Previous studies on body ownership illusions have shown that under certain multimodal conditions, healthy people can experience artificial body-parts as if they were part of their own body, with direct physiological consequences for the real limb that gets ‘substituted’. In this study we wanted to assess (a) whether healthy people can experience ‘missing’ a body-part through illusory ownership of an amputated virtual body, and (b) whether this would cause corticospinal excitability changes in muscles associated with the ‘missing’ body-part. Forty right-handed (...) participants saw a virtual body from a first person perspective but for half of them the virtual body was missing a part of its right arm. Single pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation was applied before and after the experiment to left and right motor cortices. Motor evoked potentials (MEPs) were recorded from the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) and the extensor digitorum communis (EDC) of each hand. We found that the stronger the illusion of amputation and arm ownership, the more the reduction of MEP amplitudes of the EDC muscle for the contralateral sensorimotor cortex. In contrast, no association was found for the EDC amplitudes in the ipsilateral cortex and for the FDI amplitudes in both contralateral and ipsilateral cortices. Our study provides evidence that a short-term illusory perception of missing a body-part can trigger inhibitory effects on corticospinal pathways and importantly in the absence of any limb deafferentation or disuse. (shrink)

Management and organization researchers are being called to conduct research that is more caring, yet the concept of care and how to practice it within the profession is undertheorized. Adopting a feminist epistemology and methodology, we develop the concept of care by weaving the personal, ethical, and political into the research process. First, we reflect critically on how aspects of care—attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness (Tronto, Moral boundaries: a political argument for an ethic of care, Routledge, 1993; Tronto, Caring democracy: (...) markets, equality, and justice, New York University Press, 2013)—unfolded in our personal research experiences, and secondly, we conduct a review of articles published in management and organization studies and analyse expressed or concealed conceptions of care in scholars’ accounts of research purpose and ethics. We find three ethical sensibilities at the heart of enacting care: encountering the ‘other’, interpreting roles and responsibilities, and deliberating needs and resources. We contribute to a feminist research ethics by highlighting issues related to care that are concealed in dominant ethos guiding management and organization research. Further, we develop methodological insights for implementing an ethic of care as an alternative ethical standpoint in business research ethics. Finally, we provide suggestions for how to embed more care within research ethics practices in academic institutions. (shrink)

