Volume 46, Issue 1, March 2019, Page 111-114.

If musical works are abstract objects, which cannot enter into causal relations, then how can we refer to musical works or know anything about them? Worse, how can any of our musical experiences be experiences of musical works? It would be nice to be able to sidestep these questions altogether. One way to do that would be to take musical works to be concrete objects. In this paper, we defend a theory according to which musical works are concrete objects. In (...) particular, the theory that we defend takes musical works to be fusions of performances. We defend this view from a series of objections, the first two of which are raised by Julian Dodd in a recent paper and the last of which is suggested by some comments of his in an earlier paper. (shrink)

Thanks to David Kaplan (1989a, 1989b), we all know how to handle indexicals like ‘I’. ‘I’ doesn’t refer to an object simpliciter; rather, it refers to an object only relative to a context. In particular, relative to a context C, ‘I’ refers to the agent of C. Since different contexts can have different agents, ‘I’ can refer to different objects relative to different contexts. For example, relative to a context cwhose agent is Gottlob Frege, ‘I’ refers to Frege; relative to (...) a context 0* whose agent is Alexius.. (shrink)

Sometimes people desire that their lives go badly, take pleasure in their lives going badly, or believe that their lives are going badly. As a result, some popular theories of welfare are paradoxical. I show that no attempt to defend those theories from the paradox fully succeeds.

The paper is dealing with the foundation of the Division for German Literature and Language at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem from the point of view of its first head, Prof. Stéphane Mosès.

Millianism and Fregeanism agree that a sentence that contains a name expresses a structured proposition but disagree about whether that proposition contains the object that the name refers to (Millianism) or rather a mode of presentation of that object (Fregeanism). Various problems – about simple sentences, propositional‐attitude ascriptions, and sentences that contain empty names – beset each view. To solve these problems, Millianism can appeal to modes of presentation, and Fregeanism can appeal to objects. But this raises a further problem: (...) namely, to explain why the proposition expressed by a sentence that contains a name matters in some cases but not in others. (shrink)

This article provides a conceptual map of the affective terrain while focusing on enduring positive affective attitudes, such as love and happiness. The first section of the article examines the basic characteristics of affective attitudes, i.e., intentionality, feeling, and dispositionality, and classifies the various affective attitudes accordingly. An important distinction in this regard is between acute, extended, and enduring affective attitudes. Then a discussion on the temporality of affective attitudes is presented. The second section discusses major mechanisms that enable long-lasting (...) affective attitudes to endure. These mechanisms include, Hedonic adaptation, which reduces affective intensity, thereby enabling adaptation to a stable, average level of affective intensity; Positive mood offset, which maintains a moderate level of positive mood in the absence of adverse stimuli; The enduring mood of being dissatisfied, thereby keeping the agent’s interest high, and Meaningful development, which underlies the continuation and enhancement of the affective attitude. Each of these mechanisms sustains, in its own unique way, the balance required for enduring affective attitudes. The third section applies the above considerations to two major enduring positive affective attitudes: the mood of lasting happiness and the enduring emotion of profound romantic love. Time is typically a necessary condition for the creation and enhancement of such love. However, it is not a sufficient condition. So only in some cases, but not in all, does loving longer mean loving more. (shrink)

Cholbi suggests three unique features of grief which are “unlike most emotional conditions”: (1) grief is a concatenation of affective states rather than a single such state, (2) grief is not a perception-like state but a form of affectively-laden attention directed at its object, and (3) grief is an activity with an inchoate aim. While I essentially accept this characterization, I believe that these arguments are not unique to grief but common to all (or at least most) emotions.

We present a new technique for changing the cofinality of large cardinals using homogeneous forcing. As an application we show that many singular cardinals in [Formula: see text] can be measurable in HOD. We also answer a related question of Cummings, Friedman and Golshani by producing a model in which every regular uncountable cardinal [Formula: see text] in [Formula: see text] is [Formula: see text]-supercompact in HOD.

Purpose The study explores how social media impacts institutional trust through the lens of Kohlberg’s stages of moral development. Specifically, this study aims to understand how moral relativism and moral intuitionism can moderate the relationship between social media use and perception of social authorities. Design/methodology/approach The study analyzes a large data set from the World Values Survey, covering responses from approximately 52,000 individuals across 45 countries between 2017 and 2022. Multiple regression analyses were conducted to test for interactions between social (...) media use and stages of moral development on trust in social institutions. Findings The study finds that different stages of moral development significantly moderate the relationship between social media use and institutional trust. Specifically, higher moral development buffers the negative effect of social media use on trust in three main social institutions: law enforcement, parliament and the legal system. In contrast, individuals with higher levels of moral relativism and moral intuitionism are more susceptible to the negative influence of social media on institutional trust. Research limitations/implications The study relies on self-reported data from the World Values Survey, which may introduce response biases. In addition, while the large-scale data set offers insights into correlations, it does not allow for conclusive causal inferences. Originality/value This research contributes to understanding technology’s impact on modern societies by highlighting the role of individual moral development in shaping perceptions of key social institutions. The study uniquely integrates Kohlberg’s moral development theory with the influence of social media, offering a novel perspective on how personal moral systems can moderate the effect of digital media use. (shrink)

Marxism, Cultural Studies and Sport assesses the contemporary relevance of Marxist approaches and offers a unique and diverse examination of modern sports ...

