Despite the limited references to language in Kant’s work, there is an implicit conception of meaning in trascendental philosophy as a whole. The question about meaning is equivalent to the question about the basis of the relation between a universal representation (or type) and the token which corresponds to it. In the 59th paragraph of the Critique of Judgement, Kant considers two models which allow us to think all possible type-token relations (hypotyposis): the schematic and the symbolic exposition. The main (...) aim of our paper is to analyze the nature, function and systematic place of the schematic exposition as the signification model that applies in the theoretical domain. We will also bring about Kant’s implicit criticism of the understanding of the functioning of our concepts, as found in Locke, Berkeley and Hume. A brief glimpse into the notion of symbolic exposition will be given as well, by pointing at the problem of an exposition of our ideas of reason. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente artículo es mostrar cómo la especificidad del discurso moral obliga a introducir un modo de exposición de nuestros conceptos que no acaba de ajustarse plenamente a ninguno de los dos modelos presentados por Kant en el parágrafo 59 de la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar. Situándose a medio camino de esquema y símbolo, la noción de «tipo» actúa como elemento mediador entre la ley moral y cada una de sus posibles concreciones.

That biology provides explanations is not open to doubt. But how it does so must be a vexed question for those who deny that biology embodies laws or other generalizations with the sort of explanatory force that the philosophy of science recognizes. The most common response to this problem has involved redefining law so that those grammatically general statements which biologists invoke in explanations can be counted as laws. But this terminological innovation cannot identify the source of biology's explanatory power. (...) I argue that because biological science is historical, the problem of biological explanation can be assimilated to the parallel problem in the philosophy of history, and that the problem was solved by Carl Hempel. All we need to do is recognize that the only laws that biology—in all its compartments from the molecular onward—has or needs are the laws of natural selection. (shrink)

Robotic warfare has now become a real prospect. One issue that has generated heated debate concerns the development of ‘Killer Robots’. These are weapons that, once programmed, are capable of finding and engaging a target without supervision by a human operator. From a conceptual perspective, the debate on Killer Robots has been rather confused, not least because it is unclear how central elements of these weapons can be defined. Offering a precise take on the relevant conceptual issues, the article contends (...) that Killer Robots are best seen as executors of targeting decisions made by their human programmers. However, from a normative perspective, the execution of targeting decisions by Killer Robots should worry us. The article argues that what is morally bad about Killer Robots is that they replace human agency in warfare with artificial agency, a development which should be resisted. Finally, the article contends that the issue of agency points to a wider problem in just war theory, namely the role of moral rights in our normative reasoning on armed conflict. (shrink)

The “fair benefits” approach to international research is designed to produce results that all can agree are fair without taking a stand on divisive questions of justice. But its appealing veneer of collaboration masks ambiguities at both a conceptual and an operational level. An attempt to put it into practice would look a lot like an auction, leaving little reason to think the outcomes will satisfy even minimal conditions of fairness.

To judge from the rash of recent law review articles, it is a miracle that research with human subjects in the U.S. continues to draw breath under the asphyxiating heel of the rent-seeking, creativity-stifling, jack-booted bureaucrethics that is the current system of research ethics oversight and review. Institutional Review Boards, sometimes called Research Ethics Committees, have been accused of perpetrating “probably the most widespread violation of the First Amendment in our nation's history,” resulting in a “disaster, not only for academics, (...) but for the whole nation.” One member of the President's Council on Bioethics went so far as to assert, “There has been no greater damage to academic freedom in the United States in my lifetime. And my lifetime encompasses McCarthy and it encompasses political correctness, both.” Locked in the bureaucratic “iron cage” of IRB oversight, critics charge that researchers have been transformed into a vulnerable, exposed population, subject to domination, that has been likened in one case to a kind of “Tuskegee in reverse.”. (shrink)

Dummctt argues that classical quantification is illegitimate when the domain is given as the objects which fall under an indefinitely extensible concept, since in such cases the objects are not the required definite totality. The chief problem in understanding this complex argument is the crucial but unexplained phrase 'definite totality' and the associated claim that it follows from the intuitive notion of set that the objects over which a classical quantifier ranges form a set. 'Definite totality' is best understood as (...) disguised plural talk like Cantor's 'consistent multiplicity', although this does not help in understanding how a totality could be anything other than definite. Moreover, contrary to his claims, Dummett's own notion of set is not intuitive and he does not demystify the set-theoretic paradoxes. In conclusion, it is argued that Dummett's context principle is responsible for the incoherent projection of the haziness of a conception of some objects onto reality. (shrink)

