The acquisition of a new skill usually proceeds through five stages, from novice to expert, with a sixth stage of mastery available for highly motivated performers. In this chapter, we re-state the six stages of the Dreyfus Skill Model, paying new attention to the transitions and interrelations between them. While discussing the fifth stage, expertise, we unpack the claim that, “when things are proceeding normally, experts don’t solve problems and don’t make decisions; they do what normally works” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, (...) 1988, pp. 30 – 31). This leads us to offer an account of the “perspectival deliberation” that arises for experts and masters and that is distinct from the calculative deliberation characteristic of the lower stages of skillfulness. (shrink)

This book is organized around six theorists and offers a biographical perspective of each theorist, An objective review of the theory, and recommendations for using each theory in day-to-day practice.

We present six significant open problems in Pure Inductive Logic, together with their background and current status, with the intention of raising awareness and leading ultimately to their resolution.

Addresses the perils and promises postmodernity holds for the tasks of Christian thinkers.

It has been argued that patrilineal joint family systems tend to bias family planning decisions in favour of sons. A simple model suggests that in such societies, any given son will be more highly valued by his parents (1) the fewer his brothers and (2) the earlier his birth is in the brother series. A daughter's value will be greater (1) the fewer brothers she has and (2) the earlier her birth is relative to other sisters. This study first addresses (...) the extent of son preference as inferred from family composition data for 772 Taiwanese first-graders born in the mid-1970s in two socioeconomically distinct communities in Taipei, Taiwan. It then uses linear regression to consider whether the model criteria help account for statural variation among children in each study area when controlling for differences in measurement age, parental education and housing. With respect to family composition and gender preference, available evidence was consistent with previous surveys. While better-educated parents in the more affluent study area had significantly fewer children (p<0·0005) and were more willing to stop without a son, girls there, as in the less affluent area, were still significantly more likely than boys to belong to large sibships (p[less-than-or-equal]0·005). Evidence from mean height of males and females partially accords with hypothetical predictions. In the less affluent area, the interaction effect of male birth order and the presence of younger siblings was significantly associated with mean stature (p=0·002). Males without brothers were 2·0 cm taller than males with either an older or a younger brother (116·3 ± 0·5 cm vs 114·3 ± 0·4 cm). Males who had both younger and older brothers, but often no sisters, were about as tall, however, as those without brothers. A similar, but less pronounced, pattern was found amoung males in the more affluent area, but only among those who had sisters. These boys were also consistently shorter than boys without sisters (115·6 ± 0·6 cm vs 117·7 ± 0·6 cm; p=0·001). Patterns of mean female stature did not clearly support the hypothesis. Girls in the more affluent area were relatively tall and did not show significant variation. Results among less affluent girls showed significant contrasts, but not necessarily in the predicted direction. (shrink)

Originally published in 1937 on the occasion of the five hundredth anniversary of the birth of Isaac ben Judah Abravanel, this book contains six essays on his teaching and thought by a number of scholars. The authors explain key points such as the Iberian background to Abravanel's work, his differences with other philosophers of his age, and the influence of his son, Leone Ebreo, on the Renaissance. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in Abravanel's life (...) and teaching or in Medieval Jewish philosophy. (shrink)

Bradeen and McGregor with exemplary skill and patience re-examined the almost desperately worn front face of ATL ii List 26. They were able to prove that the lines of its prescript were precisely forty-seven letters long. This excludes the possibility of dating this list 430/29 or 428/7 B.C., since only six spaces are available for the first numeral. They rightly maintained that the ATL Lists 25 and 26 must be kept together, but unlike them I would challenge the ATL numbering (...) and order. I still think that this should be reversed. (shrink)

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part 1 of this article took up the first two questions. Part 2 took up the second two questions. Part 3 now deals with Questions 5 & 6. Question 5 confronts the issue of utility, whether the manual design of DSM-III and IV favors clinicians or researchers, and what that means for DSM-5. Our final question, Question 6, takes up a concluding issue, whether the acknowledged problems with the earlier DSMs warrants a significant overhaul of DSM-5 and future manuals. As in Parts 1 & 2 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)

