Machine vision is one of the main applications of artificial intelligence. In China, the machine vision industry makes up more than a third of the national AI market, and technologies like face recognition, object tracking and automated driving play a central role in surveillance systems and social governance projects relying on the large-scale collection and processing of sensor data. Like other novel articulations of technology and society, machine vision is defined, developed and explained by different actors through the work of (...) imagination. In this article, we draw on the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries to understand how Chinese companies represent machine vision. Through a qualitative multimodal analysis of the corporate websites of leading industry players, we identify a cohesive sociotechnical imaginary of machine vision, and explain how four distinct visual registers contribute to its articulation. These four registers, which we call computational abstraction, human–machine coordination, smooth everyday, and dashboard realism, allow Chinese tech companies to articulate their global ambitions and competitiveness through narrow and opaque representations of machine vision technologies. (shrink)

In “The Crisis in Education,” her only essay dedicated to the topic of education, Hannah Arendt presents a position that in many ways runs counter to her conception of the political based on participation, actions and the potential for radical change. In so doing, she provides her readers, both political and pedagogical, with a perspective on education that challenges its instrumentalization for the sake of the political. To appreciate the counter-cultural yet commonsense claim Arendt makes, I will first consider the (...) meaning of the term citizenship and its Arendtian interpretation in a political context. Second, focusing on Arendt’s 1958 essay, I will explain why education is not first and foremost a public issue and therefore should not be interpreted as belonging to a political context. Connected to this, I bring to light Arendt’s well known discourse of the ensuing dangers of a confusion of the private and public realms. Her somewhat unwelcomed pedagogical-political contribution confronts us with our assumption that the solution to the crisis in citizenship lies within schools, showing it as yet another symptom of the political crisis of modernity. Having shown how and why schools cannot be asked to create citizens, I will – immersed in a paradox that Arendt recognizes – consider several means by which education can, in a secondary role, help us to understand and reflect upon the contemporary crisis in citizenship. (shrink)

In the past five years, there have been a series of papers in the journal Evolution debating the relative significance of two theories of evolution, a neo-Fisherian and a neo-Wrightian theory, where the neo-Fisherians make explicit appeal to parsimony. My aim in this paper is to determine how we can make sense of such an appeal. One interpretation of parsimony takes it that a theory that contains fewer entities or processes, (however we demarcate these) is more parsimonious. On the account (...) that I defend here, parsimony is a ‘local’ virtue. Scientists’ appeals to parsimony are not necessarily an appeal to a theory’s simplicity in the sense of it’s positing fewer mechanisms. Rather, parsimony may be proxy for greater probability or likelihood. I argue that the neo-Fisherians appeal is best understood on this interpretation. And indeed, if we interpret parsimony as either prior probability or likelihood, then we can make better sense of Coyne et al. argument that Wright’s three phase process operates relatively infrequently. (shrink)

This book explores a variety of conceptual and methodological questions about cancer and cancer research: Is cancer one disease, or many? If many, how many exactly? How is cancer classified? What does it mean, exactly, to say that cancer is “genetic,” or “familial”? What exactly are the causes of cancer, and how do scientists come to know about them? When do we have good reason to believe that this or that is a risk factor for cancer? How is cancer a (...) product or byproduct of multilevel evolution? Is cancer research unified? What sort of models, or theories, govern cancer research? This book takes a close look at these philosophical questions, by examining work in disciplines as diverse as cell and molecular biology, epidemiology, clinical medicine, and evolutionary biology. (shrink)

By bringing Hannah Arendt’s politics into dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics, this book develops an approach to the political that is relational, inclusive, and empowering.

