Algorithmic decision making is used in an increasing number of fields. Letting automated processes take decisions raises the question of their accountability. In the field of computational journalism, the algorithmic accountability framework proposed by Diakopoulos formalizes this challenge by considering algorithms as objects of human creation, with the goal of revealing the intent embedded into their implementation. A consequence of this definition is that ensuring accountability essentially boils down to a transparency question: given the appropriate reverse-engineering tools, it should be (...) feasible to extract design criteria and to identify intentional biases. General limitations of this transparency ideal have been discussed by Ananny and Crawford :973–989, 2018). We further focus on its technical limitations. We show that even if reverse-engineering concludes that the criteria embedded into an algorithm correspond to its publicized intent, it may be that adversarial behaviors make the algorithm deviate from its expected operation. We illustrate this issue with an automated news recommendation system, and show how the classification algorithms used in such systems can be fooled with hard-to-notice modifications of the articles to classify. We therefore suggest that robustness against adversarial behaviors should be taken into account in the definition of algorithmic accountability, to better capture the risks inherent to algorithmic decision making. We finally discuss the various challenges that this new technical limitation raises for journalism practice. (shrink)

French legal culture, from the Middle Ages to the present day, has had an impressive influence on legal norms and institutions that have emerged in Europe and the Americas, as well as in Asian and African countries. This volume examines the lives of twenty-seven key legal thinkers in French history, with a focus on how their Christian faith and ideals were a factor in framing the evolution of French jurisprudence. Professors Olivier Descamps and Rafael Domingo bring together this diverse group (...) of distinguished legal scholars and historians to provide a unique comparative study of law and religion that will be of value to scholars, lawyers, and students. The collaboration among French and non-French scholars, and the diversity of international and methodological perspectives, gives this volume its own unique character and value to add to this fascinating series. (shrink)

November 4th-5th, 2012 at Kyoto University. Organizers: Hisashi Nakao & Pierre-Alain Braillard.

Tout au long de son histoire, la philosophie s’est sentie menacée par le moment sensuel de l’art, le plaisir pris qui risquait de mettre la raison hors d’elle-même. Là où Platon s’en défendit par l’exclusion de la poésie hors de l’enceinte de la cité philosophique, Kant tenta de le domestiquer en l’intégrant au dedans des murs du système. Il espérait ainsi, en assignant une place déterminée au plaisir et au désir, en maîtriser les débordements. Mais le pouvoir de séduction de (...) l’art, comme celui des femmes auquel Kant le renvoie, ne se laisseront pas si aisément contenir dans l’économie systémique et viendront déranger le subtil équilibre architectonique de l’édifice critique. (shrink)

Dans Le Capital, le phénomène du fétichisme apparaît bien plus lié aux conditions générales de l’échange qu’à celles de l’exploitation capitaliste. Il n’est dès lors pas certain qu’il disparaisse dans la société post-capitaliste que décrit Marx dans ce même ouvrage, parce que cette société maintient le principe de l’échange équivalent. C’est seulement dans la Critique du programme de Gotha que Marx semble prendre conscience de cette difficulté, à laquelle il répond en opposant au principe bourgeois du droit l’idée d’un « (...) droit inégal ». Cette idée, dans sa radicalité, serait à rapprocher de ce que Derrida pense sous le nom de justice.In Das Kapital, fetishism appears to be more closely linked to generic exchange conditions than to capitalist exploitation. Consequently, fetishism may endure in the post-capitalist society envisioned by Marx in this same work, because this society will maintain the principle of equivalent exchange. Marx seems to realize this difficulty only in the Critique of the Gotha Programme, where he tries to solve it by opposing to the bourgeois law system the idea of « inegal law ». This idea, and its radical content, can be discussed in relation to the concept of justice as it is developed by Derrida. (shrink)