Objectives: To analyse legislation and medical professional positions concerning the doctor’s role in assisted dying in western Europe, and to discuss their implications for doctors.Method: This paper is based on country-specific reports by experts from European countries where assisted dying is legalised , or openly practiced , or where it is illegal .Results: Laws on assisted dying in The Netherlands and Belgium are restricted to doctors. In principle, assisted suicide is not illegal in either Germany or Switzerland, but a doctor’s (...) participation in Germany would violate the code of professional medical conduct and might contravene of a doctor’s legal duty to save life. The Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill proposed in the UK in 2005 focused on doctors, whereas the Proposal on Assisted Dying of the Norwegian Penal Code Commission minority in 2002 did not.Professional medical organisations in all these countries except The Netherlands maintain the position that medical assistance in dying conflicts with the basic role of doctors. However, in Belgium and Switzerland, and for a time in the UK, these organisations dropped their opposition to new legislation. Today, they regard the issue as primarily a matter for society and politics. This “neutral” stance differs from the official position of the Royal Dutch Medical Association which has played a key role in developing the Dutch practice of euthanasia as a “medical end-of-life decision” since the 1970s.Conclusion: A society moving towards an open approach to assisted dying should carefully identify tasks to assign exclusively to medical doctors, and distinguish those possibly better performed by other professions. (shrink)

Excerpt from The New Realism: Coöperative Studies in Philosophy On July 21, 1910, we published a brief article entitled 'The Program and First Platform of Six Realists,' in which we indicated the direction philosophical inquiry ought to take. We there asserted that advance would be facilitated by cooperative investigations; and the drafting of the platform was a first attempt to confirm this belief. The present volume continues, on a larger scale, the work there inaugurated; and we hope it will be (...) followed by other collections of studies. The introductory essay voices our common opinions. The other essays do so only in part. It has seemed best to publish them without laboring for complete unanimity, inasmuch as their agreements quite overshadow their differences. They have been written after prolonged conferences. A few important debatable topics are briefly discussed by dissenting members in the Appendix. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Aristotle, great Greek philosopher, researcher, reasoner, and writer, born at Stagirus in 384 BCE, was the son of Nicomachus, a physician, and Phaestis. He studied under Plato at Athens and taught there ; subsequently he spent three years at the court of a former pupil, Hermeias, in Asia Minor and at this time married Pythias, one of Hermeias's relations. After some time at Mitylene, in 343?2 he was appointed by King Philip of Macedon to be tutor of his teen-aged son (...) Alexander. After Philip's death in 336, Aristotle became head of his own school, the Lyceum at Athens. Because of anti-Macedonian feeling there after Alexander's death in 323, he withdrew to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died in 322. Nearly all the works Aristotle prepared for publication are lost; the priceless ones extant are lecture-materials, notes, and memoranda. They can be categorized as follows: I Practical: Nicomachean Ethics; Great Ethics ; Eudemian Ethics; Politics; Economics ; On Virtues and Vices. II Logical: Categories; Analytics ; Interpretation; Refutations used by Sophists; Topica. III Physical: Twenty-six works including astronomy, generation and destruction, the senses, memory, sleep, dreams, life, facts about animals, etc. IV Metaphysics: on being as being. V Art: Rhetoric and Poetics. VI Other works including the Constitution of Athens; more works also of doubtful authorship. VII Fragments of various works such as dialogues on philosophy and literature; and of treatises on rhetoric, politics and metaphysics. The Loeb Classical Library edition of Aristotle is in twenty-three volumes. (shrink)

