Bu çalışma, Covid-19 sürecinde ortaya çıkan olumsuz duyguları belirlemek, kişilerin ortaya çıkan olumsuz psikolojik faktörlere karşı ne tür başa çıkma tarzları kullandıklarını saptamak ve dini başa çıkmanın nasıl bir etkiye sahip olduğunu görebilmek amacıyla yapılmıştır. Araştırmada üç temel soruya cevap aranmıştır: İlk soruda, pandemide yaşanılan olumsuz psikolojik durumlara, ikinci soruda bu psikolojik durumlara karşı geliştirilen başa çıkma tarzlarına ve üçüncü soruda ise, dini başa çıkmanın nasıl bir konuma sahip olduğuna cevap aranmıştır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, kendileri ya da yakın çevrelerinden birilerinin (...) Covid-19 deneyimlerine sahip, farklı fakültelerdeki lisans düzeyinde eğitim gören 19 erkek ve 41 kadın katılımcıdan veri toplanmıştır. Metne dönüştürülen veriler Maxqda 20 Paket Programı yardımıyla analiz edilmiştir. Analizler sonucunda çeşitli alt tema ve temalara ulaşılmıştır. Sonuçlar incelendiğinde, bireylerin genellikle kaygı, korku, umutsuzluk, stres, yorgunluk ve depresyon gibi çok sayıda olumsuz duyguları yaşadıkları görülmektedir. Bununla birlikte, bireylerin bu olumsuz durumlara karşı en çok dini başa çıkmayı kullandıkları sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. (shrink)

In the last half century, psychological studies on the New Religious Movements have shown a significant increase not only in the discipline of psychology but also in sociology, history of religions and other religious studies. Today, it is a judgement that people seek a measure to protect themselves from the alienating and degenerating effects of modern life. In this context, firstly the inclusion of a New Religious Movement (NRM) reflects a desire to take back time in behalf of experiencing the (...) truth in the modern world. Secondly, this belonging refers, at the same time, to the desire to carry the ancient truth to modern times and move it into action on a contemporary and secular level. At this point, New Religious Movements are characterized as a protest against modernity. In the aim of this argument, there is the deconstruction of the institutionalized religion and the secular structure by the hand of individual. This situation realizes with the participation of the ‘new’ and the movement, which is a modern social structure, to the ‘religion’; and with the participation of the religion to the ‘new’, that is, the ‘secular’. For this reason, many New Religious Movements blend themselves with modern, anti-modern, sometimes even post-modern elements. These include both elements of adaptation to modernity and elements of resistance to it. The new religious movements are quite diverse and colorful. Some are theoretically highly conservative, but some of them are radically innovative. Some of them emerge from traditional religions, while others show an eclectic and syncretic appearance. It is a fact that the target group of the New Religious Movement is a group of young people aged 15-25. Since their target majority is young people, such religious movements are also defined as “youth religions/sects”. Is attending YDHs a strategic success only in New Religious Movements? Or is it the possibility that the lifestyle in the modern age presents the individual? Or a sense of meaning in which his quest corresponds to it? Or is this a grueling vicious circle that he can't afford to become an addict? In this context, the following elements are explained in general as the main reasons for the participation in a new religious movement for the individual: deprivation, alienation, the tendency to be engaged with religious issues, the instability of one's own personality and the experience of personal crisis. The individual experiences a life in “homeless mind” mode. In “homeless mind” approach, the individual perceives modernization and existence as secular, not as sacred as it used to be. The existence and life in the Western thinking experiencing this process have been seen as “ rationally understood ”, but the Western man feels himself homeless and free of refuge in the cosmos and social life when big problems are encountered. The New Religious Movements have precisely aspired the field of meaning that this feeling corresponds to, and they have met the individual in the claim of satisfying this feeling. In this study, the relationship between NRMs, psychology and personality are tried to be discussed with descriptive and partly analytic approaches. The nature of modern man's ontological entity requires the interpretation of the belief trend in the context of psychology and also requires developing a perspective that prioritizes the effectiveness of comprehension and analysis. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new normative framework to think about Big Tech reform. Focusing on the case of digital communication, I argue that rethinking the corporate purpose of social media companies is a distinctive entry point to the debate on how to render the powers of tech corporations democratically legitimate. I contend that we need to strive for a reform that redefines the corporate purpose of social media companies. In this view, their purpose should be to create and maintain a (...) free, egalitarian, and democratic public sphere rather than profit seeking. This political reform democratically contains corporate power in two ways: first, the legally enforceable fiduciary duties of corporate boards are reconceptualized in relation to democratic purposes rather than shareholder interests. Second, corporate governance structures should be redesigned to ensure that the abstract purpose is realized through representatives whose incentives align with the existence of a democratic public sphere. My argument complements radical proposals such as platform socialism by drawing a connection between democratizing social media governance and identifying the proper purpose of social media companies. (shrink)

