Previous studies have shown that the use of motivational regulation strategies has the potential to sustain invested effort and persistence in the learning process. Combining different methods (questionnaires and standardized diaries), the present study aimed to determine the role of motivational regulation in an exam preparation period. Motivational regulation is differentiated in a quantitative (extent of strategy use) and a qualitative (planning, implementing, monitoring and correcting strategy use) aspect. One hundred and fifteen university students reported the quantity and quality of (...) their motivational regulation strategy use in a pretest and kept a standardized learning diary focused on motivational difficulties and invested effort over a 14-day period just before an exam in their studies. Exam performance was assessed afterwards. Results revealed positive effects of both aspects of motivational regulation on invested effort in exam preparation and exam performance. Moreover, a high quality of motivational regulation was associated with reduced negative effects of motivational difficulties on invested effort during studying—implying that motivational regulation can buffer against specific motivational problems occurring in the learning process. (shrink)

In der Neonatologie—wie auch in anderen Bereichen der Intensivmedizin—müssen Ärzte und Pflegende häufig die ethisch schwierige Entscheidung treffen, ob die Therapie eines schwer kranken Patienten intensiviert oder eingeschränkt werden soll. In der Literatur existieren verschiedene Instrumente zur Entscheidungsfindung, die, angewandt im Rahmen ethischer Konsile, die Nachvollziehbarkeit einer ausgesprochenen Empfehlung gewährleisten sollen. Zwei dieser verfügbaren Modelle („Schema zur ethischen Urteilsbildung nach dem Muster der aristotelischen Ethik“, Honnefelder 1994 und die „Nimwegener Methode für ethische Fallbesprechung“, Gordijn 1998) wurden anhand klinischer Fälle auf (...) ihre Anwendbarkeit in der Neonatologie hin untersucht. Unsere Studie zeigt, dass die Verwendung eines Entscheidungshilfeinstruments zwar grundsätzlich sinnvoll ist, deckt aber gleichzeitig den Konkretisierungsbedarf der oben genannten Modelle beim Einsatz in der Neonatologie auf. Der daraufhin entwickelte „Kölner Arbeitsbogen zur ethischen Entscheidungsfindung in der Neonatologie“ stellt ein auf die speziellen Bedürfnisse der Neonatologie ausgerichtetes Schema dar und könnte damit eine Lücke für den rasant expandierenden Bereich der Früh- und Neugeborenenmedizin schließen. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn der Neonatologie—wie auch in anderen Bereichen der Intensivmedizin—müssen Ärzte und Pflegende häufig die ethisch schwierige Entscheidung treffen, ob die Therapie eines schwer kranken Patienten intensiviert oder eingeschränkt werden soll. In der Literatur existieren verschiedene Instrumente zur Entscheidungsfindung, die, angewandt im Rahmen ethischer Konsile, die Nachvollziehbarkeit einer ausgesprochenen Empfehlung gewährleisten sollen. Zwei dieser verfügbaren Modelle („Schema zur ethischen Urteilsbildung nach dem Muster der aristotelischen Ethik“, Honnefelder 1994 und die „Nimwegener Methode für ethische Fallbesprechung“, Gordijn 1998) wurden anhand klinischer Fälle auf (...) ihre Anwendbarkeit in der Neonatologie hin untersucht. Unsere Studie zeigt, dass die Verwendung eines Entscheidungshilfeinstruments zwar grundsätzlich sinnvoll ist, deckt aber gleichzeitig den Konkretisierungsbedarf der oben genannten Modelle beim Einsatz in der Neonatologie auf. Der daraufhin entwickelte „Kölner Arbeitsbogen zur ethischen Entscheidungsfindung in der Neonatologie“ stellt ein auf die speziellen Bedürfnisse der Neonatologie ausgerichtetes Schema dar und könnte damit eine Lücke für den rasant expandierenden Bereich der Früh- und Neugeborenenmedizin schließen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nietzsche in the Light of his Suppressed Manuscripts WALTER KAUFMANN SINCE THE EIGHTEEN-NINETIES there has been considerable discussion about the adequacy of the editing of Nietzsche's late works, and occasionally bitter polemics about suppressed material have appeared in German newspapers and periodicals as well as in a few books. In the mid-fifties the controversy was revived in the wake of a new three-volume edition of Nietzsche's works, edited by (...) Karl Schlechta, ~ but the acrimonious debate was not very illuminating, and the sensational claims that traveled across the ocean were largely misleading. More and more often it was asked how reliable our printed texts are; also, what new revelations may be expected from unpublished manuscripts. I shall try to answer both questions. The discussion will