In this paper, we discuss how to conceptual engineer ‘entropy’ and ‘information’ as they are used in information theory or statistical mechanics. Initially, we evaluate the extent to which the all-pervasive entangled use of entropy and information notions can be somehow defective in these domains, such as being meaningless or generating confusion. Then, we assess the main ameliorative strategies to improve this defective conceptual practice. The first strategy is to substitute the terms ‘entropy’ and ‘information’ by non-loaded terms, as it (...) was first argued by Bar-Hillel (1955). A second strategy is to prescribe how these terms should be correctly used to be meaningful, as it was pioneered by Carnap (1952 [1977]) in Two Essays on Entropy. However, the actual implementation of these two ameliorative strategies has been historically unsuccessful due to the low credentials that philosophers as conceptual prescribers have among scientists. Finally, to try to solve these obstacles, we propose a third strategy based on leveraging evidence from the contribution of ‘Philosophy in Science’ (à la Pradeau et al. 2024) to integrate conceptual prescriptions and analyses of entropy and information as part of the scientific practices in which these notions are used. (shrink)

In this paper I will defend the incapacity of the informational frameworks in thermal physics, mainly those that historically and conceptually derive from the work of Brillouin (1962) and Jaynes (1957a), to robustly explain the approach of certain gaseous systems to their state of thermal equilibrium from the dynamics of their molecular components. I will further argue that, since their various interpretative, conceptual and technical-formal resources (e.g. epistemic interpretations of probabilities and entropy measures, identification of thermal entropy as Shannon information, (...) and so on) are shown to be somehow incoherent, inconsistent or inaccurate, these informational proposals need to 'epistemically parasitize' the manifold of theoretical resources of Boltzmann's and Gibbs' statistical mechanics, respectively, in order to properly account for the equilibration process of an ideal gas from its microscopic properties. Finally, our conclusion leads us to adopt a sort of constructive skepticism regarding the explanatory value of the main informationalist trends in statistical thermophysics. (shrink)

En este artículo defiendo que el problema humeano de la justificación racional de la inducción no ha contribuido a la comprensión filosófica de este tipo de inferencias. La teoría material de la inducción propuesta por Norton (2003) permite analizar el razonamiento inductivo más allá del laberinto justificativo humeano, pero con un corte demasiado alto: asumir que las inducciones dependen intrínsecamente de cómo es localmente la realidad. En su lugar, propongo una teoría de la inducción en la que las inducciones dependen (...) no de tesis ontológicas, sino de las capacidades cognitivas para comprimir información de un modo epistémicamente efectivo. (shrink)

This work constitutes one of the first introductions to the new branch of philosophy focused on applying information concepts to address ontological, epistemological and ethical problems. Led Luciano Floridi, the philosophy of information has emerged in recent decades as an attempt to incorporate the effects of the digital revolution into the methods and themes of philosophical thought. What is meaning? How do we gain knowledge of reality? From the early 1950s to the present day, Rudolf Carnap, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Fred (...) Dretske, among others, have sought to use informational notions to try to answer these questions. In this book, Javier Anta presents the philosophy of information through a historical and conceptual approach ranging from Shannon's theory to the recent naturalistic proposals of Brian Skyrms. He also analyzes the main concepts of information that have allowed the consolidation of this new philosophical discipline. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that the two main approaches to statistical mechanics, that of Boltzmann and Gibbs, constitute two substantially different theoretical apparatuses. Particularly, I defend that this theoretical split must be philosophically understood as a separation of epistemic functions within this physical domain: while Boltzmannians are able to generate powerful explanations of thermal phenomena from molecular dynamics, Gibbsians can statistically predict observable values in a highly effective way. Therefore, statistical mechanics is a counterexample to Hempel's (1958) symmetry (...) thesis, where the predictive capacity of a theory is directly correlated with its explanatory potential and vice versa. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyze the physical content of the main information concepts in the history of physics of the last seven decades. I argue that this physical character should be evaluated not by appealing to analytical-linguistic confusion (Timpson 2013) or to the usefulness of its applicability (Lombardi et al. 2016), but properly from its capacity to allow us to acquire significant knowledge about the physical world. After systematically employing this epistemic criterion of physical significance I will conclude by rejecting (...) the main strategies of ontological inflation and physical content of the main information concepts in the classical thermal physics literature. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to defend a twofold thesis. On one hand, I will sup-port, against Perini [7], the indispensability of diagrams when structurally complex biomolecules are concerned, since it is not possible to satisfactorily use linguistic-sentential representations at that domain. On the other hand, even when diagrams are dispensable I will defend than they will generally be more effective than other representations in encoding biomolecular knowledge, relying on Kulvicki-Shimojima’s diagrammatic effectiveness thesis. Finally, I will ground many epistemic virtues (...) of biomolecular diagrams (understandability, explanatory power, prediction and hypothesis evaluation) on their cognitive-computational indispensability and their semantic-epistemic effectiveness. (shrink)