People experience various negative emotions in their everyday lives. They feel anger toward aggressive drivers, shame for making a mistake at work, and guilt for hurting another person. When these...

The challenges facing the life-worlds of political societies in the Islamic world require a radical shift of perspective that can improve our understanding of the contemporary situation of human rights politics. Not only the classical formulation of secularism, which aims at liberating the public sphere from domination of ‘the sacred’, but also the political-theological approach, which addresses the problems of modernity within the context of a disguised and refurbished dominance of ‘the transcendence’, suffer from and share a basic insufficiency in (...) handling human rights issues. According to these approaches, the basic issue stems from a realignment in relations between logics of the sovereign and the sacred or a redefinition of the position of state against religion. In this article, my object is shifting the scope of discussion concerning the rights beyond this logic of sovereignty by adopting an approach which provides a political ground for discussing the intermingling of religion in the life-world. From my point of view, the first step that should be taken to deepen our understanding of the argument of freedom is to unveil the nature of the sacred within the framework of a power network that longs for control over the whole lives of individuals constituting the society. In this regard, by going beyond the concepts such as fanaticism, fundamentalism or terrorism provided by ‘state mentality’, the significance of lifestyle politics for ‘rights talk’ will become more evident. From this point of view, the detection and critique of a zone of ‘weak citizenship’ constructed through restrictions stemming from the values and norms arising from the perceptions of particular communities organized through family, tradition and justice are essential. Such a critique will pave the way for a radical politicization of lifestyles by way of criteria of the demands for equal respect and dignity. (shrink)

Fabian Wendt argues that political realism is not capable of explaining how the state’s moral right to rule over its subjects is generated. I believe that Wendt’s criticism is not sound because his position relies on the false implicit assumption that realism and moralism ask the same philosophical questions on state authority. I contend that it is fallacious to evaluate the realist account of legitimacy by the standards of moralism, and vice versa, as these two accounts arrive at different conceptions (...) of legitimacy by raising different sets of philosophical questions. The two sets of philosophical questions are not reducible to each other. The realist account of legitimacy does not aim to explain what the moralist account of legitimacy aims to explain. (shrink)

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the pragmatic marker “I think” and its translation into Turkish, specifically focusing on its use in TED Talks. Using a corpus-based approach, the research investigates the various functions and Turkish equivalents of “I think”, revealing significant insights into its role as a commenting speech action. Grounded in speech act theory, particularly expositive illocutionary acts, the study emphasizes the illocutionary pluralism of “I think” in managing discourse, expressing speaker attitudes, and engaging interlocutors. The findings (...) highlight the high frequency and critical role of “I think” in spoken English, its function as a commenting speech action in maintaining discourse coherence, and the notable translation choices in Turkish, such as bence ‘in my opinion’ and sanırım ‘I suppose/I assume’. This study contributes to pragmatics by enhancing our understanding of the illocutionary pluralism of “I think” vis-à-vis its translation strategies. (shrink)

