In contrast to the theories of relativity, quantum mechanics is not yet based on a generally accepted conceptual foundation. It is proposed here that the missing principle may be identified through the observation that all knowledge in physics has to be expressed in propositions and that therefore the most elementary system represents the truth value of one proposition, i.e., it carries just one bit of information. Therefore an elementary system can only give a definite result in one specific measurement. The (...) irreducible randomness in other measurements is then a necessary consequence. For composite systems entanglement results if all possible information is exhausted in specifying joint properties of the constituents. (shrink)

We define a type theory MLM, which has proof theoretical strength slightly greater then Rathjen's theory KPM. This is achieved by replacing the universe in Martin-Löf's Type Theory by a new universe V having the property that for every function f, mapping families of sets in V to families of sets in V, there exists a universe inside V closed under f. We show that the proof theoretical strength of MLM is $\geq \psi_{\Omega_1}\Omega_{{\rm M}+\omega}$ . This is slightly greater than (...) $|{\rm KPM}|$ , and shows that V can be considered to be a Mahlo-universe. Together with [Se96a] it follows $|{\rm MLM}|=\psi_{\Omega_1}(\Omega_{{\rm M}+\omega})$. (shrink)

Helen Steward holds that agency is a power to move oneself, and that it is specifically a power to move one’s body. This conception of agency is supported by a long tradition and is widely held today. It is, however, opposed to another conception of agency on which agency is a power to transact with others—with other things and with other agents. The latter conception, though scarcely represented in contemporary action theory, is no less traditional than the one that Steward (...) prefers. In this paper I argue, first, that Steward’s official purposes do not require her to privilege self-movement over other-movement, as she resolutely does; and second, that the two touchstones of truth to which she appeals throughout her book—namely, ordinary thought and natural science—both recommend a conception of agency on which it is a power whose characteristic and definitive act is a transaction. abstract. (shrink)

Prematurely born children who have underdeveloped lungs may suffer a potentially fatal condition called respiratory distress syndrome. A U.S. company developed a drug, called Surfaxin, to treat such poorly functioning lungs. A placebo-controlled study was planned in four Latin American countries. At the time, in 2001, four treatments were already on the market, although not available to the research populations used in the study. This case is usually discussed as part of the standard of care debate or offered as an (...) example of exploitation. However, what concerns us in this case is rather the choice given to the parents of a prematurely born child under these circumstances: “You can give consent for your child's participation in this study. Half of the babies enrolled will receive sham air and are as likely to die as if they had not enrolled. The other half will receive an active treatment and are more likely to survive.” The parents can vastly increase their baby's chances of survival by participating in the study. Can the consent be voluntary? Do the parents have any meaningful choice? (shrink)

The dependency of a speech recognition system on the accent of a user leads to the variation in its performance, as the people from different backgrounds have different accents. Accent labeling and conversion have been reported as a prospective solution for the challenges faced in language learning and various other voice-based advents. In the English TTS system, the accent labeling of unregistered words is another very important link besides the phonetic conversion. Since the importance of the primary stress is much (...) greater than that of the secondary stress, and the primary stress is easier to call than the secondary stress, the labeling of the primary stress is separated from the secondary stress. In this work, the labeling of primary accents uses a labeling algorithm that combines morphological rules and machine learning; the labeling of secondary accents is done entirely through machine learning algorithms. After 10 rounds of cross-validation, the average tagging accuracy rate of primary stress was 94%, the average tagging accuracy rate of secondary stress was 94%, and the total tagging accuracy rate was 83.6%. This perceptual study separates the labeling of primary and secondary accents providing the promising outcomes. (shrink)

We present well-ordering proofs for Martin-Löf's type theory with W-type and one universe. These proofs, together with an embedding of the type theory in a set theoretical system as carried out in Setzer show that the proof theoretical strength of the type theory is precisely ψΩ1Ω1 + ω, which is slightly more than the strength of Feferman's theory T0, classical set theory KPI and the subsystem of analysis + . The strength of intensional and extensional version, of the version à (...) la Tarski and à la Russell are shown to be the same. (shrink)

This paper aims to apply contemporary theories of causation to historiography. The main purpose is to show that historians can use the concept of causation in a variety of ways, each of which is associated with different historiographical claims and different kinds of argumentation. Through this application, it will also become clear, contrary to what is often stated, that historical narratives are (in a specific way) causal, and that micro-history can be seen as a response to a very specific (causal) (...) problem of Braudelian macro-history. (shrink)