I note the multitude of ways in which, beginning with the classic paper by Machamer et al., the mechanists have qualify their methodological dicta, and limit the vulnerability of their claims by strategic vagueness regarding their application. I go on to generalize a version of the mechanist requirement on explanations due to Craver and Kaplan :601–627, 2011) in cognitive and systems neuroscience so that it applies broadly across the life sciences in accordance with the view elaborated by Craver and Darden (...) in In Search of Mechanisms. I then go on to explore what ramifications their mechanist requirement on explanations may have for explanatory “dependencies” reported in biology and the special sciences. What this exploration suggests is that mechanism threatens to eliminate instead of underwrite a large number of such “dependencies” reported in higher-levels of biology and the special sciences. I diagnose the source of this threat in mechanism’s demand that explanations identify nested causal differences makers in mechanisms, their components, the components further components, and so forth. Finally, I identify the “love–hate” relationship mechanism must have with functional explanation, and show how it makes mechanism an extremely interesting thesis indeed. (shrink)

There is extensive evidence that adults, children, and some non-human species, represent routine events in the form of hierarchically structured 'action scripts,' and show superior recall and imitation of information at relatively high-levels of this hierarchy. Here we investigate the hypothesis that a 'hierarchical bias' operates in human cultural transmission, acting to impose a hierarchical structure onto descriptions of everyday events, and to increasingly describe those events in terms of higher hierarchical levels. Descriptions of three everyday events expressed entirely in (...) terms of basic low-level actions were transmitted along ten chains each containing four adult human participants. It was found that the proportion of low-level information showed a significant linear decrease with transmission generation, while the proportions of medium- and high-level information showed significant linear increases, consistent with the operation of a hierarchical bias. The findings additionally provide support for script theory in general, and are discussed in relation to hierarchical imitation in non-human primates. (shrink)

Climate change is often described as an existential risk to the human species, but this terminology has generally been avoided in the climate-justice literature in analytic philosophy. I investigate the source of this disconnect and explore the prospects for incorporating the idea of climate change as an existential risk into debates about climate justice. The concept of existential risk does not feature prominently in these discussions, I suggest, because assumptions that structure ‘ideal’ accounts of climate justice ensure that the prospect (...) of climate change as an extinction-level threat does not arise. Given persistent noncompliance with mitigation duties, however, we have reason to revisit these assumptions. I argue that the most promising way for theories of climate justice to account for the significance of existential risk is to look to the practices of protest and resistance in which a concern about extinction or global catastrophe is frequently given expression. (shrink)

Eliminativism about intentional content argues for its conclusion from the partial correctness of all three of the theses Hutto and Satne seek to combine: neo-Cartesianism is correct to this extent: if there is intentional content it must originally be mental. Neo-Behaviorism is correct to this extent: attribution of intentional content is basically a heuristic device for predicting the behavior of higher vertebrates. Neo-Pragmatism is right to this extent: the illusion of intentionality in language is the source of the illusion of (...) intentionality in thought. Eliminativists employ the insights of all three “neo”-theses to explain why there is no such thing and why the systematic illusion that there is intentional content runs so deep. (shrink)

Reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, a claim about explanations, and a research program. The metaphysical thesis reductionists advance (and antireductionists accept) is that all facts, including all biological facts, are fixed by the physical and chemical facts; there are no non-physical events, states, or processes, and so biological events, states and processes are “nothing but” physical ones. The research program can be framed as a methodological prescription which follows from the claim about explanations. Antireductionism does not dispute reductionism’s metaphysical claim, (...) but rejects the explanatory claim and so the methodological moral. To a first approximation what reductionists and antireductionists disagree about is whether explanations in functional biology can be or need to be explained by or completed or perhaps replaced by explanations in terms of molecular biology.i And this disagreement over the adequacy of explanations in functional biology drives a significant methodological disagreement with consequence for the research program of biology. (shrink)

Nine issues of fundamental importance for business ethics are examined with a view to encouraging researchers in the field to direct their attention to them in the 1990s and beyond. The issues are related to organized labour, social dumping, international finance and Third World debt, tobacco promotion, arms trade, wealth concentration and taxation, pollution and resource depletion, international trading blocks, and the Canadian Business Council on National Issues and other business organizations.

