Minimal Semantics asks what a theory of literal linguistic meaning is for - if you were to be given a working theory of meaning for a language right now, what would you be able to do with it? Emma Borg sets out to defend a formal approach to semantic theorising from a relatively new type of opponent - advocates of what she call 'dual pragmatics'. According to dual pragmatists, rich pragmatic processes play two distinct roles in linguistic comprehension: as well (...) as operating in a post-semantic capacity to determine the implicatures of an utterance, they also operate prior to the determination of truth-conditional content for a sentence. That is to say, they have an integral role to play within what is usually thought of as the semantic realm. Borg believes dual pragmatic accounts constitute the strongest contemporary challenge to standard formal approaches to semantics since they challenge the formal theorist to show not merely that there is some role for formal processes on route to determination of semantic content, but that such processes are sufficient for determining content. Minimal Semantics provides a detailed examination of this school of thought, introducing readers who are unfamiliar with the topic to key ideas like relevance theory and contextualism, and looking in detail at where these accounts diverge from the formal approach. Borg's defence of formal semantics has two main parts: first, she argues that the formal approach is most naturally compatible with an important and well-grounded psychological theory, namely the Fodorian modular picture of the mind. Then she argues that the main arguments adduced by dual pragmatists against formal semantics - concerning apparent contextual intrusions into semantic content - can in fact be countered by a formal theory. The defence holds, however, only if we are sensitive to the proper conditions of success for a semantic theory. Specifically, we should reject a range of onerous constraints on semantic theorizing (e.g., that it answer epistemic or metaphysical questions, or that it explain our communicative skills) and instead adopt a quite minimal picture of semantics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:.. MERELY A MAN OF LETTERS" an interview with Jorge Luis Borges* Philosophy and Literature: Why don't you tell us about some of the philosophers who have influenced your work and in whom you have been the most interested? Jorge Luis Borges: Well, I think that's an easy one. You might talk in terms of two: Berkeley and Schopenhauer. But I suppose Hume might be worked in also, because, (...) after all, Hume refutes Berkeley. Really, he comes from Berkeley—even if Berkeley comes from Locke. You might think of Locke, of Berkeley, and of Hume as being three links in an argument..... But I suppose that when someone refutes someone else in philosophy, he is carrying on the argument. P&L: And Schopenhauer? Borges: Schopenhauer is very different from Hume. Of course, Schopenhauer had his idea of the Will. That is not to be found in Hume.... The case of Berkeley was different. I suppose he thought of God as being aware of all things all the time, if I don't get him wrong. If we go away, does this room disappear? No, because God is thinking about it. Now, in the case of Schopenhauer, I was rereading Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, The World as Will and Idea, and I was rather taken aback, or baffled I should say, puzzled by something that keeps on recurring in Schopenhauer. Of course it may have been a slip of the pen, but as he goes back to it, and as he was a very careful writer, I wonder if it is a slip of the pen. For example, Schopenhauer begins by saying that the universe, the stars, the spaces in between, the planets, *On April 14, 1976, two editors of Philosophy and Literature, along with an interested colleague, interviewed Jorge Luis Borges at Michigan State University, where he held a position as visiting professor for the winter term. These remarks are edited from the transcript of that conversation. 337 338Philosophy and Literature this planet, those things, have no existence—except in the mind which perceives them. But then, to my surprise—and I suppose you can explain this to me, since you are philosophers and I am not—what Schopenhauer says is that all those things have no existence except in the brain. And that the universe—I remember these words, I don't think I'm inventing them now—"ist ein Gehirnphänomen," that the world is a cerebral phenomenon. Now, I was baffled. Because, of course, if you think of the universe, I suppose the brain is as much a part of the external world as the stars or the moon. The brain after all is a system of visual, of tactile, perceptions. He keeps on insisting on the brain. I don't think, for example, that Bishop Berkeley insists on the brain, or Hume, who would have insisted on the mind, consciousness. P&L: People sometimes say that they see Berkeley in stories like "Orbis Tertius." Borges: Yes, I suppose they do. Well, of course. But in that story I was led by literary means also. P&L: How do you distinguish the literary from the philosophical means in that story? Could you explain that? Borges: Very easily.... Encyclopedias have been my chief reading. I have always been interested in encyclopedias. I used to go to the Biblioteca National in Buenos Aires—and since I was so shy, I felt I could not cope with asking for a book, so I looked on the shelves for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I would pick up any chance volume and I would read it. One night I was richly rewarded, because I read all about the Druses, Dryden and the Druids—a treasure trove, no?—all in the same volume, "Dr-." Then I came to the idea of how fine it would be to think of an encyclopedia... a very rigorous one of course, of an imaginary world, where everything should be linked. For example, you would have a language and then a literature, and then a history and so on. Then I thought I would write a story of a fancy encyclopedia. Of course that would require many different people to write it... (shrink)