Whilst certain verbs may appear in both the intransitive inchoative and the transitive causative constructions (The ball rolled/The man rolled the ball), others may appear in only the former (The man laughed/*The joke laughed the man). Some accounts argue that children acquire these restrictions using only (or mainly) statistical learning mechanisms such as entrenchment and pre-emption. Others have argued that verb semantics are also important. To test these competing accounts, adults (Experiment 1) and children aged 5–6 and 9–10 (Experiment 2) (...) were taught novel verbs designed to be construed — on the basis of their semantics — as either intransitive-only or alternating. In support of the latter claim, participants' grammaticality judgments revealed that even the youngest group respected these semantic constraints. Frequency (entrenchment) effects were observed for familiar, but not novel, verbs (Experiment 1). We interpret these findings in the light of a new theoretical account designed to yield effects of both verb semantics and entrenchment/pre-emption. (shrink)

Previous studies have shown that children retreat from argument‐structure overgeneralization errors (e.g., *Don’t giggle me) by inferring that frequently encountered verbs are unlikely to be grammatical in unattested constructions, and by making use of syntax‐semantics correspondences (e.g., verbs denoting internally caused actions such as giggling cannot normally be used causatively). The present study tested a new account based on a unitary learning mechanism that combines both of these processes. Seventy‐two participants (ages 5–6, 9–10, and adults) rated overgeneralization errors with higher (...) (*The funny man’s joke giggled Bart) and lower (*The funny man giggled Bart) degrees of direct external causation. The errors with more‐direct causation were rated as less unacceptable than those with less‐direct causation. This finding is consistent with the new account, under which children acquire—in an incremental and probabilistic fashion—the meaning of particular constructions (e.g., transitive causative = direct external causation) and particular verbs, rejecting generalizations where the incompatibility between the two is too great. (shrink)

We prove a Mathias-type criterion for the Magidor iteration of Prikry forcings.

I reconstruct from Rietdijk and Putnam’s well-known papers an argument against the applicability of the concept of becoming in Special Relativity, which I think is unaffected by some of the objections found in the literature. I then consider a line of thought found in the discussion of the possible conventionality of simultaneity in Special Relativity, beginning with Reichenbach, and apply it to the debate over becoming. We see that it immediately renders Rietdijk and Putnam’s argument unsound. I end by comparing (...) my approach to others found in the literature, primarily Stein’s. (shrink)

The relationship between emotions and argumentation is not always clear. I attempt to clarify this issue by referring to three basic questions: (1) Do emotions constitute a certain kind of argumentation?; (2) Do emotions constitute rational argumentation?; (3) Do emotions constitute efficient argumentation? I will claim that there are many circumstances in which the answer to these questions is positive. After describing such circumstances, the educational implications of the connection between emotions and argumentation will be indicated.

This article studies the monotonicity behavior of plural determinersthat quantify over collections. Following previous work, we describe thecollective interpretation of determiners such as all, some andmost using generalized quantifiers of a higher type that areobtained systematically by applying a type shifting operator to thestandard meanings of determiners in Generalized Quantifier Theory. Twoprocesses of counting and existential quantification thatappear with plural quantifiers are unified into a single determinerfitting operator, which, unlike previous proposals, both capturesexistential quantification with plural determiners and respects theirmonotonicity (...) properties. However, some previously unnoticed factsindicate that monotonicity of plural determiners is not always preservedwhen they apply to collective predicates. We show that the proposedoperator describes this behavior correctly, and characterize themonotonicity of the collective determiners it derives. It is proved thatdeterminer fitting always preserves monotonicity properties ofdeterminers in their second argument, but monotonicity in the firstargument of a determiner is preserved if and only if it is monotonic inthe same direction in the second argument. We argue that this asymmetryfollows from the conservativity of generalized quantifiers innatural language. (shrink)