Cancer is not one, but many diseases, and each is a product of a variety of causes acting at distinct temporal and spatial scales, or ‘‘levels’’ in the biological hierarchy. In part because of this diversity of cancer types and causes, there has been a diversity of models, hypotheses, and explanations of carcinogenesis. However, there is one model of carcinogenesis that seems to have survived the diversification of cancer types: the multi-stage model of carcinogenesis. This paper examines the history of (...) the multistage theory, and uses the theory as a case study in the limits and goals of unification as a theoretical virtue, comparing and contrasting it with ‘‘integrative’’ research. (shrink)

Debates concerning the character, scope, and warrant of abductive inference have been active since Peirce first proposed that there was a third form of inference, distinct from induction and deduction. Abductive reasoning has been dubbed weak, incoherent, and even nonexistent. Part, at least, of the problem of articulating a clear sense of abductive inference is due to difficulty in interpreting Peirce. Part of the fault must lie with his critics, however. While this article will argue that Peirce indeed left a (...) number of puzzles for interpreters, it will also contend that interpreters should be careful to distinguish discussion of the formal and strictly epistemic question of whether and how abduction is a sound form of inference from discussions of the practical goals of abduction, as Peirce understood them. This article will trace a history of critics and defenders of Peirce’s notion of abduction and discuss how Peirce both fueled the confusion and in fact anticipated and responded to several recurring objections. (shrink)

In 1966, Richard Levins argued that there are different strategies in model building in population biology. In this paper, I reply to Orzack and Sober’s (1993) critiques of Levins, and argue that his views on modeling strategies apply also in the context of evolutionary genetics. In particular, I argue that there are different ways in which models are used to ask and answer questions about the dynamics of evolutionary change, prospectively and retrospectively, in classical versus molecular evolutionary genetics. Further, I (...) argue that robustness analysis is a tool for, if not confirmation, then something near enough, in this discipline. (shrink)

This book provides a rigorously researched, critically comparative introduction to yoga. Is this Yoga: Concepts, Histories, and the Complexities of Contemporary Practice recognizes the importance of contemporary understandings of yoga and, at the same time, provides historical context and complexity to modern and pre-modern definitions of yogic ideas and practices. Approaching yoga as a vast web of concepts, traditions, social interests, and embodied practices, it raises questions of knowledge, identity, and power across time and space, including the dynamics of "East" (...) and "West." The text is divided into three main sections: thematic concepts; histories; and topics in modern practice. This accessible guide is essential reading for undergraduate students approaching the topic for the first time as well as yoga teachers, teacher training programs, casual and devoted practitioners, and interested non-practitioners. (shrink)

Arabian Drugs in Early Medieval Mediterranean Medicine. By Zohar Amar and Efraim Lev. Edinburgh Studies in Classical Islamic History and Culture. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017. Pp. xiv + 290, ills. $125, £80.

The surviving portion of the tenth-century Egyptian Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Tamīmī’s recently edited Ṭīb al-ʿarūs has several formulas relating to the dying and perfuming of textiles. Some refer to the use of carved molds to impress designs upon textiles. Tamīmī’s formulas treat in particular the application of gold leaf and perfumed dye pastes with blocks, but presuppose the technology of using blocks to apply designs to textiles and include a vocabulary of technical terms for the process. This textual evidence provides (...) additional context for surviving early medieval Islamic block-printed gilded textiles. The attestation of the use of blocks to decorate textiles is contemporary with the use of blocks to print Arabic amulet texts, known by the tenth century from extant specimens and some literary evidence. (shrink)

Speciation—the origin of new species—has been one of the most active areas of research in evolutionary biology, both during, and since the Modern Synthesis. While the Modern Synthesis certainly shaped research on speciation in significant ways, providing a core framework, and set of categories and methods to work with, the history of work on speciation since the mid-twentieth century is a history of divergence and diversification. This piece traces this divergence, through both theoretical advances, and empirical insights into how different (...) lineages, with different genetics and ecological conditions, are shaped by very different modes of diversification. (shrink)

November 2009’s announcement of the USPSTF’s recommendations for screening for breast cancer raised a firestorm of objections. Chief among them were that the panel had insufficiently valued patients’ lives or allowed cost considerations to influence recommendations. The publicity about the recommendations, however, often either simplified the actual content of the recommendations or bypassed significant methodological issues, which a philosophical examination of both the science behind screening recommendations and their import reveals. In this article, I discuss two of the leading ethical (...) considerations at issue in screening recommendations: respect for patient autonomy and beneficence and then turn to the most significant methodological issues raised by cancer screening: the potential biases that may infect a trial of screening effectiveness, the problem of base rates in communicating risk, and the trade-offs involved in a judgment of screening effectiveness. These issues reach more broadly, into the use of “evidence-based” medicine generally, and have important implications for informed consent. (shrink)