In this paper I will evaluate whether some knowledge states that are interpretatively derived from statistical mechanical probabilities could be somehow relevant in actual practices, as famously rejected by Albert (2000). On one side, I follow Frigg (2010a) in rejecting the causal relevance of knowledge states as a mere byproduct of misinterpreting this theoretical field. On the other side, I will argue against Uffink (2011) that probability-represented epistemic states cannot be explanatorily relevant, because (i) probabilities cannot faithfully represent significant epistemic (...) states, and (ii) those states cannot satisfactorily account for why an agent should theoretically believe or expect something. (shrink)

In this paper I will defend an approach to the thought experiment known as ‘Maxwell’s Demon’ based on a Maxwellian conception of statistical mechanics. Instead of assuming that thermodynamic descriptions depend reductively on the dynamics of molecular components, I will adopt a conception of thermophysics as a ‘resource theory’ in the Maxwellian line recently defended by Myrvold (2011) and Wallace (2017). From this interpretative stance, Maxwell’s demon would not lead directly to the plausibility of violating the second law of thermodynamics, (...) but to show the pragmatic impossibility of knowing deterministically the exact microscopic of thermal systems. (shrink)

El primer objetivo de este artículo es mostrar que explicaciones genuinamente geométricas/matemáticas e intrínsecamente diagramáticas de fenómenos físicos no solo son posibles en la práctica científica, sino que además comportan un potencial epistémico que sus contrapartes simbólico-verbales carecen. Como ejemplo representativo utilizaremos la metodología geométrica de John Wheeler (1963) para calcular cantidades físicas en una reacción nuclear. Como segundo objetivo pretendemos analizar, desde un marco inferencial, la garantía epistémica de este tipo de explicaciones en términos de dependencia sintáctica y semántica (...) del contenido lo inferido en las premisas, lo cual denominaremos criterio de validez inferencial (CVI). (shrink)

Ontic Structural Realism, as pivotal position in philosophy of science and metaphysics, defends the idea that the world is ultimately constituted of real physical structures. French (2014) regards physical symmetries as the foundational structure of a world without objects. On the other hand, Ladyman and Ross (2007) hold that the world is essentially made of non-redundant informational structure. I argue in this paper that these two positions are by no means incompatible, for instance by interpreting French’s physical symmetries as real (...) structures both encompassing and compressing every piece of information (Kolmogorov complexity) within the world. (shrink)

In this talk I present the main results from Anta (2021), namely, that the theoretical division between Boltzmannian and Gibbsian statistical mechanics should be understood as a separation in the epistemic capabilities of this physical discipline. In particular, while from the Boltzmannian framework one can generate powerful explanations of thermal processes by appealing to their microdynamics, from the Gibbsian framework one can predict observable values in a computationally effective way. Finally, I argue that this statistical mechanical schism contradicts the (...) Hempelian (1958) thesis that the predictive power of a scientific theory is directly proportional to its explanatory potential, and vice versa. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to demonstrate that Rudolf Carnap's analysis of the application of information theory within physics, an intellectual-historical precedent of current philosophical criticisms toward this tendency, is justified. First, Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952) underlined the unjustified ‘semantification’ of Shannon entropy Furthermore, Carnap criticized the ‘physicalization’ of Shannon entropy, but that criticism was not accepted by the physics community of the 1950s (Köhler 2001). Finally, in the posthumously published "Two Essays on Entropy" Carnap (1977) developed a critical assessment (...) of entropy concepts that showed some deep conceptual and interpretative deficiencies in Jaynes (1957a) and Brillouin’s (1956) informational approaches to thermophysics. (shrink)