revolve largely around a recent German work by Erich F. Podach 2 who makes sensational claims about The Antichrist and, above all, Ecce Homo, and who wants to supersede all previous editions of these works, including Schlechta's. 3 II Erich Podach holds a unique place in the Nietzsche literature: nobody else has contributed five genuinely important books. Yet Podach is not a philosopher, and he has never shown any profound understanding of Nietzsche 's thought. The point is that all of his books make use of unpublished documents. His study of Nietzsches Zusammenbruch (1930) was translated i Werke in drei Biinden (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1954-1956), 1282, 1276, and 1476 pp..2Friedrich Nietzsches Werke des Zusammenbruehs (Heidelberg: Wolfgang Rothe Verlag, 1961), 432 pp. and 24 plates with 29 facsimiles of MS pages. 3My article was completed before two reviews of Podach's book appeared in The Philosophical Review, April 1964, pp. 282-285, and in The Journal ot Philosophy, April 23, 1964, pp. 286-288. Both reviews are by Henry Walter Brann; both accept uncritically Podach's editing and Podach's claims; and both add original errors. Brann says that Podach tells "the amazing story of the most brazen literary fraud committed in recent times," and he quotes Podach as saying that "Nietzsche is the most brazenly falsified figure of recent literary and cultural history with regard both to his life and to his works." (The last sentence is rendered into smoother English in The Philosophical Review, and the two reviews arc altogether slightly different.) I shall try to show how Podach and Brann themselves have contributed to this "amazing story" by trying to convince us that one of Nietzsche's best hooks was not written by him. [2051 206 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY into English in 1931. Gestalten um Nietzsche (1932) 4 is his most interesting book and deserves to be translated: it offers chapters on Nietzsche's mother, Rohde, Gast, Bernhard and Elisabeth F6rster (Nietzsche's sister and her husband), and Julius Langbehn. In 1937 Podach published Der kranke Nietzsche : Briefe seiner Mutter an Franz Overbeck, and after that Friedrich Nietzsche und Lou Salom& All of these volumes are important for the biography of Nietzsche. The fifth book aims to offer philologically reliable texts of Nietzsches Werke des Zusammenbruchs, i.e., Nietzsche contra Wagner, Der Antichrist, Ecce Homo, and Dionysos-Dithyramben. All of these were first published after Nietzsche had become insane (in January, 1889), and while no philosophically important changes were made, the early editors were not greatly concerned about philological exactitude. Nietzsche contra Wagner, for example, as published first in 1895 and reprinted many times since, differs quite strikingly from the final version of which Nietzsche himself was reading proofs in January, 1889, when he collapsed. Yet a very few copies of the original version were actually printed in 1889. This version contained a third chapter, "Intermezzo," deleted in 1895 and ever since, and this, a page and a half long, ended with the poem variously called, in later collections of Nietzsche's verse, "Venice" or "Gondola Song." The reason for this omission was not at all sinister. Nietzsche was working on several books late in 1888. Initially, this section formed part of Ecce Homo; then he inserted it in Nietzsche contra Wagner; then he wrote his publisher that after all he preferred to move it back into Ecce Homo; but when soon thereafter he received proofs of... (shrink)

Human cognition and action are intentional and goal-directed, and explaining how they are controlled is one of the most important tasks of the cognitive sciences. After half a century of benign neglect this task is enjoying increased attention. Unfortunately, however, current theorizing about control in general, and the role of consciousness for/in control in particular, suffers from major conceptual flaws that lead to confusion regarding the following distinctions: automatic and unintentional processes, exogenous control and disturbance of endogenous control, conscious control (...) and conscious access to control, and personal and systems levels of analysis and explanation. Only if these flaws are overcome will a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between consciousness and control emerge. (shrink)

In this paper we bring together results from a series of previous papers to prove the constructive version of the Gelfand duality theorem in any Grothendieck topos , obtaining a dual equivalence between the category of commutative C*-algebras and the category of compact, completely regular locales in the topos.

