Ancien fleuron de l’industrie horlogère, Lip est une manufacture bisontine connue pour les conflits sociaux retentissants dont elle fut le théâtre en 1973-1974 puis en 1976-1977, et se dota très vite d’une aura légendaire à laquelle participèrent de nombreuses productions culturelles et artistiques contemporaines des événements. Le temps passant, l’intervention fit place à la rétrospection : de nouvelles œuvres s’employèrent à revisiter cette histoire, tendues entre le mythe et ses angles morts, la commémoration et le souvenir. Publiée en 1998, Les (...) Yeux rouges de Dominique Féret est l’une des premières à s’inscrire dans cet après-coup. Composée de quatre entretiens avec d’anciens protagonistes des luttes de Lip, cette pièce en dit au moins tout autant sur le passé que sur le présent qui se tourne vers lui et traduit l’inflexion que connaît tout un pan du théâtre européen des années 2000, marqué par la résurgence de la question sociale mais aussi par des modulations pathétiques qui tendent à sa dépolitisation. (shrink)

Talbot Brewer offers a new approach to ethical theory, founded on a far-reaching reconsideration of the nature and sources of human agency.

In this article, we expand the analytical and theoretical foundations of the study of knowledge commons in the context of more classical agrarian commons, such as seed commons. We show that it is possible to overcome a number of criticisms of earlier work by Ostrom (Governing the commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990) on natural commons and its excludability/rivalry matrix in addressing the inclusive social practices of “commoning”, defined as a way of living (...) and acting for the preservation of the commons. Our empirical analysis emphasizes, using the most recent advances in the IAD/SES framework, the distributed and collaborative knowledge governance in a French peasant seed network as a key driver for reintroducing cultivated agrobiodiversity and on-farm seed conservation of ancient and landrace varieties. These inclusive peasant seed groups developed alternative peer-to-peer models of collaborative peasant-led community-based breeding and grassroots innovations in the search for more resilient population varieties. Our results highlight the various models of collective action within the network and discuss the organizational tradeoffs of opting out of peasant seed activities and recreating a shared collective knowledge base on the benefits of restoring cultivated agrobiodiversity. It helps us better understand how modern peasant seed groups function as epistemic communities which contributes to envisioning alternative agricultural systems. (shrink)

This article deals with the integration of ethical reflection into the research practices of the project at the Lille Nord-Pas-de-Calais genopole: “Multifactorial genetic pathologies and therapeutic innovations”. The general hypothesis of this text is that changes in research practices in biology (mainly through the use of bioinformatics) imply changes in medical practices, which require critical reflection. This hypothesis could be broken down into three sub-hypotheses: (1) Research in biology is undergoing a complete transformation; (2) Research in biology is a cultural (...) practice, which cannot be reduced to a simple cognitive action; (3) Research in biology is a techno-scientific practice. As for the method, the aim of our research at the Medical Ethics Centre is to elucidate the philosophical and ethical range of biomedical practices. This work entails a double task for reflection. On the one hand, from the revelation of ethical tensions present in these practices, we have to think about what is at stake in these practices, and more broadly in society. On the other hand, we have to analyse the conditions enabling the actors to assume the significance of ethical reflection in their practices. The method set up to undertake this double task could be qualified as “narrative hermeneutics”, as its aim is to attempt to interpret the stakes in practices from proximity with these practices and from what their actors have to say about them. The text then goes on to analyse more specifically the emergence and place of bioinformatics in present-day biomedical research. (shrink)

La crise structurelle de la psychiatrie questionne aujourd’hui le modèle médical dans son ensemble. Premier poste de dépense de l’assurance maladie, les techniques de soins psychiatriques, soins de la subjectivité malade, sont-elles destinées à être numérisées? L’influence étasunienne, vecteur d’un retour de la neuropsychiatrie, tend à le laisser croire. À partir des constats observés au fil de l’histoire de la psychiatrie française, nous interrogerons cette tendance, ses fantasmes et réalités, pour préciser les conditions d’une appropriation des technologies qui améliore le (...) service médico-psychiatrique individuel et collectif. (shrink)