Frege analyzed the grammatical subject-term 'S' in quantified subject-predicate sentences, 'q S are P', as being logically predicative. This is in contrast to Aristotelian Logic, according to which it is a logical subject-term, like the proper name 'a' in 'a is P' – albeit a plural one, designating many particulars. I show that Frege's arguments for his analysis are unsound, and explain how he was misled to his position by the mathematical concept of function. If common nouns in this grammatical (...) subject position are indeed logical subject-terms, this should require a thorough reevaluation of the adequacy of Frege's Predicate Calculus as a tool for the analysis of the logic and semantics of natural language. (shrink)

This paper criticizes Kripke’s and Putnam’s theory of the semantics of natural kind terms (KPT) and develops an alternative theory. It first examines description theories of natural kind terms, to see what their flaws are and what can be preserved of them. It then presents the KPT and makes three main criticisms. These rely on the meaning of elementary particles’ names, on reactions to the absence of a common essential nature, and on applications of old terms to new cases. Lastly, (...) it develops a theory that takes noun phrases to be plural referring expressions, and shows how that theory meets the objections to the KPT. (shrink)

Students systematically and deliberately apply rule‐based but erroneous algorithms to solving unfamiliar arithmetic problems. These algorithms result in erroneous solutions termed rational errors. Computationally, students' erroneous algorithms can be represented by perturbations or bugs in otherwise correct arithmetic algorithms (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; Langley & Ohilson, 1984; VanLehn, 1983, 1986, 1990; Young S O'Sheo, 1981). Bugs are useful for describing how rational errors occur but bugs are not sufficient for explaining their origin. A possible explanation for this is that rational (...) errors are the result of incorrect induction from examples. This prediction is termed the “induction hypothesis” (VanLehn, 1986). The purpose of the present study was to: (a) expand on post formulations of the induction hypothesis, and (b) use a new methodology to test the induction hypothesis more carefully than has been done previously. The first step involved teaching participants a new number system called NewAbacus, a written modification of the abacus system. The second step consisted of dividing them into different groups, where each individual received an example of only one port of the NewAbacus addition algorithm. During the third and final step, participants were instructed to solve both familiar and unfamiliar types of addition problems in NewAbacus. The induction hypothesis was supported by using both empirical and computational investigations. (shrink)

Ned Block. Psychologism and behaviorism. Philosophical Review, 90, 5-43.) argued that a behaviorist conception of intelligence is mistaken, and that the nature of an agent's internal processes is relevant for determining whether the agent has intelligence. He did that by describing a machine which lacks intelligence, yet can answer questions put to it as an intelligent person would. The nature of his machine's internal processes, he concluded, is relevant for determining that it lacks intelligence. I argue against Block that it (...) is not the nature of its processes but of its linguistic behavior which is responsible for his machine's lack of intelligence. As I show, not only has Block failed to establish that the nature of internal processes is conceptually relevant for psychology, in fact his machine example actually supports some version of behaviorism. As Wittgenstein has maintained, as far as psychology is concerned, there may be chaos inside. (shrink)

The paper includes a series of letters exchanged between the author and the late Professor Feyerabend, concerning the best "method" for military intelligence, as a test case for the role of conceptual frameworks in philosophy of science. The letters deal with issues like: Is it possible to make an intelligence estimate without a conceptual framework? Does such a framework have any 'positive' role? If so, how should a conceptual framework in intelligence be built? What risks lurk within it? Is it (...) possible to indicate methods for intelligence estimates which are 'better' and more 'successful' than others? (shrink)

The Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) is based on the assumption of homogeneous voters who imperfectly know the correct policy. We reassess the validity of the CJT when voters are homogeneous and each knows the correct decision with an average probability of more than a half.

Scientific endeavor is the pursuit of knowledge with the aim of advancing the welfare of all human beings. This endeavor is built on the ideology of science; thus, society relies on the integrity of the practice of science and of scientists themselves. The responsible conduct of research is the essence of good science; however, many of the pedagogical approaches used to instill integrity in science accentuate the negative rather than exemplify ideal professionalism. This paper makes an argument for the inculcation (...) of the appropriate conduct of research via a positive approach. We address the acclimation to the culture of science that supersedes diverse cultural backgrounds of students. We suggest techniques for the implementation of positive strategies and reinforce the benefit of approaching the teaching of ethical behavior as a competitive advantage. We highlight ways in which this approach can empower the individual scientist and the scientific community as a whole. Transmission of the culture of scientific professionalism formalizes the aims of an ideal scientific professional and encourages assimilation and identification as a member of the scientific profession. We purport that instilling scientific professionalism will spur responsible conduct of research. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

This interview with Michal Ben-Naftali from March 2004 is one of Derrida's last. It begins with the question of the relationship between love, law, and justice and then moves on to discuss everything from the secret, hospitality, friendship, sacrifice, pardon and psychoanalysis to the relationship between deconstruction and melancholy.

