This chapter focuses on a widely held package of views, according to which: (i) assertions are governed by some alethic or epistemic norm, (ii) such a norm is intimately connected to assertion, in the sense that it individuates or characterizes the speech act, and (iii) this sense of intimate connection can be explained with the help of an analogy between language use and games. It is argued that this package of views must be rejected. More specifically, by considering some different (...) ways of spelling out the analogy mentioned in (iii), it is shown that at least that part of the package must be abandoned: even if some alethic or epistemic norm is intimately connected to assertion, that relationship is not mirrored by the relationship between norms and the games they govern. (shrink)

This chapter considers whether ordinary instances of racist hate speech can be authoritative, thereby constituting the subordination of people of color. It is often said that ordinary speakers cannot subordinate because they lack authority. Here it is argued that there are more ways in which speakers can come to have authority than have been generally recognized. In part, this is because authority has been taken to be too closely tied to social position. This chapter presents a series of examples which (...) show that speaker authority needn’t derive from social position at all. Moreover, these examples also show that a speaker can come to have authority even when they lack it prior to speaking. After distinguishing these different ways in which speakers can come to have authority, it is argued that there is ample reason to think that even producers of ordinary instances of racist hate speech can sometimes have authority in these ways. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the phenomenon that has been labeled 'silencing' in some of the recent philosophical literature. A speaker who is silenced in this sense is unable to make herself understood, even though her audience hears every word she utters. For instance, consider a woman who says “No”, intending to refuse sex. Her audience fails to recognize her intention to refuse, because he thinks that women tend to be insincere, and to not say what they really mean, especially (...) in sexual situations. This speaker’s utterance then goes astray in the manner that constitutes silencing in my sense. Regarding this phenomenon, philosophers such as Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby have argued, first, that women are particularly liable to be thus affected, i.e., silenced; second, that, as a result of this silencing, they are systematically disadvantaged; and third, that pornography is responsible for this silencing. Here, I focus on the third of these claims, explaining what it might mean for silencing to be systematic. (shrink)

Pornography deserves special protections, it is often said, because it qualifies as speech. Therefore, no matter what we think of its content, we must afford it the protections that we extend to most speech, but don’t extend to other actions.1 In response, Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton have argued that the case is not so simple: one of the harms of pornography, they claim, is that it silences women’s speech, thereby preventing women from deriving from speech the very benefits that (...) warranted the special protections in the first place.2 At first glance, it is hard to see how to make sense of this response. If the claim is that pornography prevents women from actually uttering words, then it just seems false; on the other hand, if that isn’t the claim, then it isn’t clear how anyone can be said to be silenced. Faced with such worries, many have been inclined to dismiss these claims about silencing as confused. (shrink)

Many liberal societies are deeply committed to freedom of speech. This commitment is so entrenched that when it seems to come into conflict with other commitments (e.g., gender equality), it is often argued that the commitment to speech must trump the other commitments. In this paper, we argue that a proper understanding of our commitment to free speech requires being clear about what should count as speech for these purposes. On the approach we defend, should get a special, technical sense, (...) different from its ordinary sense. We offer a partial characterization of this technical sense. Finally, we argue that if certain theorists (e.g., MacKinnon) are right about what (some) pornography does, then it should fall outside the scope of the free-speech principle. If so, then contrary to first appearances, pornography may not be a case in which our commitments to freedom and gender equality come into conflict. (shrink)

A feminist theory of content allows us to appreciate the nuanced role that historical and socio-cultural forces play in shaping the content of many of our terms. In this chapter, Maitra first shows how the classic articulation of externalism in literature is ineffective for feminist purposes. She then identifies two important ingredients that a feminist theory of content requires, namely, accounts of how the social and physical world shape content and what is required to transform that content. The final (...) part of her argument develops the first approximation of a feminist theory of content drawing from Ruth Millikan’s “consumer” account of meaning and mental representation. Using as an example José Jorge Mendoza’s analysis of how the history of U. S. immigration and citizenship law has shaped the term ‘whiteness,’ this chapter argues that feminist theorizing and activism stand to benefit from the possibility of a feminist theory of mental content that makes explicit how the contents of many terms with social and political import are determined and held stable. (shrink)