What is the point of ideology critique? Prominent Anglo-American philosophers recently proposed novel arguments for the view that ideology critique is moral critique, and ideologies are flawed insofar as they contribute to injustice or oppression. We criticize that view and make the case for an alternative and more empirically-oriented approach, grounded in epistemic rather than moral commitments. We make two related claims: (i) ideology critique can debunk beliefs and practices by uncovering how, empirically, they are produced by self-justifying power, and (...) (ii) the self-justification of power should be understood as an epistemic rather than moral flaw. Drawing on the recent realist revival in political theory, we argue that this genealogical approach has more radical potential, despite being more parsimonious than morality-based approaches. We demonstrate the relative advantages of our view by discussing the results of empirical studies on the contemporary phenomenon of neopatriarchy in the Middle East and North Africa. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Naharaim Jahrgang: 10 Heft: 2 Seiten: 175-194.

We introduce a set of biologically and computationally motivated design choices for modeling the learning of language, or of other types of sequential, hierarchically structured experience and behavior, and describe an implemented system that conforms to these choices and is capable of unsupervised learning from raw natural-language corpora. Given a stream of linguistic input, our model incrementally learns a grammar that captures its statistical patterns, which can then be used to parse or generate new data. The grammar constructed in this (...) manner takes the form of a directed weighted graph, whose nodes are recursively (hierarchically) defined patterns over the elements of the input stream. We evaluated the model in seventeen experiments, grouped into five studies, which examined, respectively, (a) the generative ability of grammar learned from a corpus of natural language, (b) the characteristics of the learned representation, (c) sequence segmentation and chunking, (d) artificial grammar learning, and (e) certain types of structure dependence. The model's performance largely vindicates our design choices, suggesting that progress in modeling language acquisition can be made on a broad front—ranging from issues of generativity to the replication of human experimental findings—by bringing biological and computational considerations, as well as lessons from prior efforts, to bear on the modeling approach. (shrink)

This paper argues that social media companies’ power to regulate communication in the public sphere illustrates a novel type of domination. The idea is that, since social media companies can partially dictate the terms of citizens’ political participation in the public sphere, they can arbitrarily interfere with the choices individuals make qua citizens. I contend that social media companies dominate citizens in two different ways. First, I focus on the cases in which social media companies exercise direct control over political (...) speech. They exercise quasi-public power over citizens because their regulation of speech on social media platforms implies the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with citizens’ democratic contestation in the political system. Second, companies’ algorithmic governance entails the capacity to interfere with citizens’ choices about what mode of discursive engagement they endorse in their relationships with fellow citizens. By raising the cost of deliberative engagement, companies narrow citizens’ choice menu. (shrink)

This article argues that Bernard Williams’ Critical Theory Principle (CTP) is in tension with his realist commitments, i.e., deriving political norms from practices that are inherent to political life. The Williamsian theory of legitimate state power is based on the central importance of the distinction between political rule and domination. Further, Williams supplements the normative force of his theory with the CTP, i.e., the principle that acceptance of a justification regarding power relations ought not to be created by the very (...) same coercive power. I contend that the CTP is an epistemic criterion of reflective (un)acceptability which is not strictly connected to the question of whether people are dominated or not. I show that there are cases of non-domination that fail the epistemic requirements of the CTP. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

This book is the first devoted to modern biology's innovators and iconoclasts: men and women who challenged prevailing notions in their fields.

While contemplative practices have emerged from wisdom-traditions, the rhetoric surrounding their justification in contemporary public educational settings has been substantially undergirded by the scientific evidence-based approach. This article finds the practice and construct of ‘attention’ to be the bridge between this peculiar encounter of science and wisdom traditions, and a vantage point from which we can re-examine the scope and practice of ‘education’. The article develops an educational typology based on ‘attention’ as a curricular deliberation point. Every pedagogical act rides (...) over a meta-pedagogical injunction of where to attend to find that which society deems worthwhile. The deep curricular teachings thus begin in the question where knowledge of most worth exists and precede content. It is at this hidden level in which our spatial-temporal disposition towards life-meaning can be shaped. Following this typology, the article will suggest that beyond what may be critiqued as instrumental mindfulness-based curricular ‘interventions’ that cater to an economic educational narrative, lurks the trajectory of a contemplative educational turn that may be outwitting over-instrumentalisation through wisdom-traditions. (shrink)

