In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Full Collection of Personal NarrativesAustin Morris, Lisa P., Jeanne Kerwin, Jean Watson, Eve Makoff, Brent R. Carr, Anonymous One, Michelle Prong, Laura J. Hoeksema, Tracy R. Wilson, Frances Rieth Maynard, Laura A. Katers, and Maggie Taylor• Against Their Wishes: The Gift of a Goodbye• Lisa’s Story• Unbefriended• The Clinical Ethics Consult: Transforming Ambivalence to Action• Side Stepping The Issues: Disappointment With An Ethics Consult For A Medically High (...) Risk Patient• My Father Dies Alone• Whose Voice Matters? The Role of Ethics Consultation in Supporting the 16-Year-Old Healthcare Decision-Maker of a Critically Ill Neonate• The Healing Power of an Ethics Consult• Clinical Ethicists: Can They Help Families in Their Times of Need?• “It’s All Personal”• Fault Lines• Difficult, Difficult, Lemon, DifficultCopyright © 2024 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A DIFFERENT METHOD; A DIFFERENT CASE: THE THEOLOGICAL PROGRAM OF JULIAN HARTT AND AUSTIN FARRER WILLIAM M. WILSON University of Virginia, OharlottesvUZe, Virginia, WRITERS COVERING the work of Julian Hartt or Austin Farrer-the :llew that there ar~generally find that the hest introduction is a straightforward acknowledgement that what is to come is unique. Basil Mitchell, for instance, has said that no matter how one catalogues contemporary (...) theologians, a footnote will be needed, reading " and then of course there is Austin Farrer." 1 Likewise, David Kelsey has said that Hartt's work "is not identi:firuble as a variant on any of the options on the present scene." 2 Those already aicquainted with Hartt and Farrer will no dorurbt agree with the sense o[ these assessments; but if they have heen carefol students they will demand, nev,ertheless, a slight qualification : Hartt,and Farrer.are unique as a party of two. Farrer is a " variant " on Hartt; Hartt belongs down in the footnote aibout Farrer. But from the claim that these two are unique it does not follow that their wo:vk is something akin to those bold " new theologies " fashioned from the innocent's quest for a faith untouched hy either the hands of tradition or the perplexities of our time. Farrer's: anchorage in tradition is obvious throughout his writing and clearly stated in the preiface to his first 1 ' Austin Marsden Farrer,' A Oelebmtion of Fa,ith, ed. Leslie Houlden (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1970), pp.13-14. 2" Christian Sense Making: Hartt's 'Theological Method and Imagination,"' The J owrna,Z of ReUgion Vol. 58 (4), October 1978, p. 428. 599 600 WILLIAM M. WILSON work. There he said that he was " possessed hy the Thomistic vision" and w:as incapable of "thinking it wrong."3 As to novelty, he had this to say:. •. it is indeed absurd to propose new grounds for belief in the existence of God. The belief has stood for more than ~.ooo years if we are to speak of the essentials of transcendental theism. If belief has been reasona9le it has had a reason, and our only business must be to draw this out and restate it.4 It is.fair to say, to 1be sure, that Farrer "drew out" and "restated " that reason in a. way unlike that of any other contemporary Thomist. There are some who would deny him even the label.5 And it is in this sense that Mitchell's statement about him must remain: If " transcendental," " Neo-," and " traditional " Thomist are three current categories, Farrer is a footnote to them. Hartt, unlike Farrer, has ne,ver labeled himself, hut none of his readers can miss his hostility to any pretense to novelty, even to those which have become our standard fare. The good ship theology (has taken) on a radioactive cargo, its company attracted by the dynamic and dazzle of it all. Relevance~ Historicism, several varieties of analysis, Secularism-what a promising manifest! 6 The " spirit of the age " is not to illuminate the gospel, according to Hartt, rather it is the gospel which illuminates the spirit of the age.7 s Finite and Infinite: A Philosophical Essay, Ibid., p. 1. 11 But see note 5 above. JULIAN HARTT AND AUSTIN FARRER 603 I. The Uniqueness of Hartt and Farrer In a recent encydopedia entry, David Kelsey arranges a useful chart of contemporary theology according to the answers given to " the array o:f decisions theologians must make in the course of doing theology." 12 According to Kelsey, theologians must decide the subject matter o:f theology, the importance o:f cultural context, the 1wudience, the significance of the theologian 's vantage point, the goals o:f theology and the best means o:f accomplishing them. For our purposes o:f identifying Hartt and Farrer, however, we need concentrate only on the first and the last-the question o:f subject matter and the question o:f the hest means £or attaining theological ends. The latter (being the last question the theologian must face) best :identifies the overall mind o:f the theologian at work. Thus, against the standard answers given here, I shall try... (shrink)

