In list-method directed forgetting, reexposure to forgotten List 1 items has been shown to reduce directed forgetting. proposed that reexposure to a few List 1 items only during a direct test of memory reinstates the entire List 1 episode. In the present experiments, part-list reexposure in the context of indirect as well as direct memory tests reduced directed forgetting. Directed forgetting was reduced when 50% or more of the items were reexposed, and was intact when only 25% were reexposed. Furthermore, (...) part-list reexposure appeared to reinstate only reexposed items-not the entire List 1 episode. (shrink)

This fifty-page essay treats Marx's concept of action as the principle underlying his whole system. Activity for Marx is described as both a philosophical concept and an element of human experience demanded by his system. The principle of activity is present as early as in Marx's doctoral dissertation and its influence is traced on his materialism, epistemology, and conception of philosophy. In the process, some strong similarities are shown with Dewey's concept of action, despite the difference in goals of the (...) two philosophers. The concept of action was not original with Marx as the author demonstrates in his discussion of Kant's epistemology and Hegel's dialectics. What distinguishes Marx's concept of action is the unification of theory and practice, and the interrelationship of the two on a materialist foundation. To Marx, there was no meaningful theory without practice and no effective action without theory. Furthermore, the oft-quoted statement by Marx that philosophers have only interpreted the world whereas the point is to change it asserts only half of the case. Marx is not advocating change for the sake of change or change in accordance with any interpretation of the world. He is proposing change of a very specific kind and his concept of action cannot be separated from its content. This point does not emerge as clearly as it should in the essay under consideration because the author tends to treat the concept of activity in isolation and as an uninfluenced influence on the rest of Marx's thought. The author welcomes Marx's emphasis on practice as a much-needed antidote to the trend that makes philosophy a world apart. He also approves Marx's active personal role in society and his unhesitating entry into debate with the finest minds of his time. Of great value to those interested in the young Marx is the author's translation of Marx's doctoral dissertation on The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. This is the first complete translation to appear in English. It occupies half the space of the present volume.--H. B. (shrink)

An attempt to "remove the obstacles to a more positive kind of philosophizing than is now usually cultivated," and to "restore the traditional scope of philosophy." Eight historical chapters very rapidly review and criticize almost every major philosopher from Descartes on, claiming that there has been an unduly restricted conception of the data of experience and too narrow a view of the powers of thought. Four final "reconstructive" chapters sketch out a program for a modern synthesis which will continue the (...) Greek and medieval tradition, beginning from a truly adequate empiricism and allowing full scope to the powers of human thinking, "uninhibited by Kantian presuppositions." This synthetic program might be taken more seriously if the preceding historical and critical chapters had been more carefully worked out.--B. H. (shrink)

These fourteen essays were written to honor a philosopher and historian of philosophy who has been associated for more than thirty years with the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies at the University of Toronto. In keeping with Pegis’ historical interests, the essays are on topics relating to the ancient and especially the mediaeval period. Some of the contributions are not directly philosophical in content, e.g., "Nugae Hyginianae" by Wilma Fitzgerald, "Marriage and Family in English Conciliar and Synodal Legislation" by Michael (...) M. Sheehan, "Riddles relating to the Anglo-Saxon Scriptorium" by Laurence K. Shook, "A Middle English Christological Poem" by Edmund Colledge, "Three Forgotten Martyrs of Anazarbus in Cilicia" by Michael R. E. Gough, and "Greek Recentiores, Basil, Adversus Eunomium, IV-V" by Walter Hayes. But each of the essays reflects the meticulous scholarship for which the Institute is justly renowned. (shrink)