Vaisnavism in Bengal is justifiably renowned for its remarkable elaboration of the philosophy and cult of Divine Love as the essential expression of the nature of the God, Visnu-Krsna. This text, the first of six constituent parts expounding the philosophy of Bengal Vaisnavism, critically analyses the eight traditional bases of knowledge as a means of discovering the nature of Ultimate Reality. The author rejects most of the traditional pramänas as inadequate and false in providing "right cognition" of Ultimate Reality: namely, (...) perception inference, comparison, postulation, quantitative reasoning and tradition. Like both Mïmämsäka and Vedänta, he declares that, in the final analysis, only Sruti or Scripture serves as an infallible source of knowledge. But against the Vedänta of Sankara he rejects the notion that Bhagavat-Krsna, the Creator, Sustainer and Destroyer of the universe, can be fully apprehended through mystical intuition and claims that the non-phenomenal or spiritual nature of God is accessible only through devotional love and personal surrender. The devotional path to God encompasses but transcends both the paths of mystical knowledge and ascetic mortification. The highest aspect of the "power of essential selfhood" is personified in Krsna's eternally youthful consort, Rädhä. It is through the mystical realization of Ultimate Reality as the Divine Duality-in-Union as Rädhä-Krsna, that one experiences absolute Being, Consciousness and Bliss which is Brahman of the Upanisads and Vedänta. Sanskrists and students of Indian religion and philosophy will welcome the publication of this most valuable text which attempts for the first time to present the entire philosophy and theology of Gaudiya Vaisnavism of Bengal in systematic form and comprehensive manner.--J. B. L. (shrink)

Six essays on such topics as the phenomena of mystical experience, the history of the word "mysticism," an analysis of St. Paul's mysticism, and, most prominently, the meaning of mysticism in the early Church. The essays follow no general plan; consequently the various subjects are treated unequally, and there are repetitions and occasional inconsistencies. --R. B.

In his first book on Marx, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, published in 1961, Tucker developed three main themes: Marx's philosophy is deeply rooted in the traditions of German philosophy from Kant to the neo-Hegelians; there is a fundamental continuity between the thought of the young Marx of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and the mature Marx of the Critique of Political Economy and Das Kapital; the missing clue for a full understanding of Marx, particularly of the apparently contradictory (...) presence of strong moral overtones in Marx's writings and the absence of any supporting philosophy of ethics, is that Marx was basically a utopian religious moralist with an eschatology that envisaged the redemption of man. These three themes are briefly and forcefully restated in the present book without change or qualification and serve as the springboard for extending Tucker's interpretation of Marx and Engels into new areas. The reference to Marx and Engels introduces another element common to both works. Unlike most non-Marxist scholars, Tucker treats Marx and Engels as harmonious collaborators in the fashioning of a single doctrine. The first hundred pages are studded with references to the joint views of both men and their differences in belief are mentioned perfunctorily. Six of the seven chapters in the book have appeared previously as individual essays. The new chapter is on the relevance of Marxism to the modernization theories of the contemporary social sciences. Two other chapters examine Marx and Engels' position on distributive justice and on the state and politics. The latter half of the book takes up Marxism as an ideology of revolutionary movements, with special stress on the appeal of Marxism to the intelligentsia of under-developed countries and on the theoretical contributions of Lenin, Stalin, and Mao tse-Tung. The sixth chapter is on the de-radicalization of Marxism in the USSR and the final chapter finds an enduring value in Marx's utopian "futurology" of a transformed mature humanity living in a transformed world.--H. B. (shrink)

A series of lectures, directed to philosophical laymen, tracing the effects of secular philosophy on religious doctrines. Relevant reflections by Spinoza, Kant, Hume, Nietzsche, James and Santayana are briefly and sensitively discussed.--J. A. B.

