Epistemologists have recently noted a tension between (i) denying access internalism, and (ii) maintaining that rational agents cannot be epistemically akratic, believing claims akin to ‘p, but I shouldn’t believe p’. I bring out the tension, and develop a new way to resolve it. The basic strategy is to say that access internalism is false, but that counterexamples to it are ‘elusive’ in a way that prevents rational agents from suspecting that they themselves are counterexamples to the internalist principles. I (...) argue that this allows us to do justice to the motivations behind both (i) and (ii). And I explain in some detail what a view of evidence that implements this strategy, and makes it independently plausible, might look like. (shrink)

The status of the knowledge iteration principles in the account provided by Lewis in “Elusive Knowledge” is disputed. By distinguishing carefully between what in the account describes the contribution of the attributor’s context and what describes the contribution of the subject’s situation, we can resolve this dispute in favour of Holliday’s claim that the iteration principles are rendered invalid. However, that is not the end of the story. For Lewis’s account still predicts that counterexamples to the negative iteration principle ) (...) come out as elusive: such counterexamples can occur only in possibilities which the attributors of knowledge are ignoring. This consequence is more defensible than it might look at first sight. (shrink)

It is often proposed that the unacceptability of a semantically interpretable sentence can be rooted in its meaning. Elaborating on Oshima New frontiers in artificial intelligence, Springer, Berlin, 2007), we argue that the meaning-driven unacceptability of factive islands must make reference to felicity conditions, and cannot be reduced to the triviality of propositional content. We also observe, again elaborating on Oshima, that the triviality of factive islands need not be logical, but can be relative to a listener’s background assumptions. These (...) findings call for a revision of a prevalent view about meaning-driven unacceptability, according to which unacceptability results from triviality that is both propositional and logical. (shrink)

This edited volume offers a new approach to understanding social conventions by way of Martin Heidegger. It connects the philosopher's conceptions of the anyone, everydayness, and authenticity with an analysis and critique of social normativity. Heidegger’s account of the anyone is ambiguous. Some see it as a good description of human sociality, others think of it as an important critique of modern mass society. This volume seeks to understand this ambiguity as reflecting the tension between the constitutive function of conventions (...) for human action and the critical aspects of conformism. It argues that Heidegger’s anyone should neither be reduced to its pejorative nor its constitutive dimension. Rather, the concept could show how power and norms function. This volume would be of interest to scholars and students of philosophy and the social sciences who wish to investigate the social applications of the works of Martin Heidegger. (shrink)

This article deals with developments of Shinto in the seventeenth century, focussing on the school of Yoshikawa Shinto. It is presented as an example of the coalition between Shinto and Neo-Confucianism intellectuals typical for that time. Pointing out the medieval predecessors of this coalition, the article argues that the theological ideas of Yoshikawa Shinto were much more indebted to medieval Shinto than is generally assumed. This is demonstrated by a doctrinal comparison as well as by a historiographical sketch of the (...) relations between Yoshikawa Shinto and Yoshida Shinto. Both schools regarded themselves as legitimate representatives of Japan's original Way of the kami. The article examines the internaljustifications of these claims as well as their acknowledgments by thepolitical authorities. (shrink)

Generics exhibit genericity, and though a theory of generics is closely connected to a theory of genericity, the two are distinct. They raise a host of interesting linguistic and philosophical issues, both separately and in their interaction. This chapter begins with a fairly manifest phenomenon one can observe in natural language. There is a range of sentences that, speaking intuitively, one can use to talk about kinds. It argues that there's no simple statistical criterion that systematically captures the patterns of (...) the truth and falsity of generics. Generics seem to not just be substantially independent of statistical facts in the world and at the time with respect to which they are evaluated. The chapter points‐out a likely form of context dependence in generics, and argues that on a quantificational approach to generics, the restrictor of the generic quantifier must be determined at least in part by the predicate at issue. (shrink)

1. T. Hegels Logik und die Tradition der Selbstbestimmung.

Definition of the problem: The medical progress made in human reproduction and prenatal diagnosis is having an increasing effect on the responsibility of doctors concerning reproduction and birth. A faulty diagnosis or professional error is causing lawyers to be confronted with difficulties in which ethical views are involved. It is becoming clear that there will be difficulties if the courts have to rule on the question whether the doctor is under an obligation to pay maintenance following the birth of an (...) unwanted child or a child with genetic defects. Arguments and conclusion: First, the controversy about parental claims on maintenance as a result of an unwanted child (”wrongful birth”) is presented, and the ethical arguments against physician liability are critically discussed. Subsequently, the claims of a genetically defective child against the doctor (”wrongful life”) are dealt with. It should be stressed that it is unjust for the court to reject physician liability in this case. The intention is to point out that ethical judgements are improper and inadequate in both cases. (shrink)

