It is often proposed that the unacceptability of a semantically interpretable sentence can be rooted in its meaning. Elaborating on Oshima New frontiers in artificial intelligence, Springer, Berlin, 2007), we argue that the meaning-driven unacceptability of factive islands must make reference to felicity conditions, and cannot be reduced to the triviality of propositional content. We also observe, again elaborating on Oshima, that the triviality of factive islands need not be logical, but can be relative to a listener’s background assumptions. (...) These findings call for a revision of a prevalent view about meaning-driven unacceptability, according to which unacceptability results from triviality that is both propositional and logical. (shrink)

: Some twenty years since its publication Putnam's model‐theoretic argument is still much discussed. The present paper aims to defend a reconstruction of the argument but begins by attempting to clarify the form of the argument. Usually, and with good textual grounds, the argument is treated as a reductio argument against metaphysical realism. I argue instead that it should be treated as developing a paradox. I go on to claim that the most promising response to this paradox is to be (...) able to provide a theory of sense, in the style recommended by Dummett. So, according to this reasoning, the argument is not an argument against metaphysical realism but an argument against positions which reject the notion of sense. (shrink)

The paper examines Wright’s attempt to inflate deflationism about truth. It accepts the details of Wright’s argument but contends that it should best be seen as posing a dilemma for the deflationist: either truth is independent of norms of warranted assertibility—in which case it is substantial—or it is not—in which case epistemicism about truth is a consequence. Some concerns about epistemicism are raised in avoiding the second horn. The first is avoided by distinguishing between independence and substantiality and arguing that (...) only the first applies to truth and only the second is worrisome to deflationism. So, despite its sub-title, the following is not a diatribe against Home Rule but a modest defence of deflationism. (shrink)

Antirealism about the past is apparently in conflict with our acceptance of a set of systematic linkages between the truth-values of differently tensed sentences made at different times. Arguments based on acceptance of these so-called truth-value links seem to show that fully accounting for our use of the past and future tenses will involve use of a notion of truth which is not epistemically constrained and is thus antirealistically unacceptable. I elaborate these difficulties through an examination of work by Dummett (...) and Wright. I agree with Wright's rejection of Dummett's proposal but go on to argue that Wright's account fares no better. Building on what I take to be the failure of Wright's account, I offer a solution for the antirealist which diagnoses the problem as stemming from an equivocation in the meanings assigned to the tensed truth predicates. I close by raising a different problem for antirealist accounts of the past, one which is, however, related to more general difficulties for antirealist theories of meaning. (shrink)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 754-755, December 2011.

Certain anti-realisms about mathematics are distinguished by their taking proof rather than truth as the central concept in the account of the meaning of mathematical statements. This notion of proof which is meaning determining or canonical must be distinguished from a notion of demonstration as more generally conceived. This paper raises a set of objections to Dummett's characterisation of the notion via the notion of a normalised natural deduction proof. The main complaint is that Dummett's use of normalised natural deduction (...) proofs relies on formalisation playing a role for which it is unfit. Instead I offer an alternative account which does not rely on formalisation and go on to examine the relation of proof to canonical proof, arguing that rather than requiring an explicit characterisation of canonical proofs we need to be more aware of the complexities of that relation. (shrink)

In this paper I consider metaphysical positions which I label as ‘perspectival’. A perspectivalist believes that some portion of reality cannot extend beyond what an appropriately characterised investigator or investigators can (in some sense) reveal about it. So a perspectivalist will be drawn to claim that a portion of reality is, in some sense, knowable. Many such positions appear to founder on the paradox of knowability. I aim to offer a solution to that paradox which can be adopted by any (...) perspectivalist, which involves no restriction on the claim of knowability and which allows certain sentences to be unknowable. The solution hinges on recognising that what is meant by ‘knowable’ will vary from one type of proposition to another and thus that characterising the modality involved in the notion in terms of possible worlds will be impossible. I thus offer a subjunctive conditional reading of that modality, a reading which, I claim, has the virtues just recounted. (shrink)

Since its disc overy by Fitch, the paradox of knowability has been a thorn in the anti-realist's side. Recently both Dummett and Tennant have sought to relieve the anti-realist by restricting the applicability of the knowability principle -- the principle that all truths are knowable -- which has been viewed as both a cardinal doctrine of anti-realism and the assumption for reductio of Fitch's argument. In this paper it is argued that the paradox of knowability is a peculiarly acute manifestation (...) of a syndrome affecting anti-realism, against which Dummett's and Tennant's manoeuvres are not finally efficacious. The anti-realist can only cope with the syndrome by being much clearer about her notion of knowability. In fact, she'll have to offer an account which relativises the notion of knowability both to the world at which knowability is assessed and to the content of the proposition to which it is applied. This is not, however, merely an ad hoc manoeuvre to counter the problematic syndrome; rather it is just what we should expect from the anti-realist's intuitive use of the notion. A preliminary investigation indicates that there is no way of providing a general, systematic explanation of such a notion of knowability and thus an inherent restriction on the principle of knowability -- but one differing from those offered by either Dummett or Tennant -- is developed. (shrink)

This chapter briefly summarises work by four key figures in the phenomenological philosophy of science: Edmund Husserl; Martin Heidegger; Patrick Heelan; and Joseph J. Kockelmans. In addition, some comparison is made with well-known figures in mainstream philosophy of science, and suggestions are given for further readings in the phenomenological philosophy of science.