This paper examines Jason Stanley’s account of propaganda. I begin with an overview and some questions about the structure of that account. I then argue for two main conclusions. First, I argue that Stanley’s account over-generalizes, by counting mere incompetent argumentation as propaganda. But this problem can be avoided, by emphasizing the role of emotions in effective propaganda more than Stanley does. In addition, I argue that more propaganda is democratically acceptable than Stanley allows. Focusing especially on sexual assault prevention (...) campaigns, I show that propaganda can be acceptable even when it represents some in our communities as worthy of contempt. (shrink)

This volume draws on a range of approaches in order to explore the problem and determine what ought to be done about allegedly harmful speech.Most liberal societies are deeply committed to a principle of free speech. At the same time, however, there is evidence that some kinds of speech are harmful in ways that are detrimental to important liberal values, such as social equality. Might a genuine commitment to free speech require that we legally permit speech even when it is (...) harmful, and even when doing so is in conflict with our commitment to values like equality? Even if such speech is to be legally permitted, does our commitment to free speech allow us to provide material and institutional support to those who would contest such harmful speech? And finally, and perhaps most importantly, which kinds of speech are harmful in ways that merit response, either in the form of legal regulation or in some other form? This collection explores these and related questions. Drawing on expertise in philosophy, sociology, political science, feminist theory, and legal theory, the contributors to this book investigate these themes and questions. By exploring various categories of speech (including pornography, hate speech, Holocaust denial literature, 'Whites Only' signs), and attending to the precise functioning of speech, the essays contained here shed light on these questions by clarifying the relationship between speech and harm. Understanding how speech functions can help us work out which kinds of speech are harmful, what those harms are, and how the speech in question brings them about. All of these issues are crucially important when it comes to deciding what ought to be done about allegedly harmful speech. (shrink)

The few abbreviations employed in the body of the article are explained in the bibliography.

When read alongside the great command of Deuteronomy, ‘love the Lord your God with all your heart, mind, and strength,’ the Judeo-Christian directive to ‘love your neighbour as yourself’ is perhaps one of the most theologically and ethically charged phrases in the Bible. In these two mutually reliant commandments lies a meeting point between the divine and the human that has important implications for our understanding of the nexus between theological conceptions of love and philosophical engagement with worldly existence. This (...) point of intersection is explored in a particularly unique way in the thinking of Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Nancy. In this article, I conduct the first sustained comparative analysis of their respective philosophies, using an exploration of the role of love and affectivity in their work to better understand the philosophical opportunity represented by the commandment to love God and neighbour. (shrink)

This article seeks to explore the implications of Jean-Luc Nancy’s reading of the subject for educational philosophy by connecting his re-interpretation of Descartes to his later thinking on what he names the ontological singular plural. Nancy’s re-imagining of the Cogito coalesces around the figure of the mouth through which the subject enunciates itself within the world. Reading this extension of the ego through the mouth as an enunciation of ontological singular plurality exposes a speaking subject that communicates via a sharing (...) of its own being with other singular subjects. The article concludes that Nancy’s singular plural holds potential for affirming a substance-less subjectivity that can nevertheless serve as a locus of meaning in the classroom. (shrink)

. With an overall objective of establishing association between air pollutants and incidence of respiratory diseases, the environmental professionals and medical practitioners have made significant contribution, using statistical mechanics in modelling epidemiological data, population characteristics, and pollution parameters. Broadly speaking, the studies have shown that the increase in vehicular traffic has been one of the causes of respiratory diseases. However, the WHO Centre for Environment and Health, Europe in its 2005 document states: “There is little evidence for a causal relationship (...) between asthma prevalence/incidence and air pollution in general, though the evidence is suggestive of a causal association between the prevalence/incidence of asthma symptoms and living in close proximity to traffic”. Decision making process in a real world is invariably based on perceptions which are expressed in words or may be in numeric terms and not in probability terms. In the paper, we made an attempt to model the perceptions of experienced pulmonologists in arriving at their combined degree of belief/plausibility/ignorance for all the possible combinations of identified respiratory diseases, using evidence theory and fuzzy relational calculus without collecting sizeable parametric data accumulated over a period of years. Tightening pollution norms by the regulatory authorities is an overall objective of the global efforts on greenhouse gases reduction in general, and air pollution mitigation in particular. The concept of solar battery operated electric vehicles for road transport is advocated, initially for two/three wheelers, and extending it to four wheelers, especially in the developing countries. (shrink)