This paper consists of two parts. In the first part, I give an in-depth comparison and analysis of the theories of Frank Ankersmit and Eelco Runia, in which I highlight their most important resemblances and differences. What both have in common is their notion of the presence of the past as a ‘presence in absence’. They differ, however, with respect to the character of this past and the role representation plays in making it present. Second, I also argue that for (...) both Ankersmit and Runia, the presence of the past is always the present of our past, which excludes the experience of the otherness of the past, and which opens both theories to the criticisms of being self-centered and nationalistic. (shrink)

In this article, the main complexities of understanding and curbing the HIV/AIDS pandemic in (South) Africa, are discussed. These are: 1. Poverty as niche or social context of the pandemic, 2. Denial, lack of leadership and the politicization of the public discourse on AIDS, 3. Problems related to accomplishing behavior changes under conditions of deprivation and illiteracy, 4. Women's vulnerability, and 5. The disenchantment of intimacy brought about by the pandemic. In each case, some solutions are suggested, although the notion (...) of complexity does not allow for definitive solutions. Concluding remarks deal with the possible philosophical and moral sense that we might make of the pandemic. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue with Ernst Cassirer that anticipation plays an essential part in the constitution of time, as seen from a transcendental perspective. Time is, as any transcendental concept, regarded as basically relational and subjective and only in a derivative way objective and indifferent to us. This entails that memory is prior to history, and that anticipation is prior to prediction. In this paper, I will give some examples in order to argue for this point. Furthermore, I (...) will also argue, again with Cassirer and contra Henri Bergson, that time should be seen as a functional unity, and not as a collection of three different things-in-themselves (past, present and future). (shrink)

In this paper we try to bring some clarification in the recent debate on causal pluralism. Our first aim is to clarify what it means to have a pluralistic theory of causation and to articulate the criteria by means of which a certain theory of causation can or cannot qualify as a pluralistic theory of causation. We also show that there is currently no theory on the\nmarket which meets these criteria, and therefore no full-blown pluralist theory of causation exists. Because (...) of this, we offer a general strategy by means of which pluralist theories of causation can be developed. (shrink)

In this paper, I will present what I take to be a standard view of morality, and I argue that this view amounts to a paradox: the moral event or moral concern, the source of morality, ultimately leads, through moral theory, to a denial of itself. I will show how Badiou and Levinas take a way out of this and in doing so deny the possibility of anticipating the moral. Furthermore, I claim that this anticipatory moment can be introduced back (...) by means of the concept of “practical wisdom” as used in analytical virtue ethics. Finally, I argue that the Kantian notion of the sublime is structurally the same as the moral event in Badiou and Levinas, and that our view of the sublime can benefit from both Levinas’ view and the concept of “practical wisdom” as well. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews How Philosophy Uses Its Past. By John Herman Randall, Jr. Foreword by Cornelius Krus~. (The Matehette Lectures, Wesleyan University, 1961; New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. xiv + 106. $3.50.) One could easily characterize this small volume as a minor masterpiece on a major theme. It is an admirable statement from the pen of one of America's leading thinkers in both the history of (...) philosopy and philosophy "proper." Actually the distinction between these two fields of philosophic activity becomes superfluous since Professor Randall has an elaborate theory of his own, whereby to do philosophy and do it well involves, in a serious and inescapable way, competent performance in the history of philosophy. How Philosophy UsesIts Past may have to be read, and I propose here that it should, as the general introduction to Randall's projected three volumes of his monumental The Career of Philosophy, of which only Volume One has been published. The close analyses of specific men and issues presented in the latter work can be seen as the evidence meant to corroborate the thesis asserted in How Philosophy Uses Its Past. In his own words: "It remains true that it is impossible to gain insight into the history of philosophical ideas--into the dimensions of philosophizing--without being led to formulate a philosophy of cultural change" (p. 20). Randall has made in this volume a significant contribution if only by way of focusing his powerful lens on three central issues: (1) how genuine philosophizing is still "metaphysical" thinking; (2) why it is necessary to undertake a thorough investigation of the antecedents leading up to our prevailing philosophies of experience; (3) how to understand the seemingly chaotic situation in our philosophical affairs, under the age-old distinction of the "one and many." In a critical and appreciative article on Lovejoy, Randall stated his reservations toward Lovejoy's "atomistic" conception of intellectual history and proceeded to note that the history of philosophy has a philosophic function iust as philosophy has historical dimensions such that when adequately explored can tell us much about the nature and limits of our own philosophizing.1 A permeative thesis in the volume under review is that to do "history of philosophy" is to do "philosophy." To show how and why Randall believes this to be the case, we must consider in some detail three of his main themes: the redefinition of metaphysics, the broader conception of experience, and the "one and many" aspect of contemporary philosophy. One may go so far as to say that Randall is doing philosophy just as he is formulating a theory of the philosophy, for the sake of responding philosophically to the stated problems. But to respond philosophically is something that one must learn in conjunction with the examination of the historical past of philosophy. Randall thus believes, on the evidence gathered, that philosophy has revealed itself to be "a clarification and criticism of fundamental beliefs involved in all the great enterprises of human culture, science, art, religion, the moral, social and practical activity, when some new idea or some altered experience has impinged upon them and generated intellectual tensions and maladjustments" (pp. 19; 100). This way of understanding philosophy affects his approach to every problem he mentions. Indeed, even the denial of the importance of the history of philosophy is rooted in historical processes which must be understood before the denial can be fully illumined. Without historical knowledge, he argues even our decisions will suffer (p. 14). Randall calls his approach to defining philosophical problems "operational." Accordingly, we do not know whether we have a philosophical problem until a philosophical response has occurred. Looking back from the response to what it was that philosophers responded to, we See Randall's "Arthur O. Lovejoy and the History of Ideas," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,XXII (1963), 475-479; also book under review, p. 36. [1071 108 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY discover that these were problems that emerged "whenever strife of ideas and experiences forced men back to the fundamental assumptions in any field" (p. 18). Briefly put, the response has always been that of analysing, clarifying, criticizing and reconstructing "fundamental assumptions." The problems vary and... (shrink)