This book draws on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, psychology, neuroscience and Buddhist philosophy to explicate Merleau-Ponty’s unwritten ethics. Daly contends that though Merleau-Ponty never developed an ethics per se, there is significant textual evidence that clearly indicates he had the intention to do so. This book highlights the explicit references to ethics that he offers and proposes that these, allied to his ontological commitments, provide the basis for the development of an ethics. In this work Daly shows how Merleau-Ponty’s relational ontology, in (...) which the interdependence of self, other and world is affirmed, offers an entirely new approach to ethics. In contrast to the ‘top-down’ ethics of norms, obligations and prescriptions, Daly maintains that Merleau-Ponty’s ethics is a ‘bottom-up’ ethics which depends on direct insight into our own intersubjective natures, the ‘I’ within the ‘we’ and the ‘we’ within the ‘I’; insight into the real nature of our relation to others and the particularities of the given situation. Merleau-Ponty and the Ethics of Intersubjectivity is an important contribution to the scholarship on the later Merleau-Ponty which will be of interest to graduate students and scholars. Daly offers informed readings of Merleau-Ponty’s texts and the overall approach is both scholarly and innovative. (shrink)

This article traces the hidden race-religion constellation in Europe. The term “race-religion constellation” refers to the connection or co-constitution of the categories of race and “religion.” Specifically, the term “race-religion constellation” is used to refer to the practice of classifying people into races according to categories we now associate with the term “religion.” This calls for a consideration of European history and forms of racism in Europe, such as anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. This article aims to provide an alternative non-secularized or (...) biological account of the origins of the socially constructed category of race in Europe. The alternative story begins in the sixteenth century, when the category of “religion” as a means for classifying peoples was both constructed and politicized. In tracing this alternative story, this article seeks to outline a framework for a critical philosophy of race focused on a European religion line that intersects with Du Bois's color line. (shrink)

The recent literature in philosophy of biology has drawn attention to the different sorts of explanations proffered in the biological sciences—we have molecular, biomedical, and evolutionary explanations. Do these explanations all have a common structure or relation that they seek to capture? This paper will answer in the negative. I defend a pluralistic and pragmatic approach to explanation. Using examples from classical population genetics, I argue that formal demonstrations, and even strictly “mathematical truths,” may serve as explanatory in different historical (...) contexts. (shrink)

The modern synthesis in evolutionary biology is taken to be that period in which a consensus developed among biologists about the major causes of evolution, a consensus that informed research in evolutionary biology for at least a half century. As such, it is a particularly fruitful period to consider when reflecting on the meaning and role of chance in evolutionary explanation. Biologists of this period make reference to “chance” and loose cognates of “chance,” such as: “random,” “contingent,” “accidental,” “haphazard,” or (...) “stochastic.” Of course, what an author might mean by “chance” in any specific context varies. -/- In the following, we first offer a historiographical note on the synthesis. Second, we introduce five ways in which synthesis authors spoke about chance. We do not take these to be an exhaustive taxonomy of all possible ways in which chance meaningfully figures in explanations in evolutionary biology. These are simply five common uses of the term by biologists at this period. They will serve to organize our summary of the collected references to chance and the analysis and discussion of the following questions: • What did synthesis authors understand by chance? • How did these authors see chance operating in evolution? • Did their appeals to chance increase or decrease over time during the synthesis? That is, was there a “hardening” of the synthesis, as Gould claimed (1983)? (shrink)

The object of this paper is to reply to Morrison's ([2000]) claim that while ‘structural unity’ was achieved at the level of the mathematical models of population genetics in the early synthesis, there was explanatory disunity. I argue to the contrary, that the early synthesis effected by the founders of theoretical population genetics was unifying and explanatory both. Defending this requires a reconsideration of Morrison's notion of explanation. In Morrison's view, all and only answers to ‘why’ questions which include the (...) ‘cause or mechanism’ for some phenomenon count as explanatory. In my view, mathematical demonstrations that answer ‘how possibly’ and ‘why necessarily’ questions may also count as explanatory. The authors of the synthesis explained how evolution was possible on a Mendelian system of inheritance, answered skepticism about the sufficiency of selection, and thus explained why and how a Darwinian research program was warranted. While today we take many of these claims as obvious, they required argument, and part of the explanatory work of the formal sciences is providing such arguments. Surely, Fisher and Wright had competing views as to the optimal means of generating adaptation. Nevertheless, they had common opponents and a common unifying and explanatory goal that their mathematical demonstrations served. Introduction: Morrison's challenge Fisher v. Wright revisited The early synthesis Conclusion: unification and explanation reconciled. (shrink)