La doctrine picturale du classicisme instituait le parallèle de l’image et du verbe, elle adoptait pour maxime la formule extraite d’Horace « Ut pictura poesis » (« Il en est d’une poésie comme d’une peinture »). Gotthold Ephraïm Lessing réfute cette conception dans son Laocoon en opposant les propriétés du lisible à celles du visible, et en affirmant l’impossibilité d’établir une équivalence entre elles. Il met en crise la lisibilité de l’œuvre plastique en opérant une distinction fondamentale entre l’image et (...) le mot, avec pour conséquence de séparer nettement la finalité essentielle de la peinture et celle de la poésie. Lessing défend l’idée que les moyens de la peinture correspondent aux limites de la poésie, et que les moyens de la poésie correspondent aux limites de la peinture. Ce chiasme se résout dans le théâtre qui, unissant les pouvoirs du verbe et de l’image, surmonte les limites expressives de la poésie et de la peinture en conjuguant leurs pouvoirs respectifs. (shrink)

One On addressing understanding People know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do does. ...

Marie-Magdeleine Davy (1903-1998) était philosophe, écrivaine et maître de recherche au cnrs. Profondément engagée dans la vie intellectuelle de son époque, elle confia ses plus riches pensées à d'innombrables écrits publiés pendant plus d'un demi-siècle. On y croise les figures essentielles de sa méditation : Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, Nicolas Berdiaev, Louis Massignon, Gabriel Marcel, Roger Godel, Henry Corbin, Simone Weil, Henri Le Saux et tant d'autres. Esprit indépendant et non conventionnel, éternelle voyageuse en quête d'absolu, Marie-Magdeleine Davy ne cessa d'affirmer (...) que la connaissance de soi se présente comme une recherche du sens de la Vie, c'est-à-dire une recherche de la Vérité conduisant à une démarche d'intériorité.00± Découvrir sa dimension de profondeur permet de prendre contact avec l'Infini qui est en soi ; ce caractère d'éternité humanise et rend possible la véritable communication avec autrui.? Telle est la conviction de Marie-Magdeleine Davy, après avoir lu, médité et conversé avec des hommes et des femmes en Orient et en Occident.00Pour beaucoup d'Européens, Marie-Magdeleine Davy aura été un témoin de la dimension d'intériorité que tout être porte en lui, une preuve vivante de cet aspect autre de la vie capable de donner un sens au monde et à l'Histoire. ± Une grande dame.? C'est ainsi que les Deux-Sévriens qui l'ont connue l'appellent encore. Ses archives, désormais classées, apportent un éclairage nouveau sur une œuvre et une pensée s'adressant à tous ceux qui sont soucieux de répondre à leur destin. (shrink)

Οι ανασκαφές του βόρειου τείχους της Αμαθούντος οδήγησαν στην ανακάλυψη ενός ζωικού συνόλου, που προσφέρει μια νέα άποψη της πανίδας της πόλης, εξαιτίας των αρχαιολογικών συμφραζομένων και της χρονολόγησης αυτού του δευτερογενούς αποθέτη, ο οποίος χρησιμοποιήθηκε στη στήριξη μιας επισκευής του οχυρωματικού περιβόλου. Έτσι, το δείγμα που περισυνελέγει δίνει μια πρωτότυπη εικόνα της διατροφής με κρέας στην αρχαϊκή εποχή και της μεταχείρισης ορισμένων πτωμάτων, τα οποία εγκαταλείφθηκαν σε αποθέτες χωρίς να έχουν καταναλωθεί. Αυτή η πρώτη προσέγγιση της οικονομίας παραγωγής τροφίμων (...) σε έναν αστικό χώρο, αποδεικνύει ότι η διατροφή βασιζόταν στα κλασικά οικόσιτα θηλαστικά και επιβεβαιώνει τις παρατηρήσεις, που είχαν γίνει για τις προηγούμενες περιόδους, σχετικά με τη διαφορετική μεταχείριση των ιπποειδών και των σκύλων. Το περιορισμένο φάσμα της πανίδας υπογραμμίζει με βεβαιότητα τον ανθρώπινης προέλευσης χαρακτήρα των απορριμμάτων αυτών, με τα οποία δεν αναμιγνύεται κανένα άλλο ζώο, με εξαίρεση το λαγό, η κατανάλωση του οποίου μαρτυρείται ήδη από την εποχή του Χαλκού. (shrink)