Although the everyday notion of information has clear semantic properties, the all-pervasive technical concept of Shannon information is usually considered as a non-semantic concept. In this paper I show how this concept was implicitly ‘semantized’ in the early 1950s by many authors, such as Rothstein or Brillouin, in order to explain the knowledge dynamics underlying certain scientific practices such as measurement. On the other hand, I argue that the main attempts in the literature to develop a quantitative measure of semantic (...) information to clarify science and scientific measurements, such as Carnap-Bar-Hillel, or Dretske, will not successfully achieve this philosophical aim for several reasons. Finally, I defend the use of a qualitative notion of semantic information within the information-theoretical framework MacKay to assess the informational dynamics underlying scientific practices, particularly measurements in statistical mechanics. (shrink)

ArgumentIn this comparative historical analysis, we will analyze the intellectual tendency that emerged between 1946 and 1956 to take advantage of the popularity of communication theory to develop a kind of informational epistemology of statistical mechanics. We will argue that this tendency results from a historical confluence in the early 1950s of certain theoretical claims of the so-called English School of Information Theory, championed by authors such as Gabor (1956) or MacKay (1969), and from the attempt to extend the profound (...) success of Shannon’s ([1948] 1993) technical theory of sign transmission to the field of statistical thermal physics. As a paradigmatic example of this tendency, we will evaluate the intellectual work of Léon Brillouin (1956), who, in the mid-fifties, developed an information theoretical approach to statistical mechanical physics based on a concept of information linked to the knowledge of the observer. (shrink)

In this paper we develop an inferential account on the meaning and reference of theoretical concepts in physics, mainly based on the pragmatic notion of ‘inferential validity’. Firstly, we distinguish between empirical meaningfulness and theoretical significance as two different modes of meaning, wherein the former depends on consistently encoding experimental values, as proposed by Chang, and the latter on being semantically coherent with other concepts. Secondly, we argue that each of these contributions to the validity of inferences imports a causal (...) and representational mechanism of reference-fixing, respectively. Finally, we will rely on entropy concepts as our case study. (shrink)

Throughout the history of the philosophy of science, theories have been linked to formulas as a privileged representational format. In this paper, following, I defend a semantic-representational conception of theories, where theories are identified with sets of scientific re-presentations by virtue of their epistemic potential and independently of their format. To show the potential of this proposal, I analyze as a case study the use of phase diagrams in statistical mechanics to convey in a semantically consistent and syntactically correct way (...) theoretical principles such as Liouville’s theorem. I conclude by defending this philosophical position as a tool to show the enormous representational richness underlying scientific practices. (shrink)

In this paper we argue for an integrated inferential conception about theories and representations and its role in accounting for the theoretical value of philosophically disregarded representational practices, such as the systematic use of phase space diagrams within the theoretical context of statistical mechanics. This proposal would rely on both inferentialism about scientific representations (Suárez 2004) and inferentialism about particular physical theories (Wallace 2017). We defend that both perspectives somehow converge into an integrated inferentialism by means of the thesis theories (...) as being composed of representations, as defended from the representational semantic conception defended by Suárez and Pero (2019). (shrink)

This paper aims to analyze a specific way in which a scientific programme or area can, in Lakatosian terms, degenerate: namely, through a developmental process of intellectual inflation. Adopting a pluralist approach to the notion of scientific progress, we propose that the historical development of a particular scientific area can be analyzed as being intellectually inflationary during a bounded period of time if it has considerably increased its productive output (thus displaying productive progress) while the overall semantic or epistemic value (...) of those products have not improved in a significant fashion (thus lacking progress in a semantic or epistemic sense). Then, we apply this concept to thoroughly assess whether there are some intellectually inflationary patterns in the development of two areas of research: (i) information-theoretical evolutionary biology in 1961-2023, and (ii) ensemblist non-equilibrium statistical mechanics in 1938-2023. And finally, we argue that tracking and analyzing intellectually inflationary patterns in the history of sciences might contribute to vindicate a non-productivist picture of current scientific research. (shrink)

