In this post-modern darkness, the Phenomenology of Life and of the Human Condition excavates and brings to light the Logos of Life in its entire harmonizing interplay. In the present collection, which continues the long and winding itinerary of our previous probings, we first uncover the new field of the ontopoiesis of life by means of the self-individualisation of life, the key to its labyrinth (Tymieniecka). A network of the ontopoietic itineraries manifest life in its innumerable perspectives: the constructive scanning (...) (chronos and Kairos) are treated specifically by Eva Syristova, M. Bielawka, F. Bosio, and M.A. Cecilia. Individualising dynamisms of passions and the tying of the communal order by G. Bucher, R. Sweeney, A. Polis, A. Zvie Bar-On and others. The life-struggle for the light of the spirit by L. Sundararajan, I.R. Owen etc. The deep springs of mundaneity in human existence (moral sense, empathy, communication) by A. Luse, A. Ales Bello, J. Cibulka, J. Sivak, etc. (shrink)

In this third volume of a monumental four book survey of Phenome­ nology world-wide fifty years after the death of its chief founder, Edmund Husserl, we have a collection of studies which, in the first place, consider Husserl's legacy in the postmodern world. The extent of our indebtedness to the Master is shown in explora­ tions of the archeology of knowledge, hermeneutics, and critical studies of language by A. Ales Bello, P. Pefialver, P. Million, V. Martinez Guzman, H. Rodriguez Pifiero, (...) Y. Vlaisavlevich, and others. There follow calls for renewing the critique of reason by C. Schrag, F. Bosio, and J. Lerin Riera and discussion by D. Laskey, K. G6rniak-Kocikowska, M. R. Barral, Y. Park, and N. Delle Site on A-T. Tymieniecka's phe­ nomenology of life, which proposes a total reorientation of phenome­ nology by introducing a conception of the human condition in which the human creative act is the Archimedean point for philosophy. (shrink)

In Valuing Health, Dan Hausman argues that well-being is not measurable, at least not in the way that science and policy would require. His argument depends on a demanding conception of well-being and on a pessimistic verdict upon the existing measures of subjective well-being. Neither of these reasons, I argue, warrant as much skepticism as Hausman professes.

BackgroundAn increasing number of studies utilize intracranial electrophysiology in human subjects to advance basic neuroscience knowledge. However, the use of neurosurgical patients as human research subjects raises important ethical considerations, particularly regarding informed consent and undue influence, as well as subjects’ motivations for participation. Yet a thorough empirical examination of these issues in a participant population has been lacking. The present study therefore aimed to empirically investigate ethical concerns regarding informed consent and voluntariness in Parkinson’s disease patients undergoing deep brain (...) stimulator (DBS) placement who participated in an intraoperative neuroscience study.MethodsTwo semi-structured 30-minute interviews were conducted preoperatively and postoperatively via telephone. Interviews assessed participants’ motivations for participation in the parent intraoperative study, recall of information presented during the informed consent process, and participants’ postoperative reflections on the research study.ResultsTwenty-two participants (mean age = 60.9) completed preoperative interviews at a mean of 7.8 days following informed consent and a mean of 5.2 days prior to DBS surgery. Twenty participants completed postoperative interviews at a mean of 5 weeks following surgery. All participants cited altruism or advancing medical science as “very important” or “important” in their decision to participate in the study. Only 22.7% (n = 5) correctly recalled one of the two risks of the study. Correct recall of other aspects of the informed consent was poor (36.4% for study purpose; 50.0% for study protocol; 36.4% for study benefits). All correctly understood that the study would not confer a direct therapeutic benefit to them.ConclusionEven though research coordinators were properly trained and the informed consent was administered according to protocol, participants demonstrated poor retention of study information. While intraoperative studies that aim to advance neuroscience knowledge represent a unique opportunity to gain fundamental scientific knowledge, improved standards for the informed consent process can help facilitate their ethical implementation. (shrink)