These are three welcome works on medieval logic. The Summa Logica of William of Ockham has long been a classic, and scholars have been waiting for this critical edition, begun almost a quarter of a century ago by Philotheus Boehner and finally brought to completion by the combined efforts of Stephen Brown and especially Gedeon Gal, now the general editor of the Opera Philosophica et Theologica being prepared at the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University. The editors date this work (...) after the Commentary on the Sentences, two volumes of which have already appeared in the above mentioned series. It also postdates Ockham’s commentaries on Porphyry, the Praedicamenta, Perihermenias, and Sophisticis Elenchis, as well as the first four books of Aristotle’s Physics. As a terminus ante quem the editors take the fifth book of this same Physics and see it as certainly prior to the Tractatus de praedestinatione, and to the De corpore Christi and De Sacramento Altaris. Parts of the Quodlibetal questions, however, precede it, and others follow. Loux’s translation, unfortunately, antedated this splendid edition of the Summa Logicae, being based on only the partial, earlier edition of Boehner. Nevertheless, it is a useful instrument providing a good and relatively complete introduction to the basic themes of Ockham’s philosophy of language as well as his ontology. A spot check reveals some misprints, e.g., on pp. 56, 192 and on page 38, lines 68-83 of the Latin edition he used have not been translated. The work is introduced by two essays: "The Ontology of William Ockham" and "Ockham on Generality"—the latter dealing with his theory of supposition. Nuchelmans’ interesting work, though it deals mostly with the medieval history of propositions as bearers of truth and falsity, contains some six chapters which trace the history of the term as early as Plato’s treatment in the Sophist, through Aristotle and the important Stoic lekton and axioma. He also concludes with a useful chapter on the significance of a true propositio, both as a mode of being of a thing and as the mental conception.—A.B.W. (shrink)

This book can be useful in a number of ways to teachers and students in social philosophy and allied fields despite the frustrating brevity of the selections, most of which average five pages. Purchased with this severe economy is the advantage of a wide span of selections, starting with Plato and Aristotle, and including those as recent as the 1960s. The selections are comprehensive in viewpoints presented. In addition to professional philosophers we are given the work of theologians, jurists, political (...) theorists, even excerpts from Dante and Camus. Beck follows six problems: man and society, values, authority, law, obligation, and justice, through nine major philosophical "perspectives," an attempt to show the interconnection of philosophic concepts both with each other, and with the methods and presuppositions whereby they were reached. Each section begins with a page or two of introduction in which the editor gives historical background, and perspicuous definitions and analysis of the central ideas. The sections are: Classical Realism, Positivism, Liberalism, Utilitarianism, Idealism, Communism, Pragmatism, Existentialism, and Analytic Philosophy. There is a bibliographical essay which covers secondary material, primary sources not excerpted in the text, and references on special topics. Taken together with fuller use of the sources represented in the editor's selections, this book could be a text for a course in social philosophy, taken alone it is an attractively presented introduction or good browsing for the professional.—M. B. M. (shrink)

Twenty-four scientists and philosophers contribute to this volume, which constitutes the proceedings of the 1959 meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Six symposia deal with theory construction; empirical and conventional elements in physical theory; induction, probability and simplicity; the logic of variables and constants; philosophical issues of quantum theory; and the methodology of psychology and the social sciences. Many of the contributions are excellent; most deal with controversial issues, and generate considerable life in the discussions and (...) commentaries.--B. J. H. (shrink)

Designed to complement the editors' earlier selection, The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, this book arranges its material in six sections: theory of knowledge, metaphysics, ethics, esthetics, politics, and philosophy of history, with the editors contributing a one-page or two-page introduction to each section. The texts, taken from some fifteen of Maritain's works and in some cases published for the first time in English, are well chosen and interesting in themselves, but are too brief to present fully developed (...) arguments. This raises the question of the audience being aimed at. The book is not coherent enough to serve as a serious introduction to Maritain or to modern Thomism; it is rather a "sampler," and might be most useful as a kind of bedside book for those already acquainted with Maritain.--W. B. K. (shrink)