Three theories contend as explanations of perpetrator behavior in the Holocaust as well as other cases of genocide: structural, intentional, and situational. Structural explanations emphasize the sense in which no single individual or choice accounts for the course of events. In opposition, intentional/cutltural accounts insist upon the genocides as intended outcomes, for how can one explain situations in which people ‘step up’ and repeatedly kill defenseless others in large numbers over sustained periods of time as anything other than a choice? (...) Situational explanations offer a type of behavioral account; this is how people act in certain environments. Critical to the situational account as I discuss it is the ‘Asch paradigm’, i.e. experimentally attested conditions for eliciting conformityof behavior regardlesss of available evidence of prior beliefs. In what follows, I defend what I term above a version of situational explanations of perpetrator behavior. Moreover, I maintain that the factors that explain provide an understanding as well. While not committed to the complete irrelevance or exclusion of cultural or structural factors, nonetheless situational analyses can account both for what happened and why. A cardinal virtue of this version of situational explanations consists in showing how shallow the problem of understanding turns out to be for such cases. (shrink)

A 'no-ownership' or 'no-self theory' holds that there is no proper subject of experience; the ownership of experience can only be accounted for by invoking a sub-personal entity. In the recent self-versus-no-self debate, it is widely assumed that the no- referent view of 'I', which is closely associated with Wittgenstein and G. E. M. Anscombe, implies a no-ownership theory of experience. I spell out this assumption with regard to both non-reflective and reflective consciousness and show that it is false. If (...) the so-called 'self' is an individual, the person, nothing more is required for the ownership of sensations than the non-reflective experiencing, undergoing, or suffering of them, whereas the sense of 'ownership' of reflective consciousness varies according to the type of 'I'-thought in question. Ownership of 'I'-thoughts about one's own actions, for one thing, is a matter of being able to fit future actions to them or answer questions as to why one is doing what one does. (shrink)

Without directly addressing the Demarcation Problem for logic—the problem of distinguishing logical vocabulary from others—we focus on distinctive aspects of logical vocabulary in pursuit of a second goal in the philosophy of logic, namely, proposing criteria for the justification of logical rules. Our preferred approach has three components. Two of these are effectively Belnap’s, but with a twist. We agree with Belnap’s response to Prior’s challenge to inferentialist characterisations of the meanings of logical constants. Belnap argued that for a logical (...) constant to exist, its rules must be conservative over a previously given consequence relation and guarantee the uniqueness of the constant. The twist is that we require logical vocabulary to be provably conservative, not over a previously given formal consequence relation, but over a previously given meaningful vocabulary of a language. Uniqueness is also a feature defined in terms of provability: if two syntactically distinguished expressions are governed by the same rules, then formulas with them as main operators are interderivable. Belnap’s criteria are not only those for the existence of a logical constant, but more: they are what distinguishes logical vocabulary from all other expressions. It is the defining mark of a logical constant that it is provably conservative over the fragment of the language which excludes it and that its rules guarantee its uniqueness. The third component is the topic neutrality of logic. The provable conservativeness of logic over a previously given vocabulary of a language is motivated, in part, by appeal to molecularism in the theory of meaning. Molecularity is a feature endorsed by the theory of meaning as a whole, so it does not distinguish logical constants from other expressions. The same is true for conservativeness. We argue that molecularity, and hence conservativeness, are implicit presuppositions of speakers’ use of language: the addition of new vocabulary to a language is presupposed to be conservative. But this presupposition is one that we should be able reflectively to endorse (such as when attempting a rational reconstruction of the use of the vocabulary). Thus, where conservativeness is found to fail, this defect should be remedied and the use of the vocabulary corrected (as in classical negation) or excised altogether (as in pejoratives). We go on to characterise a notion of topic neutrality, which we argue applies to logical vocabulary. We then note that reflective endorsement of the conservativeness of a topic neutral vocabulary requires a proof that the vocabulary is conservative relative to any base vocabulary. Thus we require that logical vocabulary be demonstrably conservative. Allying this requirement, distinctive of logic, to a general consideration about the commitments of assertion yields a mode of justification for logical constants akin to some conceptions of Harmony, i.e., to the idea that the consequences of assertion of a logical complex need to be warranted by the grounds and ought to be the strongest consequences warranted by the grounds. Intuitionistic logic acquires a somewhat familiar justification but emanating from a new motivation. (shrink)