A standard objection to so-called ‘minimal semantics’ (Borg 2004, 2012, Cappelen and Lepore 2005) is that minimal contents are explanatorily redundant as they play no role in an adequate account of linguistic communication (those making this objection include Levinson 2000, Carston 2002, Recanati 2004). This paper argues that this standard objection is mistaken. Furthermore, I argue that seeing why the objection is mistaken sheds light both on how we should draw the classic Gricean distinction between saying and implicating, and how (...) we should think about the key philosophical notion of assertion. Specifically, it reveals that these ideas are best understood primarily in socio-linguistic terms (resting on the degree of liability a speaker is held to have for linguistically conveyed content). (shrink)

Emma Borg examines the relation between semantics and pragmatics, and assesses recent answers to fundamental questions of how and where to draw the divide between the two. She argues for a minimal account of the interrelation between them--a 'minimal semantics'--which holds that only rule-governed appeals to context can influence semantic content.

This is a book symposium on Steffen Borge’s The Philosophy of Football. It has contributions from William Morgan, Murray Smith and Brian Weatherson with replies from Borge.

Mirror neurons are neurons which fire in two distinct conditions: (i) when an agent performs a specific action, like a precision grasp of an object using fingers, and (ii) when an agent observes that action performed by another. Some theorists have suggested that the existence of such neurons may lend support to the simulation approach to mindreading (e.g. Gallese and Goldman, 1998, 'Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind reading'). In this note I critically examine this suggestion, in both (...) its original and a revised form (due to Iacoboni et al., 2005, 'Grasping the intentions of others with one's own mirror neuron system'), and argue that the existence of mirror neurons can in fact tell us very little about how intentional attribution actually proceeds. (shrink)