Sometimes a belief that p promotes having true beliefs, whether or not p is true. This gives reasons to believe that p, but most epistemologists would deny that it gives epistemic reasons, or that these reasons can epistemically justify the belief that p. Call these reasons to believe “truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief.” This paper argues that three common views in epistemology, taken together, entail that reasons of this sort can epistemically justify beliefs. These three claims are: epistemic oughts (...) are normative, epistemic oughts have a source, and the source of epistemic oughts is an end that has true belief as a necessary component. These claims would be hard for many epistemologists to deny, but accepting them, and thus accepting that truth promoting non-evidential reasons can justify beliefs, has significant consequences for epistemology. The paper considers accounts of epistemic oughts that endorse these claims but might seem to avoid the consequence that truth promoting non-evidential reasons generate real epistemic oughts, and shows that none do. (shrink)

Le concept d’Allemagne permet de révéler, selon une approche« misologique », l’ampleur des désaccords ayant présidé à la définition du concept d’État en France. De ce dernier, l’on aborde divers emplois qu’illustrent des modèles d’État. Le « modèle germanique » opère ainsi dans un débat qui est le creuset de la connaissance politique moderne, avec ses apories: celles de la souveraineté externe, de l’ordre interétatique, de la confédération. L’article expose alors la relation entre les théories du droit public et la (...) « continuité des assemblées »; d’une certaine manière, le fondement de l’ordre politique. Au final, le droit public apparaît comme le transfert du pouvoir temporel à l’instituant, au collectif, et son affaiblissement, comme la raison d’être de l’étatisme. (shrink)

Boyer & Petersen lay out a compelling theory for folk-economic beliefs, focusing on beliefs about markets. However, societies also allocate resources through mechanisms involving power and group decision-making, through the political economy. We encourage future work to keep folkpoliticaleconomic beliefs in mind, and sketch an example involving pollution and climate change mitigation policy.

De Dreu and Gross's distinction between attack and defense is complicated in real-world conflicts because competing leaders construe their position as one of defense, and power imbalances place status quo challengers in a defensive position. Their account of defense as vigilant avoidance is incomplete because it avoids a reference to anger which transforms anxious avoidance into collective and unified action.

In this paper, I draw a distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of commitments by highlighting some previously unnoticed subtleties in the pragmatics of "commissive" utterances. I argue that theories which seek to model all commitments on promises, or to ground them all on voluntary consent, can account only for one sort of obligation and not for the other. Since social groups are most perspicuously categorized in terms of the sorts of commitments that bind their members together, this puts me (...) in a position to distinguish two importantly different kinds of social groups, which I call aggregations and associations. I try to show that this position can account for features of the normative structure of social groups that are overlooked by those theorists (e.g. Margaret Gilbert) who have attempted to offer a unitary, voluntarist account of the phenomena under investigation. (shrink)

I. Language constructing language: the implications of reflexivity for linguistic theory -- II. Language in its own image: on epilinguistic and metalinguistic knowledge -- III. Folk-linguistic fictions and the explananda of the language sciences -- IV. Why we need a theory of language -- V. Folk psychology and the Language Myth -- VI. Talking about what happened -- VII. Metalinguistic truisms and the emancipation of the language sciences.