Philosophy’s essence depicted by Socrates lies in its role as pedagogy for living, yet its traditional treatment of ‘body’ as a hindrance to ‘knowledge’ in fact severs it from life, transforming it into ‘an escape from life’.The philosophy/life dichotomy is thus an inherent flaw preventing philosophy as traditionally taught and engaged in, from fulfilling its original goal. Recent rejections of the Cartesian nature of Western curriculum, such as O’Loughlin’s ‘Embodiment and Education: Exploring creatural existence’, constitute an important theoretical paradigm shift, (...) yet still fail to translate to substantial pedagogies which explore the ‘body’ and its relation to ‘mind’ directly. This article suggests a reorientation of philosophy teaching from its present disembodied pedagogy, towards an embodied-lived-philosophicalpractice. By the description and exemplification of modern postural yoga I will depict the twofold role of the ‘body’ in philosophy teaching: 1) The ‘body’ as pedagogical vehicle serving the emergence of philosophical discourse, and 2) The body as yielding livingness to mean embodied-lived-philosophy as opposed to disembodied-lofty-philosophical escape from life. It will thus be suggested that yoga be incorporated as an integral part of philosophy teaching reclaiming its educational ethos. (shrink)

Shirking, the act of avoiding the demands of one’s job, is generally seen as unethical. Drawing on empirical evidence from the sociology of work, I develop a normative conception of shirking as a form of worker resistance against illegitimate managerial power. In doing so, I present a new approach to the political theory of the firm, which is more adversarial and agent-centered than available alternatives. It is more adversarial as it recognizes the political value of counterproductive and disruptive behavior in (...) capitalist firms. It is more agent-centered because it theorizes the firm from the perspective of workers, asking what pro tanto reasons they have to shirk. I show that shirking under the structural domination of capitalism has diagnostic, agential, and epistemic values. The paper contributes to the wider methodological ambition to tailor political theorizing to the positionality of social actors by shifting attention from the institutional design of the firm to the methods of worker resistance. (shrink)

Derek Parfit’s early work on the metaphysics of persons has had a vast influence on Western philosophical debates about the nature of personal identity and moral theory. Within the study of Buddhism, it also has sparked a continuous comparative discourse, which seeks to explicate Buddhist philosophical principles in light of Parfit’s conceptual framework. Examining important Parfitian-inspired studies of Buddhist philosophy, this article points out various ways in which a Parfitian lens shaped, often implicitly, contemporary understandings of the anātman doctrine and (...) its relation to Buddhist ethics. I discuss in particular three dominant elements appropriated by Parfitian-inspired scholarship: Parfit’s theoretical categories; philosophical problems raised by his reductionist theory of persons; and Parfit’s argumentative style. I argue that the three elements used in this scholarship constitute different facets of one methodological approach to cross-cultural philosophy, which relies on Western terminology and conceptual schemes to establish a conversation with non-Western philosophy. I suggest that while this methodology is fruitful in many ways, philosophy as a cosmopolitan space may benefit significantly from approaching Buddhist philosophy using its own categories and terminology. (shrink)