This book is in the tradition that defines the philosophical center of contemporary philosophy of science, the tradition of Carnap, Hempel, and Nagel as supplemented by generous additions from Austin and an Oxfordized Wittgenstein in the style introduced by N. R. Hanson. This tradition has been criticized both from the philosophical left, by Sellars, and from the philosophical right, by Bergmann. Achinstein's work is so squarely in the center that neither Sellars nor Bergmann ever appear in the index. That (...) makes the book the third or fourth generation of a series in that central tradition all of which have been concerned largely with discussing their predecessors in that same tradition. This series is now producing books—Achinstein's is one of them—that have the virtues and the defects of an ingrown aristocracy: finely shaped features; an aloofness with respect to which no doubt is felt that it is justified ; and in their quarrels among themselves the cunning of foxes; but with none of the robust life and vitality of lions that first secured them the right to rule. (shrink)

Charles Travis’s new collection on perception brings together eleven of his previously published essays on this topic, some of which are substantially revised, plus one new essay. The intentionally ambiguous subtitle hints at the author’s endorsement of Fregean anti-psychologism, though influences from Wittgenstein and Austin are equally apparent. The work centres around two major questions in the philosophy of mind and perception. First, Travis argues against the view that perceptual experience, as distinct from perceptual judgement or belief, is representational, (...) and so belongs to what Travis calls ‘the conceptual’. This is contrasted with the ‘non-conceptual’, or ‘historical’; that is, environmental particulars which lack the generality of representational thought. The second is what Travis calls ‘the fundamental question of perception’; namely, how can perceptual experience make the world bear (rationally) upon what we are to think and do? The answer, he argues, cannot be found in terms of relations between thoughts—a purely conceptual affair—but in the way that thought is itself grounded in the particularity of experience. For perceptual experience to bear rationally upon thought at all—or, in more familiar Fregean terms, to bring ‘objects’ under ‘concepts’—perception must first make environmental particulars available to cognition. Thus, Travis argues, experience cannot itself be ‘conceptual’, or representational, on pain of undermining the very thing that grants us a recognisable, and so thinkable, world at all. (shrink)

This is a book that challenges the current orthodoxy, both in the philosophy of mind and in the cognitive sciences, that thinking (construed broadly to include perceiving, imagining, remembering, etc.) is a mental process in the head. Such a view has been largely taken for granted since the demise of behaviorism in the 1960s, and it underpins both the representational and computational theories of mind, including their connectionist and dynamicist variants. While the orthodoxy has been rejected in recent years by (...) a motley collection of e-theorists—externalists, embodiers, embedders, and extended minders—Melser’s view is quite distinct from such views. For Melser, rather than thinking being a process that begins in the head but extends beyond it (as most e-theorists hold), it is a personal-level activity, something that a person does through her actions. Since Melser views such activities as being disjoint from natural processes, thinking is not a natural process at all, the sort of thing that we might study scientifically. Thus, thinking is a personal action that calls for a different kind of study, one that draws on empathy, interpretation, and hermeneutics. That is the view defended at the core of the book (chh.1-7), and if it makes it sound like a very old-fashioned book, that’s because it is. Melser’s antecedents are philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle, J.L. Austin, and Stuart Hampshire, both in style and in content. Apart from Melser’s heavy reliance on selective parts of developmental psychology, there is minimal discussion of substantive work in contemporary cognitive science. That is what might be expected from an author whose view is that whatever it is cognitive scientists are doing, it is not (much to their surprise, no doubt) the investigation of thinking. As I will try to show in a moment, however, the central argument of the book could have been strengthened by more direct engagement with such empirical work. (shrink)