Empirical studies such as Goyal et al. (J Polit Econ 114(2):403–412, 2006) or Newman (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 101(Suppl. 1):5200–5205, 2004) show that scientific collaboration networks present a highly unequal and hierarchical distribution of links. This implies that some researchers can be much more active and productive than others and, consequently, they can enjoy a much better scientific reputation. One may think that big intrinsical differences among researchers can constitute the main driving force behind these inequalities. Nevertheless, this model (...) shows that, under specific circumstances, very similar individuals may self-organize themselves forming unequal and hierarchical structures. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Isaac Barrow on the Mathematization of Nature: Theological Voluntarism and the Rise of Geometrical OpticsAntoni MaletIntroductionIsaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy embodies a strong program of mathematization that departs both from the mechanical philosophy of Cartesian inspiration and from Boyle’s experimental philosophy. The roots of Newton’s mathematization of nature, this paper aims to demonstrate, are to be found in Isaac Barrow’s (1630–77) philosophy of the mathematical sciences.Barrow’s attitude (...) towards natural philosophy evolved from his earnest interest in medicine of around 1650, when a young Cambridge graduate, to natural philosophy (apparently under Henry More’s influence); from his thesis on the insufficiency of the Cartesian hypothesis to geometrical optics and the strong program of mathematization of natural philosophy of the middle 1660s; from Lucasian professor of Mathematics to Chaplain of his Majesty and eminent Restoration divine. Contemporary accounts of Barrow’s life suggest that he grew ever more skeptical about the worth of natural philosophy and mathematics. 1 In his last years he became a prolific [End Page 265] author of sermons and theological works. Published shortly after his death by John Tillotson (1630–94), later archbishop of Canterbury, they occupy over two thousand folio pages. Overloaded with involved philosophical arguments, Barrow’s sermons were apparently not very popular, but they were highly regarded by scholars and the Anglican hierarchy. 2 It is on certain of his sermons, as well as on the philosophical discussions contained in the Mathematical Lectures that our account of Barrow’s philosophy of the mathematical sciences will rest. 3 Barrow’s understanding of the mathematical sciences will allow us to discuss together three issues often analyzed independently: the theological background to English natural philosophy, the changing notion of mixed mathematical sciences during the seventeenth century, and finally the philosophical foundations of modern geometrical optics.It has long been recognized that significant relationships exist between theological voluntarism or intellectualism and views on natural philosophy. In particular Robert Boyle’s theological voluntarism is seen as grounding his experimentalist approach to natural philosophy. It is not quite so clear, however, how well theological voluntarism may relate to a strong program of mathematization such as the one embodied in Newton’s Principia Mathematica. In fact it has been suggested that the relationship is a negative one. This is derived from the necessary character of mathematical laws, which would put unwanted restrictions on God’s absolute dominion over nature, and also from the notion that theological intellectualism is conducive to a deductive, a priori science—the paradigm of which is of course geometry. However, Barrow’s theological voluntarism lead him to heighten the role of mathematics within natural philosophy.During the seventeenth century the so-called mixed or subalternate mathematical sciences changed profoundly. In the Enlightenment mixed mathematics—meaning above all rational mechanics—became one of the most prestigious and influential disciplines. The mixed mathematics of the Enlightenment, however, was markedly different from the Aristotelian [End Page 266] mixed mathematical sciences. The differences are noticeable both in the subject matter and in the substitution of mathematical infinitesimal analysis for geometrical synthesis, but also in the way of grounding mathematical theory on empirical evidence. Barrow’s Mathematical Lectures (delivered at Cambridge from 1664 to 1666) offer a fresh insight into the metamorphosis of these sciences just when Newton’s “mathematical principles” were in the making. Not the least interesting feature of Barrow’s discussion is that God’s omnipotence allows an evaluation of the truth of mathematical theories that do not apply to this world. Therefore, Barrow is led to introduce the distinction between the internal consistency, or mathematical truth, of a mathematical theory and its physical truth. This, in turn, leads him to the notion that theories need testing.Barrow on Matter and GodRecent literature has established significant correlations between theological voluntarism and empiricism, as well as between theological intellectualism and rationalism. As E. B. Davis writes, “the Christian doctrine of creation is a dialogue between God’s unconstrained will, which utterly transcends the bounds of human comprehension, and God’s orderly intellect, which serves as the model for the human mind.” Intellectualist theology considers God’s omniscience His... (shrink)

Currently, testimony is studied extensively in Anglo-American philosophy. However, most of this work is done from a justificationist perspective in which philosophers try to justify our reliance on testimony in some way. I agree with Popper that justificationism is radically mistaken. Thus, I construct an account of how we respond to testimony that in no way attempts to justify our reliance on it. This account is not a straightforward exegesis of Popper, as he never tackled testimony systematically. It makes use, (...) however, of several of Popper's key insights and incorporates them into a viable theory of testimony. Key Words: testimony • anti-justificationism • social epistemology • situational analysis • defeasibility. (shrink)

L’article passe en revue le développement de l’histoire des femmes au Moyen Âge en Espagne depuis ses origines, la fin des années 1970, et discute l’influence que les thèses de Georges Duby ont exercée sur elle. Il relève que les regards venus de l’étranger ont contribué à discréditer et faire abandonner les préoccupations nationalistes qui avaient longtemps obsédé l’historiographie autochtone jusque dans la façon d’envisager et représenter les femmes. Le long et fécond parcours de l’histoire des femmes dans les vingt (...) dernières années est alors examiné, depuis l’orientation fondamentalement juridique et positiviste qui a marqué ses débuts jusqu’aux recherches récentes sur l’identité et la subjectivité féminines ou aux polémiques sur le pouvoir des femmes et leur participaton à la vie politique. La portée des thèses de G. Duby dans cette évolution ainsi que les critiques qu’elles se sont attirées sont finalement considérées. (shrink)

Bartley’s pancritical rationalism is seen by some as being a refinement of Popper’s critical rationalism. I contest this view and argue that pancritical rationalism is obtained from critical rationalism by removing some of its most important and useful features. The remainder consists of a restatement of some of Popper’s key ideas and an interpretation of others that I attempt to show is not entirely faithful to what Popper says.