À l’instar d’Humpty Dumpty, le personnage de Lewis Carroll qui fête son non-anniversaire 364 jours par an, Bergson semble inscrire la discontinuité de l’événement dans la continuité de la durée. Il invite son lecteur à concevoir la nouveauté comme la trame du réel. Rien ne se répète jamais à l’identique, chaque événement est singulier et s’inscrit dans un temps irréversible. Pourtant, l’intelligence ne perçoit pas toujours cette « création continue d’imprévisible nouveauté » car elle immobilise et spatialise le réel en (...) le rendant homogène. Mais dès lors que l’esprit retrouve le caractère temporel de la réalité, le présent apparaît comme toujours inédit. Vu sous cet angle, la définition bergsonienne de l’événement semble donner au banal les caractéristiques de l’exceptionnel. Les non-anniversaires possèderaient la même consistance ontologique que les anniversaires sans pour autant disparaître dans l’homogénéité de la répétition quotidienne. L’événement serait à la fois une aspérité surgissant dans le flux de la durée et en même temps l’expression de la plus pure continuité. Pour résoudre cette apparente contradiction il faut alors se demander : comment Bergson réussit-il à concilier la nouveauté de l’événement avec la continuité de la durée? Pour répondre à cette question, nous montrerons comment Bergson introduit des différences qualitatives au sein de la continuité du devenir. Ces différences s’expriment à travers plusieurs niveaux de réalité que l’article étudie successivement. Nous partons de la métaphysique bergsonienne de la durée, capable de donner à l’événement un contenu réel et pas seulement représentatif. Grâce à l’épaisseur du devenir, l’événement se relie à la continuité spirituelle de la durée tout en conservant son caractère inédit et imprévisible. Son hétérogénéité le distingue de la pure discontinuité du fiat lux et de l’homogénéité mécaniste. La causalité des événements se révèle différente du simple mécanisme. Dans la seconde partie de l’article nous tirons les conséquences de cette métaphysique pour les appliquer à l’événement étudié sous l’angle de l’histoire. Partant d’un réexamen des apories du possible, nous examinons la valeur de l’uchronie pour ensuite décrire la manière dont Bergson théorise la connaissance historique et l’action des grands hommes. (shrink)

This article argues that, as applied to education, the Capabilities Approach pioneered by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum shares a range of philosophical commitments with the work of social realist scholars on the concept of ‘powerful knowledge’. I first trace the history of the concept of powerful knowledge and present critiques put forward by social justice scholars. I then outline the Capabilities Approach, arguing it provides a response to some of these concerns. From here I develop the connection between the (...) two educational paradigms focusing on four areas of affinity. The first is the conceptual similarity between the ‘power’ of powerful knowledge and Nussbaum’s account of a capability. The second is their concern with the reduction of education to technical-instrumentalism, human capital, and other economically driven imperatives. The third is a shared focus on the link between knowledge, human agency, and freedom. The fourth, is a mutual rejection of relativism and embrace of a nuanced universalism. Ultimately, by drawing together these two conceptually rich approaches to the aims and purposes of education, I hope to open a space for theorizing about both capabilities and powerful knowledge that can resolve some of the problems in both. For powerful knowledge, the Capabilities Approach allows a more concrete explication of why access to disciplinary bodies of knowledge is of value to both individuals and society. On the side of the Capabilities Approach, engaging with the concept of powerful knowledge can help give a rationale for how educational knowledge fosters certain centrally important capabilities. (shrink)

Accuracy‐first epistemology is an approach to formal epistemology which takes accuracy to be a measure of epistemic utility and attempts to vindicate norms of epistemic rationality by showing how conformity with them is beneficial. If accuracy‐first epistemology can actually vindicate any epistemic norms, it must adopt a plausible account of epistemic value. Any such account must avoid the epistemic version of Derek Parfit's “repugnant conclusion.” I argue that the only plausible way of doing so is to say that accurate credences (...) in certain propositions have no, or almost no, epistemic value. I prove that this is incompatible with standard accuracy‐first arguments for probabilism, and argue that there is no way for accuracy‐first epistemology to show that all credences of all agents should be coherent. (shrink)