Until 1969, there was only one book in English on Georg Lukács, Victor Zitta's Georg Lukács' Marxism: Alienation, Dialectics, Revolution. A Study in Utopia and Ideology, published in 1964 by Martinus Nijhoff. In early 1970, Georg Lukács: The Man, His Work, and His Ideas, edited by G. H. R. Parkinson, was published in London by Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Now, we have Lichtheim's addition to what promises to be a growing body of literature in English on this many-sided and controversial philosopher. (...) Although Lichtheim expresses some reservations about Zitta's treatment of Lukács, his own work belongs to the same genre in two essential respects: first, it is fundamentally hostile to Lukács, and second, it lapses into many ad hominem arguments which reflect this hostility. Thus, also, the book is sparing in its acknowledgment of Lukács' originality and unsparing in its criticism of his acceptance of any aspect of Leninism as distinct from Marxism. The stated aim of the book is a critical examination of Lukács' theory of aesthetics. In Lukács' case, this requires coming to grips with his views on history, politics, society, and epistemology. Over half of the book is devoted to the latter subjects. The picture of Lukács which emerges is that of an academician, physically divorced from, and without roots in the working class whose cause he espouses. His historical importance is attributed to his recapture of the Hegelian dimension of Marx and his error is his over-extension of the Hegelian aspect to the point where authentic Marxism is submerged in a Hegelianized version of it. Aside from the historical inaccuracy of presenting Lukács as an academician, isolated from the practical sides of daily life, Lichtheim misses the revolutionary essence of Lukács' thought which led him to abandon the comfortable and secure life of a dissident banker's son for the uncertainties and hardships of the life of the revolutionary. The influences of Plato and Dilthey are given undue emphasis in Lukács' thought and a disproportionate part of the book is given over to expounding on this subject. This is a small book about a big philosopher. Most of such books do not satisfy and the present one is no exception.--H. B. (shrink)

De George undertakes the formidable task of compressing within 154 pages of text a description and critical analysis of the changes which have taken place in Marxist theory in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union since the Twentieth Congress in 1956. The brevity of the book is its chief handicap detracting from what is otherwise a stimulating study of modern Marxism. The summary form of statement leads to some unsupported claims and to others which are ambiguous (...) because they lack development. Most of the space is devoted to the two extremes of Soviet and Yugoslav Marxism, with sketchy references to Poland and Hungary and scantier references to Czechoslovakia. East Germany and Rumania are dismissed in one sentence as puppet versions of Soviet Marxism. Among the interesting and provocative observations which would benefit from expanded treatment are: Contemporary Marxists in Eastern Europe view Marxism or Marxism-Leninism as a philosophy, not as a science. Even in the Soviet Union, where Marxism-Leninism is still considered a science, the term has been given a meaning distinct from the ordinary meaning of science. Theory and practice have become separated, although not divorced. The political leaders are not the theoreticians and the theoreticians are not the party spokesmen. The power centers are removed from the centers of theoretical activity. There is a continuity between the Stalinist and post-Stalinist periods which is not recognized or admitted by most Marxists. Stalin himself initiated some of the developments which are generally regarded as post-Stalinist features. The wide variety of interpretations of Marxism by contemporary Marxists in the countries under study indicates the vitality of the basic doctrine and its potential for further development. They also prove that Marxism need not go the way of Lenin and Stalin and that communism need not go the way of Soviet Russia.--H. B. (shrink)

The solution is that there can be no justification of induction, "the rule we use to make inferences about unknown events from a sample of data drawn from experience." A principle may be justified either by validation or by vindication; Hume's argument showed conclusively that no validation of induction is possible, but left open the possibility of a vindication. Reichenbach explored this possibility within the framework of a frequency theory of probability. Katz now explores Reichenbach's treatment in detail, finding that (...) it ultimately fails to produce either a "preferability vindication" or an "expediency vindication." Katz then argues that it is in principle impossible ever to modify Reichenbach's account in a way which would allow such vindication-for the inductive rule or, in fact, any convergent rule whatever, whether on a "frequency" or a "degree of confirmation" interpretation of probability. But if no vindication is possible, then no justification of any kind is possible, providing we have correctly reduced the problem; so the problem of induction has received its solution. This in no way calls for skepticism or conventionalism concerning empirical knowledge; we can certainly criticize various inductive procedures and show that one canon is better than another. We can "convince those who are in agreement about basic standards but are interested in more precise versions and their proper application to particular cases"; these are quite different issues from the general "problem of induction." A boldly-outlined argument, drawing upon a good deal of complex material, and handled very skillfully.--B. H. (shrink)