Resumo: A acessibilidade como tema transversal à formação dos egressos da Universidade Federal do Pampa se faz presente tanto no projeto institucional da universidade quanto nos Projetos Pedagógicos dos Cursos. No entanto, embora tal intencionalidade constar nos documentos institucionais, a materialização de tal temática - para além da garantia dos requisitos legais de acessibilidade presentes nos instrumentos de avaliação do ensino superior - se mostra incipiente. No curso de Medicina, apesar do tema da diversidade e, da garantia de equidade sem (...) qualquer tipo de distinção, no atendimento da rede básica, compor as Diretrizes Curriculares Nacionais para a formação dos futuros médicos, a discussão sobre a temática da deficiência é recente, sendo atualmente impulsionada pela demanda de recursos para este público, em específico, na atenção básica de saúde, em função da pandemia da COVID-19. Neste artigo, apresentamos as práticas interdisciplinares que vêm sendo protagonizadas entre o Curso de Medicina e o Programa de Mestrado Profissional em Ensino de Ciências. Dentre estas práticas estão a produção de pranchas em Comunicação Alternativa Aumentativa (CAA) para apoio ao diagnóstico do COVID-19 em pacientes com deficiência; materiais instrucionais acessíveis sobre temas envolvendo a pandemia; curso de CAA para estudantes da área da saúde e formação de profissionais dos serviços de saúde para o atendimento de usuários com deficiência. Estas práticas e suas consequências para a formação dos estudantes de Medicina, constitui o objetivo deste trabalho. Palavras-chave: acessibilidade; formação médica; inclusão; educação especial Medical Education and Inclusive Processes: interdisciplinary teaching practices guided by the knowledge of special education Abstract: The accessibility, as transversal theme to the formation of the Pampa Federal University egresses, is present in the University institutional project as well in the Courses Pedagogical Projects. However, although such intentionality appears in the institutional documents, the materialization of such theme – apart from the guarantee of the accessibility legal requirements present in the evaluation instruments of the university education – is still incipient. Even in the medical course, in spite of the diversity theme and the guarantee of equality without any kind of distinction in the basic system assistance compose the National Curricular Guidelines to the education of the futures doctors, is recent the discussion about the disability theme, being nowadays stimulated by the demand of resources required for this specific type of public in the primary health care, arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. In this article, we present the interdisciplinary practices that have been executed in the Medical Course and Professional Master’s Degree on Sciences Teaching. Among these practices we have the production of boards in Augmentative Alternative Communication (AAC) for supporting the COVID-19 diagnosis in disabled patients; accessible instructional materials about themes concerning the pandemic; AAC courses for health area students and training of health services professionals for the assistance of disabled users. These practices and their consequences for the education of Medical students are the objective of the present work. Key-Words: accessibility; medical training; inclusion; special education Educación médica y procesos inclusivos: prácticas docentes interdisciplinarias guiadas por el conocimiento de la educación especial Resumen: La accesibilidad como tema transversal a la formación de los egresados ​​de la Universidad Federal de Pampa está presente tanto en el proyecto institucional de la universidad como en los Proyectos Pedagógicos de los Cursos. Sin embargo, aunque tal intencionalidad está incluida en los documentos institucionales, la materialización de tal tema, además de garantizar los requisitos legales de accesibilidad presentes en los instrumentos de evaluación de la educación superior, es aún incipiente. En el curso de medicina, a pesar del tema de la diversidad y la garantía de equidad sin ningún tipo de distinción, en la atención de la red básica, componiendo los Lineamientos Curriculares Nacionales para la formación de futuros médicos, la discusión sobre el tema de la discapacidad es reciente., siendo impulsado actualmente por la demanda de recursos para este público, específicamente, en la atención primaria de salud, debido a la pandemia de COVID-19. En este artículo presentamos las prácticas interdisciplinarias que se vienen dando entre el Curso de Medicina y el Programa de Maestría Profesional en Enseñanza de las Ciencias. Entre estas prácticas se encuentran la producción de tableros en Comunicación Aumentativa Alternativa (CAA) para apoyar el diagnóstico de COVID-19 en pacientes con discapacidad; materiales educativos accesibles sobre temas relacionados con la pandemia; Curso CAA para estudiantes del área de la salud y formación de profesionales de los servicios de salud para la asistencia a usuarios con discapacidad. Estas prácticas y sus consecuencias para la formación de los estudiantes de medicina, constituyen el objetivo de este trabajo. Palabras-clave: Accesibilidad; entrenamiento médico; inclusión; educación especial. Data de registro: 14/04/2021 Data de aceite: 01/12/2021. (shrink)

I aim to show that a semantic minimalist need not also be a semantic internalist. §I introduces minimalism and internalism and argues that there is a prima facie case for a minimalist being an internalist. §II sketches some positive arguments for internalism which, if successful, show that a minimalist must be an internalist. §III goes on to reject these arguments and contends that the prima facie case for uniting minimalism and internalism is also not compelling. §IV returns to an objection (...) from §I and argues for a way to meet it which does not depend on giving up semantic externalism. (shrink)

Any account of Spinoza's understanding of attribute must be able to satisfy his definition criterion; that is, it must coherently accommodate the elements involved in his definition of attribute as “what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence” (E1d4). But this is not enough. There are several available readings that satisfy this criterion and are mutually incompatible. To know what Spinoza means we must supplement his definition criterion with a criterion aiming at consistency with other principles in (...) his system. With the definition and consistency criteria in the backdrop, the aim of this paper is to offer a critical overview of the current state of the debate on Spinoza's theory of attributes. (shrink)