Employing a well-known local regularity from macroeconomics, the Phillips curve, I examine Woodward’s ([2000], [2003]) account of the explanatory power of such historically restricted generalizations and the mathematical models with which they are sometimes associated. The article seeks to show that, pace Woodward, to be explanatory such generalizations need to be underwritten by more fundamental ones, and that rational choice theory would not avail in this case to provide the required underwriting. Examining how such explanatory restricted regularities are underwritten in (...) biology—by unrestricted Darwinian regularities—provides the basis for an argument that Darwinian regularities serve the same function in human affairs. The general argument for this claim requires, inter alia , that we accept some version or other of a theory of memes. The article concludes by clearing the field of some prominent objections to the existence of memes, and extracting some policy implications from the persistence and acceleration of arms races in human affairs. (shrink)

This book draws on studies of movement, gesture, and early film to offer a series of readings on repetition through the body in Homer. Each chapter presents an argument based on a specific posture, action or gesture, through which to rethink epic practices of embodiment and formularity.

Resumo Este artigo defende o ponto de vista de que as bases da ciência cognitiva contemporânea estão em sintonia com o pensamento de Merleau-Ponty, em seus aspectos antiobjetivista e antirrepresentacionalista. A ideia de representação mental é contestada, tanto na CC quanto no pensamento de Merleau-Ponty. A cognição não espelha um mundo exterior independente dos sujeitos incorporados. O mundo é um existencial, como afirmam Merleau-Ponty e a CC. A hipótese da representação mental supõe que o mundo pode ser percebido de forma (...) independente do sujeito que percebe. Isso não é verdade. A percepção depende da forma como o sujeito age em seu mundo percebido. Todas as estimulações que o organismo encontra só são possíveis pelos seus movimentos precedentes que resultam na exposição do órgão receptor às influências externas. Os estímulos sensoriais que o organismo encontra dependem diretamente do seu comportamento motor e a forma como o organismo se move depende diretamente das consequências sensoriais dos seus comportamentos anteriores.This article defends the view that the foundations of contemporary cognitive science are in tune with Merleau-Ponty’s thinking in its anti-objectivist and anti-representationalist aspects. The idea of mental representation is contested both in CC and in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. Cognition does not mirror an outside world independent of embodied subjects. The world is an existential one as Merleau-Ponty and the CC say. The mental representation hypothesis assumes that the world can be perceived independently of the perceiving subject. This is not true. Perception depends on how the subject acts in his perceived world. All the stimulations that the organism finds are only possible by its previous movements that result in the exposure of the receiving organ to external influences. The sensory stimuli that the organism finds depend directly on its motor behavior and the way the organism moves depends directly on the sensory consequences of its previous behaviors. (shrink)

This paper shows how critical realism can be used to integrate empirical data and philosophical analysis within ‘empirical bioethics’. The term empirical bioethics, whilst appearing oxymoronic, simply refers to an interdisciplinary approach to the resolution of practical ethical issues within the biological and life sciences, integrating social scientific, empirical data with philosophical analysis. It seeks to achieve a balanced form of ethical deliberation that is both logically rigorous and sensitive to context, to generate normative conclusions that are practically applicable to (...) the problem, challenge, or dilemma. Since it incorporates both philosophical and social scientific components, empirical bioethics is a field that is consistent with the use of critical realism as a research methodology. The integration of philosophical and social scientific approaches to ethics has been beset with difficulties, not least because of the irreducibly normative, rather than descriptive, nature of ethical analysis and the contested relation between fact and value. However, given that facts about states of affairs inform potential courses of action and their consequences, there is a need to overcome these difficulties and successfully integrate data with theory. Previous approaches have been formulated to overcome obstacles in combining philosophical and social scientific perspectives in bioethical analysis; however each has shortcomings. As a mature interdisciplinary approach critical realism is well suited to empirical bioethics, although it has hitherto not been widely used. Here I show how it can be applied to this kind of research and explain how it represents an improvement on previous approaches. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between Gilles Deleuze's philosophical endeavours and Marxism, with a particular focus on his unfinished work, Grandeur de Marx. Despite the collapse of Soviet socialism, Deleuze acknowledged that his philosophical pursuits were profoundly intertwined with Marxist thought. His insistence on this connection was not a mere expression of regret or an apology for his political leanings. In the 1990s, as neoliberal globalisation spread beyond the United States and Europe, Marxism persisted as a rallying cry for resistance. (...) The ascendancy of global capitalism was not a consequence of Marxism's failure; rather, it was a manifestation of what Marx had presciently predicted in his works. Thus, Deleuze's unfinished project on Marx can be viewed as a response to anti-Marxist reactionism from a distinct vantage point. While several interpretations of Deleuze's unwritten Marx exist, the argument in this essay is that Deleuze attempted to recreate the conditions for Marx's critical analysis by employing communism as an event. (shrink)