Antonin Artaud was a poet, theorist, philosopher, essayist, playwright, actor and director, and one of the 20th century’s most important theoreticians of drama. His theory of the ‘Theatre of Cruelty’ has influenced playwrights as diverse as Beckett, Genet, Albee and Gelber. Magic was always a central concept for Artaud, and in nearly all his writing it is given the most positive force, as something capable of healing the rift between words and things, culture and life. But during his nine (...) years of incarceration in mental asylums, magic seemed to lose its illuminating transformative power and to become demonic and persecutory. Artaud entered the realm of spectres and vampires which he believed were sucking the vitality from his mind and body. Artaud later filled twelve little exercise books with an account of his struggles to escape this physical, psychological and artistic hell. The first eleven books are filled with fragments of writing and extraordinary sketches of totemic figures, pierced bodies and enigmatic machines. Two months before his death, he took a twelfth exercise book and wrote a remarkable, incantatory text, 50 Drawings to Murder Magic. It was the last thing he wrote. (shrink)

One of the main objections against effective altruism is the so-called institutional critique, according to which the EA movement neglects interventions that affect large-scale institutions. Alexander Dietz has recently put forward an interesting version of this critique, based on a theoretical problem affecting act-utilitarianism, which he deems as potentially conclusive against effective altruism. In this article I argue that his critique is not as promising as it seems. I then go on to propose another version of the institutional critique. In (...) contrast to Dietz's version, it targets not the core principles of effective altruism but rather some important methodological assumptions made in EA research, namely diminishing marginal returns and low-hanging fruits. One key conclusion is that it may be time for critics of effective altruism to shift their attention from the theoretical core principles of effective altruism towards the methodological tools actually employed in practice by the EA movement. (shrink)

The heterogeneity problem, which stems from the alleged difficulty of finding out what all pleasant experiences have in common, is largely considered as a substantial issue in the philosophy of pleasure, one that is usually taken as the starting point for theorizing about the essence of pleasure. The goal of this paper is to move the focus away from the heterogeneity problem and toward an alternative approach to pleasure. To do this, I first show that, although the approach stemming from (...) the heterogeneity problem has led to an interesting discussion about the essence of pleasure, it has usually endorsed an introspectionist methodology and other problematic assumptions that have led to doubtful results. I thus propose a natural-kind approach to pleasure, which seeks to determine what, if any, the natural kind of pleasure would consist in. This approach broadens the investigation of pleasure by enabling the use of a larger range of methodological tools, thus opening new promising directions for research. (shrink)

Revelation, or the view that the essence of phenomenal properties is presented to us, is as intuitively attractive as it is controversial. It is notably at the core of defences of anti-physicalism. I propose in this paper a new argument against Revelation. It is usually accepted that low-level sensory phenomenal properties, like phenomenal red, loudness or brightness, stand in relation of similarity and quantity. Furthermore, these similarity and quantitative relations are taken to be internal, that is, to be fixed by (...) what their relata are. I argue that, under some plausible additional premises, no account of what grounds these relations in the essence of their relata is consistent with Revelation, at least if we take common phenomenological descriptions for granted. As a result, the plausibility of Revelation is undermined. One might however resist this conclusion by weakening the epistemic relation postulated between subjects and their phenomenal properties. (shrink)

Demuth tests generalize Martin-Löf tests in that one can exchange the m-th component a computably bounded number of times. A set fails a Demuth test if Z is in infinitely many final versions of the Gm. If we only allow Demuth tests such that GmGm+1 for each m, we have weak Demuth randomness.We show that a weakly Demuth random set can be high and , yet not superhigh. Next, any c.e. set Turing below a Demuth random set is strongly jump-traceable.We (...) also prove a basis theorem for non-empty classes P. It extends the Jockusch–Soare basis theorem that some member of P is computably dominated. We use the result to show that some weakly 2-random set does not compute a 2-fixed point free function. (shrink)