Allen begins with a general survey of "atheism and atheists" in the Renaissance, gives brief sketches of six individual "atheists"—Pomponazzi, Cardano, Vanini, Montaigne, Charron, Bodin—devotes chapters to rational theology against atheism and to reason and immorality, and closes with a portrait of the "atheist redeemed" in the person of the Earl of Rochester, the arch-rake of the Restoration who was converted during his final illness. He points out that during this period "atheist" usually meant no more than a person whose (...) theology did not agree fully with that of the name-caller, and that none of the thinkers he mentions merited the term in any strict sense. The book is a wide-ranging, erudite survey without much attempt at either analysis in depth or synthesis, but Allen's somewhat Voltairean point of view helps give it form.—W. B. K. (shrink)

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)

This article offers a novel, conservative account of material constitution, one that incorporates sortal essentialism and features a theory of dominant sortals. It avoids coinciding objects, temporal parts, relativizations of identity, mereological essentialism, anti-essentialism, denials of the reality of the objects of our ordinary ontology, and other departures from the metaphysic implicit in ordinary ways of thinking. Defenses of the account against important objections are found in Burke 1997, 2003, and 2004, as well as in the often neglected six paragraphs (...) that conclude section V of this article. (shrink)

Smith examines, in six chapters, the doctrines of Peirce, James, and Dewey as they relate to each of six general topics: basic conceptions of meaning, belief and action; basic conceptions of a theory of truth; the new conception of experience; inquiry, science, and control; metaphysics; and religion. The fourth chapter presents a minor exception, for the topic of "inquiry, science, and control" is discussed virtually exclusively in relation to Peirce and Dewey. Generally, the positions of the three pragmatists are examined (...) separately in relation to various issues, but there are usually interesting and illuminating comparisons among them. (shrink)

The pluralism of methodologies and severe time constraints pose important challenges to pedagogy in clinical ethics. We designed a step-by-step student handbook to operate within such constraints and to respect the methodological pluralism of bioethics and clinical ethics. The handbook comprises six steps: Step 1: What are the facts of the case?; Step 2: What are your obligations to your patient?; Step 3: What are your obligations to third parties to your relationship with the patient?; Step 4: Do your obligations (...) converge or conflict?; Step 5: What is the strongest objection that could be made to the identification of convergence in step 4 or the arguments in step 4? How can this objection be effectively countered?; and Step 6: How could the ethical conflict, or perceived ethical conflict, have been prevented? (shrink)

This article concerns the validity of six canonical rules that institutional review boards use to constrain the behavior of investigators. These rules require investigators to design their studies in a scientifically valid way, not pay their subjects to take risks, minimize risks to their subjects, secure for their subjects access to effective interventions post-trial, not pay their subjects too much and allow their subjects to withdraw from the study unconditionally. Enforcement of these rules is problematic because there are other relationships (...) that seem to be like the investigator-subject relationship in all ethically relevant respects, such as the employer-employee and volunteer organizer-volunteer relationships, to which we would not dream of applying these same rules. Applying these rules in one context but not the others is a violation of ethical consistency I label “exceptionalism.” We should conclude that it is time to reexamine the validity of the six rules. (shrink)

In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis – the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along with Frances’ responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first – what is the nature of psychiatric illness – and that in some manner all further (...) questions follow from the first. Following this review I attempt to move the discussion forward, addressing the first question from the perspectives of natural kind analysis and complexity analysis. This reflection leads toward a view of psychiatric disorders – and future nosologies – as far more complex and uncertain than we have imagined. (shrink)

The title of this book is misleading; the subtitle indicates the content more faithfully. Only the last chapter is concerned with paradoxes, namely, with the semantic paradoxes. But the argument there is based on the general theory of assertion and predication defended in the preceding six chapters, which constitute the heart of the book. Cargile rejects the familiar answers to the semantic paradoxes mainly on the grounds that they require restricting the universality of the laws of logic, which involve self-reference (...) just as much as do the paradoxical sentences. What is Cargile’s answer? His treatment of the Epimenides is representative. A Cretan who asserts that all Cretan assertions are false is asserting a different proposition from the proposition a non-Cretan would assert with the same sentence. What assertion is being made with such a sentence depends on the predications, performed by the assertion, of truth or falsity of the propositions "non-assessably" asserted in the original, "assessable" assertion. The Cretan’s assertion predicates falsity of itself, as well as of every other Cretan assertion, but the non-Cretan’s assertion does not. The latter is presumably false and in any case nonparadoxical. The former is self-contradictory, therefore false, therefore also nonparadoxical, since, among other things, it asserts that it is false that all Cretan assertions are false. Other semantic paradoxes require different treatments, also provided by Cargile, but on the basis of the same general theory of assertion and predication. (shrink)