The intentions of others often enter into your practical reasoning, even when you’re acting on your own. Given all the agents around you, you’ll come to grief if what they’re up to is never a consideration in what you decide to do and how you do it. There are occasions, however, when the intentions of another figure in your practical reasoning in a particularly intimate and decisive fashion. I will speak of there being on such occasions a practical intersubjectivity of (...) intentions holding between you and the other individual. I will try to identify this practical intersubjectivity, and to take some preliminary steps toward giving a philosophical account of it. Occasions of practical intersubjectivity are usually those where individuals share agency, or do things jointly, such as when they walk together, kiss, or paint a house together. I will not assume that all instances of practical intersubjectivity are instances of shared agency. But the converse is true: any instance of shared agency involves a practical intersubjectivity holding between the participants. An account of shared agency is inadequate if it fails to handle practical intersubjectivity. The paper is structured as follows. In section 1, I present an example to illustrate this idea of practical intersubjectivity, at least as it appears in the context of shared agency. Practical intersubjectivity is a normative phenomenon, and it is on this basis that in section 2 I distinguish it from the mere coordination of intentions some have recognized as essential for shared activity. The task of section 3 is to show how practical intersubjectivity cannot be adequately described in terms of ordinary intentions familiar from the study of individual agency. Such approaches fail to handle the rational dynamics of intention revision when practical.. (shrink)

This paper discusses free-choice like effects in generics. Just as Jane may drink coffee or tea can be used to convey Jane may drink coffee and Jane may drink tea (she is free to choose ), some generics with disjunctive predicates can be used to convey conjunctions of simpler generics: elephants live in Africa or Asia can be used to convey elephants live in Africa and elephants live in Asia. Investigating these logically slightly more complex generics and especially the free-choice (...) like effects throws light on both the semantics of generics and the interaction between world knowledge and the interpretive options generics offer. This paper presents a package of semantic and pragmatic hypotheses to account for the data, including why the effect is absent in the superficially logically similar elephants live in Africa or give birth to live young. (shrink)

Religions commonly are taken to provide general orientation in leading one's life. We develop here the idea that religions also may have a much more concrete guidance function in providing systematic decision biases in the face of cognitive-control dilemmas. In particular, we assume that the selective reward that religious belief systems provide for rule-conforming behavior induces systematic biases in cognitive-control parameters that are functional in producing the wanted behavior. These biases serve as default values under uncertainty and affect performance in (...) any task that shares cognitive-control operations with the religiously motivated rule-conforming behavior the biases were originally developed for. Such biases therefore can be unraveled and objectified by means of rather simple tasks that are relatively well understood with regard to the cognitive mechanisms they draw on. (shrink)

In den USA ist die anthropologische, ethnographische und philosophische Diskussion uber posthumanes Menschsein in vollem Gange, in Deutschland eher verhalten.

It is God's covenant with Abraham, freely initiated by God, that constitutes Israel as a people who gratefully recall the past, who live obediently in the present, and who face the future in the assurance of God's promises.