To what extent was ordinary language philosophy a precursor to experimental philosophy? Since the conditions on pursuit of either project are at best unclear, and at worst protean, the general question is hard to address. I focus instead on particular cases, seeking to uncover some central aspects of J. L. Austin’s and John Cook Wilson’s ordinary language based approach to philosophical method. I make a start at addressing three questions. First, what distinguishes their approach from other more traditional (...) approaches? Second, is their approach a form of experimental philosophy? Third, given their aims, should it have been? I offer the following preliminary answers. First, their approach distinctively emphasizes attention to what we should say when. Second, their approach is closer to contemporary experimental mathematics than it is to some prominent forms of contemporary experimental philosophy. Third, some purported grounds for pursuing their aims by way of surveying what individual speakers would say when are not compelling. (shrink)

John Cook Wilson (1849–1915) was Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College, Oxford and the founder of ‘Oxford Realism’, a philosophical movement that flourished at Oxford during the first decades of the 20th century. Although trained as a classicist and a mathematician, his most important contribution was to the theory of knowledge, where he argued that knowledge is factive and not definable in terms of belief, and he criticized ‘hybrid’ and ‘externalist’ accounts. He also argued for direct realism in (...) perception, criticizing both empiricism and idealism, and argued for a moderate nominalist view of universals as being in rebus and only ‘apprehended’ by their particulars. His influence helped swaying Oxford away from idealism and, through figures such as H. A. Prichard, Gilbert Ryle, or J. L. Austin, his ideas were also to some extent at the origin of ‘moral intuitionism’ and ‘ordinary language philosophy’ which defined much of Oxford philosophy until the second half of the twentieth-century. Nevertheless, his name and legacy were all but forgotten for generations after World War II. Still, his views on knowledge are with us today, being in part at work in the writings of philosophers as diverse as John McDowell, Charles Travis, and Timothy Williamson. (shrink)

A continuous Oxford tradition on knowledge runs from John Cook Wilson to John McDowell. A central idea is that knowledge is not a species of belief, or that, in McDowell's terms, it is not a hybrid state; that, moreover, it is a kind of taking in of what is there that precludes one's being, for all one can see, wrong. Cook Wilson and McDowell differ on what this means as to the scope of knowledge. J.L. Austin set (...) out the requisite foundations for McDowell to be right. McDowell has shown why the tradition, and his version of it, need to be right. But he does not accept Austin's innovation. That is a shame. For, despite McDowell's very great insightfulness, precisely that much separates him from a very powerful, and correct, view of what knowledge is. (shrink)

Exploratory experiments are widely characterized as experiments that do not test hypotheses. Experiments that do test hypotheses are characterized as confirmatory experiments. Philosophers have pointed out that research programmes can be both confirmatory and exploratory. However, these definitions preclude single experiments being characterized as both exploratory and confirmatory; how can an experiment test and not test a hypothesis? Given the intuition that some experiments are exploratory, some are confirmatory, and some are both, a recharacterization of the relationship between exploratory and (...) confirmatory experimentation is needed. I discuss ‘phase IV’ trials to show what this recharacterization could look like. Phase IV trials can be exploratory and confirmatory insofar as they concurrently test hypotheses and explore for unforeseen phenomena. Even if it is uncontroversial that a single experiment can have multiple aims, the recharacterization of the relationship between exploratory and confirmatory experimentation is still required for these aims to be held together coherently. I offer an alternative characterization of the relationship between exploratory and confirmatory experimentation where the former remains a distinct kind of experimentation but is not characterized as non-hypothesis-testing. (shrink)

In what does philosophical progress consist? 'Vertical' progress corresponds to development within a specific paradigm/framework for theorizing (of the sort associated, revolutions aside, with science); 'horizontal' progress corresponds to the identification and cultivation of diverse paradigms (of the sort associated, conservativism aside, with art and pure mathematics). Philosophical progress seems to involve both horizontal and vertical dimensions, in a way that is somewhat puzzling: philosophers work in a number of competing frameworks (like artists or mathematicians), while typically maintaining that only (...) one of these is correct (like scientists). I diagnose this situation as reflecting that we are presently quite far from the end of inquiry into philosophical methodology. The good news is that we appear to be making advances on this score. The bad news is that failure to recognize or make explicit that our standards are in flux often leads to dogmatism, as I illustrate by attention to three assumptions presently operative in metaphysical and metametaphysical contexts. I close by identifying a tension between vertical and horizontal progress in philosophy, and suggesting an updated version of Carnap's principle of tolerance for new philosophical forms. (shrink)