The paper develops a philosophical account of emotions experienced and communicated on the internet, and, in particular, in the context of social media use. A growing body of research across disciplines has investigated the distinctive features of emotions in the digital age, and a key question in this regard concerns whether online emotions are the same kind of phenomena as those undergone offline. In this paper, I contribute to addressing this question by suggesting that the structure and characteristic features of (...) internet-mediated emotions can be accounted for within the perspective of Peter Goldie’s narrative theory of emotion. To do so, I first offer a reconstruction of Goldie’s conception of emotions as complex, dynamic, episodic and structured phenomena. I then move to show how the experience of emotions on social media like Facebook displays the characteristics which are at the core of Goldie’s account, proceeding to suggest that this enables us to better understand some of the features of emotions undergone on the internet. More specifically, I argue that the intensity, persistence and contagiousness of some online emotions can be better understood if we adopt Goldie’s framework. (shrink)

The Brentanian idea that every state of consciousness involves a consciousness or awareness of itself (Brentano 1874), which has been a central tenet of the phenomenological school, is a current topic in contemporary philosophical debates about consciousness and subjectivity, both in the continental and the analytic tradition. Typically, the self-awareness that accompanies every state of consciousness is char­acterized as pre-reflective. Most theorists of pre-reflective self-awareness seem to converge on a negative characterization: pre-reflective self-awareness is not a kind of reflective awareness. (...) Whereas reflective self-awareness is attentive and descriptive, pre-reflective self-awareness is non-attentive and non-descriptive.This paper aims to show that the reflective/pre-reflective dichotomy overlooks a finer-grained distinction. The first part is devoted to arguing that the typical use of the adjective ‘pre-reflective’ conflates two properties (non-attentiveness and non-descriptiveness), which are in fact separable. Accordingly, not only can there be non-descriptive and non-attentive self-consciousness (i.e. pre-reflective self-awareness), but also non-descriptive but attentive self-consciousness. I call the latter primitive introspection. The second part of the paper is devoted to arguing that, whereas both pre-reflective self-awareness and primitive introspection enable the subject to apprehend the phenomenology of their experience, the kind of apprehension each allows for is different. By analyzing the notion of apprehension in terms of information acquisition and personal-level availability of information, it is proposed that, although both pre-reflective self-awareness and primitive introspection allow for acquisition of the maximal amount of information about the experience, only primitive introspection makes all such information personal-level available. (shrink)

The burgeoning science of well-being makes no secret of being value laden: improvement of well-being is its explicit goal. But in order to achieve this goal its concepts and claims need to be value adequate; that is, they need, among other things, to adequately capture well-being. In this article I consider two ways of securing this adequacy—first, by relying on philosophical theory of prudential value and, second, by the psychometric approach. I argue that neither is fully adequate and explore an (...) alternative. This alternative requires thorough changes in the way philosophers theorize about well-being. (shrink)

This paper aims to critique the phenomenon of advanced patient autonomy and choice in healthcare within the specific context of self-testing devices. A growing number of self-testing medical devices are currently available for home use. The premise underpinning many of these devices is that they assist individuals to be more autonomous in the assessment and management of their health. Increased patient autonomy is assumed to be a good thing. We take issue with this assumption and argue that self-testing provides a (...) specific example how increased patient autonomy and choice within healthcare might not best serve the patient population. We propose that current interpretations of autonomy in healthcare are based on negative accounts of liberty to the detriment of a more relational understanding. We also propose that Kantian philosophy is often applied to the healthcare arena in an inappropriate manner. We draw on the philosophical literature and examples from the self-testing process to support these claims. We conclude by offering an alternative account of autonomy based on the interrelated concepts of relationality, care and responsibility. (shrink)