Discussions of artificial intelligence have been shaped by two brilliant thought-experiments: Turing’s Imitation Test for thinking systems and Searle’s Chinese Room Argument. In many ways, debates about large language models (LLMs) struggle to move beyond these original, opposing thought-experiments. So, in this paper, I ask whether we can move debate forward by exploring the features Sceptics about LLM abilities take to ground meaning. Section 1 sketches the options, while Sections 2 and 3 explore the common requirement for a robust relation (...) between linguistic signs and external objects. Section 3 argues that concerns about worldly connections can be met and thus that outputs of LLMs should be viewed as genuinely meaningful. Section 4 then turns to the argument that the kind of derived meaning explored in Section 3 is insufficient for LLMs to count as meaningful systems per se, looking at the claim that they must possess original intentionality before we admit them to the space of meaning. I argue that this demand is not a prerequisite for meaning per se, but rather for some kinds of agency or conscious understanding. I suggest that the demands for original intentionality are not currently met by LLMs and that we should be cautious about whether we want them to be. (shrink)

Some demonstrative expressions, those we might term ‘bare demonstratives’, appear without any appended descriptive content (e.g. occurrences of ‘this’ or ‘that’ simpliciter). However, it seems that the majority of demonstrative occurrences do not follow this model. ‘Complex demonstratives’ is the collective term I shall use for phrases formed by adjoining one or more common nouns to a demonstrative expression (e.g. ‘that cat’, ‘this happy man’) and I will call the combination of predicates immediately concatenated with the demonstrative in such phrases (...) the ‘matrix’ of the expression. The question, then, is how we should construe the logical form of such expressions within a semantic theory for our language; and I wish to suggest that some recent answers to this question are, in fact, mistaken. The structure of the paper is as follows: first, I wish to highlight two (often underlying) assumptions about the nature of noun phrases in general, and suggest that, if they are both adopted, they apparently constrain the possible accounts of the logical form of complex demonstratives to just three options. The second and third parts of the paper will be concerned with expanding these options and arguing that none of them are adequate; thus the major part of the paper is concerned with the negative claim that the most obvious moves to make in this area must actually fail on closer inspection. The fourth and final section will then (very briefly) sketch the positive thesis of the paper: that we can deliver a clear and cohesive account of complex demonstratives, armed simply with elements which we will draw from David Kaplan’s theory of demonstratives, but only at the cost of rejecting (or at least refining) one assumption we recognised initially. (shrink)

In this paper I address the topic of sport records and concentrate on the ontology of sport records. I argue that sport records are social facts in the sense that sport records not only depend on the physical facts of sport competitions, but also on the attitude we take towards the phenomenon—our attitude is partly constitutive of the phenomenon of sport records. In particular, the Mieto–Wassberg incident and the Larsson–McKee incident show that performance records should also be regarded as social (...) facts. Lastly, I show how my view sits with the view that sports are response-sensitive. I argue that the latter gives us further reason to believe that sport records, in particular performance records, are social facts. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against a criticism by Matthew Weiner to Grice’s thesis that cancellability is a necessary condition for conversational implicature. I argue that the purported counterexamples fail because the supposed failed cancellation in the cases Weiner presents is not meant as a cancellation but as a reinforcement of the implicature. I moreover point out that there are special situations in which the supposed cancellation may really work as a cancellation.

Jorge Luis Borges is working for decades now on the execution of the nightmare. Perhaps his most celebrated instance is "Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius ". It would take much work to sift the fabricated references in Borges' works from the ones deliberately misread from the over-emphasis on an author's casual remark, etc.

I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.

O esquecimento é uma experiência incómoda da quotidianeidade. Marca de temporalidade e de finitude, tem carácter ontológico e alcance ôntico. Manifesta o caminho da verdade do ser à maneira humana e do ser no mundo de tudo quanto há. Heidegger define esse caminho ontológico incontornável como sendo o da metafísica ocidental, hoje culminante na época da técnica. Mas, numa abordagem meta-ontológica, o fenómeno ontológico de poder esquecer constitui uma possibilidade para o existir de cada um, enquanto projecto. O não-esquecimento compulsivo-obsessivo (...) inibe o a-vir, reduzindo-o a interpretações sedimentadas, pre-determinadas por situações hermenêuticas do sido, congeladas num não-passado. A presente abordagem pretende considerar esta duplicidade do possível e do não-possível, radicada no olvido e na abertura afectiva, ao encontro e ao seu novum, assim habilitado. Para tal, parte de um quadro de Klee e de uma narrativa de Borges, para orientar a leitura de textos de Heidegger, desde 1927 a 1945. (shrink)