Being in the bodily presence of others facilitates important perceptual, social, and informational advantages. For example, it enables direct access to other subjects’ embodied perspectives, motivates intersubjective engagements, and is involved in the construction of shared experiences and joint actions. These advantages are based on and gained through attending to and with others, i.e. they rely on social attention. It is no surprise, therefore, that a growing body of empirical data indicates that social attention is a special attentional state that (...) involves specific behavioral and neural-cognitive properties. Another important feature of the human capacity for social attention, which is highlighted in this article is that in everyday environments social attention considerably extends and enriches the subject’s attentional field. This idea draws on phenomenological considerations and on findings from cognitive science research that suggest that subjects can attend to more than in the center of their attention and that under normal conditions we can gain more features and more situations when attending to the movements, gestures, and facial expressions of others. The influence of others on the structure of our attentional field is evident from situations where others are absent from our daily surroundings. In these circumstances our attentional field narrows and the world transforms into an unfamiliar and sometimes uncanny place. Intriguingly, the same most likely occurs in social pathologies such as BPD and SAD, in which the bodily presence of others does not generate the emotional response we see in healthy humans even though the subject’s basic capacity for social attention is intact. (shrink)

In contemporary democracies, global capitalism exerts a significant influence over how state power is exercised, raising questions about where political power resides in global politics. This question is important, since our specific considerations about justifiability of political power, i.e. political legitimacy, depend on how we characterize political power at the global level. As a partial answer to this question, I argue that our notion of global political legitimacy should be reoriented to include the structural power of the Transnational Capitalist Class (...) as its subject matter. Structural power is a social relation in which the institutional context makes some agents comply with others’ preferences regardless of actors’ intentional efforts to bring about such outcomes. Even when global business elites do not intentionally exercise power to obtain political control of global governance, their structural power has recognizable effects that partly enforce the world order. To advance my claim, I utilize the radical realists’ argument that the notion of legitimacy is applicable to a broader range of social practices that are beyond dyadic power relations, i.e. rulers intentionally exercising power over subjects. (shrink)

This paper argues that instituting Citizen Boards of Governance (CBGs) is the optimal strategy to democratically contain Big Tech’s algorithmic powers in the digital public sphere. CBGs are bodies of randomly selected citizens that are authorized to govern the algorithmic infrastructure of Big Tech platforms. The main advantage of CBGs is to tackle the concentrated powers of private tech corporations without giving too much power to governments. I show why this is a better approach than ordinary state regulation or relying (...) on market mechanisms. My proposal follows from the critique of Big Tech’s concentrated powers, and explains how this justifies democratizing algorithms in the digital public sphere. My approach thus speaks to a core commitment in democratic theory: enhancing the autonomy of the public sphere from the centers of powers in modern societies, be it corporations or governments. (shrink)

People reject ‘paradoxical’ inferences, such as: Luisa didn't play music; therefore, if Luisa played soccer, then she didn't play music. For some theorists, they are invalid for everyday conditionals, but valid in logic. The theory of mental models implies that they are valid, but unacceptable because the conclusion refers to a possibility inconsistent with the premise. Hence, individuals should accept them if the conclusions refer only to possibilities consistent with the premises: Luisa didn't play soccer; therefore, if Luisa played a (...) game then she didn't play soccer. Two experiments corroborated this prediction for three sorts of ‘paradox’, including a disjunctive paradox. (shrink)

It is a common view in modern scholarship on Buddhist ethics, that attachment to the self constitutes a hindrance to ethics, whereas rejecting this type of attachment is a necessary condition for acting morally. The present article argues that in Vasubandhu's theory of agency, as formulated in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Treasury of Metaphysics with Self-Commentary), a cognitive and psychological identification with a conventional, persisting self is a requisite for exercising moral agency. As such, this identification is essential for embracing the ethics (...) of Buddhism and its way of life. The article delineates the method that Vasubandhu employs to account for the notion of a selfless moral agent, with particular emphasis on his strategies for dealing with one central aspect of agency, self-interested concern for the future. (shrink)

This paper argues that the critique of depoliticization in Mouffe’s agonistic political theory needs to be revised. This is because her account of the political does not succeed in filtering out undesirable forms of politicization such as science denialism and other types of post-truth politics. Mouffe's conception of the common symbolic space does not accomplish the task of limiting extreme pluralism in the absence of certain standards about how to correctly apply the fundamental notions of this space. By drawing on (...) a quasi-Wittgensteinian reading of linguistic normativity, I develop principled but non-universalist limits on politicization that are needed for a healthy, well-functioning democracy. (shrink)