La evidencia fenomenológica ha sido caracterizada como cumplimiento de una intención mentante, comprensión que tiende a asimilar la evidencia con la conciencia plena, sin hacer justicia a la esencial implicancia mutua de vacío y plenitud que la constituye por su carácter horizóntico-intencional. El horizonte, configurado típicamente, ofrece el campo de cumplimiento posible, por lo que puede sostenerse que la evidencia tiene lugar en una conciencia de posibilidad, es decir, modal, aunque en sentido originariamente material y no dóxico o posicional, pues (...) es el primero el que compete a las relaciones de cumplimiento. La modalidad que caracteriza esencialmente a la evidencia no se revela entonces en la modalización posible en cuanto modificación posicional de un contenido unitario, sino en su configuración material “perfilada” de plenitud y vacío que da algo como algo remitiendo a otras posibilidades como momentos de su propia validez. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to inquire into the meaning of the troublesome Aristotelian expression ‘Ο λόγοσ τῆσ οὐσίασ as it occurs at the very opening of Categories 1a 1–2, 7. That the passage has presented serious difficulties to commentators and translators alike can be easily ascertained through a survey and comparison of the relevant literature. It would seem from the disagreements among translators that the passage is either vague in the original Greek or that Aristotle did not have (...) a special doctrine to put across at the very opening such that would require technical formulations that would comply with the ontology presented in this treatise. (shrink)

This study endeavours to demonstrate the dynamic “tolerance-recognition” in view of a comprehensive paradigm. Tolerance is presumed to be a „modus vivendi” – that is, the recognition of multiple ways of finding the good and happiness by human communities. In this context, the author proposes, as a heuristic device, a model of humanity based upon correlations between nature, condition, and essence as hypostases of humanity. In this way the study attempts to contribute to the planning of a necessary politics and (...) culture of recognition. (shrink)

Focused on the dynamic of the relations between truth and acknowledgement, this study brings forward the following series of hypotheses: 1) between “the essence of truth”, as revelation and referential experience, cognitive and moral supreme resort and the various embodiments of partial, temporary and relative truths, there is an operational space of thinking and acting, favorable to the comprehensive truths, as we call them; 2) within the unceasing aspiration of overcoming the partial truths and asymptotical closeness to “the essence of (...) truth”, the comprehensive truth is the wide-awakeness of the self-conscience haunted by worries and doubts and which, through the quests for faith and reason, becomes capable of acknowledgement; 3) from an extensional point of view, the comprehensive truth is the acknowledgement in the informational-cognitive area, and from the intentional point of view, the comprehensive truth is the acknowledgement in the axiological and moral areas; 4) if by means of comprehension we acknowledge something or someone, then comprehension and acknowledgement interact with each other, and the path towards a culture of acknowledgement can be realized by living the comprehensive truth as a truth of acknowledgement oriented to understanding and communication; 5) the path towards a culture of acknowledgement implies the establishment and implementation of a human model, a real challenge for each of us. The anthropological model that this study suggests starts from the dynamic of the hypostases of the human being. According to this model, the human nature, as the natural essence of what human means and the human condition of moral and spiritual fulfillment, meet in the human essence synthesized in what Pope John Paul II called “the acting person”. By shaping the real human being, a fallible and creative being, through the dynamic of his hypostasis, we come to a comprehensive truth regarding the human being, a truth on which the culture of acknowledgement is founded. Moreover, the main idea of our demarche is that between acknowledgement and comprehension there is a deep, organic connection for the comprehensive truth that lies at the basis of the culture of acknowledgement. (shrink)