Aristotle and the sea battle, by G. E. M. Anscombe.--Aristotle's different possibilities, by K. J. J. Hintikka.--On Aristotle's square of opposition, by M. Thompson.--Categories in Aristotle and in Kant, by J. C. Wilson.--Aristotle's Categories, chapters I-V: translation and notes, by J. L. Ackrill.--Aristotle's theory of categories, by J. M. E. Moravcsik.--Essence and accident, by I. M. Copi.--Tithenai ta phainomena, by G. E. L. Owen.--Matter and predication in Aristotle, by J. Owens.--Problems in Metaphysics Z, chapter 13, by M. J. Woods.--The (...) meaning of agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, by H. A. Prichard.--Agathon and eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle, by J. L. Austin.--The final good in Aristotle's Ethics, by W. F. R. Hardie.--Aristotle on pleasure, by J. O. Urmson.--Bibliography (p. 335-341). (shrink)

Some photographs show determinate features of a scene because the photographed scene had those features. This dependency relation is, rightly, a consensus in philosophy of photography. I seek to refute many long-established theories of photography by arguing that they are incompatible with this commitment. In Section II, I classify accounts of photography as either single-stage or multi-stage. In Section III, I analyze the historical basis for single-stage accounts. In Section IV, I explain why the single-stage view led scientists to postulate (...) “latent” photographic images as a technical phenomenon in early chemical photography. In Section V, I discredit the notion of an invisible latent image in chemical photography and, in Section VI, extend this objection to the legacy of the latent image in digital photography. In Section VII, I appeal to the dependency relation to explain why the notion of a latent image makes the single-stage account untenable. Finally, I use the multi-stage account to advance debate about “new” versus “orthodox” theories of photography. (shrink)

Aristotle and the sea battle, by G. E. M. Anscombe.--Aristotle's different possibilities, by K. J. J. Hintikka.--On Aristotle's square of opposition, by M. Thompson.--Categories in Aristotle and in Kant, by J. C. Wilson.--Aristotle's Categories, chapters I-V: translation and notes, by J. L. Ackrill--Aristotle's theory of categories, by J. M. E. Moravcsik.--Essence and accident, by I. M. Copi.--Tithenai ta phainomena, by G. E. L. Owen.--Matter and predication in Aristotle, by J. Owens.--Problems in Metaphysics Z, chapter 13, by M. J. Woods.--The (...) meaning of agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, by H. A. Prichard.--Agathon and eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle, by J. L. Austin.--The final good in Aristotle's Ethics, by W. F. R. Hardie.--Aristotle on pleasure, by J. O. Urmson.--Bibliography (p. 335-41). (shrink)

Individuals are a prominent part of the biological world. Although biologists and philosophers of biology draw freely on the concept of an individual in articulating both widely accepted and more controversial claims, there has been little explicit work devoted to the biological notion of an individual itself. How should we think about biological individuals? What are the roles that biological individuals play in processes such as natural selection (are genes and groups also units of selection?), speciation (are species individuals?), and (...) organismic development (do genomes code for organisms)? Much of our discussion here will focus on organisms as a central kind of biological individual, and that discussion will raise broader questions about the nature of the biological world, for example, about its complexity, its organization, and its relation to human thought. (shrink)

Justice and Power in the Sociolegal Studies asks what interdisciplinary work in the law and society tradition tells us about the relationship of law and justice, as well as the way power operates in and through law. The fundamental concepts of justice and power provide points of departure for leading scholars to explore the various domains of socio-legal research. As they note the explicitness of the engagement with issues of power and the relative silence about -- or indirectness in taking (...) on -- questions of justice found in most law and society research, they ask how engagement with issues of power and silence about justice constituted law and society as a research field caught between a desire to have political impact and, at the same time, to maintain its scientific respectability. (shrink)