In this article, I will use terms such as “responsive” and “responsivity”, that became indispensable for my own thinking when I tried to develop a theory of radical Fremdheit. In this article I develop the basic features of this responsivity in which others are involved. Methodologically, I am guided by a variant of responsive phenomenology that is to be understood as a phenomenology grounded in the body. Crucial to this is the descent into a radical form of experience that precedes (...) all constructs and models, as well as its own theory. (shrink)

John Locke discusses the notions of identity and diversity in Book 2, Chapter 27 of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. At the beginning of this much-discussed chapter, Locke posits the place-time-kind principle. According to this principle, no two things of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time . Just what Locke means by this is unclear, however. So too is whether this principle causes problems for Locke, and whether these problems can be resolved. This (...) is significant because the place-time-kind principle is foundational to Locke's discussion of identity. Moreover, the place-time-kind principle stands at the center of a number of lively and long-standing debates in Locke scholarship. These include the debates over the ontological status of Lockean persons, and whether Locke is a relative identity theorist, to name just two. In this paper, I offer a survey of how Locke's place-time-kind principle has been interpreted in the secondary literature. The aim of this taxonomy is to clarify where the differences between competing interpretations lie, and additionally show just how challenging it is to determine which reading is best. (shrink)

The role of gestures in communication is still debated: Some claim that gestures are merely ancillary forms of expressions, whereas others suggest a central role of gestures in the development of language. In this article, I provide data in support of the overarching hypothesis that gestures have a transitional function between ergotic/epistemic movements of hands and symbolic expressions. The context for the study of these transitions is constituted by school science laboratory activities conducted by students who are also asked to (...) describe and explain while still within proximity of the materials of their investigations. It is hypothesized that communication is distributed across the context and shifts increasingly into a verbal modality as students become familiar with the phenomena they are to learn about. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that initial temporal delays between gestures and the corresponding words decrease and finally disappear so that gestural and verbal modalities coincide. It is suggested that engaging in communication in the presence of material has an important cognitive function in that it affords a distribution of cognition across different modalities until individuals have developed the competence to express themselves effectively in the verbal modality. (shrink)

Charles de Gaulle once famously complained about the difficulty of governing a nation with 250 different kinds of cheese. His comment is a true description of France’s diversity and its population. We are like a loud, unruly family always arguing among ourselves. However, as much as we disagree, there is one thing on which we French stand united—we love our healthcare system and do not want it changed, even as economic realities make it increasingly difficult to maintain.

_On Tyranny_ is Leo Strauss’s classic reading of Xenophon’s dialogue _Hiero_, or _Tyrannicus_, in which the tyrant Hiero and the poet Simonides discuss the advantages and disadvantages of exercising tyranny. Included are a translation of the dialogue from its original Greek, a critique of Strauss’s commentary by the French philosopher Alexandre Kojève, and the complete correspondence between the two. This revised and expanded edition introduces important corrections throughout and expands Strauss’s restatement of his position in light of Kojève’s commentary to (...) bring it into conformity with the text as it was originally published in France. (shrink)

Genocide is evil or nothing could be. It raises a host of questions about humanity, rights, justice, and reality, which are key areas of concern for philosophy. Strangely, however, philosophers have tended to ignore genocide. Even more problematic, philosophy and philosophers bear more responsibility for genocide than they have usually admitted. In Genocide and Human Rights: A Philosophical Guide, an international group of twenty-five contemporary philosophers work to correct those deficiencies by showing how philosophy can and should repsond to genocide, (...) particularly in ways that defend human rights. (shrink)

Experience is investigated according to those breaking points where the unexpected surfaces and the surprise of the extraordinary and the alien breaks through. What happens is always in the postponement between pathos and response; this represents the fundamental agreement of a responsive phenomenology: it is never a quiet succession, but always something arriving too early or too late. Threshold experiences such as hesitation, delay, waiting, pausing, stumbling are investigated in this framework.