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 31, Issue 3, Page 875-887, July 2022.

This book is a unique exploration of the idea of the "second person" in human interaction, the idea that face-to-face interactions involve a distinctive form of reciprocal mental state attributions that mediates their dynamical unfolding. Challenging the view of mental attribution as a sort of "theory of mind", Pérez and Gomila argue that the second person perspective of mental understanding is the conceptually, ontogenetically, and phylogenetically basic way of understanding mentality. Second person interaction provides the opportunity for the acquisition of (...) concepts of mental states of increasing complexity. The book reviews the growing interest in a variety of second person phenomena, both in development and in adulthood, presenting research that shows how participants in human interaction attribute psychological states of a referentially transparent kind to each other. This review documents the spontaneous preference for face-to-face interaction, from eye contact to joint attention, from forms of vitality to communicative intentions, from interaction detection to joint action, and from synchrony to interpersonal coordination. Also looking at the implications and applications of the second person perspective within fields as diverse as art and morality, this book is fascinating reading for students and academics in social and cognitive psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and philosophy. (shrink)

Research on gender inequalities in well-being, attribute lower levels of wellness in women to the burden of multiple role demands, particularly during midlife. Using mostly quantitative measures of subjective well-being (SWB), such studies tend to narrow the concept of well-being and overlook the value of in-depth, context-specific inquiry. Work-life balance is also a consistent causative narrative in studies on women's well-being. Yet, such a narrative frequently emphasizes individual agency in a seemingly unattainable quest, implying an anomaly on how women then (...) actually manage to sustain their well-being. The present study therefore explored the work-life experiences of women in their midlife. The aim was to reach a deeper understanding of the psycho-social dynamics at play in sustaining a psychologically-well self. Meta-theoretically the study built on non-traditional and gendered career models that augment female employees' unique career needs. From a socioanalytic stance, this study investigated secondary data gathered from focus groups, which were based on the socioanalytic method of social dream drawing. The data originated from four sessions of social dream drawings, in which the researcher as participant-observer, investigated work-life experiences of seven women. The gathered information was managed through Atlas.ti and processed through phenomenological hermeneutic analysis. The findings contribute to the discourse on women and well-being and give insight into the application of a unique socioanalytic methodology to research in this field from a gendered perspective. Results were analyzed by developing metaphors from the data. These metaphors reflect women's well-being as they present three unique career needs, namely challenge, balance, and authenticity, during their midlife career stage. Findings show how women's projective identification with outdated gender role norms may perpetuate a gendered notion of work-life balance, which consistently challenges their well-being. Projective identifications are evident in introjected feelings of self-doubt, self-stereotyping, and in the tension between female employees' personal and social identities. The study ultimately points to well-being as a dynamic phenomenon, which women sustain by engaging both positive and negative experiences and through identity tasks such as self-awareness, self-authorisation, self-regard, and authentic self-expression. These findings highlight the importance of creating self-reflective space in organizations to facilitate women's psychological well-being. (shrink)

In this paper, we take Darwall’s analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of it has potential as an account of our moral (...) psychology. We propose a naturalistic interpretation of Darwall’s work to address some of the main issues about our moral psychology. First, we explain why moral norms motivate us; namely, because of these second-personal relations. We provide a naturalized version of this solution. Second, we articulate how intersubjective interactions take place effectively; grounding duties to particular other subjects, and being related to distinctive moral emotions. Third, we address the question of the limits of the moral community, proposing that it comprises all agents capable of second-personal interactions. Finally, we explain the emergence of community norms through intersubjective interaction. Since all group members can adopt alternatively the second-personal stance to each other, demands are sanctioned and recognized in a triangulation process which explains the emergence of group norms. (shrink)