En este artículo pretendo evaluar las bases conceptuales y interpretativas de las ‘paradojas info-térmicas’ subyacentes a las aproximaciones informacionales a la física térmica, por las cuales nuestra información epistémica sobre un sistema molecular aumenta y disminuye simultáneamente cuando este se aproxima al equilibrio térmico. Defiendo que el contenido paradójico de nuestra tesis persiste incluso cuando se distinguen distintos tipos de información, debido a la conexión robusta entre la parte del incremento y la parte de la disminución informacional de la tesis. (...) Concluiré defendiendo que dicha paradoja muestra las inconsistencias conceptuales de las aproximaciones informacionales de la física térmica. (shrink)

In this study I aim to develop a cognitive evaluation of how semantically-driven and rule-based diagrammatic reasoning were psychologically plausible for partic-ular cases of scientific practice: an actual trackless path reconstruction in bubble chamber experiments, as reported by Galison (1997). I will propose “cognitive imagery projection and manipulation” (CIPM) as the most plausible psychologi-cal (perceptual/attentional/cognitive) mechanism matching the specific explanatory requirements for the case study, outlining the most significant current theories about this mental phenomenon (Shimojima; 2011).

Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences: From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Physics introduces us to the philosophy of physics of logical empiricism. However, here the expression “philosophy of physics” does not refer to a consolidated area of philosophy but to the set of concepts, methods, and analyses relating to general relativity, quantum mechanics, and other physical theories that were developed by the members of the logical empiricist movement. Because of the thoroughness with which it treats an issue so (...) unjustly disregarded in the literature, Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences is an essential work not only for HOPOS readers interested in the intellectual origins of recent philosophy of physics but also for those interested in general philosophy of science. The main aim of this book is to overturn many of the inherited prejudices about how the logical empiricists—Carnap, Reichenbach, Frank, Neurath, and Feigl, among others—related philosophically to the physics of their time. (shrink)

Is structure a fundamental and indispensable part of the world? Is the question of ontology a question about structure? Structure is a central notion in contemporary metaphysics [Sider 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Clarendon Press]. Realism about structure claims that the question of ontology is about the fundamental and indispensable structure of the world. In this paper, I present a criticism of the metaphysics of realism about structure based on a version of Russell’s famous regress argument against (...) nominalism [Russell 1911. “On the Relation of Universals and Particular.” In Logic & Knowledge. Reprint, London: George Allen & Unwin]. First, I argue that the three general tests for the fundamentality of structure proposed by realism about structure rely on a particular empirical test for structure, namely, the so-called ‘similarity test for structure.’ Second, I argue that the similarity test is not well-founded because it leads to a vicious regress. Third, I argue that the regress affects the whole metaphysics of realism about structure, and that no structural notion can be said to be fundamental in connection with any of the other tests. Lastly, I argue that the question of ontology as a question about structure is not substantive. (shrink)

What is the so-called “question of ontology?” Is the question of ontology genuinely a question about “categories” (Lowe 2006), “structure” (Sider 2011), “existence” (Thomasson 2015), or rather “reality” (Fine 2009)? In this article, I defend the neo-Sellarsian approach to the question of ontology, a novel, naturalistic approach according to which the foundational question of ontology is about “understanding the manifest and the scientific images of the world, and their multiple relationships.” First, I argue for the thesis of Impure Eliminativism, a (...) form of constructive pluralism about the question of ontology by which the substantivity of questions of ontology which are not the neo-Sellarsian one is to be built upon certain relations with the neo-Sellarsian question of ontology. Second, I argue for the categorial plasticity of the two images and their relations in connection with the hypothesis of Weak Epistemic Factualism. Third, and lastly, I argue for a person-based ontology framed in terms of the crucial notions of “fact” and “understanding” in response to the eliminativist categorizations of the two images and their relationships proposed by substantialism and structuralism. (shrink)

The Sellarsian task of ontology is to reconcile two seemingly divergent images of ordinary objects such as persons, tomatoes and tables, namely, the manifest image of common sense and the scientific image provided by fundamental physics (Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality, 1963). Can the genuine categories of the ontologies of Substantialism (Heil, The World as We Find It, 2012), Structural Realism (Ladyman and Ross,Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, 2007; French, The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, 2014), and (...) Factualism (Cumpa, ‘A Materialist Criterion of Fundamentality’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 2014), such as ‘substance’, ‘structure’, and ‘fact’, help us to solve the problem of the reconciliation of the two images of ordinary objects? In this paper I defend the thesis that the ontology of Factualism does a better job of reconciling the manifest and the scientific images of ordinary objects than other ontologies. (shrink)