Der Band versammelt Beiträge renommierter Vertreter unterschiedlicher Disziplinen zu der Frage, ob wir tatsächlich einen Zugang zur Wirklichkeit haben oder lediglich von unseren eigenen Konstruktionen der Wirklichkeit umgeben sind. In der Debatte kommt der Sprache eine zentrale Rolle zu. Konstruktivistische Positionen gehen davon aus, dass unsere Wörter und Sätze nie die Dinge an sich bezeichnen, sondern dies immer aus einer bestimmten Perspektive tun. Einer ‚Wirklichkeit an sich‘ nachzujagen, ist zwecklos, als wichtig gilt das Aufzeigen der Perspektiven. Nicht selten geschieht das (...) in aufklärerischer Absicht, wenn etwa Formulierungen wie die von der „Größe eines Volkes“, der „historischen Bestimmung einer Nation“ oder der „Natur des Geschlechts“ kritisch hinterfragt werden. Diesen Versuchen, die Wirklichkeit als interessengeleitet konstruierte auszuweisen, wird mit dem Argument begegnet, der Akt der Aufklärung diene letztlich nur dazu, die jeweils eigene Position als die ‚eigentlich richtige‘ durchzusetzen. Außerdem widerspreche die Annahme eines umfassenden Konstruiertseins unserer Wirklichkeitsbilder jeder Alltagserfahrung von der Präsenz und Widerständigkeit der Welt. An diesem Punkt der Kontroverse setzt der vorliegende Band an. Andreas Gardt : Wort und Welt. Konstruktivismus und Realismus in der Sprachtheorie Markus Gabriel : Der Neue Realismus zwischen Konstruktion und Wirklichkeit John R. Searle : The Philosophy of Perception and the Bad Argument Bernhard Pörksen : Der Blick des Kritikers. Die Debatte über den Konstruktivismus in der deutschsprachigen Kommunikationswissenschaft – ein Beispiel für die Auseinandersetzung zwischen realistischen und relativistischen Wissenschaftlern Siegfried J. Schmidt : Wie wirklich ist die Wirklichkeit? Heinz Bude : Realitäten in der Wirklichkeit Paul Kirchhof : Rechtssprache zwischen Ideal und Wirklichkeit Paul-Gerhard Klumbies : Gott – bewusst gemacht oder bewusstgemacht? Eine theologische Rückmeldung zu Konstruktivismus und Neuem Realismus Wolf-Andreas Liebert : Können wir mit Engeln sprechen? Über die eigenartige Wirklichkeit der Verständigung im Religiösen Gerhard Roth : Wahrnehmung und Erkenntnis: Grundzüge einer neurobiologisch fundierten Erkenntnistheorie Thomas Fuchs : Die gemeinsame Wahrnehmung der Wirklichkeit. Skizze eines enaktiven Realismus Alexander Ziem/Björn Fritsche : Von der Sprache zur Wirklichkeit: Die konstruktivistische Perspektive der Kognitiven Linguistik Max Düsterhöft/Robert Jacob/Marco Lehmann-Waffenschmidt : Konstruiert oder real? Die konstruierte Alltagswirklichkeit des Geldes Ludwig Jäger : „Outthereness". Über das Problem des Wirklichkeitsbezugs von Zeichen Matthias Attig : Begriffsrealismus als sprachwissenschaftliches Problem. Überlegungen zur kategorialen Eigenart von Termini Josef Klein : ‚Betrachten der Wirklichkeit‘ und politisches Framing. Am Beispiel der CDU-Wahlkampagne 2013 Ekkehard Felder : Wahrheit und Wissen zwischen Wirklichkeit und Konstruktion: Freiheiten und Zwänge beim sprachlichen Handeln. (shrink)

Through a comparison of the phenomenological motif of the alien and the psychoanalytic motif of the unconscious, a critique is advanced against Cartesian dualism, which recurs today in the natural sciences and in the split of the contemporary individual, divided between spirit and nature, the proper world and the alien world, the inner sphere and the outer sphere. It is a matter of thinking of an original subtraction, an absent presence that begins with ourselves, in a slippage that achieves no (...) synthesis. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to examine Heidegger’s analysis of existential spatiality in Being and Time in the light of Sloterdijk’s criticism of it. Sloterdijk states in Spheres I that Heidegger presented, in Being and Time, an “embryonically revolutionary” approach to being and space but did not complete it. His own ‘Spheres Project’ would purport fill this gap. Based on the analysis of the fundamental moments of existential spatiality (§§12 to 28 and §70 of Being and Time), and taking into (...) account comments made by Heidegger himself in later years, I will attempt to answer the question of the alleged unfinished character of the analysis of existential spatiality in Being and Time. (shrink)