The paper describes the context and the origin of a particular debate that concerns the evolution of phenotypic plasticity. In 1965, British biologist A. D. Bradshaw proposed a widely cited model intended to explain the evolution of norms of reaction, based on his studies of plant populations. Bradshaw’s model went beyond the notion of the “adaptive norm of reaction” discussed before him by Dobzhansky and Schmalhausen by suggesting that “plasticity” the ability of a phenotype to be modified by the environment (...) should be genetically determined. To prove Bradshaw’s hypothesis, it became necessary for some authors to identify the pressures exerted by natural selection on phenotypic plasticity in particular traits, and thus to model its evolution. In this paper, I contrast two different views, based on quantitative genetic models, proposed in the mid-1980s: Russell Lande and Sara Via’s conception of phenotypic plasticity, which assumes that the evolution of plasticity is linked to the evolution of the plastic trait itself, and Samuel Scheiner and Richard Lyman’s view, which assumes that the evolution of plasticity is independent from the evolution of the trait. I show how the origin of this specific debate, and different assumptions about the evolution of phenotypic plasticity, depended on Bradshaw’s definition of plasticity and the context of quantitative genetics. (shrink)

In recent years the study of well-being has attracted considerable attention, fostering hope that the scientific community will ultimately succeed in discovering its very nature, thereby emulating successful scientific projects in other disciplines. However, there have been recurring worries about how to measure and define well-being. In this context, Hersch (Br J Philos Sci 73:1045–1065, 2022) has recently argued that we could progressively alleviate these worries through an iterative dialogue between theory and measurement, by seeing them as stemming from a (...) coordination problem. In this article, I argue that the concept of well-being fails to meet the prerequisites for Hersch’s approach. If the latter is the best defense of the capacity of science to uncover the nature of well-being, it follows that the science of well-being should probably relinquish this ambition. (shrink)

Kuera, A., On relative randomness, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 63 61–67. It is the aim of the paper to answer a question raised by M. van Lambalgen and D. Zambella whether there can be a nonrecursive set A having the property that there is a set B such that B is 1-random relative to A and simultaneously A is recursive in B. We give apositive answer to this question as well as further information about relative randomness.

In 1956, in his Principles of Embryology, Conrad Hal Waddington explained that the word “epigenetics” should be used to translate and update Wilhelm Roux’ German notion of “Entwicklungsmechanik” to qualify the studies focusing on the mechanisms of development. When Waddington mentioned it in 1956, the notion of epigenetics was not yet popular, as it would become from the 1980s. However, Waddington referred first to the notion in the late 1930s. While his late allusion clearly reveals that Waddington readily associated the (...) notion of epigenetics with the developmental process, in the contemporary uses of the notion this developmental connotation seems to have disappeared. The advent and success of molecular biology have probably contributed to focusing biologists’ attention on the “genetic” or the “non-genetic” over the “developmental”. In the present paper, I first examine the links that exist, in Waddington’s work, between the classical notion of epigenesis in embryology and those of epigenetics that Waddington proposed to connect, and even synthesize, data both from embryology and genetics. Second, I show that Waddington’s own view of epigenetics has changed over time and I analyze how these changes appear through his many representations of the relationships between genetic signals and developmental processes. (shrink)

A positive answer to a question of M. van Lambalgen and D. Zambella whether there exist nonrecursive sets that are low for the class of random sets is obtained. Here a set A is low for the class RAND of random sets if RAND = RAND A.

We show that there is a low T-upper bound for the class of K-trivial sets, namely those which are weak from the point of view of algorithmic randomness. This result is a special case of a more general characterization of ideals in $\Delta _2^0 $ T-degrees for which there is a low T-upper bound.

