An adult university hospital ethics committee evaluated a proposed TA-NRP protocol in the fall of 2018. The protocol raised ethical concerns about violation of the Uniform Determination of Death Act and the prohibition known as the Dead Donor Rule, with potential resultant legal consequences. An additional concern was the potential for increased mistrust by the community of organ donation and transplantation. The ethics committee evaluated the responses to these concerns as unable to surmount the ethical and legal boundaries and the (...) ethics committee declined to endorse the procedure. These concerns endure. (shrink)

The Wisconsin Supreme Court, after adopting the doctrine of the objective patient standard, expanded it in bold and innovative ways over nearly four decades, until the Wisconsin legislative and executive branches drastically reversed this course. The saga has implications for other jurisdictions considering adoption or expansion of the objective patient standard doctrine.

It is now a default obligation to provide cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), in the absence of knowledge of a patient’s or surrogate’s wishes to the contrary. We submit that it is time to reevaluate this position. Attempting CPR should be subject to the same scrutiny demanded of other medical interventions that involve balancing a great benefit against grievous harms.

There is a remarkable trend in contemporary environmentalism that emphasizes ‘accepting responsibility’ for the natural world in contrast to outdated preservationist thinking that shirks such responsibility. This approach is often explained and justified by reference to the anthropocene: this fundamentally new epoch—defined by human domination—requires active human intervention to avert planetary catastrophe. However, in this paper, I suggest this rhetoric encourages a flight from history. This often jubilant, sometimes anxious, yearning for unprecedented human innovation and—ultimately—control in our new millennia mirrors (...) the Futurist movement that took off near the beginning of the last century. Despite the significant differences in the details of how academics have defended this twenty-first-century environmental outlook, they all represent the true flight from history; they too quickly jettison the ideas of historical environmentalists and so misunderstand the environmental values at the heart of preservation that are more salient than ever. (shrink)

This paper is a critical analysis of David Rayfield's attempt to distinguish true from correct descriptions of human actions (Inquiry, Vol. 13 [1970], Nos. 1?2). It is argued that the analysis fails to do the job required of it for two reasons. First, the analysis of true descriptions is circular insofar as it turns on the notion of an ?unbound action?. Secondly, and independent of the charge of circularity, it is shown that the basis upon which Rayfield draws the true?correct (...) distinction leads to certain unacceptable consequences for action theory. (shrink)

As the title indicates, This paper represents an examination of the relationships obtaining among the concepts of foresight, Intention, And responsibility. It begins with a critical analysis of the legal and quasi-Moral principle of the resumption of intentionality (i.E., An agent is presumed to have intended the "foreseeable" consequences of her intentional actions). It is shown that, While legally indispensable, It will simply not withstand philosophical scrutiny for purposes of ascribing moral responsibility. I proceed eventually to an evaluation of a (...) proposal which would make foresight itself a sufficient--Though not a necessary--Condition for the ascription of responsibility. The strengths and weaknesses of such a proposal are assessed within both legal and moral contexts. Having distinguished between what I term the "hard-Liners" vs. The "soft-Liners" to the debate, I give my reasons for aligning myself with the hard-Liners (i.E., Those who might be sympathetically inclined to my alternate proposal). (shrink)

This article re-investigates the underlying values driving the rapidly growing rewilding movement in Europe and North America. In doing so, we respond to a common academic narrative that draws a sharp distinction between North American and European approaches to rewilding. Whereas the first is said to promote a colonial vision of wilderness, European rewilding is claimed to value a more inclusive notion of wildness. We challenge this narrative through a genealogical investigation into the wild(er)ness ideas that inspired rewilding, showing that (...) North American and European rewilding draw from similar philosophical sources with cross-continental origins. Thus, we contend that a linguistic shift from ‘wilderness’ to ‘wildness’ fails to engage substantively with the colonial critique it alleges to resolve. Through two case studies, we show how both wilderness and wildness concepts have been employed to support either colonialism or decolonial resistance and draw attention to the need to consider specific socio-political contexts when assessing rewilding. Ultimately, we propose that reclaiming a liberatory meaning of wild(er)ness, articulated in a critical tradition of wild(er)ness advocacy, will be an essential step in decolonising rewilding. (shrink)