I aim to establish in this article why Aribiah Attoe, like other determinists before him, got it wrong in arguing for the possibility of predeterminism in a materially evolving universe. I will do this by proving two things: I will first establish the inconsistency of the idea of predeterminism in an evolving universe. Then, I argue that the adirectionality presupposed by an evolutionary universe gives room for free will and negates the argument for a predeterministic universe. I aim to achieve (...) the above by exposing why the view which upholds the universe and all existents within it as lacking free will – or the possibility of adirectionality – stems from a category error on the part of the determinists. Lastly, I defend the position that for predeterminism to stand a chance against the free will of animate things-in-the-world, it must deny the possibility of an evolving/expanding universe that is adirectional and suggestive of boundlessness, and the possibility that some events are not fundamentally necessary reactions to previous states of affairs. (shrink)

Charles Dickens began one of his many great works of literature with this seemingly paradoxical, self-contradictory statement. Reflecting on a jury verdict in Northern California in June of 2001, in the context of what has transpired during the decade of the 1990s with regard to the care of dying patients, observations in the genre of Dickens come readily to mind. In 1991, two of the most compelling books on the subject of pain, medicine, and society were published: Eric Cassell's The (...) Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine and David Morris's The Culture of Pain. Both works unflinchingly recognized and explored the implications of the vast clinical literature documenting the failure of modern medicine to respond compassionately and effectively to what had by then become an epidemic of undertreated pain. (shrink)

When one considers the protracted and continuing struggle of the citizens of Oregon to include physician-assisted suicide among the panoply of measures available to dying patients and the physicians who care for them, the depth and breadth of the issue becomes inescapable. The potential intractability of the dispute is illustrated by the very fact, noted in the preceding parenthetical phrase, that consensus eludes us on even the most basic of semantic points—how we are to most aptly characterize the conduct in (...) question? The case featured in this issue's The Caduceus in Court must be examined as the latest battle in a long war of attrition waged by opponents of physician-assisted suicide against the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. After briefly reviewing that history, I will then consider the details of Oregon v. Ashcroft and the implications of the litigation not only for the care of dying patients but also for the regulation of medical practice in the United States and, more broadly still, the search for resolution of serious medical disputes in a democratic society. (shrink)

In this paper, I will be arguing that the basic infrastructure of an ineffable formal identity between name and object which is presented in the Tractatus is still very much involved in Wittgenstein's early development of the concept of grammar. First, it will be necessary to clearly describe how the identity between name and object is initially formulated in the Tractatus. Hence, in section 1, I will show how the 'picture theory' is ontologically grounded on the identity of linguistics' and (...) worldly atomic structural elements. I will discuss the ‘picture theory’ only briefly, since my main interest is to illuminate how that infrastructure remains a core aspect of Wittgenstein's “middle period” thinking: that is, in what way the identity of name and object is contained and presupposed within his concept of grammar and how it is still used as a condition for our symbolism to make sense. Another way to describe this paper's aim, this time from its end backwards, would be to say that it is to reveal that grammatical systems of rules are nothing other than the implementations of that special kind of identity, for the latter is always and already manifest within our symbolism. (shrink)

Committee decision making is examined in this study focusing on the role assigned to the committee members. In particular, we are concerned about the comparison between committee performance under specialization and non-specialization of the decision makers. Specialization (in the context of project or public policy selection) means that the decision of each committee member is based on a narrow area, which typically results in the acquirement and use of relatively high expertise in that area. When the committee members’ expertise is (...) already determined, specialization only means that the decision of each committee member is based solely on his/her relatively high expertise area. This form of specialization is potentially inferior relative to non-specialization under which the decision of each committee member is based on different areas, not just his/her relatively high expertise area. Given that the expertise of the committee members is already determined but unknown, our analysis focuses on non-specializing individuals whose decision is based on a decision rule that does not require information on the decision-making skills. Under these realistic assumptions, non-specialization is shown to be preferable over specialization, depending on the aggregation rule applied by the committee. The significance of our approach is not limited to the specific results that we obtain. Rather, it should be viewed as a first step toward a deeper examination of the role of individual decision makers in enhancing the performance of collective decision making. (shrink)

Theoretical methods for empirical state determination of entangled two-level systems are analyzed in relation to information theory. We show that hidden variable theories would lead to a Shannon index of correlation between the entangled subsystems which is larger than that predicted by quantum mechanics. Canonical representations which have maximal correlations are treated by the use of Schmidt and Hilbert-Schmidt decomposition of the entangled states, including especially the Bohm singlet state and the GHZ entangled states. We show that quantum mechanics does (...) not violate locality, but does violate realism. (shrink)