L'hédonisme axiologique a une longue histoire en philosophie. Pourtant, il garde une mauvaise réputation qui lui vaut d’être parfois écarté sans ménagement de la discussion philosophique. Cet article se propose de défendre l'hédonisme axiologique en exposant les principaux arguments en sa faveur et en répondant aux principales critiques et confusions dont il fait l'objet. Une attention particulière sera portée aux arguments établissant la spécificité du plaisir et du déplaisir par rapport à toutes les autres choses — amitié, savoir, justice, etc. (...) — dont on pourrait argumenter la valeur finale.While axiological hedonism has a long history in philosophy, it also has a bad reputation, which has led to it being discarded without proper examination of its plausibility. In this article, I defend axiological hedonism by presenting the main arguments in its favour as well as the criticisms and confusions to which it has been subjected. I pay special attention to the arguments that hint at the specificity of pleasure and displeasure in comparison with other things — friendship, knowledge, justice, etc. — that might be argued to have final value. (shrink)

The concept of plasticity has always been present in the history of developmental biology, both within the theory of epigenesis and within morphogenesis studies. However this tradition relies also upon a genetic conception of plasticity. Founded upon the concepts of ‘‘phenotypic plasticity’’ and ‘‘reaction norm,’’ this genetic conception focuses on the array of possible phenotypic change in relation to diversified environments. Another concept of plasticity can be found in recent publications by some developmental biologists (Gilbert, West-Eberhard). I argue that these (...) authors adopt a ‘‘broad conception of plasticity’’ that is closely related to a notion of development as something that is ongoing throughout an organism’s lifecycle, and has no clear-cut boundaries. However, I suggest that given a narrow conception of plasticity, one can define temporal boundaries for development that are linked to specific features of the morphological process, which are different from behavioral and physiological processes. (shrink)

This is an introduction to a collection of articles on the conceptual history of epigenesis, from Aristotle to Harvey, Cavendish, Kant and Erasmus Darwin, moving into nineteenth-century biology with Wolff, Blumenbach and His, and onto the twentieth century and current issues, with Waddington and epigenetics. The purpose of the topical collection is to emphasize how epigenesis marks the point of intersection of a theory of biological development and a theory of active matter. We also wish to show that the concept (...) of epigenesis existed prior to biological theorization and that it continues to permeate thinking about development in recent biological debates. (shrink)

L’hédonisme éthique est la théorie selon laquelle les seules choses qui ont de la valeur finale, respectivement positive et négative, sont le plaisir et le déplaisir. Une grande partie du débat philosophique autour de l’hédonisme éthique s’est concentrée sur la nature de ces états affectifs. Cet article se propose de revisiter cette question en examinant les relations entre l’hédonisme éthique et la philosophie du plaisir et de la douleur. L’hédonisme éthique est traditionnellement associé à une théorie qui conçoit le plaisir (...) comme une qualité phénoménale, mais cette théorie est loin de faire l’unanimité. Nous montrerons que la plupart des théories récentes les plus prometteuses en philosophie du plaisir et de la douleur sont en fait incompatibles avec l’hédonisme éthique, ce qui place l’hédoniste dans une position difficile. (shrink)

La fonction utopique que l'œuvre de Theodor W. Adorno attribue à la littérature dessine l'horizon d’une « langue sans terre », au-delà de la « dialectique de la raison » et de l’autodestruction de la Raison.

En s ’ emparant de la question du clonage reproductif humain au milieu de la tourmente médiatique qui a suivi la naissance du premier mammifère cloné, le Comité consultatif national d ’ éthique (CCNE) a avancé un certain nombre d ’ arguments éthiques contre cette pratique, en tentant de montrer qu ’ elle ne pouvait que porter atteinte à la dignité de la personne. Pour cela, le CCNE a établi des correspondances entre les modalités de conception de l ’ individu (...) et quelques attributs moraux telles l ’ autonomie, la liberté et la dignité, nourrissant ainsi la confusion entre identité génétique et identité personnelle. Instituant un dialogue serré avec le Comité, le législateur de 2004 a rédigé le texte de la loi de bioéthique en assumant ce postulat d ’ une assise biologique des attributs de la personne et en reprenant, parfois au terme près, l ’ argumentation mise en place quelques années plus tôt par le CCNE. (shrink)