There are several different ways in which chance affects evolutionary change. That all of these processes are called “random genetic drift” is in part a due to common elements across these different processes, but is also a product of historical borrowing of models and language across different levels of organization in the biological hierarchy. A history of the concept of drift will reveal the variety of contexts in which drift has played an explanatory role in biology, and will shed light (...) on some of the philosophical controversy surrounding whether drift is a cause of evolutionary change. (shrink)

The focus of this chapter will be on the epistemic and normative questions at issue in debates about cancer screening, with a special focus on mammography as a case study. Such questions include: How do we know who needs to be screened? What are the benefits and harms of cancer screening, and what is the quality of evidence for each? How ought we to measure and compare these benefits and harms? What are the sources of uncertainty about our estimates of (...) benefit and harm? Why are such issues so contested? What are the major drivers of dissent and consensus on the data and their interpretation? How, if at all, do values play a role in debates surrounding mammography screening? In sum: In what ways does inductive risk, broadly conceived, 1 come into play in the science behind cancer screening, and mammography screening in particular? (shrink)

In this article, we argue, first, that there are very different research projects that fall under the heading of “systems biology of cancer.” While they share some general features, they differ in their aims and theoretical commitments. Second, we argue that some explanations in systems biology of cancer are concerned with properties of signaling networks and how they may play an important causal role in patterns of vulnerability to cancer. Further, some systems biological explanations are compelling illustrations of how “top-down” (...) and “bottom-up” approaches to the same phenomena may be integrated. (shrink)

While there have been forty years of active debate among philosophers of psychiatry about how to define mental disorder, there has been relatively little discussion of mental health. This is starting to change. A new literature is emerging about what it means to have mental health. While some define mental health as simply as the absence of mental disorder, others argue to the contrary that mental health is distinct from, and not reducible to, the presence or absence of mental illness. (...) In this paper we review competing accounts and develop our own account. We characterize a diverse set of dispositions, skills, habits, and capacities, associated with aspects of personality structure. These are some of the same capacities developed across many psychotherapies. Attention to the literature on personality, and clinical psychotherapy, can, in our view, illuminate one (of several) dimensions of positive mental health. (shrink)

Abstract:In this paper, I distinguish four ways in which aspects or features of mental illness may be said to be functional. I contend that discussion of teleological perspectives on mental illness has unfortunately tended to conflate these senses. The latter two senses have played important practical roles both in predicting and explaining patterns of behavior, cognition, and affective response, atnd relatedly, in developing successful interventions. I further argue that functional talk in this context is neither inconsistent with viewing some disorders (...) as dysfunctional in one of several senses, nor inappropriately adaptationist, provided we keep these senses of function distinct, and are precise about which is in play in a given context. (shrink)

A variety of different arguments have been offered for teaching ‘‘both sides’’ of the evolution/ID debate in public schools. This article reviews five of the most common types of arguments advanced by proponents of Intelligent Design and demonstrates how and why they are founded on confusion and misunderstanding. It argues on behalf of teaching evolution, and relegating discussion of ID to philosophy or history courses.

Cancer is typically spoken of as a “complex” disease. But, in what sense are cancers “complex”? Is there one sense, or several? What implications does this complexity have – both for how we study, and how we intervene upon cancers? The aim of this paper is first, to clarify the variety of senses in which cancer is spoken of as "complex" in the scientific literature, and second, to discover what explanatory and predictive roles such features play.