The future of India certainly lies in the hands of present teachers at all levels of education. A potential and self-introspective teacher is the greatest need of the day. The author believes : a teacher is an instrument of personality building, social service and change and thereby is a silent builder of the nation at large. Aresponsible teacher is not only a contributor of building a nation but enjoys the job satisfaction and contentment at personal level which are the roots (...) for positive thinking. In this article, the writer endeavoured to present the views on (i) the need of a proficient teacher (ii) the qualities of a teacher; (iii) the ethical concern of ateacher in the light of six major Upanisad namely; Katha, Prasna, Mundaka, Taittiriya, Chandogya and Brihadaranyaka. (shrink)

: According to a consensus of psycho-physiological and philosophical theories, color sensations (or qualia) are generated in a cerebral "space" fed from photon-photoreceptor interaction (producing "metamers") in the retina of the eye. The resulting "space" has three dimensions: hue (or chroma), saturation (or "purity"), and brightness (lightness, value or intensity) and (in some versions) is further structured by primitive or landmark "colors"—usually four, or six (when white and black are added to red, yellow, green and blue). It has also been (...) proposed that there are eleven semantic universals—labeling the previous six plus the "intermediaries" of orange, pink, brown, purple, and gray. There are many versions of this consensus, but they all aim to provide ontological, epistemological and semantic blueprints for the brute fact of the reality of color ordained by Nature (evolution). In contrast to this consensus, we have argued that "seeing color" is not a matter of light waves impacting on our eyes, producing sensations to be categorized and labeled in the "color space" in the brain. While electrochemical events may unproblematically be regarded as the causal precondition for seeing color, the reception of sensations in "the color space" as semantically labeled natural categories, kinds, or information, is a "just so" story: it is Wittgenstein's beetle in a box. In contrast we consider that the authority of this consensus might better be regarded not as the result of the truth-tracking of nature, but as the sociohistorical outcome of philosophical presuppositions, scientific theories, experimental practices, technological apparatus, and their feed forward into the lifeworld. The question we shall therefore explore is whether, or to what extent, we ourselves are changed, as the conditions of production of color science change. Thus we are doing a kind of anthropology at two levels: of color science itself (and its effect on our own lifeworld), and of those studied by the "anthropology of color". As befits this stance we are agnostic about the theoretical entities of color science (cf. van Fraassen 2001), and within this new context, we propose to cross-cut object-and-subject, organism-and-environment (the bedrock of color science) in socio-historical ways. Our approach is in part inspired by, but not the same as, that of Gibson, in that we wish to pursue the notion of "social affordances" (Burmudez 1995). We suggest that color has become a naturalization through science-based technologies, which, through praxes and materializations, have become the perceptual and cultural entities that structure experience and understanding in the lifeworld. It is this naturalization that we shall refer to and characterize as "the historically inflected exosomatic organ". Consequently we shall explore the historical ontology of "color" without assuming an underlying biological constant (Dupré 2001). In part 1 we show the flimsiness of the evidence for the three dimensions of color, borrowed from physics, and fine-tuned to a "standard observer" (a "spectral creature" with a phenomenal "color space"). In part 2 we address the structuring of hue through the development of color circles and color spaces. This is followed by a review of the evidence for unique hues. Again the evidence is shown to be flimsy. We then show that an isolated domain of color is a particular kind of model, not a "natural given". In part 3, after reviewing what is referred to as "the isomorphy thesis," we discuss the exemplary case study of Berlin and Kay (1969). This illustrates the pull of stadial models presupposed by their evolutionary theory of color language. The Berlin and Kay paradigm proposes that American English color terms are incorrigible and can provide the universal metalanguage. We conclude by presenting an alternative account, namely that we ourselves are changed as the conditions of production of color science change. We argue that it is better to regard "seeing-color" as a historically inflected exosomatic organ that provides social affordances for those trained to grasp them. (shrink)