Once a term used primarily by moral philosophers, “moral distress” is increasingly used by health professionals to name experiences of frustration and failure in fulfilling moral obligations inherent to their fiduciary relationship with the public. Although such challenges have always been present, as has discord regarding the right thing to do in particular situations, there is a radical change in the degree and intensity of moral distress being expressed. Has the plight of professionals in healthcare practice changed? “Plight” encompasses not (...) only the act of pledging, but that of predicament and peril. The author claims that health professionals are increasingly put in peril by healthcare reform that undermines their efficacy and jeopardizes ethical engagement with those in their care. The re-engineering of healthcare to give precedence to corporate and commercial values and strategies of commodification, service rationing, streamlining, and measuring of “efficiency,” is literally demoralizing health professionals. Healthcare practice needs to be grounded in a capacity for compassion and empathy, as is evident in standards of practice and codes of ethics, and in the understanding of what it means to be a professional. Such grounding allows for humane response to the availability of unprecedented advances in biotechnological treatments, for genuine dialogue and the raising of difficult, necessary ethical questions, and for the mutual support of health professionals themselves. If healthcare environments are not understood as moral communities but rather as simulated marketplaces, then health professionals’ moral agency is diminished and their vulnerability to moral distress is exacerbated. Research in moral distress and relational ethics is used to support this claim. (shrink)

The volume addresses the historical context of Henry, e.g. his writings and his participation in the events of 1277; examines Henry’s theology, metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics; and studies Henry’s influence on John Duns Scotus and Pico della Mirandola.

Cunningham and Kavic [1] rightly note that standard accounts of surgical complications—ours included—have focused on postoperative events [2, 3]. As they point out, this postoperative focus leaves open the question of how we should categorize adverse intraoperative events. They argue that we should distinguish between two types of adverse intraoperative events: those that introduce additional risk of postoperative complications and those that do not. On their account, adverse intraoperative events that introduce additional risk of postoperative complications are intraoperative complications, whereas (...) those that do not are simple errors. Cunningham and Kavic say little about why we might want to make this distinction. We take it that the underlying purpose is to focus attention on the importance of diligence in surgical performance. Gawande defines diligence as ‘‘the necessity of giving sufficient attention to detail to avoid error and prevail against obstacles’’ [4, p. 8]. It is clear that diligence in surgery requires us to attend not just to those adverse intraoperative events that lead to postoperative complications but also to adverse intraoperative events that increase the risk of postoperative complications. We wholeheartedly agree about the importance of diligence in surgery, both in the intraoperative and the.. (shrink)

The Oxford University Studies in the Enlightenment series, previously known as SVEC (Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century), has published over 500 peer-reviewed scholarly volumes since 1955 as part of the Voltaire Foundation at the University of Oxford. International in focus, Oxford University Studies in the Enlightenment volumes cover wide-ranging aspects of the eighteenth century and the Enlightenment, from gender studies to political theory, and from economics to visual arts and music, and are published in English or French.

We show that Weak Vopěnka’s Principle, which is the statement that the opposite category of ordinals cannot be fully embedded into the category of graphs, is equivalent to the large cardinal principle Ord is Woodin, which says that for every class [Formula: see text] there is a [Formula: see text]-strong cardinal. Weak Vopěnka’s Principle was already known to imply the existence of a proper class of measurable cardinals. We improve this lower bound to the optimal one by defining structures whose (...) nontrivial homomorphisms can be used as extenders, thereby producing elementary embeddings witnessing [Formula: see text]-strongness of some cardinal. (shrink)

The subject of this book is an epistemological consideration concerning the nature of knowledge. But other than the most essays on the subject of knowledge, here I am going to deal with a largely overlooked account to try to find an answer to the question of knowledge. This is the mental state account of knowledge. Or to put it into the main question: is knowledge a mental state? Now, the question is: Why is the epistemic thinking of Cook Wilson, (...) Prichard and Austin afflicted with such ignorance in contemporary epistemic discussions? The answer is: an unreflected Platonian heritage during 2000 years of epistemic thinking - a notion which is similar to a point Hetherington has called "epistemic absolutism". So my main conclusion here is: the JTB thesis (knowledge is some aspect of justified true belief) is insufficient in order to give an account of the nature of knowledge. A consequence from this is: all the epistemic theories which are dealing with the JTB thesis are based on deficient assumptions. Hence their results - notably the well-known externalism/internalism debate - are insufficient, too. So, there is a need for a new theory of knowledge based on the MS thesis. (shrink)

Law in Crisis is an unsettling history of natural disaster and political subject formation in the modern world.