"Die Unterscheidung in Haupt- und Nebensache ist ein kulturabhängiges ästhetisches Konstrukt, das immer wieder neu ausgehandelt wird. Dieser Band erschließt die Ästhetik des Beiwerks in der Bild- und Textkultur des Quattrocento über den historischen Begriff Parergon (dt. Beiwerk) folglich auch innerhalb einer Normen- und Rezeptionsgeschichte. Der Topos von der potentiellen Gefährdung des Werkes durch übermäßiges Beiwerk prägt seit der Antike westliche kunsttheoretische, theologische und nicht zuletzt auch wissenschaftliche Diskurse. In eingehenden Analysen verfolgt dieser Band das Phänomen aus der Perspektive von (...) Künstlern des ausgehenden 15. Jahrhunderts, die das scheinbar Nebensächliche als konstitutiv anerkennen und dergestalt produktiv einsetzen. Maler wie Francesco del Cossa, Carlo Crivelli oder Vittore Carpaccio schöpfen aus dem prekären Verhältnis von Ergon und Parergon, indem sie dieses visuell reflektieren und dabei gerade im sakralen Tafelbild das Beiwerk als Ort elaborierter ästhetischer Auseinandersetzungen entdecken."--P. [4] of cover. (shrink)

Fazekas and Overgaard () present a novel, multidimensional model that explains different ways in which conscious representations can be degraded. Moreover, the authors discuss possible mechanisms that underlie different kinds of degradation, primarily those related to attentional processing. In this letter, we argue that the proposed mechanisms are not sufficient. We propose that attentional mechanisms work differently at various processing stages; and factors that are independent of attentional ones, such as expectation, previous experience, and context, should be accounted for if (...) we are aiming to construct a comprehensive model of conscious visual perception. (shrink)

Americans increasingly cite moral values as a factor in how they vote, but when we define morality simply in terms of a voter's position on gay marriage and abortion, we lose sight of the ethical decisions that guide our everyday lives. In our encounters with friends, family members, nature, and nonhuman creatures, we practice a nonutilitarian morality that makes sacrifice a rational and reasonable choice. Recognizing these everyday ethics, Anna L. Peterson argues, helps us move past the seemingly irreconcilable (...) conflicts of culture and refocus on issues that affect real social change. Peterson begins by divining a "second language" for personal and political values, a vocabulary derived from the loving and mutually beneficial relationships of daily life. Even if our interactions with others are fleeting and fragmentary, they provide a viable alternative to the contractual and atomistic attitudes of mainstream culture. Everyday ethics point toward a more just, humane, and sustainable society, and to acknowledge moments of grace in our daily encounters is to realize a different way of relating to people and nonhuman nature—an alternative ethic to cynicism and rank consumerism. In redefining the parameters of morality, Peterson enables us to make fundamental problems such as the distribution of wealth, the use of public land and natural resources, labor and employment policy, and the character of political institutions the preferred focus of debate and action. (shrink)

There are (at least) two ways to think of the differences in basic concepts and typologies that one can find in the different scientific practices that constitute a research tradition. One is the fundamentalist view: the fewer the better. The other is a non-fundamentalist view of science whereby the integration of different concepts into the right abstraction grounds an explanation that is not grounded as the sum of the explanations supported by the parts. Integrative concepts are often associated with idealizations (...) that can successfully set the stage for different phenomena to be compared or for explanations of different phenomena to be considered as jointly increasing our understanding of reality beyond that which each explanation provides separately. In this paper, our aim is to argue for the importance of the notions of an ?affordance? and ?scaffolding? as integrative concepts in the cognitive sciences. The integrational role of the concept of affordance is closely related with the capacity of affordances to generate the scaffoldings leading to the integration. The capacities of affordances that turn them into (stable) scaffoldings explain why such notions are often used interchangeably (as we shall see). On this basis, we aim to show that the concepts of affordance and scaffolding provide the sort of epistemic perspective that can overcome common complaints about the limits and unity of the cognitive sciences once claims about extended cognition are taken seriously. (shrink)