RESUMENEn esta contribución pretendemos reivindicar la necesidad de tener en cuenta las relaciones de confianza a la hora de tratar de entender la evolución de la cooperación. En este artículo, tras motivar el interés de tener en cuenta el papel de la confianza en la evolución de la cooperación, revisamos el concepto de confianza, como una actitud compleja que presupone vinculación afectiva y expectativas normativas, y proponemos una tipología que permite ordenar su variedad. Sostenemos que la complejidad de la cooperación (...) humana tiene que ver con la manera en que los homínidos desarrollaron el andamiaje psicológico que hizo posible la confianza, y tratamos de proponer un escenario de su origen.PALABRAS CLAVECONFIANZA, COOPERACIÓN, EVOLUCIÓN SOCIALABSTRACTIn this paper we contend that trust has to be taken into account to explain the evolution of human cooperation. After showing that current models within evolutionary game theory overlook the role of trust, we offer our understanding of this concept, as a complex attitude that involves affective filiations and normative expectations, and put forward a typology of kinds of trust. We argue that the complexity of human cooperation was made possible in the psychological scaffolding that characterizes hominid evolution and made trust relationships possible. We also advance an hypothesis about the origin of trust.KEYWORDSTRUST, COOPERATION, SOCIAL EVOLUTION. (shrink)

In this paper I try to establish the relevance of Peirce's Semeiotics to the conceptual foundations of Cognitive Science. Given Cognitive Science's commitment to the Representational Theory of Mind, I try to clarify the nature of mental representation from the standpoint of Peirce's general theory of signs. As it turns out, mental representations, because of their special role as interpretants of non-mental signs, present especial problems for their interpretation, whose solution Peirce anticipated in a way very close to that developed (...) in Cognitive Science. (shrink)

We show that externalization is a feature not only of moral judgment, but also of value judgment in general. It follows that the evolution of externalization was not specific to moral judgment. Second, we argue that value judgments cannot be decoupled from the level of motivations and preferences, which, in the moral case, rely on intersubjective bonds and claims.

Building on the discussion between Stephen Darwall and Michael Tomassello, we propose an alternative evolutionary account of moral motivation in its two-pronged dimension. We argue that an evolutionary account of moral motivation must account for the two forms of moral motivation that we distinguish: motivation to be partial, which is triggered by the affective relationships we develop with others; and motivation to be impartial, which is triggered by those norms to which we give impartial validity. To that aim, we present (...) the second-person standpoint of morality, first as Darwall conceives of it, and then as we reinterpret it from a naturalistic approach. Then we synthesize Tomasello’s evolutionary account of morality, and Darwall’s objections to it. To reply to those objections, building on Tomasello’s proposal, we argue that the motivation to be impartial, and the feeling of obligation to comply with normative requirements, appeared when humans anticipated and, critically, internalized others’ sanctions to the violation of social norms. Consequently, we posit that social norms and sanctions appeared first at the community level, and only after that were they internalized in the form of self-directed reactive attitudes. Finally, we derive some corollaries that follow from our proposal. (shrink)

We give a presentation of Post algebras of ordern+1 (n1) asn+1 bounded Wajsberg algebras with an additional constant, and we show that a Wajsberg algebra admits a P-algebra reduct if and only if it isn+1 bounded.

By measuring the level of CSR communication carried out by hotels located in the Colombian Caribbean region and identifying the main determinant factors influencing this level (including pressure from the different stakeholders), this paper contributes to deepening our understanding of the antecedents of CSR communication in small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) operating in emerging economies and, particularly, in the hotel industry, for which no previous studies on this topic could be uncovered. The results reveal that the level of CSR disclosure (...) is low in the region and that the size of the hotel, the pressure from government agencies, and the age and educational background of the hotel’s top manager have a significant influence on the level of CSR communication. Results indicate a reactive approach to CSR communication confirming the prominent role played by government agencies, thus contributing to gain a richer understanding of institutional influences on CSR in Latin American countries. In terms of practical implications, findings suggest that governments should play a more active role in stimulating CSR communication in emerging countries, particularly in the case of SMEs. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty decía que nuestra relación con el mundo se sitúa en el orden del «misterio insoluble». Es la invisibilidad de los dioses lo que garantiza la visibilidad del mundo. Este verso invisible –«le Dieu caché», «Dieu insondable», «Être muet», «arrière-silence», «membrure cachée», en términos merleau-pontianos– es la textura misma del recto visible. En el cine extremo o visionario este lenguaje aparentemente antitético no está menos presente para expresar eso que excede a toda visibilidad. Voyance (Merleau-Ponty) que emerge de los légamos (...) de lo invisible pero que no es lo contrario de la vista: «vision [est] ek-stase...», una visión en la que el mudo Ser revela su propio sentido. Así pues, lo invisible no es lo opuesto absoluto de lo visible sino más bien, como dice Merleau-Ponty, su «contrapartida secreta» sin la cual no podría existir la visibilidad. Asimismo, según Derrida, la imagen cinematográfica tiene una estructura fantasmática, está suspendida entre la presencia y la ausencia, pues la invisibilidad determina la lógica de las imágenes. El cine es un ojo, pero sólo ve bien cuando también se relaciona con ese ojo interior que es el de la «visión» de los visionarios. Igualmente, para Jean-Luc Godard, uno de los cineastas más relevantes del cine contemporáneo, la imagen real es la que no vemos. Lo que se ve en el filme tiene menos importancia que lo invisible. Violencia del mirar, desvelamiento de otra luz, que restituye la imagen de lo sagrado. (shrink)

