral dilemmas where maximization of outcomes for the greater good (utilitarianism) conflicts with adherence to moral norms (deontology). Expanding on a description of the traditional paradigm to study moral-dilemma judgments (i.e., the trolley problem), the chapter reviews the most prominent dual-process account of moral-dilemma judgments, normative conclusions that have been derived from this account, and criticisms raised against this line of work. The following sections review advances in the development (...) of alternative approaches that aim to address shortcomings of the traditional dilemma paradigm as well as the implications of this work for psychological theories of moral-dilemma judgments and philosophical inferences about the normative implications of moral-dilemma research. The chapter concludes with a review of research on the links between moral-dilemma judgments and social impressions. (shrink)

A central theme in recent research on attitudes is the distinction between deliberate, "explicit" attitudes and automatic, "implicit" attitudes. The present article provides an integrative review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change that is guided by a distinction between associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. The proposed associative-propositional evaluation model makes specific assumptions about (...) the mutual interplay of the 2 processes, implying several mechanisms that lead to symmetric or asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. The model integrates a broad range of empirical evidence and implies several new predictions for implicit and explicit attitude change. (shrink)

A crucial assumption of the recently developed schema model of self-control is that people’s perceived self-control efforts are related to the experience of lowered subjective vitality. In the present study, this assumption was tested. It was also examined whether perceived self-control effort is related to a diffuse affective experience or is discretely related to subjective vitality, general positive affect, and general negative affect. Based on the previous literature, it was expected that the latter would better fit the data. In a (...) survey study, university students completed standardized measures of their perceived self-control effort, subjective vitality, general positive affect, and general negative affect with regard to a specific frame of reference. Bivariate correlations and confirmatory factor analyses revealed the expected relationships, meaning that perceived self-control effort was negatively related to subjective vitality and that the statistical model with three distinct affective variables fit the data better than the model with subjective vitality, positive affect, and negative affect incorporated into one common factor. It was concluded that the findings are in line with the schema model of self-control. (shrink)

The concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. (...) It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future. (shrink)

ETUDES DE PHILOLOGIE ET D'HISTOIRE Bertram Eugene Schwarzbach Voltaire's Old Testament Criticism 1971 - LIBRAIRIE DROZ- GENEVE ...

Highlights the roles of intention and intentionality in social cognition.

How is art both distinct and different from the rest of human life, while also mattering in and for it? This central yet overlooked question in contemporary philosophy of art is at the heart of Georg Bertram's new aesthetic. Drawing on the resources of diverse philosophical traditions – analytic philosophy, French philosophy, and German post-Kantian philosophy – his book offers a systematic account of art as a human practice. One that remains connected to the whole of life.

Leading scholars from psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy present theories and findings on understanding how individuals infer such complex mental states ...

A long series of studies in social psychology have shown that the explanations people give for their own behaviors are fundamentally different from the explanations they give for the behaviors of others. Still, a great deal of uncertainty remains about precisely what sorts of differences one finds here. We offer a new approach to addressing the problem. Specifically, we distinguish between two levels of representation ─ the level of linguistic structure (which consists of the actual series of words used in (...) the explanation) and the level of conceptual structure (which consists of the concepts these words are used to express). We then formulate and test hypotheses both about self-other differences in conceptual structure and about self-other differences in the mapping from conceptual structure to linguistic structure. (shrink)

The article deals with research on framing effects. First, I will start with classifying different approaches on framing. Subsequently, I will provide a definition of the concepts of frame, schema and framing, expand on framing research conducted so far – both theoretically and operationally. Having this equipment at hand, I will initiate a discussion on studies of framing-effects in terms of theory, methods and empirical results. This discussion leads to the conclusion that studies on framing effects are insufficiently concerned with (...) the more recent psychological constructs and theories. In merely focusing on the activation of schemata, most studies ignore the more elaborate types of framing-effects. Therefore, several empirical questions remain unanswered and some methodical chances seem to be wasted. (shrink)

Attribution theory has played a major role in social-psychological research. Unfortunately, the term attribution is ambiguous. According to one meaning, forming an attribution is making a dispositional (trait) inference from behavior; according to another meaning, forming an attribution is giving an explanation (especially of behavior). The focus of this paper is on the latter phenomenon of behavior explanations. In particular, I discuss a new theory of explanation that provides an alternative to classic attribution theory as it dominates the textbooks and (...) handbooks—which is typically as a version of Kelley’s (1967) model of attribution as covariation detection. I begin with a brief critique of this theory and, out of this critique, develop a list of requirements that an improved theory has to meet. I then introduce the new theory, report empirical data in its support, and apply it to a number of psychological phenomena. I finally conclude with an assessment of how much progress we have made in understanding behavior explanations and what has yet to be learned. (shrink)

Our embodied capacity for action and our dispositions towards goals define our perception of a situation and possible actions. Thus, situations are not constitutive of action, but they demand that we act. For Shane Ralston, the situations that call for action are historical, imagined, or projected debates involving John Dewey. When Dewey is portrayed not just as a presenter of theory, but as an actor in debates grounded in time, place, and daily life consequences, we understand his arguments in new (...) ways. When he is called upon to act by engaging in debates that arose even long after his death, the interaction (or transaction) of philosopher and situation produces new meaning.The non-teleological, creative .. (shrink)