This paper deals with the question of whether nature sports are to be counted among the (traditional) sports and Kevin Krein’s recent argument, based on sporting excellence, as to why they should. Krein argues that sports as such are ultimately about sporting excellence and because both so-called traditional sports and nature sports fulfil that criterion, nature sports belong in the sport domain. Here, I show that Krein’s argument rests on an equivocation between two concepts of sporting excellence. Sporting excellence in (...) traditional sports is connected to sporting success. Here agon (contest or competition) dictates or frames areté (striving for excellence). This is not the case for sporting excellence in nature sports, as these are not competitions. We are dealing with two different concepts of sporting excellence and Krein’s argument, based on sporting excellence, must be rejected. It gives no basis for including nature sports in the sport domain. (shrink)

In this paper, the relationship between the e-value of a complex hypothesis, H, and those of its constituent elementary hypotheses, Hj, j = 1… k, is analyzed, in the independent setup. The e-value of a hypothesis H, ev, is a Bayesian epistemic, credibility or truth value defined under the Full Bayesian Significance Testing mathematical apparatus. The questions addressed concern the important issue of how the truth value of H, and the truth function of the corresponding FBST structure M, relate to (...) the truth values of its elementary constituents, Hj, and to the truth functions of their corresponding FBST structures Mj, respectively. (shrink)

‘Pragmaticist’ positions posit a three-way division within utterance content between: (i) the standing meaning of the sentence, (ii) a somewhat pragmatically enhanced meaning which captures what the speaker explicitly conveys (following Sperber and Wilson 1986, I label this the ‘explicature’), and (iii) further indirectly conveyed propositions which the speaker merely implies. Here I re-examine the notion of an explicature, asking how it is defined and what work explicatures are supposed to do. I argue that explicatures get defined in three different (...) ways and that these distinct definitions can and do pull apart. Thus the notion of an explicature turns out to be ill-defined. (shrink)

I argue that, against what is commonly believed, Spinoza’s use of the relation of constitution to characterize the relation between attributes and the essence of a substance does not indicate that, for him, there must be a numerical identity between each attribute and the essence constituted by that attribute. To do this, I follow a twofold strategy. First, I contend that the claim that because in Spinoza’s time constitution was understood as a one- to-one relation is mistaken: the main logicians (...) of Spinoza’s time, all Cartesian philosophers, believe that the constitution of an essence can be a many-to-one relation. I show that Spinoza can both accept that constitution is a many-one relation and share Descartes’ understanding of this relation. Second, I defend the claim that Spinoza’s use of constitution in the Ethics is consistent with these logicians’ account of constitution. In particular, I focus on Spinoza’s inclusion of the intellect in the definition of attribute and his definition of God. (shrink)

BackgroundThe expressions of a “wish to hasten death” or “wish to die” raise ethical concerns and challenges. These expressions are related to ethical principles intertwined within the field of medical ethics, particularly in end-of-life care. Although some reviews were conducted about this topic, none of them provides an in-depth analysis of the meanings behind the “wish to hasten death/die” based specifically on the ethical principles of autonomy, dignity, and vulnerability. The aim of this review is to understand if and how (...) the meanings behind the “wish to hasten death/die” relate to and are interpreted in light of ethical principles in palliative care.MethodsWe conducted a meta-ethnographic review according to the PRISMA guidelines and aligned with Noblit and Hare’s framework. Searches were performed in three databases, Web of Science, PubMed, CINAHL, with no time restrictions. Original qualitative studies exploring the meanings given by patients, family caregivers and healthcare professionals in any context of palliative and end-of-life care were included. A narrative synthesis was undertaken. PROSPERO registration CRD42023360330.ResultsOut of 893 retrieved articles, 26 were included in the analysis, accounting for the meanings of a total of 2,398 participants. Several factors and meanings associated with the “wish to hasten death” and/or “wish to die” were identified and are mainly of a psychosocial and spiritual nature. The ethical principles of autonomy and dignity were the ones mostly associated with the “wish to hasten death”. Ethical principles were essentially inferred from the content of included articles, although not explicitly stated as bioethical principles.ConclusionsThis meta-ethnographic review shows a reduced number of qualitative studies on the “wish to hasten death” and/or “wish to die” explicitly stating ethical principles. This suggests a lack of bioethical reflection and reasoning in the empirical end-of-life literature and a lack of embedded ethics in clinical practice. There is a need for healthcare professionals to address these topics compassionately and ethically, taking into account the unique perspectives of patients and family members. More qualitative studies on the meanings behind a wish to hasten death, their ethical contours, ethical reasoning, and implications for clinical practice are needed. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the proper content of a formal semantic theory in two respects: first, clarifying which uses of expressions a formal theory should seek to accommodate, and, second, how much information the theory should contain. I explore these two questions with respect to occurrences of demonstratives and pronouns – the so- called ‘deferred’ uses – which are often classified as non-standard or figurative. I argue that, contrary to initial impressions, they must be treated as (...) semantically identical to ordinary, perceptual uses of these expression-types, and that this finding has important repercussions for our view of the scope and limits of a semantic theory. (shrink)