Research in phenomenology and philosophy of psychiatry has suggested that psychopathological disturbances of experience often involve an alteration of one's ‘sense of possibility’, dependent upon the presence of specific ‘existential feelings’ (Ratcliffe 2012). In this paper I provide an extended account of how the engagement with certain narratives can lead to a transformation of one's sense of possibility by eliciting affective experiences that are not consonant with the person's existential feelings. More precisely, I claim that, even when the experience of (...) some types of emotion is generally precluded by a restricted sense of possibility, such emotions may be aroused by particular self-narratives, and I explore how this dynamic can give rise to enduring and wide-ranging affective changes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper investigates from a phenomenological perspective the origins of self-illness ambiguity. Drawing on phenomenological theories of affectivity and selfhood, I argue that, as a phenomenon which concerns primarily the ‘personal self’, self-illness ambiguity is dependent on distinct alterations of affective background orientations. I start by illustrating how personhood is anchored in the experience of a specific set of non-intentional affects – i.e. moods or existential feelings – alterations of which are often present in mental ill-health. Also through the (...) exploration of the phenomenology of acute and long-term anxiety, I suggest that self-illness ambiguity originates in the presence of moods or existential feelings that are in tension with the ones that structure the person’s experience prior to the onset of the illness or when its symptoms are not experienced. More specifically, I claim that due to their ability to ‘block’ or ‘suspend’ some of the person’s affective and cognitive responses, such affective orientations may unsettle one’s self-defining evaluative perspective, leading to uncertainty and doubting about one’s personal self. (shrink)

In this paper I critically investigate an unorthodox attempt to metaphysically explain in virtue of what there are states of affairs. This is a suggestion according to which states of affairs exist thanks to, rather than, as is the common view, in spite of, the infinite regress their metaphysical explanation seems to engender. I argue that, no matter in which form it is defended, or in which theoretical framework it is set, this suggestion cannot provide us with the explanation we (...) crave. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the two types of self-deception, usually labeled straight and twisted self-deception. In straight cases the self-deceptive belief coincides with the subject’s desire. In twisted cases, by contrast, the self-deceptive belief opposes the subject’s desire as in the example of Othello’s conviction of Desdemona’s infidelity. Are both these contrasting types of deceptive beliefs cases of SD? The argument of this paper shall answer this question in the positive, yet in different way from the unitary explanation of straight and (...) twisted SD proposed by Alfred Mele. The causal account of SD claims to provide a unitary and simple explanation for both straight and twisted SD, and considers such a unitary explanation as a specific virtue of the causal view. Within the same causal model, the difference between straight and twisted self-deception is explained by a difference in the motivational state that in twisted cases is dominated by emotions. The paper will critically examine this claim, and advance an alternative explanation based on a different view of self-deception where emotions play a role alongside wishes both in straight and in twisted case. (shrink)

What is it, metaphysically, for a universal to be instantiated in a concrete particular? Philosophical controversy has been ongoing since the beginning of philosophy itself. I here contribute a novel account of instantiation developed on the basis of Aristotelian premises (but departing from the mainstream interpretation according to which Aristotelian universals are instantiated by ‘combining’ hylomorphically with matter). The key stance is that for Aristotle each substance is one, i.e. single (in addition to also being a non-recurrent particular). I show (...) that for Aristotle, the oneness of substances is primitively assumed, and, importantly, cannot be derived from composition of parts, not even holistic composition. Parts undermine oneness. It follows that instantiated properties are 'not parts' of substances. However, if not parts of the substances they are in, what are they? Aristotle shows they are 'qualifications' of the substances they are in. Don’t qualifications undermine the singleness of a substance? I show that Aristotle makes sure they do not. The way he does it is new, then and now. Instantiated properties are ‘hybrid’ entities: they sacrifice their own discreteness 'qua' properties, while adopting the discreteness of the metaphysical subject they qualify, i.e. the substance. But then, how can a universal quality recur in many substances, if, when instantiated, it assimilates the discreteness of each of these substances? This is a key Aristotelian stance: 'the quality recurs, not its qualifications'. Qualities are abstracted from their instances in similar objects, e.g. ‘wisdom’ is abstracted from many ‘wise’ people; ‘wisdom’ is individuated bottom-up from its instances, by abstraction. (shrink)

У статті визначено та проаналізовано основні правові засади, на яких ґрунтується трудова сфера. Визначені проблеми та перешкоди щодо формування правових засад розвитку трудових відносин та трудової сфери України в контексті соціальної відповідальності та обґрунтовані напрями щодо становлення та впровадження таких засад.