Enormous harms, such as climate change, often occur as the result of large numbers of individuals acting separately. In collective action problems, an individual has so little chance of making a difference to these harms that changing their behavior has insignificant expected utility. Even so, it is intuitive that individuals in many collective action problems should not be parts of groups that cause these great harms. This paper gives an account of when we do and do not have obligations to (...) change our behavior in collective action problems. It also addresses a question insufficiently explored in the literature on this topic: when obligations arising out of collective action problems conflict with other obligations, what should we do? The paper explains how to adjudicate conflicts involving two collective action problems and conflicts involving collective action problems and other sorts of obligations. (shrink)

It is not clear whether to assess Robert Audi’s Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character as a collection of essays or a unified piece of theorizing. Seven of the book’s twelve essays have been published before, and at first blush they appear connected by little more than a common focus on ethics. These essays are framed, however, by an introduction and conclusion characterizing the book as the elaboration of a single, large-scale ethical theory. Perhaps a comprehensive theory can be disentangled from (...) these essays, but its contours and merits would be far clearer if Audi had presented it systematically, drawing selectively from previous essays rather than reproducing them wholesale. (shrink)

It is widely affirmed that human beings have irreplaceable valuable, and that we owe it to them to treat them accordingly. Many theorists have been drawn to Kantianism because they think that it alone can capture this intuition. One aim of this paper is to show that this is a mistake, and that Kantianism cannot provide an independent rational vindication, nor even a fully illuminating articulation, of irreplaceability. A further aim is to outline a broadly Aristotelian view that provides a (...) more fitting theoretical framework for this appealing conception of human value. This critique of Kantianism extends to contemporary theorists with a broadly Kantian orientation, including Christine Korsgaard, Stephen Darwall and John Rawls. The problem with these views, at heart, is that they attempt to ground morality in respect alone. Yet it is love, not respect, that brings irreplaceability into view. The paper closes with a sketch of a virtue-theoretic theory that follows Aquinas in taking love to be a master virtue that refines the other virtues so as to ensure a continuous and practically efficacious sensitivity to the irreplaceable value of fellow human beings. (shrink)

The epistemic norms should matter. The ones philosophers typically focus on do not matter enough. They should be replaced. This book discusses a range of views of why and how epistemic norms could matter and shows how epistemic norms as standardly understood fall short on each. No matter how the importance of the epistemic is to be explained, it does not matter at all what we believe about most topics or why we believe it. When what we believe does matter, (...) it is often not particularly important that our beliefs are true, but rather that they are good enough for our purposes, and thus no truth-connected epistemic notion such as reliability, evidence, coherence, accuracy, or knowledge is really relevant. Finally, even when truth is genuinely important, standard epistemic norms do not properly aim at the truth, because they do not allow us to sacrifice one true belief for the sake of others. In light of all of this, epistemic norms as standardly conceived are not really concerned with what matters. We can and should do better. The epistemic norms that genuinely matter will replace truth-based epistemic notions with conceptions of success, reasons, and justification aimed at the “good enough.” They will require us to form some seemingly bad beliefs—beliefs that violate all standard norms by going against our evidence, being incoherent, or even being clearly false—in order to improve other beliefs. In fact, they will sometimes allow our beliefs to be bad for no reason whatsoever. (shrink)

Perhaps the most fundamental and distinctive idea of Kantian moral psychology is that no behavior can count as action unless it is performed on a subjective practical principle, or a maxim of action. The maxim is supposed to provide the target of moral assessment of all actions, whether this assessment is prospective or retrospective. The presence of a maxim is also supposed to illuminate how it is that agents are active in, hence responsible for, the peculiar species of events we (...) call actions. To put the point roughly, agents are the sources of their actions in that they have in some sense affirmed or endorsed the maxims of these actions. (shrink)