This paper discusses a problem arising from the way in which John Searle marks the distinction between intentional and unintentional action (Inquiry, Vol. 22, pp. 253?80), namely, that of adequately distinguishing those events which we regard as unintentional actions on the part of an agent from those other events occasioned by or brought about as a result of his action which we (correctly) do not countenance as actions of any sort ? unintentional or otherwise. Searle's attempt to distinguish them in (...) terms of the ?proximity of the contents of intentions? is examined and rejected, and an alternative account which exploits the anthropocentric character of our action vocabulary is proposed and defended. The discussion ends with a brief indication of some other difficulties engendered by Searle's analysis. (shrink)

What term is most appropriate in describing the limits of medicine? That depends on who determines the limits and the bases on which those limits are delineated and communicated. Schneiderman, Jecker, and Jonsen critique two recent policy statements by critical care providers—Bosslet et al. and Nates et al. —for their rejection of the use of the term futile for treatment. Both statements recommend using the adjective inappropriate for the problematic treatment, rather than futile, based on the lack of consensus of (...) just what constitutes futility. Schneiderman, Jecker, and Jonsen also assert that, despite a lack of consensus about the determination of futility, the definitions they have... (shrink)

In the 1999 Galton Lecture for the annual conference of The Galton Institute, the author summarizes the main elements of Galtongenerals original and largely intuitive ideas, which still inspire mainstream scientific research on intelligence.

Throughout his philosophical career Thomas Reid was an opponent of scepticism. When providing some remarks on his philosophical development he informs us that initially he accepted Berkeley’s version of the theory of ideas, thinking it adequately secured knowledge of ordinary things and events, until Hume demonstrated the sceptical problems with knowledge of the self encountered by the doctrine. This led to Reid’s re-examination and ultimate rejection of the theory of ideas.

From computerized medical records to databases of pharmacological interactions and automated provisional EKG readings, the emergence of information technology has significantly altered the practice of medicine. Information technology has been widely used to enhance diagnosis and treatment and to improve communication between providers. The advent of the Internet also brings far-reaching implications for patient–physician communication, challenging physicians, patients, and policymakers to consider its impact on the delivery of medical care and the therapeutic relationship. A new set of practices by patients (...) and physicians is unfolding in cyberspace, ranging from the use of e-mail to communicate between physicians and patients in an existing relationship to one-to-one consultations with an anonymous physician and ongoing online treatment, such as psychotherapy. These practices are emerging in both the for-profit and not-for-profit spheres. (shrink)

This article substantiates the common intuition that it is wrong to contribute to dangerous climate change for no significant reason. To advance this claim, I first propose a basic principle that one has the moral obligation to act in accordance with the weight of moral reasons. I further claim that there are significant moral reasons for individuals not to emit greenhouse gases, as many other climate ethicists have already argued. Then, I assert that there are often no significant moral (or (...) excusing) reasons to emit greenhouse gases. In any such trivial-cost – but not necessarily trivial-impact – cases, the individual then has an obligation to refrain. Finally, I apply the moral weighing principle to everyday situations of emitting and establish two surprisingly substantial implications: the relevance of virtues to the interpersonal assessment of environmentally harmful actions and the extensive individual ethical obligations that exist short of moral purity. (shrink)

Physicians generally recommend that patients resuscitated with naloxone after opioid overdose stay in the emergency department for a period of observation in order to prevent harm from delayed sequelae of opioid toxicity. Patients frequently refuse this period of observation despiteenefit to risk. Healthcare providers are thus confronted with the challenge of how best to protect the patient’s interests while also respecting autonomy, including assessing whether the patient is making an autonomous choice to refuse care. Previous studies have shown that physicians (...) have widely divergent approaches to navigating these conflicts. This paper reviews what is known about the effects of opioid use disorder on decision-making, and argues that some subset of these refusals are non-autonomous choices, even when patients appear to have decision making capacity. This conclusion has several implications for how physicians assess and respond to patients refusing medical recommendations after naloxone resuscitation. (shrink)