Should we embrace nihilism, as Nolen Gertz suggests, or try to overcome it? For Nietzsche, nihilism must be overcome – if we're strong enough. The key, argues Alex Silk, is to see how nihilistic beliefs – that, say, nothing matters – derive from nihilistic feelings and bodily states. Understanding the basic features of human nature and experience at the root of nihilism paves the way toward a healthier, affirming perspective on ourselves and human life. Nietzsche’s rhetorical style helps us incorporate (...) such a perspective by engaging our feelings as well as our rational faculties. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to critically evaluate the thesis that ethics counselors constitute a new priesthood in the pejorative sense of this term. In defense of the thesis, an account is given of the diverse variety of fundamental ideas about ethics or morality. The underlying argument is simply that there is such a diversity of opinion about so many fundamental issues that most ethical appraisals, especially in committees, are probably very shallow and barely warranted. Following this negative work, (...) an attempt is made to try to find some positive benefits from the work of ethics counselors. Some potential benefits are identified, but there is a need for empirical research in order to construct a more persuasive case for such work. In the penultimate section of the paper I addressed some of my own second thoughts about the discussion and some provocative suggestions that friends gave me about earlier drafts. (shrink)

Among other interesting claims made in Robert Reich's 2007 treatise, Supercapitalism, it is asserted in various ways that proponents of corporate social responsibility (CSR) or what I would call 'business ethics' are engaged in relatively unproductive exercises. Their resources would be better used if they undertook the hard work of engagement in democratic political processes leading to legislation that would force corporations to pursue the public interest as well as their own. In this article, I summarize some of Reich's central (...) theses and arguments, show that they are fatally flawed and explain why the institution of morality is essential for business, law and democracy. (shrink)

The study of economics has been a going concern among philosophers for the better part of twenty years without very many people even noticing that economics has a metaphysics. Indeed, among economists the term ‘metaphysical’ is probably an epithet of opprobrium, employed to suggest that a claim is untestable or otherwise without cognitive significance. Philosophers of economics will admit to the existence of an epistemology of economics—the study of the nature, extent and justification of economic knowledge. But even this is (...) controversial among some economists. The notion that economics might have a metaphysics as well as an epistemology will be scoffed at by those economists doubtful about the enterprise of the philosophy of economics altogether. Nevertheless, philosophers of economics should have no trouble identifying a metaphysics in some of the theoretical commitments of economics. (shrink)