The objective of this study was to analyze the quality of climate information disclosed by companies and the impression management strategies they have developed to justify or conceal negative aspects of their performance. The study is based on a qualitative content analysis of the sustainability reports of 21 energy-sector companies that use the Global Reporting Initiative with A or A+ application levels over a period of 5 years. It contributes to the literature on climate disclosure by demonstrating the ineffectiveness of (...) the external assurance process in ensuring the quality and representativeness of the data. Significant non-compliance with GRI standards was identified in 86 of the 93 reports audited by a third party. In addition, six of the 21 companies surveyed were found to disclose increasingly opaque information over time, concealing information on the measurement and methodology used. Through this study, four impression management strategies were identified. These are employed either to justify certain information or to conceal it. In exposing the high incidence of non-compliance in GRI reporting and the use of impression management strategies by companies, this study shows that it will be difficult or impossible for stakeholders to reasonably assess, monitor and compare companies’ climate performance on the basis of these reports. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics describes a universe with physical properties that run completely contrary to everyday experience and intuition. These strange properties cause some people to seek equally strange philosophical theories to explain them. Talbot attempts to link the physical theories with some non-physical experimental results. The latter are, if true, disturbing and fascinating. Among the subjects explored are poltergeists, the possibility of instantaneous communication across great distances, and the nature of the mind and consciousness. This is an interesting combination of (...) physics, metaphysics, and parapsychology. Harold D. Shane, Mathematics Dept., Baruch Coll., CUNY. (shrink)

Several scientists have shown the importance of mitigating global warming and have highlighted a need for major social change, particularly when it comes to meat consumption and collective engagement. In the present study, we conducted a cross-sectional study to test the mismatch model, which aims at explaining what motivates individuals to participate in normative change. This model stipulates that perceiving a self—other difference in pro-environmental attitudes is the starting point and can motivate people to have high pro-environmental intentions. This mismatch (...) effect is explained by participants’ willingness to participate in normative and social change: people that perceive a gap between their personal attitude and the social norm should be more willing to participate in normative change. This should then motivate them to have high pro-environmental intentions on an individual and group level. The results confirm the hypothesized model on an individual and group level and explain how people can be motivated to participate in normative change. Implications of these findings and the need for further studies are discussed. (shrink)

Se revendiquer d’un art « engagé » est devenu, dans le paysage artistique mondialisé, une posture si communément empruntée qu’elle semble presque s’être vidée de son sens. Les artistes revendiquant cette étiquette se mobilisent de manière explicite et visible en faveur d’une cause, entendant ainsi participer à lutter contre l’injustice sociale. On examine ici la manière dont se construit aujourd’hui dans le Sud global l’ ethos de l’artiste engagé, entre engagement sociopolitique et quête de la singularité, la subtile conjonction des (...) deux pouvant donner lieu à des formes d’entrepreneuriat de soi ou bien à des conflits de loyauté entre systèmes de valeurs antagonistes. (shrink)

To argue that “ought” implies “can,” one can appeal to general principles or to intuitions about specific cases. One general truism that seems to show that “ought” implies “can” is that obligations must be able to guide action, and putative obligations that are unfulfillable are unable to do so. This paper argues that obligations that are unfulfillable can still guide action, and that moral theories which reject the principle that “ought” implies “can” are actually better able to account for how (...) obligations guide than theories which endorse “ought” implies “can.” The paper also argues that any intuitions about specific cases that seem to provide evidence that “ought” implies “can” do not actually give us this evidence. Rather, these intuitions pose similar problems for theories which accept “ought” implies “can” as they pose for theories which reject the principle. Some theories which reject “ought” implies “can” will fit our intuitions at least as well, if not better, than theories which accept it. So, intuitions do not favor accepting that “ought” implies “can,” and appeal to general principles favors its denial. (shrink)