Book review of Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents: Contributions to Social Ontology, edited by Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid. Springer, 2013.

We show that strongly compact cardinals and MM are sensitive to $\lambda$-closed forcings for arbitrarily large $\lambda$. This is done by adding ‘regressive' $\lambda$-Kurepa trees in either case. We argue that the destruction of regressive Kurepa trees requires a non-standard application of MM. As a corollary, we find a consistent example of an $\omega_2$-closed poset that is not forcing equivalent to any $\omega_2$-directed-closed poset.

ArgumentDuring the 1860s Ernst Haeckel, German zoologist and one of the foremost popularizers of Darwinism, proposed a natural philosophy called “Monism.” Based on developmental thinking, natural selection, and sound natural laws, the scientific Weltanschauung of Monism was to supersede Christian religion in all its accounts of nature. Haeckel's new scientific religion, this essay argues, fused the religious joys of reveling in the beauty of “mother nature” with the assurance of progress based on scientific certainty. Even though Haeckel and his followers (...) polemicized against dualistic and teleological interpretations of nature, and despite their fierce struggle against the Christian churches, Monism cannot conceal its roots. All central arguments of natural theology reappear – albeit sometimes in causal or reductionist phrasing. Haeckel's aesthetics of nature in particular shows his indebtedness to the concept of a divine economy of nature. His Monism is an evolutionary and pantheistic natural theology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Logos and Alogon: Thinkable and Unthinkable in Mathematics, from the Pythagoreans to the Moderns by Arkady PlotnitskyNoam CohenPLOTNITSKY, Arkady. Logos and Alogon: Thinkable and Unthinkable in Mathematics, from the Pythagoreans to the Moderns. Cham: Springer, 2023. xvi + 294 pp. Cloth, $109.99The limits of thought in its relations to reality have defined Western philosophical inquiry from its very beginnings. The shocking discovery of the incommensurables in Greek (...) mathematics not only reintroduced these limits with greater force but also instigated two different forms of coping with the unthinkable in Western philosophy, mathematics, and science. As Arkady Plotnitsky sets forth, in response to the incommensurability crisis in the ancient Greek intellectual world, there appeared two different attitudes toward the alogon, that is, the unthinkable or irrational. Plato and his followers sought to overcome the unthinkable, of which the incommensurables in mathematics are only an example, through philosophy. In contrast, the Pythagoreans continued to hold on to mathematics as the primary means of knowing the world, but put a larger emphasis on geometry. Plotnitsky [End Page 359] claims that by not putting aside the primacy of mathematics, the Pythagorean shift from arithmetic to geometry established in Western thought a certain tolerance toward the unthinkable within the realm of the thinkable, “a possibility of the alogon in the logos.” Until modern times this remained no more than a possibility. However, in modern mathematics and mathematical physics Plotnitsky identifies a certain fulfillment of this potential, a “radical Pythagorean mathematics.” In his comprehensive and thought-provoking study, Plotnitsky recounts the development of such radical modern Pythagoreanism, not only to tell its history but also to suggest that the unthinkable is a condition of possibility for thought, and that a proper recognition of this role it plays is crucial for the advancement of mathematical thinking and thinking in general.Plotnitsky begins by portraying in broad strokes the two defining characteristics of radical Pythagorean mathematics: the presence of the unthinkable within mathematical thought itself, and the interplay of algebra and geometry. Relying on an extensive knowledge of the history of modern mathematics and physics, in the first two chapters of the book Plotnitsky gradually demonstrates the key role that the alogon plays in some theories of modern mathematical thought, such as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and quantum mechanics. He also presents and clarifies his own conception of the history of Western thought as a creative process of concept-forming. By creating rather than discovering concepts, great mathematicians break new ground for thinking. The book as a whole argues in length for these two main theses.In chapter 3, the author addresses the thought of Bernhard Riemann to make the case that Riemann’s mathematical thought puts an emphasis on creative conceptual thinking and is not defined merely by calculations or logic. Such thinking is problem-posing rather than axiomatic. Riemann’s central innovation in this respect is the concept of manifold (Mannigfaltigkeit), which enabled him to think anew space and geometry in a radical non-Euclidean fashion, implying an infinite number of possible geometries. Plotnitsky argues—borrowing Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology—that this opened up a “plane of immanence,” which is to say that Riemann created a concept-generating movement of thought. However, we cannot grasp the generation of concepts in modern mathematics without giving proper attention to the interplay of algebra and geometry that defines it. Chapter 4 demonstrates this interweaving of the two fields by recounting the history of the idea of the curve in modernity, from the analytic geometry and calculus of Fermat and Descartes to its modification in the concept of a Riemann surface, up to its more recent developments in the algebraic geometry of Weil and Grothendieck. It gives a historical account of the algebraization of the curve that at the same time brings into relief the irreducible geometrical aspect, continuity, of all modern mathematical conceptualizations of the curve.The next two chapters provide further case studies. Chapter 5 expands and solidifies the argument of chapter 2. It discusses three examples of mathematical practice, each displayed by a pair of important [End Page 360] mathematicians: Abel and Galois, Lobachevsky and Riemann, Weil and Grothendieck. Each case... (shrink)