Conditional constructions (if–then) enable us to express our thoughts about possible states of the world, and they form an important ingredient for our reasoning and argumentative capabilities. Different types and argumentative uses have been distinguished in the literature, but their applicability to actual language use is rarely evaluated. This paper focuses on the reliability of applying classifications of connections between antecedents and consequents of conditionals to discourse, and three issues are identified. First, different accounts produce incompatible results when applied to (...) language data. Second, a discrepancy between theory and data was observed in previous studies, which sometimes discard existing classifications for being detached from actual language use. Finally, language users construct various cognitive relations between clauses of conditionals without being able to rely on overt linguistic features, which poses problems for the annotation of conditionals in argumentation and discourse. This paper addresses these issues by means of comparing theoretical types and actual uses of conditionals, by inspecting the dispersion of types in natural-language corpora, and by conducting an experiment in which the inter-rater reliability of classifications was assessed. The results show that the reliability of classifications of conditionals when applied to language data is low. With respect to the aforementioned issues, different classifications produced incompatible results, a discrepancy between theory and data was indeed observed, and low reliability scores indicated a largely interpretative nature of types of conditionals. Given these results, suggestions for the enhancement of reliability in corpus studies of conditionals and beyond are provided to enhance future classification design. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 2, pp 151 - 167 This paper considers the unity of Socrates’ twin apparitions of sophist and statesman, alluded to in the _Sophist_. Examining how these apparitions are at work in the _Theaetetus_, I argue that the difficulty is that of combining the nurturing or educative role of the statesman with the sophist’s practice of refutation. Beginning from Socrates’ shift in appearance early in the dialogue, I argue that the cause of this shift is Theaetetus’ (...) character, that this forces the general problem Socrates has in mind into a particular form, and that Theaetetus never fully grasps this fundamental, intractable problem. Consequently, the problem’s intractability shows why Socratic education is always refutative, and so combines the statesman and sophist’s respective arts. And because Theaetetus is the cause of Socrates’ shift, the philosopher’s appearance is always an ironic reflection of his interlocutor’s opinions: the dialogue the _Philosopher_ would have to be named the _Theaetetus_. (shrink)

At the start of Plato’s Minos an anonymous comrade argues that the variability of law according to time and place undermines the claim that it conveys moral truth. But by the end he has accepted Minos as the greatest of lawgivers because of his education by Zeus. How does he manage to slide so quickly from the moral laxity of conventionalism to the moral absolutism of divine revelation? Guided by this question, the author considers how the two divergent parts of (...) the Minos form one whole, and so what Plato suggests is the common basis to conventionalism and piety. Plato’s Minos thus ends up having an unexpectedly close relationship to his Euthyphro. (shrink)

Scholars have typically viewed book 3 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics as an unsystematic array of different metaphysical problems. In this article, the author argues that Aristotle organizes them with great care. The principle behind his ordering of the problems stems from Aristotle’s concern with impressing upon his audience the difficulty of becoming thoroughly perplexed. This principle is found to make sense of the discrepancies between Aristotle’s list of the problems in 3.1 and his discussion of them in 3.2–6. In short, Aristotle’s (...) primary concern in Metaphysics 3 is to temper the ambitions of his audience of enterprising physicists, a concern that takes him from the aim of metaphysics to the tension between theology and philosophy. Borrowed as this concern is from the Platonic Socrates, the author shows that the arc of Metaphysics 3 is Socratic, and how it is Socratic. (shrink)

The Art Experience: An Introduction to Philosophy and the Arts takes readers on an engaging and accessible journey that explores a series of fundamental questions about the nature of art and aesthetic value. Three of these questions serve as the major sections for the book's 12 chapters: What makes something a work of art? How should we experience art in order to get the most out of it? And once we understand art, how should we evaluate whether it is good (...) or bad? Philosophical theory is illustrated with concrete examples: the paintings of Frida Kahlo, the music of Johann Sebastian Bach, the masks of the Nso people, and many others. Classic questions are balanced with cutting-edge challenges, such as Linda Nochlin's work on the exclusion of women from the artistic canon. The Art Experience presupposes no prior knowledge of philosophy or art, and it will be of interest to any reader seeking an accessible and engaging introduction to this field. Along the way, readers learn how philosophical theories can affect our real-world experiences with painting, music, theater, and many more art forms. Key Features Accessible for any college student and assumes no knowledge of philosophy, art theory, or any artistic medium Organizes topics conceptually, rather than historically, allowing students to more easily grasp the core issues themselves rather than tracing their historical evolution Offers readers a large number of contemporary examples and a consistent focus on the way theory can affect people's real-world experiences with art Explores questions about bias - for example, whether the artistic canon has excluded some groups unfairly and whether definitions of art are Western-biased. (shrink)