We argue against the knowledge rule of assertion, and in favour of integrating the account of assertion more tightly with our best theories of evidence and action. We think that the knowledge rule has an incredible consequence when it comes to practical deliberation, that it can be right for a person to do something that she can't properly assert she can do. We develop some vignettes that show how this is possible, and how odd this consequence is. We then argue (...) that these vignettes point towards alternate rules that tie assertion to sufficient evidence-responsiveness or to proper action. These rules have many of the virtues that are commonly claimed for the knowledge rule, but lack the knowledge rule's problematic consequences when it comes to assertions about what to do. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Nellie Wieland argues that silencing in the sense put forward by Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby has the unpalatable consequence of diminishing a rapist's responsibility for the rape. We argue both that Wieland misidentifies Langton and Hornsby's conception of silencing, and that neither Langton and Hornsby's actual conception, nor the one that Wieland attributes to them, in fact generates this consequence.

Although cognitive science started in the 1970s as a multidisciplinary field with the goal of becoming an interdisciplinary one over time, it is now dominated by cognitive psychology. The question becomes whether this matters, and if it does, what should cognitive scientists do about it? I propose that the multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity of cognitive science does matter because it leads to potential generation of new ideas, models, and methods. I offer a few recommendations for reforming cognitive science based, in part, (...) on the recent 41st annual meeting of the Cognitive Science Society that sought to reopen cognitive science to minority disciplines comprising cognitive science. (shrink)

The extant clinical literature indicates profound problems in the assessment, monitoring, and documentation of care in long-term care facilities. The lack of adequate resources to accommodate higher staff-to-resident ratios adds additional urgency to the goal of identifying more costeffective mechanisms to provide care oversight. The ever expanding array of electronic monitoring technologies in the clinical research arena demands a conceptual and pragmatic framework for the resolution of ethical tensions inherent in the use of such innovative tools. CareMedia is a project (...) that explores the utility of video, audio and sensor technologies as a continuous real-time assessment and outcomes measurement tool. In this paper, the authors describe the seminal ethical challenges encountered during the implementation phase of this project, namely privacy and confidentiality protection, and the strategies employed to resolve the ethical tensions by applying principles of the interest theory of rights. (shrink)

In this article I explore how a philosophical conception of love may be used to draw debate on the death of God beyond the binary opposition between theology and philosophy through a comparative study of the work of Jean-Luc Marion and Jean-Luc Nancy. Although Marion’s reading of love—in both its theological and phenomenological guises—proposes an innovative phrasing of a non-metaphysical notion of divinity, I argue that it is ultimately unable to maintain its coherence in nominal discourse due to Marion’s insistence (...) on keeping love and being separate. In contrast, through his unique thinking on ontology, Nancy’s philosophy allows us to reposition love at the heart of being, from whence it may serve as a means of disrupting the very principle governing the atheist and theist world-views. Far from dismantling Marion’s core proposition, I conclude that the two thinkers may in fact be more closely aligned than previous scholarship has acknowledged, coming together in the need to affirm an experience of the impossible that takes place in the present rather than in any eschatological fulfillment to come. At this intersection between two nominally very different thinkers, love forms an ontological limit-point for thought that poses a challenge to both theology and philosophy alike as they continue to grapple with the question of religion in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

This essay discusses Rae Langton’s recent collection of essays, Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification. After introducing some of the major themes of the collection, I raise questions about two of the central concepts in the book. The first question has to do with Langton’s notion of subordination. I ask why she takes pornography to be a subordinating speech act, rather than a subordinating practice, and argue that the latter view has several advantages. The remaining questions have to (...) do with Langton’s notion of objectification. Looking first at the moral dimension of objectification, I raise some concerns about Langton’s strategy for distinguishing instances of objectification from non-instances. Then, turning to Langton’s discussion of the epistemic dimension of objectification, I ask under what circumstances certain belief-forming mechanisms, such as desire-driven projection, are objectifying, on her view. (shrink)

India is a large country with 29 states as constituents in its federal structure. The large and growing population imposes great pressure on available natural resources. Disputes arising out of contested river water entitlements between states are common and often intractable. Laws conceived for settling such disputes were created for a particular socio-political environment characterized by strong Centre and relatively non-assertive states. The paper argues that this political configuration has changed dramatically and in turn has reduced the efficacy of the (...) existing statutory mechanisms. A new paradigm for dispute resolution is required. The existing institutional mechanism and its political environment are examined and the structural changes identified. A set of reforms in the dispute resolution mechanism is proposed, which would reduce the friction between the statutory mechanism and its operational environment. (shrink)

Ashok Aklujkar, Indian Sanskritist and Indologist; contributed articles.