Depuis le début du XXe siècle jusqu’à la fin des années 1960, l’unité de la philosophie oxonienne est garantie par l’adhésion à une certaine forme de réalisme, « Oxford Realism », dont les deux principes sont la primauté de la connaissance sur la croyance et l’absolue indépendance de l’objet connu. On examinera l’histoire de la critique de Hume par le réalisme de l’école d’Oxford de Cook Wilson à Austin, en passant par Price.

"Under Magee's sensitive guidance a remarkably coherent interpretation of this period emerges."--Marshall Cohen, Listener. "The whole book has a marvellous air of casualness and clarity that makes it a delight to read."--Colin Wilson. Contemporary British philosophy is experiencing unprecedented openness to influences from abroad. New growth is evident in many areas of traditional philosophy which had been neglected by the logical positivists and the linguistic analysts. This sense of freedom permeates Magee's volume of conversations with leading British philosophers. Under (...) Magee's direction, the philosophers discuss other influential thinkers, such as Wittgenstein, Russell, Moore, and Austin, as well as ideas of universal interest, such as morality, art, religion, and social theory. As an introduction to contemporary British philosophy, a unique collection of candid commentaries by important thinkers, and study of fresh ideas, Modern British Philosophy is consistently lively and authoritative. (shrink)

This essay outlines a certain 20th century Oxonian tradition in epistemology, contrasting it with another line of thought set out by Michael Ayers. The tradition begins with Cook Wilson and the idea that knowing is never having evidence, no matter how strong. It takes a turn in J.L. Austin, introducing two ideas into philosophy: disjunctivism and occasion-sensitivity. The last section considers whether either can really live without the other. The first part of the essay is a general consideration (...) of the relation between two forms of awareness: perceptual, and ‘propositional’, and of how the first may furnish proof of the second. The second part considers Ayers’ view of the relation, particularly as expressed in his idea of primary and secondary knowledge, and its relation to disjunctivism about knowledge. (shrink)

Using a Solomon four-group design, we investigate the effect of a case-based critical thinking intervention on students’ critical thinking skills. We randomly assign 31 sessions of business classes to four groups and collect data from three sources: in-class performance, university records, and Internet surveys. Our 2 × 2 ANOVA results showed no significant between-subjects differences. Contrary to our expectations, students improve their critical thinking skills, with or without the intervention. Female and Caucasian students improve their critical thinking skills, but males (...) and non-Caucasian do not. Positive performance goals and negative mastery goals enhance and decrease improvements of their CTA scores, respectively. ACT and age are related to pre- and post-test. Gender is related to pre-test. GPA is related to post-test. Results shed light on the Pygmalion effect, the Galatea effect, ability, motivation, and opportunity as signals for human capital, and business ethics. (shrink)

In The Market Experience, Robert Lane restates the central criticism of economic views of human satisfaction?namely, that they define welfare as utility and, in practice if not in theory, use money as the measure of utility, while in reality utility (or welfare) ought to be defined as happiness. In exploring the implications of this noneconomic definition for our assessment of markets, Lane summarizes the evidence about how people assess their own happiness more successfully than he clarifies the meaning of that (...) word. Since increases in income above a certain minimum do not increase happiness, work must be made more meaningful. (shrink)

I discuss certain representative accounts of metaphysical emergence falling into three broad categories, assessing their prospects for satisfying certain criteria; the ensuing dialectic has a bit of the Goldilocks fable about it. At one end of the spectrum are what I call ‘scientistic’ accounts, which characterize metaphysical emergence by appeal to one or another specific feature commonly registered in scientific descriptions of seeming cases of emergence; such accounts, I argue, typically fail to provide a clear basis for ensuring incompatibility with (...) ontological reduction, and thus fail to guarantee satisfaction of the criterion of appropriate contrast (§2). At the other end of the spectrum are what I call ‘abstractionist’ accounts, which characterize emergence in terms floating free of scientific notions; such accounts, I’ll argue, typically fail to guarantee satisfaction of the criterion of illuminating contrast (§3). I’ll then look at several accounts of metaphysical emergence that are what I call ‘substantive’, in appealing to familiar relations or posits which are properly metaphysical, while being intelligibly connected to scientific relations and posits. As we’ll see, the resources of such accounts are up to the tasks of blocking ontological reduction and of enabling investigations into metaphysical emergence to proceed in an illuminating way (§4). I close with some methodological morals (§5). (shrink)