El propósito de este estudio es dilucidar algunos de los rasgos distintivos de la concepción del ser humano que mantiene Jürgen Habermas y sus implicaciones en la teoría de la acción comunicativa. De este modo, se trata de mostrar que la antropología habermasiana se singulariza por adoptar una perspectiva naturalista y darwinista. En la primera parte, se analiza el legado epistemológico de Darwin como un programa de investigación y se contrastan los estudios de Habermas sobre antropología biológica con las últimas (...) investigaciones en genética y paleontología. En la segunda parte, se presenta la propuesta de Habermas de afrontar un dualismo epistemológico mediante un naturalismo débil noreduccionista, como crítica de la metafísica moderna y estructurador de un nuevo realismo. (shrink)

El siguiente texto intenta exponer algunas de las ideas básicas de la tercera de las tres partes que componen Meditaciones del Quijote: la “Meditación primera. Breve tratado de la novela”. En las no muchas páginas que ocupa el texto de Ortega, se ofrece una visión sobre el inmortal libro de Cervantes que no puede dejar indiferentes a los filósofos.

El objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer una interpretación, en parte novedosa, del pasaje 5.54-5.5423 del Tractatus en el que Wittgenstein examina las proposiciones que representan relaciones intencionales como el juicio. La idea fundamental será que estas proposiciones se consideran como proposiciones que tratan de complejos y, en consecuencia, deberían analizarse de conformidad con el parágrafo 2.0201, lo que me llevará a desarrollar paso a paso el análisis propuesto. Adicionalmente, argumentaré que la teoría de Wittgenstein así entendida excluye la posibilidad (...) de juzgar sinsentidos, a diferencia de la teoría de Russell del juicio como relación múltiple. (shrink)

Reinhardt Grossmann is one of the most sophisticated, knowledgeable and original contemporary metaphysicians. Although he was a student of Bergmann, he influenced the development of Bergmann's metaphysics considerably. No philosopher other than Grossmann defends perception to that degree against the persistent skeptical arguments. He characterizes his epistemological positions as radical empiricism and radical realism. By realism Grossmann mainly means the view that the material things we perceive exist. It is thus also an ontological position and closely related to his empiricism. (...) Grossmann's empiricism is radical insofar as he claims that entities of all categories are perceptible, even numbers and universals. Grossmann's universal realism advocates a theory of abstract categories against the current naturalism. He distinguishes between the world and the physical universe. The latter is the domain of science; the former is the subject of ontology. (shrink)

Aristotle recognises preternatural affections in numerous passages from his ethical writings, where he claims that some desires and emotions are beyond human nature, too strong for our nature to withstand, and that an action motivated by them is συγγνωμονικὸν: something excusable. However, there has been some reluctance among scholars to explicitly acknowledge that Aristotle recognised preternatural affections as a category of excuse in its own right. The aim of this paper is to remove the obstacles that stand in the way (...) of such a recognition, and to show that Aristotle developed a normative account of preternatural affections, based on the natural human capacity to withstand, allowing him to class them as genuine cases of βία, compulsion. (shrink)

En este texto discutiremos dos elementos de la propuestas de Habermas sobre el rol de la religión en la esfera pública: la naturaleza especial del lenguaje religioso y las posibilidades de la traducción entre un lenguaje religioso y uno secular. Esto lo haremos a partir de las reflexiones de Wittgenstein sobre la naturaleza del lenguaje y sobre los diferentes sentidos de la comprensión. Mostraremos que estas últimas pueden ser valiosas para justificar por qué el lenguaje religioso necesita un análisis diferenciado (...) y para explicar por qué y cómo, a pesar de lo anterior, la traducción es posible. (shrink)

Information technologies have made possible the rising of new forms of communities, cities and societies. These changes are analyzed from the perspective of innovation studies, as technological but also social innovations. Starting from the contributions of Ortega y Gasset to the philosophy of technology, and applying these ideas to the information and communications technologies system, this article introduces the notions of technosocieties and cybercities. Our aim is to deeply examine the Telepolis project; a digital and global city supported by ICT (...) and artificial intelligence. We pay attention to the different challenges that AI will have to face in upcoming years in technosocieties and cybercities. In our opinion, the future of AI is tightly related with the technological support of this kind of new city and their cybercitizens. Finally, we claim that there won’t be a shared public space in the infosphere till public organizations acknowledge the importance of promoting and maintaining this new and already needed digital agora. (shrink)