This paper is concerned with the acquisition of the semantics and pragmatics of evidentiality. Evidentiality markers encode the speaker’s source for the information being reported in the utterance. While languages like English express evidentiality in lexical markers (I saw that it was raining vs. I heard that it was raining), other languages grammaticalize evidentiality. In Turkish, for all instances of past reference there is an obligatory choice between the suffixes -DI (realized as –di, -dı, -du, -dü, -ti, -tı, -tu, -tü (...) depending on the vowel harmony) and –mIs (realized as -mis, -mıs, -mus, -müs depending on the vowel harmony). These past-tense morphemes also carry evidential meanings: the morpheme –DI is used to describe witnessed events and the morpheme –mIs is used to describe information acquired from someone (hearsay) or some clue (inference). (shrink)

The relation between language and thought has held a constant fascination for students of human cognition. In recent years, the question of whether language shapes or is shaped by cognitive categories has been at the center of debates on language and thought. One position, commonly referred to as ‘linguistic determinism’ (or ‘linguistic relativity’), has been particularly forcefully argued for by Benjamin Whorf. According to Whorf (1956: 212).

[Abstract in English follows] -/- Το παρόν άρθρο πραγματεύεται την ατμοσφαιρική εννοιολόγηση της έμφυλης-φυλετικοποιημένης βίας, η οποία συνδέεται με τη μαύρη φεμινιστική σκέψη με την ύπαρξη και λειτουργία πολλαπλών, συνυφασμένων συστημάτων καταπίεσης. Παρουσιάζει μια διαθεματική προσέγγιση η οποία αποφεύγει την απομόνωση περιστατικών βίας από τις δομές, τους θεσμούς, τις υλικές, συναισθηματικές και αναπαραστατικές οικονομίες στο εσωτερικό των οποίων λαμβάνει χώρα η διαπροσωπική βία. Έπειτα, το άρθρο συνδέει την ατμοσφαιρικότητα της βίας με την ηγεμονία του φύλου, το οποίο υπό μια τρανσφεμινιστική (...) οπτική αποφαίνεται να αποτελεί όχι μόνο τη βάση ή την αφορμή βίαιων πράξεων, αλλά να αποτελεί βία. Τελικά, το άρθρο προτείνει ότι μια διαθεματική προσέγγιση καθιστά δυνατή την κριτική αντίληψη των λογοθετικών διάκενων μεταξύ των διαφόρων δηλωμένων και αδήλωτων κρίσεων και την αποπνικτική και αιφνιδιαστική βία που τις διαρθρώνει. -/- [Abstract] The atmosphericity of violence under conditions of intersecting crises [in Greek] -/- In this paper, I discuss the atmospheric conception of gendered-racialised violence, which in black feminist thought is connected to the existence and functioning of multiple, intermeshed systems of oppression. I present an intersectional approach, which avoids isolating or abstracting incidents of violence from the structures, institutions, material, affective, and representational economies in and through which interpersonal violence occurs. I connect the atmosphericity of violence to the hegemony of gender, which from a transfeminist perspective is revealed to constitute not only the basis or the pretext of violent acts, but to constitute violence. Finally, I suggest that an intersectional approach renders possible the critical perception of the discursive interstices between various declared and undeclared crises and the suffocating and sudden violence that articulates them. (shrink)