This book is open access under a CC BY 4.0 license. This book examines the current state of elective placements of medical undergraduate students in developing countries and their impact on health care education at home. Drawing from a recent case study of volunteer deployment in Uganda, the authors provide an in-depth evaluation of the impacts on the students themselves and the learning outcomes associated with placements in low resource settings, as well as the impacts that these forms of student (...) mobility have on the host settings. In addition to reviewing the existing literature on elective placements, the authors outline a potential model for the future development of ethical elective placements. As the book concurs with an increasing international demand for elective placements, it will be of immediate interest to universities, intermediary organizations, students as consumers, and hosting organisations in low-resource settings. (shrink)

BackgroundA growing number of studies show the potential of loyalty card data for use in health research. However, research into public perceptions of using this data is limited. This study aimed to investigate public attitudes towards donating loyalty card data for academic health research, and the safeguards the public would want to see implemented. The way in which participant attitudes varied according to whether loyalty card data would be used for either cancer or COVID-19 research was also examined.MethodsParticipants were recruited (...) via Prolific Academic to take part in semi-structured telephone interviews, with questions focused on data sharing related to either COVID-19 or ovarian/bowel cancer as the proposed health condition to be researched. Content analysis was used to identify sub-themes corresponding to the two a priori themes, attitudes and safeguards.ResultsParticipant attitudes were found to fall into two categories, either rational or emotional. Under rational, most participants were in favour of sharing loyalty card data. Support of health research was seen as an important reason to donate such data, with loyalty card logs being considered as already within the public domain. With increased understanding of research purpose, participants expressed higher willingness to donate data. Within the emotional category, participants shared fears about revealing location information and of third parties obtaining their data. With regards to safeguards, participants described the importance of anonymisation and the level of data detail; the control, convenience and choice they desired in sharing data; and the need for transparency and data security. The change in hypothetical purpose of the data sharing, from Covid-19 to cancer research, had no impact on participants’ decision to donate, although did affect their understanding of how loyalty card data could be used.ConclusionsBased on interviews with the public, this study contributes recommendations for those researchers and the wider policy community seeking to obtain loyalty card data for health research. Whilst participants were largely in favour of donating loyalty card data for academic health research, information, choice and appropriate safeguards are all exposed as prerequisites upon which decisions are made. (shrink)

Fisher’s ‘fundamental theorem of natural selection’ is notoriously abstract, and, no less notoriously, many take it to be false. In this paper, I explicate the theorem, examine the role that it played in Fisher’s general project for biology, and analyze why it was so very fundamental for Fisher. I defend Ewens (1989) and Lessard (1997) in the view that the theorem is in fact a true theorem if, as Fisher claimed, ‘the terms employed’ are ‘used strictly as defined’ (1930, p. (...) 38). Finally, I explain the role that projects such as Fisher’s play in the progress of scientific inquiry. (shrink)

This paper explores the issue whether feminism needs a metaphysical grounding, and if so, what form that might take to effectively take account of and support the socio-political demands of feminism; addressing these demands I further propose will also contribute to the resolution of other social concerns. Social constructionism is regularly invoked by feminists and other political activists who argue that social injustices are justified and sustained through hidden structures which oppress some while privileging others. Some feminists (Haslanger and Sveinsdóttir, (...) Feminist metaphysics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University, 2011) argue that the constructs appealed to in social constructivism are real but not metaphysically fundamental because they are contingent. And this is exactly the crux of the problem—is it possible to sustain an engaged feminist socio-political critique for which contingency is central (i.e., that things could be otherwise) and at the same time retain some kind of metaphysical grounding. Without metaphysical grounding it has been argued, the feminist project may be rendered nonsubstantive (Sider, Substantivity in feminist metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 174(2017), 2467–2478, 2017). There has been much debate around this issue and Sider (as an exemplar of the points under contention) nuances the claims expressed in his earlier writings (Sider, Writing the book of the world. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011) and later presents a more qualified account (Sider, Substantivity in feminist metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 174(2017), 2467–2478, 2017). Nonetheless, I propose the critiques and defences offered by the various parties continue to depend on certain erroneous assumptions and frameworks that are challengeable. I argue that fundamentality as presented in many of these current accounts, which are underpinned by the explicit or implicit ontologies of monism and dualism and argued for in purely rationalist terms which conceive of subjects as primarily reason-responding agents, reveal basic irresolvable problems. I propose that addressing these concerns will be possible through an enactivist account which, following phenomenology, advances an ontology of interdependence and reconceives the subject as first and foremost an organism immersed in a meaningful world as opposed to a primarily reason-responding agent. Enactivism is thus, I will argue, able to legitimize feminist socio-political critiques by offering a non-reductive grounding in which not only are contingency and fundamentality reconciled, but in which fundamentality is in fact defined by radical contingency. My paper proceeds in dialogue with feminists generally addressing this ‘metaphysical turn’ in feminism and specifically with Sally Haslanger and Mari Mikkola. (shrink)