The following considerations do not take their point of departure in legal logic, legal pragmatics, or in the critique of law but rather in the genesis of law, its emergence, and its place in actual experience. In particular, I would like to look at law as a special form of order and ordering power. Reference to “the law” can only be provisional, as it concerns a variable term that also changes in its linguistic designations.I will concentrate on the pre-juridical and (...) supra-juridical aspects of legal practice itself. Accordingly, although the law will not hereinafter be the object of an inquiry from an external point of view, I assume that legal thinking, as all thinking that takes place in determinate orders, has its own peculiar outside.Here I follow Foucault’s injunction concerning a penser du dehors. Close scrutiny of the internal/external difference opens up critical perspectives that spring from “the very core of law.” In general, the following pages take their cue from the responsively oriented and ‘pathically’ grounded phenomenology I have developed hitherto. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Leibliches Verhalten, sei es Gehen, Wahrnehmen, Sprechen, Hantieren, Essen oder raumzeitliche Orientierung, entspringt diesseits von Natur und Kultur einer Lebenswelt, in der alles mehr oder weniger natürlich vorgeprägt wie künstlich geformt ist. Es vollzieht sich in zwischenleiblichem Verkehr mit Anderen. Es verkörpert sich in einer Zwischensphäre von Werkzeugen, Apparaturen, Medien und Symbolen. Es zehrt von einer natürlichen Vorgeschichte. In seiner Doppelrolle als Leibkörper bildet der Leib eine „Umschlagstelle” zwischen Natur und Kultur, zwischen Eigenem und Fremdem. So fungiert die Natur (...) innerhalb der Lebenswelt, bevor sie sich in Form alltäglicher Störungen, methodisch und technisch herbeigeführter Eingriffe oder pathologischer Spaltungen absondert. Unser Leib ist nicht aus einem Guss. Reine Natur und reine Kultur sind Konstrukte der Moderne, die aus einer naturalistischen oder kulturalistischen Leibvergessenheit resultieren. (shrink)

Germany and Japan are two of the worldwide leading countries in robotics research. Robotics as a key technology introduces technical as well as philosophical and cultural challenges. How can we use robots that have a human-like appearance in everyday life? Are there limits to technology? What are the cultural similarities and differences between Germany and Japan? These are some of the questions which are discussed in the book. Five chapters comprehend an intercultural and interdisciplinary framework including current research fields like (...) Roboethics, Hermeneutics of Technologies, Technology Assessment, Robotics in Japanese Popular Culture and Music Robots. Contributions on cultural interrelations, technical visions and essays round out the content of this book. (shrink)

Through a comparison of the phenomenological motif of the alien and the psychoanalytic motif of the unconscious, a critique is advanced against Cartesian dualism, which recurs today in the natural sciences and in the split of the contemporary individual, divided between spirit and nature, the proper world and the alien world, the inner sphere and the outer sphere. It is a matter of thinking of an original subtraction, an absent presence that begins with ourselves, in a slippage that achieves no (...) synthesis. (shrink)

We characterize complete Boolean algebras with dense subtrees. The main results show that a complete Boolean algebra contains a dense tree if its generic filter collapses the algebra's density to its distributivity number and the reverse holds for homogeneous algebras.

We point out a connection between reflection principles and generic large cardinals. One principle of pure reflection is introduced that is as strong as generic supercompactness of ω2 by Σ-closed forcing. This new concept implies CH and extends the reflection principles for stationary sets in a canonical way.

We present results concerning winning strategies and tactics in club games on [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]math imageλ. We show that there is generally no winning tactic for the player trying to get inside the club. The bound-countable game turns out to be rather fruitful and adds to some previous results about the construction of elementary substructures and their localization in certain intervals. We show that Player II has a winning strategy in the bound-countable game, thus establishing a new ZFC result. (...) The applications given are new proofs for two cardinal diamonds and the impossibility of collapsing cardinals to ℵ2 under certain conditions. (shrink)

While the therapeutic effect of post-classical philosophy in antiquity has recently been recognized, Cicero and his oeuvre have been mostly ignored in that respect, because he was deemed too compilatory and eclectic. However, the Tusculanae Disputationes are just that - a philosophical therapy for the soul that pervades all five books of this work - as is brought to light in this new interpretation. German text.