In Down Girl, Kate Manne sets out to reclaim the word ‘misogyny’. To do this, she takes on the naïve conception, according to which misogyny is the hatred of women – universally or at least generally speaking – simply because they are women. Manne argues that this conception has many drawbacks, chief among them its tendency to “deprive women of a suitable name for a potentially potent problem facing them”. Her aim, then, is to develop an alternate conception of misogyny (...) that names this problem, and in so doing, provides a more effective tool for understanding this aspect of gender-based oppression. In this commentary, I focus on two themes. First, I look in more detail at Manne’s critique of the naïve conception. I find that critique entirely persuasive. However, I argue that Manne’s preferred conception of misogyny ends up being very broad, in at least three respects. This breadth, I worry, is incompatible with generating predictions about the phenomenon. I’ll also consider some responses to this worry, but argue that these too have a cost. Some mis-classify clear cases, while others risk re-raising some difficulties for the naïve conception. Second, I consider Manne’s rejection of humanism. In this part, I argue that her substantive account of patriarchy, and the resulting conception of misogyny, is more closely related to humanism than she allows. I also emphasize differences between distinct versions of humanism, and argue that some may be able to counter some of Manne’s main criticisms of this family of views. This part of the discussion seeks to press Manne on precisely how much of humanism she ultimately wishes to reject. (shrink)

This article aims to explore the philosophical approach to faith after deconstruction as manifested in the work of Jean-Luc Marion and Jean-Luc Nancy. By taking the saturated phenomenon as its focus, the analysis seeks to demonstrate that whilst Marion’s thinking proves to be an innovative re-imagining of the possibilities of phenomenology, its problematic recourse to a supplementary hermeneutic means that saturation can never be adequately applied to faith without simultaneously compromising the excessive intuition upon which it relies. The article then (...) explores whether Nancy’s suggestion that saturation be re-framed as faith can offer a viable alternative approach. Whilst the post-phenomenological modality within which Nancy operates means it may be problematic to retain the term ‘saturation’ in the exact sense Marion gives it, it is argued that Nancy’s version of saturated faith allows us to approach the binary divide between philosophy and theology from a different direction, resulting in a vision of faith that cuts across theism and atheism, destabilising them from within. Although Nancy’s thought in this area certainly does nothing to respond to persistent questions surrounding the place of institutionalized religion within secular modernity, it nevertheless serves as a powerful tool for thinking the possibilities of faith in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Philosophers since Descartes have felt themselves compelled to make a choice between mind and body. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mind , first published in 1986, argues that there is no genuine epistemological problem of mind, and that the widespread philosophical scepticism with regard to our knowledge of other minds is without foundation. Ashok Vohra applies Wittgenstein’s method to show that the problem has arisen through a tendency to over-philosophise our simple experiences. Vohra presents a positive account of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of (...) mind, arguing that to consider his philosophy entirely destructive is misleading. He shows that knowledge of mind is gained through a large complex of intersubjectively identifiable factors such as the linguistic and non-linguistic past, present and future behaviour of the person concerned. He thus justifies the belief, on which psychology and psychoanalysis are based, that mind is not a mystery to which only the owner has privileged access. (shrink)

The essays included in this book break new ground in the philosophy of reason by situating rationality - logical theory, ontology, first philosophy, philosophical hermeneutics - in a global context and tapping the global essence of natural reason. The essays formulate and resolve a fundamental problem in the human condition which has not been adequately dealt with: how discourse between two profoundly different worlds is possible. The formulation and solution of this vital human concern requires the clarification of the universal (...) logos in natural reason - the universal logic which is the common ground between worlds. The essays open the way to the emerging frontier of global reason in expanding the foundations of logic, ontology, hermeneutical practice and the discourse of philosophy in a global context. This calls for a paradigm shift in rational practice from egocentric reason to dialogical or global reason. (shrink)