In this paper, I take up Herman Paul’s suggestion to analyze the process of writing history in terms of virtues. In contrast to Paul, however, I argue that the concept of virtue used here should not be based on virtue epistemology, but rather on virtue ethics. The reason is that virtue epistemology is discriminative towards non-coginitive virtues and incompatible with the Ankersmitian/Whitean view of historiography as a multivocal path from historical reality to historical representation. Virtue ethics on the other hand, (...) more specifically those forms of virtue ethics which emphasize the uncodifiability thesis, is very capable of providing such an account. In order to make this somewhat more concrete, I distinguish four important traits of virtue ethics, and I try to make clear how these can be interpreted with respect to the writing of history. (shrink)

In From History to Theory, Kerwin Lee Klein writes a history of the central terms of the discipline of theory of history, such as “historiography,” “philosophy of history,” “theory of history,” and “memory.” Klein tells us when and how these terms were used, how the usage of some declined during the twentieth century, and how other terms became increasingly popular. More important, Klein also shows that the use of these words is not innocent. Using words such as “theory” or “historiography” (...) implies certain specific ideas about what the writing of history should be like, and how theoretical reflection on the nature of history and its writing relates to the practical issues of the discipline.In the second half of his book, Klein focuses more on the concept of memory and the memory boom since the later part of the 1980s. He observes that “memory” came to be seen as a kind of “counterhistory,” a postcolonial, fragmented, and personal alternative to the traditional mainstream discourse of history. Klein does not necessarily disagree with this view, but he does warn us about unwanted side effects. More specifically, he argues that the discourse of memory is surprisingly compatible with that of extremist right-wing groups, and should be treated with suspicion. Although Klein certainly has a point, he presents it in a rather dogmatic fashion. However, a more nuanced version of Klein's criticism of memory can be developed by building on Klein's suggestion that there is an intimate connection between memory and identity. (shrink)

Aristotle’s virtue ethics can teach us about the relationship between our habits and our actions. Throughout his works, Aristotle explains much about how one may develop a virtuous character, and little about how one might change from one character type to another. In recent years criminal law has been concerned with the issue of recidivism and how our system might reform the criminals we return to society more effectively. This paper considers how Aristotle might say a vicious person could change (...) and what a penal system could do to facilitate such a transformation. It discusses how previous attempts to rehabilitate criminals may have failed because they do not address habit in the way that Aristotle advocates. This paper concludes that a rehabilitative model that addresses habit more aggressively than previous methods might be required to soften the hardest criminals. (shrink)

The purpose of this book, first published in 1957, is to make a critical analysis of the controversial Socratic problem. The Socratic issue owes its paramount difficulty not only to the status of available source materials, but also to the diversity of opinion as to the proper use of these materials. This volume offers a new approach to the problem, and a starting point to further investigations.

Normal 0 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Hegel is often considered as obscure author. This means that for him, reason speaks differently than it thinks. It is at stake, first of all, the Hegelian terminology and the invocation of Heraclitus. It is interesting that Hegel himself had spoken out against an obscure terminology and against the abuse (...) of abstractions. Initially, as a professor, he was not taken very seriously. He was a bad story-teller, although an exceptional thinker. He could not narrate, however, he could explain. But, people would eventually understand, since Hegel was one obsessed with method. For him, the method had a far greater significance than the system. In the present text, I will focus on these things, trying to see whether Hegel was, indeed, obscure and if, for him, reason really does speak differently than it thought. For this, I have chosen a few fragments that I believed to be exemplary from Hegelian philosophy. The purpose is to show that Hegel is not, however, as Papini maliciously named him, a philosopher of the incomprehensible. On the contrary! And the considerations on Hegelian ethics do not come to help, as an application of the theme that I assumed as starting point for the present text. (shrink)

El artículo analiza las concepciones nucleares o ideas-fuerza de la Nueva Derecha Europea en sus diferentes versiones, ortodoxa y heterodoxa , y las compara con las concepciones nucleares del fascismo clásico para establecer los factores de continuidad y de divergencia con él. Los ideólogos de la ND difieren del fascismo clásico en diversos aspectos, como por ejemplo en el apoyo a las formaciones populistas de derecha radical, pero comparten una misma visión del mundo y una forma de estar en él. (...) En sus publicaciones muestran, de forma similar a como lo hicieron los ideólogos del fascismo clásico, una misma diagnosis de la situación ; plantean unos mismos objetivos y utilizan unos mismos referentes culturales . Un aspecto central de los factores de continuidad reside, a su vez, en que comparten una similar concepción del hombre, de la naturaleza y de la historia. El hombre como un ser agresivo, jerarquizado y territorializado. (shrink)