The dominant position of science in our culture has ended. In our postmodern world, belief that science will provide the answer to our problems and that progress is inevitable has been shaken, if not toppled. Optimism has been replaced by realism, creating a milieu for the development of intelligent Christian belief. Participating in the Trinity Institute's conference on ÒThe Church in a Postmodern Age, these six prominent scholars explore the breakdown of the basic tenets of the Enlightenment, the sorry state (...) of biblical literacy in our culture, Christian faith in a pluralistic world, the relevance of the Bible today, and the role of the church in our age. Contributors include Robert N. Bellah, Diogenes Allen, George A. Lindbeck, James B. Miller, Sandra M. Schneiders, and Rowan D. Williams. (shrink)

This article brings together the Aryan Semitic and Sinitic super-cultures in a comparative light in terms of religious numerological leitmotifs. Vedic Hinduism and Zoroastrianism together with the pre-Christian religions of Indo-European Europe belong to this group. Buddhism and to a lesser extent Jainism are also part of this grouping. Judaism and Islam belong to the Semitic group. Daoism and Confucianism come under the Sinitic group. Christianity and Sikhism are hybrid religions that have one leg in the Aryan group and one (...) leg in the Semitic group. The numbers three, six and nine are the hallmarks of Aryan culture the numbers one five and seven are expressed throughout Semitic culture and the numerals three five and eight have received their expression in Chinese culture. (shrink)

W. E. B. Du Bois was a public intellectual, sociologist, and activist on behalf of the African American community. He profoundly shaped black political culture in the United States through his founding role in the NAACP, as well as internationally through the Pan-African movement. Du Bois's sociological and historical research on African-American communities and culture broke ground in many areas, including the history of the post-Civil War Reconstruction period. Du Bois was also a prolific author of novels, autobiographical accounts, innumerable (...) editorials and journalistic pieces, and several works of history. Collected in one volume for the first time, The World and Africa and Color and Democracy are two of W E. B. Du Bois's most powerful essays on race. He explores how to tell the story of those left out of recorded history, the evils of colonialism worldwide, and Africa's and African's contributions to, and neglect from, world history. More than six decades after W. E. B. Du Bois wrote The World and Africa and Color and Democracy, they remain worthy guides for the twenty-first century. With a series introduction by editor Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and two introductions by top African scholars, this edition is essential for anyone interested in world history. (shrink)

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions. With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)

Six essays by two authors which deal with several facets of Weber’s work. Wolfgang Schluchter’s two longer pieces begin the collection: the first on the concept of rationalization, the second on the well-worn issue of value neutrality. Guenther Roth’s four essays are shorter: the first applying the concept of a charismatic community to contemporary counter-culture groups, the second examining the counter-culture in terms of the concept of religious virtuosi, the third comparing Fernand Braudel’s history of the longue durée with Weber’s (...) historical work, and the last analyzing the role of history in the whole of Weber’s thought. Thus, where Schluchter examines critically and modifies Weber’s arguments, Roth is more concerned to show their useful application to contemporary subjects. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to discuss the contemporary relevance of Dewey’s philosophy. If there are topics central to the six essays included here, they are those of methodology and society.