The meanings in which the word "word" can be taken, the interpretations that the relevant meanings would necessitate of the "word-equals-world" thesis, and the extent to which Bhartṛhari can be said to be aware of or receptive to these interpretations are considered. The observation that more than one interpretation would have been acceptable to Bhartṛhari naturally leads to a discussion of his notion of truth, his perspectivism, and his understanding of the nature of philosophizing as an activity in which language (...) plays a basic role and epistemology and ontology are interdependent. The difference of Bhartṛhari's thinking from that of the Vedāntins of Śaṅkara's tradition is identified, and a brief comment on the history of vivarta and pariṇāma as philosophical terms is offered. (shrink)

Professor k. Satchidananda Murty, one of modern India’s leading philosophers, passed away in his native village of Sangamjagarlamudi in Andhra Pradesh in 2011, after a stellar career during which he advanced knowledge rather than opinion. The Indian Philosophical community, and especially Ashok Vohra, is to be congratulated for producing a dynamic engagement with philosophy. I had known Murty for more than twenty years. I interacted with him several times. When I once asked him where he stood philosophically, he was (...) candid enough to say that he ‘Oscillates between Sankar and Ramanuja’. The essays in this book amply demonstrate that he was a man of many parts but as the allusion to his mystical experiences in his book The Realm of Between reveals, he was also more than the sum of his parts; that while willing to transcend the limits of reason when required. Thus ‘revelation and reason’ characterize not just the title of one of his famous books but in a sense, his life, and this fact renders this collection uniquely relevant for our times. I therefore enthusiastically recommend this book not only to all those interested in the philosophy of Professor Murty, or in Indian Philosophy, or in philosophy in general but to all those interested in contemporary philosophy in the broadest sense. (shrink)

In the energy–momentum density expressions for a relativistic perfect fluid with a bulk motion, one comes across a couple of pressure-dependent terms, which though well known, are to an extent, lacking in their conceptual basis and the ensuing physical interpretation. In the expression for the energy density, the rest mass density along with the kinetic energy density of the fluid constituents due to their random motion, which contributes to the pressure as well, are already included. However, in a fluid with (...) a bulk motion, there are, in addition, a couple of explicit, pressure-dependent terms in the energy–momentum density, whose presence to an extent, is shrouded in mystery, especially from a physical perspective. We show here that one such pressure-dependent term appearing in the energy density, represents the work done by the fluid pressure against the Lorentz contraction during transition from the rest frame of the fluid to another frame in which the fluid has a bulk motion. This applies equally to the electromagnetic energy density of electrically charged systems in motion and explains in a natural manner an apparently paradoxical result that the field energy of a charged capacitor system decreases with an increase in the system velocity. The momentum density includes another pressure-dependent term, that represents an energy flow across the system, due to the opposite signs of work being done by pressure on two opposite sides of the moving fluid. From Maxwell’s stress tensor we demonstrate that in the expression for electromagnetic momentum of an electric charged particle, it is the presence of a similar pressure term, arising from electrical self-repulsion forces in the charged sphere, that yields a natural solution for the notorious, more than a century old but thought by many as still unresolved, 4/3 problem in the electromagnetic mass. (shrink)

Chandra Mohanty, in introducing the phrase “feminism without borders,” acknowledges that she is influenced by the image of “doctors without borders” and wants to highlight the multiplicity of voices and viewpoints within the feminist coalition. So the question of agency assumes primary significance here. But answering the question of agency becomes harder once we try to accommodate this multiplicity. Take, for example, the practice of veiling among certain Muslim women. As many third-world feminists have pointed out, although veiling can't simply (...) be perceived as an expression of women's oppression, it can't be perceived as an expression of “free agency” either since what is required for true feminist agency is women's ability to “formulate choices” and not simply to make choices. In this paper I argue that this ability includes two related abilities: first, to develop a perspective of self that acknowledges and accepts its own grounding in its given intersectionalities; second, to realize that its interdependencies and interconnectivities enable a sense of continuity and solidarity that works collaboratively toward consensus without sacrificing or stifling all differences. My main argument is that feminist self-consciousness informed by Buddhist mindfulness gives us opportunities to articulate clearly and to cultivate both of these abilities. (shrink)