This book presents the heritage of the Lvov-Warsaw School from both the historical and the philosophical perspective. The historical view focuses on the beginnings and the dramatic end of the School brought about by the outbreak of World War II. The philosophical view, on the other hand, encompasses a broad spectrum of issues, including logical, epistemological, axiological, and psychological problems, revealing the interdisciplinary nature of studies carried out by Kazimierz Twardowski and his students. With thirteen diverse and original essays this (...) volume is split into three parts: History, Culture and Axiology; Psychology; and Logic and Methodology. Exploring not only the history of philosophy represented by the Lvov-Warsaw school, the book also reflects on the condition of contemporary philosophy from the perspective of concepts developed by its representatives. Furthermore, the studies presented in this book delve into problems of contemporary science and its distinctive interdisciplinary character. This volume is, therefore, not only a collection of analyses of the Lvov-Warsaw School philosophy, but also an investigation into the interdisciplinarity of science and philosophy itself. (shrink)

In "Neurotechnologies, Relational Autonomy, and Authenticity," Mary Walker and Catriona Mackenzie engage with discourses surrounding the morality of neurotechnologies, arguing that these debates have been largely mistaken in their focus on worries about the effects of emerging technologies on human authenticity. They offer an alternative, autonomy-centered approach that problematizes concerns about authenticity as necessarily "essentialist or existentialist views of the self" that "transcends socialization". Instead, they suggest that, although authenticity is a condition for self-governance, autonomy itself is the more helpful (...) way to frame current debates about neurotechnologies.The goals of their... (shrink)

Bianchi et al. argue that for some patients with severe and enduring anorexia nervosa approaches that do not aim for complete clinical recovery are ethically warranted. We believe tha...

Author: Pałubicka Anna Title: OPPOSITION OF TWO ATTITUDES TOWARDS WORLD AND JERZY KMITA’S Conception of Culture (Opozycja dwóch postaw wobec świata a koncepcja kultury Jerzego Kmity) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 145-158 Keywords: THEORY OF CULTURE, JERZY KMITA, PRACTICAL ENGAGEMENT Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:This paper concerns Jerzy Kmita’s socio-regulatory theory of culture. The author analyzes two crucial concepts of this theory, i.e. the concept of (...) “cultural beliefs acceptance” and the concept of “rescpecting of cultural beliefs”. The latter concept – according to the author of the article – is associated with an attitude of an actor engaged in fulfilling practical goals. In such an attitude the actor practices her abilities so the thinking acquires an action-like form. On the other hand, the “acceptance of cultural beliefs” implies the self-consciousness which is necessary in the course of conceptual knowledge formation. In our culture, conceptual knowledge is constituted within the attitude of distance taken towards the practical engagement in fulfilling goals. (shrink)

Author: Wojciechowska Anna Title: COLLABORATORS, CO-AUTHORS OR INDEPENDENT THINKERS? JOHN STUART MILL AND HARRIET TAYLOR MILL (Współpracownicy, współmyśliciele czy niezależni myśliciele? John Stuart Mill i Harriet Taylor Mill) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 139-158 Keywords: J.S. MILL, HARRIET TAYLOR (MILL), SOCRATIC DIALOG, COLLABORATORS Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:This article raise almost unnoticed in the literature problem of a creative relation between J.S. Mill and Harriet Taylor (...) (Mill). The author concentrates her attention on their views concerning the situation and rights of women. Comparing the views of a partners, states that thanks to the method which was combination of Socratic dialog and collaborative self, they created an incredible arrangement resting on the literary collaboration. (shrink)

Nature can be understood as socially constructed in two senses: in different cultures’ interpretations of the nonhuman world and in the physical ways that humans have shaped even areas that they think of as “natural.” Both understandings are important for environmental ethics insofar as they highlight the diversity of ways of viewing and living in nature. However, strong versions of the social constructionist argument contend that there is no “nature” apart from human discourse and practices. This claim is problematic both (...) logically, insofar as it fails to deconstruct the notion of culture, and ethically, insofar as it categorically privileges human activities and traits. (shrink)