Kant is categorical about the relation between virtue and the controlling of inclinations:Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human being, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his reason's control and so to rule over himself. Virtue presupposes apathy, in the sense of absence of affects. Kant revives the stoic ideal of tranquilitas as a necessary condition for virtue: ‘The true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind’ . In the (...) Anthropology and the Doctrine of Virtue, apathy is taken in the sense of freedom from affects. In these texts, Kant maintains that we must strive toward a state in which affects are absent. (shrink)

In this paper I want to explore the arguments for so-called ‘unarticulated constituents’ (UCs). Unarticulated constituents are supposed to be propositional elements, not presented in the surface form of a sentence, nor explicitly represented at the level of its logical form, yet which must be interpreted in order to grasp the (proper) meaning of that sentence or expression. Thus, for example, we might think that a sentence like ‘It is raining’ must contain a UC picking out the place at which (...) the speaker of the sentence asserts it to be raining. In §1 I will explore the nature of UCs a little further, and, in §2, suggest that we can recognise two different forms of argument for them.. (shrink)

Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.

Minimal semantics is sometimes characterised as a ‘neo-Gricean’ approach to meaning. This label seems reasonable since a key claim of minimal semantics is that the minimal contents possessed by sentences (akin to Grice’s technical notion of ‘what is said by a sentence’) need not be (and usually are not) what is communicated by a speaker who utters those sentences. However, given an affinity between the two approaches, we might expect that a well-known challenge for the Gricean – namely that their (...) account fails to fit with the psychological evidence concerning linguistic understanding – could also be levelled at the minimalist, and indeed this seems to be the basis of Recanati’s challenge to minimalism from his ‘availability principle’ (Recanati 2004). This paper aims to explore the relationship between semantics and psychology and show how both Gricean and minimalist approaches can avoid the challenge from psychological evidence. I conclude by suggesting that the way in which minimalism avoids this challenge also helps the account to defuse Clapp’s ‘naturalistic objection’ (Clapp 2007) that there are no grounds for selecting a correct minimal semantic theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a novel defence of the view that attributes are numerically distinct for Spinoza, which, contrary to paradigmatic objectivist readings, does not contradict his substance monism nor commit him to the view that the only substance has more than one essence. I show that Spinoza offers three overlooked arguments for attribute unity that are consistent with my interpretation. Next, I turn to the perspectivist interpretations of Spinoza’s theory of attributes, dominant in Spinoza scholarship today, under (...) which each attribute is one way in which the whole essence of the only substance can present itself to the intellect. I contend that my interpretation has two advantages over these readings: it can accommodate Spinoza’s arguments of attribute-essence symmetry and essence-modes proportionality. (shrink)

Plantinga’s free will defense is sometimes regarded as a successful response to the logical problem of evil. Still, a recent objection concludes Plantinga’s defense and theodicy are incompatible. According to this objection, in Plantinga’s defense, Jesus’ having a creaturely essence entails that Jesus suffers from transworld depravity and sins in the actual world, but this result conflicts with Plantinga’s theodicy and with Christian theism, where Jesus is sinless. In this paper, I argue that this objection is unsound, because creaturely essences (...) suffer from transworld depravity only contingently, so it is not necessarily true that their instantiations go wrong in the actual world. Hence, Plantinga’s defense and theodicy are not incompatible, so both answers to the problem of evil can be endorsed in conjunction. (shrink)