This research commentary proposes a conceptual framework for studying big tech companies as “technical systems” that organize much of their operation around the mastery and operationalization of key technologies that facilitate and drive their continuous expansion. Drawing on the study of Large Technical Systems (LTS), on the work of historian Bertrand Gille, and on the economics of General Purpose Technologies (GPTs), it outlines a way to study the “tech” in “big tech” more attentively, looking for compatibilities, synergies, and dependencies between (...) the technologies created and deployed by these companies. Using Google as example, the paper shows how to interrogate software and hardware through the lens of transversal applicability, discusses software and hardware integration, and proposes the notion of “data amalgams” to contextualize and complicate the notion of data. The goal is to complement existing vectors of “big tech” critique with a perspective sensitive to the specific materialities of specific technologies and their possible consequences. (shrink)

A "concept" in the sense favoured by Wittgenstein is a paradigm for a transition between parts of a notational system. A concept-determining sentence such as "There is no reddish green" registers the absence of such a transition. This suggests a plausible account of what is perceived in an experiment that was first designed by Crane and Piantanida, who claim to have induced perceptions of reddish green. I shall propose a redescription of the relevant phenomena, invoking only ordinary colour concepts. This (...) redescription is not ruled out by anything the experimenters say. It accounts for certain peculiarities in both their descriptions and their subjects', and suggests that instead of discovering forbidden colours the experimenters introduced a new use of "-ish". Still, there is a point in speaking of "reddish green" in their context, which can be motivated by invoking what Wittgenstein calls a "physiognomy". (shrink)

Search engines have become an integral part of our Internet use. They shape the way we look at the world, they provide orientation where there is none; but the maps they draw are too often hijacked by commercial interest. Search engines are less black box than black foam; functional decoupling, parasite technologies, and the embedding in the greater context of culture and society render the search act subject to overdetermination. Control is thus diluted into a dense network of human and (...) non-human “actants” and the power of the search engine is located in a control zone rather than a control center. In order to shift power back to the public, this paper proposes the concept of “symmetry of confidence”, a new relationship between search engine companies and their users. (shrink)

Wie kaum ein Philosoph in akademischen Amt und Wurden zuvor hat Ludwig Wittgenstein damit kokettiert, sich in der Geschichte seines eigenen Faches bestenfalls rudimentar auszukennen. Diese ironische Selbstcharakterisierung hat, ebenso wie Wittgensteins wesentlich ahistorische Art des Philosophierens, dazu gefuhrt, dass seine oftmals subtile Auseinandersetzung mit Autoren der Philosophiegeschichte wenig beachtet wurde. Der Band sucht diese Lucke zu schliessen und untersucht exemplarisch wesentliche Bezuge Wittgensteins zur Philosophiegeschichte von Platon uber Kant und Kierkegaard bis Heidegger.

This article offers a close analysis of three neo-Latin poems from a larger cycle of verse dedicated in 1511 to the Spanish cardinal Bernardino de Carvajal by the Italian humanist Giamb...

Ce texte de Bernhard Waldenfels est issu de la seconde partie de son livre Socialité et altérité – modes de l’expérience sociale, 363-85), où l’auteur met à l’épreuve et approfondit sa théorie de la responsivité à travers une série de débats avec Husserl, Schütz et Gurwitsch, Searle, Castoriadis, Foucault et Ricœur. Dans sa discussion avec ce dernier, il insiste sur les thèmes du souvenir et de l’oubli, en prenant pour base Temps et récit et La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli. Le (...) texte se compose de quatre sections. Dans les deux premières, Waldenfels retrace les arguments de Ricœur en insistant notamment sur le manque d’importance accordé à l’oubli dans le récit par Ricœur. Dans les deux dernières, l’auteur propose une révision de la philosophie ricoeurienne de l’oubli sous le signe d’une phénoménologie responsive. À la fois à partir de Ricœur et aussi contre lui, Waldenfels considère l’oubli comme un pathos face auquel nous n’avons pas d’autre choix que répondre. (shrink)