In this paper, I first outline a brief dialectic on free will and meaning in life. I then argue that meaning-compatibilism gives us reason to reject meaning-incompatibilism as it is currently understood. However, I critique meaning-compatibilism to the extent that it is silent with regard to freedom’s role in generating meaning in life. Because of these observations, I reconceptualize meaning-incompatibilism and urge us to adopt an alternative version of the position I call, “narrow meaning-incompatibilism.” Following my formulation of this position, (...) I construct a preliminary narrow meaning-incompatibilist framework. Here, I maintain that “self-expression” is what, in part, makes life meaningful. However, I argue that there are at least two different _kinds_ of self-expression, which I call personal self-expression and metaphysical self-expression. I argue that libertarian free will (but more specifically agent-causal libertarianism) enhances meaning in life because it secures metaphysical self-expression. On my account, if determinism is true, then agents will fail to obtain metaphysical self-expression. The result is a reality wherein agents hold a strangely alien relationship with their actions, and life is thus less meaningful because of this fact. Ultimately, then, I argue that agent-causal libertarianism enhances meaning in life because it safeguards metaphysical self-expression, which in turn alleviates this problem of alienation found at the level of action. (shrink)

in Angelique M. Rietsma and Jonathan D. Moreno eds., Ethical Guidelines for Innovative Surgery. (Hagerstown, MD: University Publishing Group) 19-52. [PDF].

This essay contends that the ethics around the use of spy technology to gather intelligence (TECHINT) during espionage and counterintelligence operations is ambiguous. To build this argument, the essay critically scrutinizes Cécile Fabre's recent and excellent book Spying through a Glass Darkly, which argues that there are no ethical differences between the use of human intelligence (HUMINT) obtained from or by human assets and TECHINT in these operations. As the essay explains, Fabre arrives at this position by treating TECHINT as (...) a like-for-like replacement for HUMINT. The essay argues instead that TECHINT is unlikely to act as a like-for-like replacement for HUMINT. As such, TECHINT might transform existing practices of espionage and counterintelligence, giving rise to new ethical challenges not captured in Fabre's analysis. To illustrate the point, the essay builds an analogy between TECHINT and recent armed conflicts in which precision weapons have been deployed. Although precision weapons seem ethically desirable, their availability has created new practices of waging war that are ethically problematic. By analogy, TECHINT, though not intrinsically undesirable, has the capacity to generate new practices of intelligence gathering that are ethically problematic—potentially more than HUMINT. Ultimately, recent negative experiences with the use of precision weaponry should caution against an overly positive assessment of TECHINT's ethical desirability. (shrink)

A number of prominent political philosophers, including Will Kymlicka and Joseph Carens, have suggested that one reason for limiting immigration is to protect culture, particularly what Kymlicka calls “societal culture”: “a territorially-concentrated culture, centered on a shared language which is used in a wide range of societal institutions, in both public and private life.” I situate this claim in the context of liberal nation-building and suggest that the arguments for the protection of culture are often vague, confused or tend to (...) conflict with liberal commitments. When clear, they gain their plausibility from other concerns, not cultural protection. Finally, given plausible empirical assumptions, the dangers to societal culture are considerably exaggerated and provide little reason for preventing immigration. I then briefly consider the case of general culture and whether there are some grounds to limit immigration to protect it, using the example of Iceland and aboriginal cultures to situate my arguments. Once again, I conclude that the appeal to culture to limit immigration is weak and philosophers searching for arguments against open borders should turn elsewhere. (shrink)

Plato was central both to the genesis of Stoic theory and to subsequent debates within the Stoa. These essays provide new and detailed explorations of the complex relationship between Plato and the Greek and Roman Stoic traditions, and together they show the directness and independence with which Stoics examined Plato's writing. What were the philosophical incentives to consulting and then returning to Plato's dialogues? To what extent did Plato, rather than Xenophon or Antisthenes, control Stoic reconstructions of Socrates' ethics? What (...) explains the particular focus of Stoic polemic against Plato, and how strong is the evidence for a later reconciliation between Plato and Stoicism? This book will be important for all scholars and advanced students interested in the relationship between a major philosopher and one of the most important philosophical movements. (shrink)

Genocentrism, the thesis that the genes play a special role in the causation of development is often rejected in favor of a 'causal democracy thesis' to the effect that all causally necessary conditions for development are equal. Genocentrists argue that genes play a distinct causal role owing to their informational content and that this content enables them to program the embryo. I show that the special causal role of the genome hinges not on its informational status — it has none, (...) or at least no more than computer programs have independent of our interpretations of them — but on its power literally to program the embryo, a power nicely illustrated in the use of polynucleotide sequences to compute solutions to NP hard problems in mathematics. (shrink)