Congress passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 in order to remove a perceived barrier to clinical genetic testing. By banning health insurance companies and employers from discriminating against an individual based on his or her genetic information, legislators hoped that patients would be encouraged to seek genetic testing that could improve health outcomes and provide opportunities for preventive measures. Their explicit legislative goal was to fully protect the public from discrimination and allay their concerns about the potential for (...) discrimination, thereby allowing individuals to take advantage of genetic testing, technologies, research, and new therapies.However, GINA left a number of issues unresolved, most notably failing to define the concept of disease manifestation. GINA was structured such that it only provides protection against misuse of genetic information up until the point when an individual's disease has manifested. It protects an individual with a genetic predisposition for a disease, but not an individual actively suffering from that disease. (shrink)

In Who Sings the Nation-State?, co-written with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Judith Butler identifies the paradox between the seemingly global decline of the nation-state and the steadfast strength of its genealogical force. According to Butler, “Arendt allows us to realise that this may also be because the nation-state as a form was faulty from the start.” In the first section of the article, I focus on Butler’s analysis of Israel/Palestine as a failed nation-state and seek to identify its faulty start. I (...) propose that the nation has been masked by the race-religion constellation in the creation of the Westphalian race-state and identify this as the “faulty start” of the nation-state in European history. The term “race-religion constellation” refers to the connection or co-constitution of the categories of race and “religion” and the practice of classifying people into races according to categories we now associate with the term “religion.” I contend that it is this genealogical force of the nation that frames Israel/Palestine, which was, and is, Europe’s offspring, and at times its prodigal son. In the third and final section I discuss alternatives to the nation-state by means of the notion of diasporic political communities, as taken up by Butler and Paul Gilroy respectively, to assess what such communities can provide instead of the exclusionary racist binary that is the faulty start and driving force of the race-state. (shrink)

The discussion of the adaptive landscape in the philosophical literature appears to be divided along the following lines. On the one hand, some claim that the adaptive landscape is either “uninterpretable” or incoherent. On the other hand, some argue that the adaptive landscape has been an important heuristic, or tool in the service of explaining, as well as proposing and testing hypotheses about evolutionary change. This paper attempts to reconcile these two views.

Speciation is the process by which one or more species arises from a common ancestor, and “macroevolution” refers to patterns and processes at and above the species level – or, transitions in higher taxa, such as new families, phyla or genera. “Macroevolution” is contrasted with “microevolution,” evolutionary change within populations, due to migration, assortative mating, selection, mutation and drift. In the evolutionary synthesis of the 1930’s and 40’s, Haldane , Dobzhansky , Mayr , and Simpson argued that the origin of (...) species and higher taxa were, given the right environmental conditions and sufficient time, the product of the same microevolutionary factors yielding change within populations. Dobzhansky reviewed the evidence from genetics, and argued, “nothing in the known macroevolutionary phenomena would require other than the known genetic principles for causal explanation” . In sum, genetic variation between species was not different in kind from the genetic variation within species. Dobzhansky concluded that one may “reluctantly put an equal sign” between micro- and macroevolution. In this chapter, I review arguments for and against this "neo-Darwinian" consensus on speciation, as well as debates concerning macroevolution and punctuated equilibrium. (shrink)