In everyday life, we constantly encounter and deal with useful things without pausing to inquire about the sources of their intelligibility. In Div. I of Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes just such an inquiry. According to a common reading of Heidegger's analysis, the intelligibility of our everyday encounters and dealings with useful things is ultimately constituted by practical self-understandings. In this paper, I argue that while such practical self-understandings may be sufficient to constitute the intelligibility of the tools and equipment (...) specific to many practices, these “tools of the trade” are only a small portion of the things we encounter, use, and deal with on a daily basis. Practical self-understandings cannot similarly account for the intelligibility of the more mundane things—like toothbrushes and sidewalks—used in everyday life. I consider whether an anonymous self-understanding as “one,” “anyone,” or “no one in particular” —das Man—might play this intelligibility-constituting role. In examining this possibility, another type of self-understanding comes to light: cultural identities. I show that the cultural identities into which we are “thrown,” rather than practical identities or das Man, constitute the intelligibility of the abundance of mundane things that fill our everyday lives. Finally, I spell out how this finding bears on our understanding of Heidegger's notion of authenticity. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between the bodily presence of other humans in the lived urban world and the experience of everyday architecture. We suggest, from the perspectives of phenomenology and architecture, that being in the company of others changes the way the built environment appears to subjects, and that this enables us to perform simple daily tasks while still attending to the built environment. Our analysis shows that in mundane urban settings attending to the environment involves a unique attentional (...) mode, which does not rely on concentrating on, or appreciating the architectural objects, but rather on social attention and on the subject’s kinesthesis in relation to the built environment. (shrink)

Psychotherapy is provided by professionals, trained, supervised and certified by other professionals, all the way back to Freud and similar founding fathers. Even though methods and styles vary, pa...

Uchiyama et al. emphasize that culture evolves directionally and differentially as a function of selective pressures in different populations. Extending these principles to the level of families, lineages, and individuals exposes additional challenges to estimating heritability. Cultural traits expressed differentially as a function of the genetics whose influence they mask or unmask render inseparable the influences of culture and genetics.

Much of modern moral philosophy argued that there are is’s in this world, and there are oughts, but that the two are entirely independent of one another. What this meant was that morality had nothing to do with man’s biological nature, and could not be derived from it. Any such attempt was considered to be a categorical mistake, and plain foolish. Most philosophers still believe this, but a growing group of neo-naturalist thinkers are now challenging their assumptions. Here I consider (...) the latest work of one of them, Patricia Churchland, on what neurobiology teaches us about morality, and ask whether her challenge means that the naturalistic fallacy, as it is known, should be laid to rest. I argue that while there may be no such thing as a human trait divorced from human biology, this does not necessarily mean that our natures produce constraints that are relevant to specific moral dilemmas. (shrink)

People reject ‘paradoxical’ inferences, such as: Luisa didn't play music; therefore, if Luisa played soccer, then she didn't play music. For some theorists, they are invalid for everyday conditionals, but valid in logic. The theory of mental models implies that they are valid, but unacceptable because the conclusion refers to a possibility inconsistent with the premise. Hence, individuals should accept them if the conclusions refer only to possibilities consistent with the premises: Luisa didn't play soccer; therefore, if Luisa played a (...) game then she didn't play soccer. Two experiments corroborated this prediction for three sorts of ‘paradox’, including a disjunctive paradox. (shrink)

This article considers the reception of British cytogeneticist C.D. Darlington's controversial 1932 book, Recent Advances in Cytology. Darlington's cytogenetic work, and the manner in which he made it relevant to evolutionary biology, marked an abrupt shift in the status and role of cytology in the life sciences. By focusing on Darlington's scientific method -- a stark departure from anti-theoretical, empirical reasoning to a theoretical and speculative approach based on deduction from genetic first principles -- the article characterises the relationships defining (...) the "disciplinary landscape" of the life sciences of the time, namely those between cytology, genetics, and evolutionary theory. (shrink)