In this paper a non-paradoxical interpretation of Hobbes’s defence of scientific realism of materialistic type is proposed. It attempts to explain how this author was able to defend the truth of materialism and at the same time to deny that it could be demonstrated in a metaphysical way. The key to his position depends on the metaphorical use of the concept of ‘imitation’ and the treatment of the infinite and irresistible power as the philosophically relevant attribute of God. So Hobbes’s (...) intention would consist of saying that the explanation, but not the demonstration, of the truth of materialism depends on the ontological parity and continuity between the world and the human being, in the way in which they are explained by empirical science. In this sense Hobbes’s project, very different to Descartes’s one, would be an attempt to naturalise the epistemology that yet is conscious of the metaphysical limits affecting the naturalistic proposals of philosophy. (shrink)

Se presentan las ideas centrales y la estructura del libro de Diana I. Pérez y Antoni Gomila Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction (Routledge, 2021).

Emotional contagion is a phenomenon that has attracted much interest in recent times. However, the main approach on offer, the mimicry theory, fails to properly account for its many facets. In particular, we focus on two shortcomings: the elicitation of emotional contagion is not context-independent, and there can be cases of emotional contagion without motor mimicry. We contend that a general theory of emotion elicitation is better suited to account for these features, because of its multi-level appraisal component. From this (...) standpoint, emotional contagion is viewed as a particular kind of emotional response that involves the same components and processes of emotional responses in general. (shrink)

Let ${\mathbb{BRL}}$ denote the variety of commutative integral bounded residuated lattices (bounded residuated lattices for short). A Boolean retraction term for a subvariety ${\mathbb{V}}$ of ${\mathbb{BRL}}$ is a unary term t in the language of bounded residuated lattices such that for every ${{\bf A} \in \mathbb{V}, t^{A}}$ , the interpretation of the term on A, defines a retraction from A onto its Boolean skeleton B(A). It is shown that Boolean retraction terms are equationally definable, in the sense that there is (...) a variety ${\mathbb{V}_{t} \subsetneq \mathbb{BRL}}$ such that a variety ${\mathbb{V} \subsetneq \mathbb{BRL}}$ admits the unary term t as a Boolean retraction term if and only if ${\mathbb{V} \subseteq \mathbb{V}_{t}}$ . Moreover, the equation s(x) = t(x) holds in ${\mathbb{V}_{s} \cap \mathbb{V}_{t}}$ . The radical of ${{\bf A} \in \mathbb{BRL}}$ , with the structure of an unbounded residuated lattice with the operations inherited from A expanded with a unary operation corresponding to double negation and a a binary operation defined in terms of the monoid product and the negation, is called the radical algebra of A. To each involutive variety ${\mathbb{V} \subseteq \mathbb{V}_{t}}$ is associated a variety ${\mathbb{V}^{r}}$ formed by the isomorphic copies of the radical algebras of the directly indecomposable algebras in ${\mathbb{V}}$ . Each free algebra in such ${\mathbb{V}}$ is representable as a weak Boolean product of directly indecomposable algebras over the Stone space of the free Boolean algebra with the same number of free generators, and the radical algebra of each directly indecomposable factor is a free algebra in the associated variety ${\mathbb{V}^{r}}$ , also with the same number of free generators.A hierarchy of subvarieties of ${\mathbb{BRL}}$ admitting Boolean retraction terms is exhibited. (shrink)