I outline six components of a comprehensive proposal for overhauling the foundations of deontic logic. (1) Actions and prescriptions are temporally indexed; more precisely, they attach to nodes of a tree in a branching time structure. (2) Actions are (modeled as) sets of branches and can be coarse- or fine-grained depending on whether or not they have proper subsets which are also actions. (3) Prescriptions have satisfaction and violation sets; these are sets of branches which may—but need not—be or include (...) actions. (4) Prescriptive propositions, which state that an action is obligatory/permitted/forbidden according to a given prescription, are defined by relating the action with the satisfaction and violation sets of the prescription. (5) Conditional prescriptions can—but need not—be derived from unconditional or even from other conditional ones. (6) Thick prescriptions, in contrast to thin ones, prescribe or proscribe actions with varying intensities, and can have embedded subprescriptions (some of which are negative, namely “contraryto-duty”). Most of the above components are inspired by the literature, but their combination is novel. (shrink)

Building on existing studies suggesting that corporate social performance (CSP) is important in the job choice process, the authors investigate job seekers’perceptions of importance of CSP and explore effects of CSP dimensions on organizational attractiveness. Job seekers consider CSP important to assessment of firms and rate five specific CSP dimensions (environment, community relations, employee relations, diversity, and product issues) as more important than six other CSP dimensions. Using signaling theory and social identity theory, the authors hypothesize differences in effects of (...) CSP data on ratings of employer attractiveness and find that environment, community relations, and diversity dimensions have the largest affect on attractiveness ratings. (shrink)

Cavell is one of the most gifted and sensitive philosophers who has been influenced by Wittgenstein and Austin. He is no slavish disciple but an intelligent and perceptive interpreter of the contemporary sensibility. Six of the ten essays have already appeared in print and some have already become intellectual gems. In "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," Cavell better than most has managed to capture and convey the spirit and the intensity of the later Wittgenstein. The title essay is the (...) most articulate defense of what ordinary language philosophy can be at its best. But Cavell is also an incisive commentator on Beckett and Kierkegaard. He illuminates a range of aesthetic issues. Cavell's forte is that of an essayist who manages to create in each of his essays a "form of life" within which one can participate and share his insight.--R. J. B. (shrink)

"The cases are presented in a concise and interesting manner... highlights the emerging consciousness of the importance of the contractual arrangement between physician and patient... " --Journal of the American Medical Association "The cases presented are interesting ones, and the commentaries are uniformly lucid.... Highly recommended... " --Religious Studies Review "Cohen contributes a well-selected collection of cases and commentaries which are presented in a crisp style... it is likely to have a real impact." --Ethics Twenty-six reports based on actual cases (...) with expert commentary that illuminate the ethical, medical, legal, and psychological contours of dilemmas surrounding termination of treatment decisions. Cases involve patients, families, physicians, nurses, lawyers, and health care administrators. A companion volume to the Hastings Center's Guidelines. See Guidelines for ad quotes when advertising both books. (shrink)

Impressed by morality's internal accessibility and motivational force, philosophers from the Greeks to the present day have advanced the view that moral distinctions originate in human nature. Every incarnation of this view, however, has had to face one central question: what is it about human nature that justifies some moral judgments and not others? This dissertation charts the rise and fall of one approach to that question, that contained in the works of the British moralists of the late seventeenth and (...) early eighteenth centuries. ;I argue, in the first four chapters, that in this period rationalists and sentimentalists alike collapsed justificatory questions into explanatory ones. I show how this collapse followed naturally from a widely-held theological conception of human nature, according to which it was possible to establish an immediate explanatory link between our original God-given constitution and some of our moral judgments. ;Against this background I turn, in chapters five and six, to David Hume, who shared his predecessors' commitment to founding moral distinctions in human nature but whose associative account severed the link between the explanation and justification of moral judgments. I maintain that Hume's work not only exposed the untenability of the theologically-based justificatory commitments of his predecessors but also casts serious doubt on contemporary efforts to ground normativity on reflexivity. Hume himself, I argue, makes plausible the suggestion that moral justification should be grounded not on the origins of judgments but on human ends that cannot and need not be justified in terms of anything else. (shrink)

I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the (...) bulk of the paper I address six objections to OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)