Current debate on Structural Realism starts when Worrall suggest this position is capable of accounting for the central intuitions of both Scientific Realism and Antirealism. Since then, it has become a rich field of debate in which complex disputes have emerged. In this paper I maintain that, despite its recent appearance on the philosophical scene, SR constitutes the crowning of an epistemological trend I propose to call ‘structuralist tradition’. I take as its central feature to put the focus on the (...) relations that exist in the natural world, rather than in the nature of the entities that maintain those relations. But despite this common feature, the various positions that have constituted that tradition in general, and the variants of RE in particular, have not offered a precise and uniform notion of structure. (shrink)

En una serie de trabajos, Pablo Melogno sienta las bases para la formulación de criterios racionales de elección entre teorías inconmensurables procurando compatibilizar la noción kuhniana de inconmensurabilidad con reconstrucciones racionalistas de los procesos de cambio teórico. Uno de los ejes de ese proyecto se enfoca en los aspectos semánticos de la inconmensurabilidad, en particular, en el desarrollo de una semántica histórica que relativiza los alcances del holismo semántico. En el presente trabajo, profundizo y extiendo el proyecto de Melogno considerando (...) aspectos diversos de las teorías híbridas de la referencia. (shrink)

The present article introduces and describes an innovative educational approach to learning processes, the Imagineering collaborative methodology. The methodology has been developed as a part of the learning curriculum for the Imagineering masters course. The theoretical and practical framework is explained, offering some illustrations in order to demonstrate the possibilities and implications of embracing such an approach in an educational environment. This article proposes a systemic, collaborative, and relational view on education that avoids reductive and disjunctive learning processes, inviting students (...) to be designers of their learning, preparing them to deal professionally with the demands of the twenty-first century, more aligned with a radically changing landscape in today's society. (shrink)

Cultuursociologisch essay over de postchristelijke manieren waarop mensen lijden compenseren.

In this chapter I argue that in the TTP we find overlooked and compelling evidence supporting the reading of Spinoza as a pantheist. The plan is as follows. I begin by laying out, in Section 1, four principal reasons that have been put forward against the reading of Spinoza as a pantheist: (i) the idea that the identification of God and nature lacks textual evidence, (ii) the claim that for Spinoza God is active and nature is passive, (iii) the view (...) that for Spinoza God is independent and nature is dependent, and (iv) the claim that for him whereas God is simple and indivisible, nature is complex and divisible. In Section 2, I contend that in the TTP we find strong evidence that shows that (i) is false and the claim that Spinoza accepts (ii) is incorrect. In Section 3, I turn to reasons (iii) and (iv) against the pantheist interpretation. I argue that when God and nature are understood as two ways of conceiving one and the same thing, as Spinoza posits in the TTP, then reasons (iii) and (iv) are no longer problematic for reading Spinoza as a pantheist. Finally, in Section 4 I show that the identification of God and nature has important advantages of accommodating two claims made by Spinoza: that infinite modes share the propria of substance and that the existence of modes follows necessarily from the existence of God’s attributes. (shrink)

In this article, I first address the ethical considerations about football and show that a meritocratic-fairness view of sports fails to capture the phenomenon of football. Fairness of result is not at centre stage in football. Football is about the drama, about the tension and the emotions it provokes. This moves us to the realm of aesthetics. I reject the idea of the aesthetics of football as the disinterested aesthetic appreciation, which traditionally has been deemed central to aesthetics. Instead, I (...) argue that we should try and develop an agon aesthetics where our aesthetic appreciation is understood as involving and being embedded in our engagement in the game. The drama of football is staged but not scripted. The aesthetics of competitions like football matches—the agon aesthetics—lies in engaging in the conflict that a competition is, while being aware that the conflict is not over ordinary world or everyday life issues, but unnecessary and invented for the very purpose of having a conflict to enjoy. (shrink)