Comprised of essays by top scholars in the field, this volume offers concise overviews of philosophical issues raised by biology. Brings together a team of eminent scholars to explore the philosophical issues raised by biology Addresses traditional and emerging topics, spanning molecular biology and genetics, evolution, developmental biology, immunology, ecology, mind and behaviour, neuroscience, and experimentation Begins with a thorough introduction to the field Goes beyond previous treatments that focused only on evolution to give equal attention to other areas, such (...) as molecular and developmental biology Represents both an authoritative guide to philosophy of biology, and an accessible reference work for anyone seeking to learn about this rapidly-changing field. (shrink)

Huxley coined the phrase, the “evolutionary synthesis” to refer to the acceptance by a vast majority of biologists in the mid-20th Century of a “synthetic” view of evolution. According to this view, natural selection acting on minor hereditary variation was the primary cause of both adaptive change within populations and major changes, such as speciation and the evolution of higher taxa, such as families and genera. This was, roughly, a synthesis of Mendelian genetics and Darwinian evolutionary theory; it was a (...) demonstration that prior barriers to understanding between various subdisciplines in the life sciences could be removed. The relevance of different domains in biology to one another was established under a common research program. The evolutionary synthesis may be broken down into two periods, the “early” synthesis from 1918 through 1932, and what is more often called the “modern synthesis” from 1936-1947. The authors most commonly associated with the early synthesis are J.B.S. Haldane, R.A. Fisher, and S. Wright. These three figures authored a number of important synthetic advances; first, they demonstrated the compatibility of a Mendelian, particulate theory of inheritance with the results of Biometry, a study of the correlations of measures of traits between relatives. Second, they developed the theoretical framework for evolutionary biology, classical population genetics. This is a family of mathematical models representing evolution as change in genotype frequencies, from one generation to the next, as a product of selection, mutation, migration, and drift, or chance. Third, there was a broader synthesis of population genetics with cytology, genetics, and biochemistry, as well as both empirical and mathematical demonstrations to the effect that very small selective forces acting over a relatively long time were able to generate substantial evolutionary change, a novel and surprising result to many skeptics of Darwinian gradualist views. The later “modern” synthesis is most often identified with the work of Mayr, Dobzhansky and Simpson. There was a major institutional change in biology at this stage, insofar as different subdisciplines formerly housed in different departments, and with different methodologies were united under the same institutional umbrella of “evolutionary biology.” Mayr played an important role as a community architect, in founding the Society for the Study of Evolution, and the journal Evolution, which drew together work in systematics, biogeography, paleontology, and theoretical population genetics. (shrink)

?German warplanes fired on two hijacked military fuel trucks in the northern province of Kunduz killing an estimated 90 villagers?.? While the debate over what is now known as the Kunduz Air Strike in 2009 has by no means ended, it has ? or so I shall argue ? missed a key point. By allowing the media's witchlike hunt for a scapegoat to dominate the military debate, a critical consideration concerning the ethics of network-enabled operations has been overlooked. As such, (...) I take the tragedy of the Kunduz air strikes as a case study of the failure of network-enabled operations, focusing on the ethical questions that this raises. To do so, I will begin with a description of what happened before, during and after the air strike. Following this, I consider three ethical concerns that arise as a result of network-enabled operations. I end with a proposal to increase the possibility of ethically reflective decision-making in network-enabled operations, which calls for a relational type of thinking and a complementary form of training. (shrink)

In 1968, Motoo Kimura submitted a note to Nature entitled “Evolutionary Rate at the Molecular Level,” in which he proposed what has since become known as the neutral theory of molecular evolution. This is the view that the majority of evolutionary changes at the molecular level are caused by random drift of selectively neutral or nearly neutral alleles. Kimura was not proposing that random drift explains all evolutionary change. He does not challenge the view that natural selection explains adaptive evolution, (...) or, that the vertebrate eye or the tetrapod limb are products of natural selection. Rather, his objection is to “panselectionism’s intrusion into the realm of molecular evolutionary studies”. According to Kimura, most changes at the molecular level from one generation to the next do not affect the fitness of organisms possessing them. King and Jukes (1969) published an article defending the same view in Science, with the radical title, “Non- Darwinian Evolution,” at which point, “the fat was in the fire” (Crow, 1985b). The neutral theory was one of the most controversial theories in biology in the late twentieth century. This chapter will review the debate over the netural theory subsequent to Kimura. (shrink)