La noción de intimidad tiene diversos orígenes y acepciones. En la tradición filosófica, Séneca, Agustín de Hipona, Lutero, Pascal, Descartes, Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant, Mill, Freud, Ortega y Zambrano concibieron la intimidad desde diferentes enfoques. Esta contribución dedica especial atención a Ortega y Gasset, porque vinculó ensimismamiento y técnica. Asimismo afirma una intimidad voluntariamente compartida que se desarrolla mediante relaciones íntimas en red. Sin embargo, algunos sistemas tecnológicos amenazan la intimidad. Es el caso de la inteligencia artificial promovida por el transhumanismo, (...) que surgió con el programa NBIC. Transhumanistas tecnocientíficos de gran influencia mundial, como Harari, han defendido ideas particularmente peligrosas para la intimidad de las personas. Para combatir esas amenazas se requiere promover una intimidad compartida y en red. Asimismo hay que desarrollar la noción de tecnopersona, reinvindicando el derecho a la intimidad de las tecnopersonas en el mundo digital. (shrink)

In a letter of September 1679 to Huygens, Leibniz proposed a calculus situs directly applicable to geometric relations without use of magnitudes. His researehes on this kind of Geometric Calculus were developed along all his life but, unfortunately, only a few Leibniz’ s writings on these matters had been published by Gerhardt and Couturat. They were closely connected to his own researches on Logic Calculus. From a chronological point of view, the unpublished manuscript Circa Geometrica Generalia may be considered as (...) the third most important Leibniz’ contribution on Calculus Situs. CGG summarizes several results obtained by Leibniz from 1679 to 1682 and contains some interesting ideas concerning set theory, geometric axioms, General Topology and Logic Foundations of Geometry.En una carta a Huygens escrita en septiembre de 1679, Leibniz propuso un calculus situs que fuese aplicable al estudio directo de las relaciones geometricas, sin utilizar magnitudes. Sus investigaciones en torno a los Cálculos Geometricos continuaron a lo largo de toda su vida, pero, lamentablemente, Gerhardt y Couturat sólo publicaron una pequeña parte de sus manuscritos sobre estos temas. Estasinvestigaciones estuvieron estrechamente conectadas con los trabajos de Leibniz sobre Cálculos Lógicos. El manuscrito inédito Circa Geometrica Generalia puede ser considerado, desde un punto de vista cronológico, como la tercera más importante contribución de Leibniz al Calculus Situs. En CGG Leibniz resume varios logros obtenidos desde 1679 hasta 1682 y expone ideas interesantes en relación con la Teoría de Conjuntos, los axiomas de la geometria, la Topologia General y los fundamentos logicos de la Geometría. (shrink)

La caverna platónica real es la naturaleza y está compuesta por una sucesión de microcuevas engarzadas en el espacio y en el tiempo, nuestros respectivos Lebenswelten. El lugar del filósofo es la boca de la caverna, es decir, el lugar donde se proyectan los objetos artificiales cuyas sombras son el Lebenswelt. El teatro, el cine, la televisión y actualmente Internet son buenas representaciones de las diversas cuevas virtuales que los humanos construimos dentro de la caverna real para representar nuestra situación (...) en el mundo. Las sombras de la caverna platónica sólo eran visuales. Si pensamos en una caverna audiovisual, también lo que decimos y escribimos sería una ficción, un eco de palabras que otros proyectan sobre nosotros. Los recientes avances tecnológicos en digitalización de los sentidos abren la posibilidad de construir cavernas pentasensoriales. En términos leibnicianos, éstas serían las mejores cavernas posibles.La caverna platónica real es la naturaleza y está compuesta por una sucesión de microcuevas engarzadas en el espacio y en el tiempo, nuestros respectivos Lebenswelten. El lugar del filósofo es la boca de la caverna, es decir, el lugar donde se proyectan los objetos artificiales cuyas sombras son el Lebenswelt. El teatro, el cine, la televisión y actualmente Internet son buenas representaciones de las diversas cuevas virtuales que los humanos construimos dentro de la caverna real para representar nuestra situación en el mundo. (shrink)